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Energy Security

Russian Fuel Shortages Revive Tajikistan’s Search for Oil and Gas

On July 10, Tajikistan’s Energy Minister Daler Juma said the country had enough fuel to last two more months. This situation is due to Tajikistan’s dependence on Russian petroleum products, which are in short supply in Russia itself because of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries. Located in the southeast corner of Central Asia and ringed by mountains on three sides, Tajikistan has few options to replace those Russian supplies, so the Tajik authorities are preparing to try again to find domestic hydrocarbon supplies. Looking to Strike Oil at Home Estimates of the share of Tajikistan’s petroleum imports supplied by Russia range from 70% to 80%. Tajikistan’s head of civil aviation, Habibullo Nazarzoda, said on July 9 that his country is facing shortages of airplane fuel and is in talks with Turkmenistan. Russia has a prohibition on exporting aviation kerosene that runs from June 1 to November 30. Tajikistan does have hydropower and coal, but neither one of those helps with shortages at petrol stations, and much of the internal transport of people and goods in mountainous Tajikistan is done via the road network. So, Tajikistan is again looking at the potential to develop domestic hydrocarbon fields, this time with the help solely of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). On July 7, the head of the Tajik government’s Geological Department, Ilhom Oymuhammadzoda, said CNPC was already carrying out exploration at several potential hydrocarbon deposits in Tajikistan. “I think [CNPC] will present a progress report on the seismic survey operations by the end of the year,” Oymuhammadzoda told a press conference in Dushanbe. He named the Tajik Depression, in southwestern Tajikistan, and the Ferghana Basin, in northwestern Tajikistan, as two of the more promising sites. However, Oymuhammadzoda indicated that work in northern Tajikistan could require drilling down to a depth of 7,000 meters. Tajikistan’s Search for Oil and Gas Past studies of Tajikistan’s potential oil and gas fields point especially to the southwest of the country as a logical place to seek these hydrocarbons. Southwest Tajikistan is adjacent to gas and oil fields in southern Uzbekistan that have been producing for decades, to fields in northern Afghanistan, where exploration has confirmed commercial flows, and not too far east from the giant gas fields in Turkmenistan. Looking at a map, it seems logical that southwest Tajikistan is part of this same hydrocarbon structure. In 2008, Canadian company Tethys started exploring the Bokhtar area about 100 kilometers south of Dushanbe. Tethys found both oil and gas in the area. In 2012, the Canadian company estimated the area’s gross prospective resources at 8.5 billion barrels of oil and condensate and 3.22 trillion cubic metres of gas. For a small country like Tajikistan, it was potentially enormous, although these resources remained unconfirmed and commercially unproven. However, getting to that oil and gas required drilling wells that were 3,500 meters or deeper, which greatly added to production costs. In 2013, Gazprom International drilled a well at the Sarykamysh field in southwest Tajikistan that was...

Gas Exports

Berdimuhamedov’s Beijing Visit and the Reshaping of Central Asia’s Gas System

The visit by Turkmenistan’s Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty, to Beijing on March 17–19 did more than routinely reaffirm Turkmenistan’s ties with China. It opened onto a wider issue in Central Asian energy, not simply about continuing the cooperation between Ashgabat and Beijing, but about how the renewal of that cooperation would affect the Central Asia–wide gas production and transmission system that increasingly intersects with China’s wider infrastructural and industrial presence in the region. No dramatic announcement of any new export route highlighted that wider significance, which emerged from a narrower sequence of policy initiatives that carried broader implications. Xi Jinping used the visit to restate the importance of cooperation in natural gas while widening the agenda to include connectivity, clean energy, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. Within days of the meeting, Turkmenistan moved ahead on a new phase of development at Galkynysh with CNPC. These events signal a further deepening Chinese role in the upstream and systemic organization of Central Asian energy. What Beijing Actually Signaled Beijing’s own language about the matter was direct. In the official Xinhua account of Xi’s March 18 meeting with Berdimuhamedov, China called for the two sides to “expand the scale of cooperation in the natural gas sector” and to raise trade and investment levels. Such language confirms that gas remains at the center of the relationship even as the bilateral agenda widens. For all the parallel discussions of digitalization, transport links, and non-resource cooperation, the political weight of Sino-Turkmen ties still rests primarily on energy. The Chinese side, however, did not treat gas as a self-contained file. Gas remains the primary, but it is increasingly embedded within a wider pattern of regional engagement comprising energy, transport, and adjacent economic sectors. The same Beijing readout on the meeting with Berdimuhamedov placed connectivity, artificial intelligence, the digital economy, and clean energy alongside natural gas under a broader heading of expanded cooperation. This framing removes gas from its status as a stand-alone commodity and places it within a larger operational perspective. Neither the main Chinese readout nor the public official Turkmen framing of the visit highlighted Line D of the Central Asia–China gas pipeline system. Line D has long stood as the clearest indicator of a future expansion of Turkmen gas exports through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan into China. Had the visit produced a concrete breakthrough on that front, the official language would have been the obvious place to signal it. The practical movement after the trip lay elsewhere. Why It Matters Beyond Turkmenistan The focus lay at Galkynysh. In the immediate wake of the visit, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov authorized Turkmengaz to conclude a turnkey contract with CNPC Amudarya Petroleum Company Ltd. for Phase 4 of the Galkynysh gas field. The official Turkmen account linked the decision to meetings held during Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov’s visit to China and specified facilities capable of processing 10 billion cubic meters of marketable gas per year. TCA reported the same move as a new phase of CNPC-backed field development....

Gas Industry

Turkmenistan and CNPC Sign Deal on New Phase of Galkynysh Gas Field Development

Turkmenistan has signed a new agreement with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to advance the fourth phase of development at the Galkynysh gas field, one of the largest gas deposits in the world. According to the state news agency TDH, CNPC will design and construct production facilities on a turnkey basis, including gas wells and infrastructure capable of processing up to 10 billion cubic meters of marketable gas annually. The agreement follows a presidential decree authorizing the state concern Turkmengaz to conclude a contract with CNPC’s subsidiary, CNPC Amudarya Petroleum Company Ltd. The document provides for the construction of gas treatment facilities and the drilling of a sufficient number of production wells to maintain the planned output level. According to reports by industry publication Nebit-Gaz, work on the fourth phase was expected to begin in early 2026. The overall development plan for the Galkynysh field is divided into seven phases. Information published on the Turkmengaz website, citing the international conference “Oil and Gas of Turkmenistan, 2025,” indicates that the first phase has already been completed and is operational. It includes three gas processing plants with a combined annual capacity of 30 billion cubic meters. Turkmenistan possesses the world’s fourth-largest proven reserves of natural gas, yet its export routes remain limited. The majority of gas exports, estimated at between 80% and 90%, are directed eastward through the Central Asia-China pipeline network, often referred to as the Turkmenistan-China corridor. This has resulted in a high degree of dependence on a single export destination. Efforts to diversify export routes have encountered persistent challenges. Proposed projects involving increased deliveries through Iran, trans-Caspian connections via Azerbaijan, or pipeline routes toward South Asia have been constrained by infrastructure limitations, financing issues, and geopolitical factors. Analysts also note that delays in engaging with initiatives such as the European Union’s Southern Gas Corridor in the early 2000s reduced opportunities to expand Turkmenistan’s export geography.

Oil Industry

Kazakhstan and China Launch Project to Double Capacity of Shymkent Oil Refinery

Kazakhstan and China have agreed on the basic parameters of a major expansion project at the Shymkent oil refinery, which will double its processing capacity from over 6 million to 12 million tons of oil per year. According to national oil company KazMunayGas, the Shymkent refinery became Kazakhstan’s leading facility in 2025 in terms of processing volume, handling 6.23 million tons of oil. By comparison, the Pavlodar Petrochemical Plant processed 5.76 million tons, and the Atyrau Oil Refinery 5.47 million tons. Shymkent also topped production output, delivering over 2.28 million tons of gasoline and more than 2.1 million tons of diesel fuel. The refinery is jointly owned by KazMunayGas JSC and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). The two partners plan to expand the plant’s production capacity by constructing new processing infrastructure. A delegation from Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, led by Daulet Arykbayev, Director of the Oil Transportation and Refining Department, participated in a strategic meeting in Qingdao, China, to prepare a feasibility study for the expansion. Following the meeting, both sides approved the project’s basic framework. A central decision was the adoption of the “6+6” configuration: two processing lines, each with a 6-million-ton annual capacity, fully integrated into the refinery’s existing operations. Officials stressed the importance of meeting project deadlines, with the core feasibility work scheduled for completion by 2032 under the framework agreement. The Ministry of Energy also noted that, under Kazakhstan’s broader refinery modernization program, the goal is to increase total national processing capacity from 18 million to 39 million tons of oil per year. Simultaneously, the government is seeking investors for the construction of a new refinery with an annual capacity of up to 10 million tons. The Times of Central Asia previously reported on state plans to attract foreign investment for a proposed fourth major refinery. Government estimates suggest that expanding the three existing refineries to 39 million tons will require investments of $15-19 billion. In March 2025, the Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition recommended partial privatization of the Pavlodar and Atyrau plants to boost efficiency and attract private capital. However, in December, Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov stated that KazMunayGas currently has no plans to privatize these assets.

Oil and Gas

China’s Power Play in Central Asia’s Energy Sector

China is steadily expanding its influence in Central Asia’s oil and gas sector through multi-billion-dollar investments, long-term supply agreements, and a growing network of strategic partnerships. From Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan, Beijing’s state-backed companies are securing key upstream and midstream assets, financing new petrochemical and pipeline projects, and positioning themselves as indispensable players in the region’s resource development. This expansion is driven not only by China’s rising energy demand, but also by Beijing’s ambition to establish durable overland energy corridors that reduce reliance on maritime routes vulnerable to disruption. Central Asia’s existing and planned pipelines provide China with rare direct access to oil and gas fields across its western frontier, making the region a focal point of its broader energy-security strategy and a cornerstone of Beijing’s efforts to diversify supply while deepening political and economic footholds across Eurasia. Kazakhstan Eyes Chinese Investment Amid Lukoil Sanctions Kazakhstan may seek to transfer Russian company Lukoil’s stake in the offshore Kalamkas-Khazar oil and gas project to a new partner, with some industry channels, including the Telegram channel Energy Monitor, speculating about possible Chinese interest. Lukoil, which has been targeted by Western sanctions, is reportedly planning to exit Kalamkas-Khazar Operating LLP, a joint venture with KazMunayGas (KMG). Each company currently holds a 50% stake. Some commentators have suggested that a Chinese investor could step in, but no replacement has been officially confirmed. Seconded engineers from KMG Engineering are expected to be withdrawn from the project as of January 1, 2026, with several Kalamkas-Khazar staff members temporarily reassigned to other KMG subsidiaries until a new partner is confirmed. The project is considered highly promising, with earlier estimates citing reserves of 81 million tons of oil and 22 billion cubic meters of gas. New exploration has identified additional oil-bearing structures. A final investment decision (FID) worth more than $6.5 billion was originally expected by the end of 2025. However, U.S. sanctions against Lukoil have delayed progress. Located 120 km from the Kashagan field in the North Caspian Basin, the Kalamkas-Khazar block comprises the Kalamkas-More and Khazar fields. The site is situated in Kazakhstan’s Mangistau Region, 60 km from the Buzachi Peninsula. KazMunayGas Chairman Askhat Khasenov previously confirmed that production was expected to begin in 2028-2029, with peak output reaching four million tons annually. Lukoil was sanctioned by the UK on October 15, followed by the U.S., complicating ongoing negotiations. Despite this, major projects where Lukoil holds minority stakes, such as Tengiz, Karachaganak, and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, have not been impacted. A Lukoil withdrawal would create a rare opening for China to secure its first significant offshore position in the North Caspian, a zone historically dominated by Western majors and Russian firms. Such an entry would represent a notable shift in Kazakhstan’s offshore partnership landscape. Beijing's Billion-Dollar Energy Deals in Kazakhstan In September 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced a series of energy deals with China valued at $1.5 billion. During his official visit to China, more than 70 commercial agreements totaling approximately $15 billion were signed, several...