Foreign Policy - The Times Of Central Asia

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Diplomacy

Turkmenistan Highlights International Outreach at Cabinet Meeting

A recent Cabinet meeting in Turkmenistan highlighted contacts with many countries and international organizations, reinforcing a perception that the tightly managed nation is taking more steps, however limited, to engage the world. Appearing via video link, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov presided over the May 1 meeting of ministers who covered economic growth, oil and natural gas production, scientific research, and other national priorities in a review of the year so far. But international outreach was a big part of the high-level discussion in an energy-rich Central Asian country often defined as opaque and restrictive. An account of the meeting by the Turkmenistan State News Agency (TDH) ticked off statistics: 220 delegations visited Turkmenistan this year, 400 delegations from Turkmenistan visited other countries, 711 negotiations and other meetings occurred in the country with foreign states and international agencies, and 57 more international documents were added to Turkmenistan’s legal code. “The development of diplomatic relations through foreign embassies is one of the important directions of the foreign policy work of neutral Turkmenistan,” said the report, referring to the country’s policy of non-alignment and not getting involved in the internal affairs of other countries. “Work on promoting relations with the countries of the Middle East is also ongoing,” it said. Iraq opened its embassy in Ashgabat in March, 17 years after Turkmenistan and Iraq established diplomatic relations in 2009. On May 4, Rashid Meredov, Turkmenistan’s foreign minister, spoke by telephone with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi about regional security, Caspian issues, and other matters, according to the Turkmen Foreign Ministry. The ministry’s statement did not mention the Iran conflict or uncertainty surrounding the ceasefire with the United States. Turkmenistan’s international campaign is consistent with a pattern seen across Central Asia, where governments have sought to diversify their trade and diplomatic ties while maintaining close relations with the region’s major powers, Russia and China. Turkmenistan, however, still exports most of its natural gas to China, its largest trading partner. At the same time, Turkmenistan is intensifying efforts to integrate into the global trading system, with officials reaffirming plans to move towards membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is the last post-Soviet republic to start WTO accession talks. Turkmenistan’s leaders are also working on their international profiles. Berdimuhamedov attended an ecological summit of regional leaders in Kazakhstan last month. His father and predecessor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, traveled to the U.S. in February, China in March, and Austria in April. This month, he is due to travel to the Russian city of Kazan. Although government transparency is limited in Turkmenistan, father and son appear to run the country through a power-sharing arrangement. Outsiders are getting more glimpses of Turkmenistan. The capital, Ashgabat, hosted an international tourism conference in April. This month, the Reuters news agency reported on a trip there after being given what it said was “rare access” to travel in the country. It remains unclear, however, whether any efforts to engage with the outside world will materially change daily life in Turkmenistan, where people...

Hungary

Hungary’s Political Shift Puts Central Asia Partnerships Under Scrutiny

Hungary’s political transition following the defeat of Viktor Orbán’s party and his resignation as prime minister is drawing attention not only in the EU and the United States, but also in Central Asia, where Budapest has built growing energy and investment ties. The key question is whether the policy of cooperation with Central Asia developed under Orbán will continue under the new leadership. In recent years, under Orbán, Budapest has actively developed its Central Asian foreign policy, primarily driven by the desire to find alternatives to Russian energy supplies. That push reflects Hungary’s long-standing reliance on Russian oil and gas, which has shaped its search for alternative suppliers beyond Europe. Resource-rich Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan became natural partners for diplomatic engagement. Orbán succeeded in building trust-based relationships with the presidents of the Central Asian republics, grounded in what Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó, described as “sincere friendship” in an interview with Uzbek media. “In Hungary, we have always viewed Central Asia as one of the fastest-growing regions in the world, with enormous potential. Our efforts to build these relations did not begin today, but decades ago,” he said. Hungary became the first Central European country to sign a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan in 2014. Currently, the Kazakhstan-Hungary Business Council is in operation, along with a joint agricultural direct investment fund. In 2024, bilateral trade approached $200 million, and from January to August 2025, it grew by another 22.1%, exceeding $164.6 million. Hungarian investments in Kazakhstan’s economy have surpassed $370 million, while the current investment portfolio includes 16 projects worth about $700 million in engineering, agriculture, and logistics. These links also intersect with wider efforts to expand east–west transport routes through the Caspian region, offering Hungary indirect access to Central Asian energy and trade flows. In May 2025, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held talks with Orbán in Budapest, where both sides highlighted rising trade volumes and a joint investment portfolio of about $500 million. Hungary’s OTP Bank entered into Uzbekistan’s financial market in 2023, acquiring a 73.71% stake in Ipoteka Bank, becoming its principal owner and the majority shareholder of the country’s fifth-largest bank. As early as 2019, Hungary had intensified cooperation with Turkmenistan. After talks at the Turkmen Foreign Ministry, Szijjártó told the media that Hungary views Turkmenistan as an important country from the perspective of European security. “We very much hope that Turkmenistan’s gas resources will be integrated into the overall energy flow of Central Europe,” he said. However, uncertainty remains over whether this policy direction will continue under Orbán’s successor, Péter Magyar. Oil and gas analyst Oleg Chervinsky has suggested that political changes in Hungary could affect cooperation with Kazakhstan’s national company KazMunayGas (KMG). Chervinsky notes that, having secured a constitutional majority in parliament, Magyar has a mandate to “implement reforms in both foreign and domestic policy [which could] reshape the constitutional structure of the right-wing populist authoritarian system built around Orbán.” The analyst points to Hungary’s oil and gas company MOL Group, which in recent...

Foreign Policy

Opinion: Turning Rivalry into Opportunity: Kazakhstan’s Strategic Autonomy

Over the past decade, global geopolitics has witnessed a clear return to Great Power competition, reviving elements of Cold War-style rivalry and a pronounced East-West divide. Yet, contrary to the belief that international relations are defined exclusively by great powers, the countries of Central Asia, historically perceived as chess pieces between Moscow, Washington, and Beijing, have been exercising their own autonomy and asserting independent foreign policy paths. Kazakhstan, the region’s largest and most resilient economy, has arguably emerged as a leading example of this movement. Through a careful balancing strategy, Kazakhstan has worked to avoid firmly aligning itself with any one geopolitical camp. Rather than choosing sides, it has chosen options. However, when pressure from one power arises, Astana’s response has rarely been resistance for its own sake, but rather negotiation and taking advantage of the opportunities that power can offer it. Essentially, if alignment is expected, it comes at a price. In this sense, great-power competition is treated less as an existential threat and more as a marketplace – one in which influence is traded. However, the question is, is there space for both Beijing and Washington? In this context, there is much to examine regarding last week’s B5+1 forum in Bishkek. Bringing together government officials and private sector representatives from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the United States, the forum aimed to deepen economic ties and explore investment opportunities. Among the attendees was Sergio Gor, the U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia. Perhaps the B5+1 forum is not just a routine investment event; it’s a signal from the U.S. to China. A cornerstone of the cooperation between the U.S. and Kazakhstan was illustrated by the creation of a partnership in rare metals. The Ulba Metallurgical Plant (UMP) is located in north-eastern Kazakhstan. UMP is one of the very few facilities worldwide capable of carrying out the full processing cycle for rare metals. What elevates this cooperation beyond conventional trade is UMP’s production of materials such as beryllium and tantalum. These materials are critical inputs for the defense industry supplied to major aerospace and defense contractors, including Boeing and Lockheed Martin, both of which conduct business with the U.S. Department of Defense. Thus, Kazakhstan’s contribution to the U.S. defense supply chains signals a broader shift in regional geopolitics. By enabling access to strategically important resources that underpin advanced military technologies, Astana is strengthening its economic alignment with Washington, while subtly influencing the broader balance of defense capabilities between Western and Eastern powers. Furthermore, another one of the headline-making deals at the B5+1 forum was the announcement of a joint venture between U.S.-based Cove Capital LLC and Kazakhstan’s National Mining Company to develop the world’s largest known undeveloped tungsten resource. This deal is significant against the backdrop of the ongoing tug-of-war between Beijing and Washington over strategic natural resources, and analysts note that the U.S. and China are already competing for Kazakhstan’s tungsten – another material crucial in the defence and microelectronics industries. China presently controls nearly...

Neutrality

Turkmenistan Marks 30 Years of Neutrality

On December 12, 2025, Turkmenistan marks the 30th anniversary of a UN decision granting Turkmenistan the status of a neutral country. Defining what “permanent neutrality” means for Turkmenistan is impossible, as it is a flexible term used to justify a range of policies, both domestic and foreign. This vague special status has not provided many benefits, but has helped Turkmenistan’s leadership isolate the country and create one of the most bizarre and repressive forms of government in the world today. Last Item on the Day’s Agenda On Tuesday, December 12, 1995, the UN General Assembly’s (UNGA) 90th plenary meeting reconvened at 15:20 to consider items 57 to 81 on its agenda. Item 81 was the draft resolution on “permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan.” The UNGA president at that time, Freitas do Amaral, noted to the Assembly that the draft resolution “was adopted by the First Committee without a vote,” and asked if the Assembly wished “to do likewise.” The Assembly did, and after a few brief remarks about the next Assembly meeting on December 14, the session ended at 18:05. That is how the UN officially granted Turkmenistan the status of neutrality. A Great Event The passing of the resolution on Turkmenistan’s neutrality status might have been a case of going through the motions at the UN, but it was a huge event in Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan’s first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, had been campaigning internationally for his country to have “positive” neutrality status since 1992. After this was accomplished, Niyazov often proclaimed this special UN recognition as a great achievement for the country and for himself personally. [caption id="attachment_40725" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Ashgabat’s Independence Square, previously known as Neutrality Square and originally as Karl Marx Square; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] December 12 was quickly announced as a national holiday. On the first anniversary of the UN decision in 1996, the former Karl Marx Square in Ashgabat was renamed “Neutrality Square.” Shortly after, an olive branch motif was added to Turkmenistan’s national flag, symbolizing the country’s neutral status. In 1998, on the third anniversary of UN-recognized neutrality, the 75-meter-high Arch of Neutrality was unveiled in Ashgabat. A 12-meter gold statue of Niyazov that rotated to face the direction of the sun crowned the structure. Niyazov died in December 2006, and in 2010, the Arch of Neutrality was moved from the city center to the outskirts of the Turkmen capital and unveiled again on December 12, 2011. It has been undergoing renovation and will be unveiled yet again on the 30th anniversary of neutrality. [caption id="attachment_40726" align="aligncenter" width="2099"] Former-President Niyazov's likeness atop the Arch of Neutrality; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] In 2002, Niyazov pushed through a law changing the names of the months of the year and days of the week. December became “Bitaraplyk,” the Turkmen word for neutrality, and continued to officially be called that until 2008, when Niyazov’s successor finally revoked the changes and restored the traditional names. That successor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, embraced the special permanent neutrality status and, in...

Geopolitics

Central Asia’s Road to the Southern Seas: A Search for Stability

India has confirmed that it received a six-month sanctions waiver from the United States for its involvement in developing Iran’s Chabahar port. According to The Times of India, the decision followed intensive diplomacy by New Delhi, which convinced Washington that Chabahar provides India’s only practical overland access to Central Asia that avoids Pakistan. Through Chabahar, India is building a land-based counterpart to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, creating an alternative axis linking the Indian Ocean with Eurasia while bypassing Islamabad and Beijing. The exemption, valid until April 2026, gives India room to negotiate with Washington. For Central Asia, the episode reflects a broader challenge: choosing viable routes to the southern seas. Current debates about “Afghan transit” focus largely on the Trans-Afghan Railway and the so-called Kabul corridor connecting northern Afghanistan with Pakistan’s ports. Yet Afghanistan’s transport network is forming along multiple lines. Alongside the eastern route, a western corridor from Herat to Kandahar and Spin Boldak is also developing, offering access both to Pakistan and to Chabahar. The integration of western Afghanistan’s infrastructure with Iran’s transport network makes this corridor more reliable under today’s political and security conditions. It aligns with projects pursued by Iran, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan and positions Herat as a major hub. It is also close to the North–South Transport Corridor, the Lapis Lazuli and Middle Corridors, and the Caspian and Persian Gulf regions. The planned Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat line fits the logic of the Five Nations Railway Corridor, potentially giving Tajikistan and Uzbekistan access to Chabahar and, if stability improves, to Pakistan’s ports as well. By contrast, the eastern route will remain constrained by the unstable Afghan–Pakistani border and the volatile relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Afghanistan’s own priorities also differ from outside assumptions: the Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak line primarily serves as an internal transport spine linking the west and south. For Kabul, the route to Gwadar is more a political gesture than a practical goal. Some analysts note that developing the western corridor also helps rebalance the country’s economic geography toward its more diverse western regions. These dynamics strengthen the western route’s appeal. The Taliban leadership has even urged Afghan businesses to reduce reliance on Pakistani ports, signaling a structural shift in trade orientation. Both Chabahar and Gwadar face political risks. Pakistan’s transit routes pass through areas affected by insurgency, including Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as the broader narcotics routes of the Golden Crescent. The greatest uncertainty remains the fluctuating relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Gwadar, while technologically superior, is undermined by chronic instability. Chabahar’s capacity is more modest, but its integration with Iran’s road and rail network provides reliability. The United States adds another layer of complexity. The waiver suggests Washington is balancing its Iran sanctions regime with its strategic partnership with India. The United States is not directly involved in regional infrastructure but retains enough influence to shift the balance between the western and eastern routes. Under certain conditions, Gwadar may appear less problematic for Washington than Chabahar. At the same time, selective sanctions exemptions...

C5+1 Summit

U.S. Envoys Hail Stronger Kazakhstan Partnership Ahead of C5+1 Summit

On October 29, Unites States Special Envoy for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau concluded their visit to Kazakhstan ahead of the upcoming C5+1 summit in Washington. During their trip, the U.S. envoys met with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and held discussions with representatives of Kazakhstan’s government and business community, which they described as highly productive. “We are concluding a memorable trip to Kazakhstan in the beautiful capital, Astana, which did not even exist 30 years ago and now boasts a population of more than 1.5 million,” Landau posted on social media. He also stated that bilateral relations between the U.S. and Kazakhstan “have never been so strong” and expressed gratitude for the hospitality. Gor and Landau held talks with Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and key cabinet members, including Minister of Trade and Integration Arman Shakkaliev, Minister of Energy Yerlan Akkenzhenov, Minister of Transport Nurlan Sauranbayev, and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin, to discuss Kazakhstan’s economic priorities and areas for expanding bilateral cooperation. According to the Kazakh government, the talks focused on expanding trade and investment cooperation between the two countries. Priority areas included transport and logistics, energy, agriculture, the digital economy, and artificial intelligence. During their visit, the U.S. envoys also met with Deputy Prime Minister Murat Nurtleu, who reaffirmed Kazakhstan’s readiness to cooperate on sustainable development and energy security. The meetings demonstrated Kazakhstan’s active engagement with the United States in the lead-up to the upcoming Central Asia–U.S. summit. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin, who highlighted Kazakhstan’s economic strengths during talks with Gor and Landau, had recently returned from a high-level visit to the United States. His delegation, which included Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Erbolat Dossaev and Chairperson of the Agency for Regulation and Development of the Financial Market Madina Abylkasymova, held meetings in New York and Washington with American business leaders and members of Congress. During the visit, the Kazakh delegation presented the country’s economic growth strategy, highlighted ongoing GDP expansion, and discussed the potential listing of government securities on the New York Stock Exchange. They also raised the possible repeal of the Jackson–Vanik Amendment, a long-standing priority for Kazakhstan’s diplomatic agenda. Against this backdrop, the White House’s decision to convene a summit between President Donald Trump and the leaders of the Central Asian republics may partly reflect Kazakhstan’s sustained diplomatic outreach. In that context, Gor and Landau’s remarks of appreciation as they departed Astana underscored recognition of Kazakhstan’s role in shaping this evolving partnership.