• KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10820
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 107

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team covers a heatwave sweeping across Central Asia, anti-Taliban forces briefly seizing a district headquarters in a worrying sign of cracks in the Taliban's control, a shootout between different branches of Kyrgyzstan's security forces near the Uzbek border, promising new talks between Turkmenistan and Georgia, and a major shake-up inside Uzbekistan's presidential security services. Before then turning to our main story this week, where a growing number of countries are working with Central Asian governments to forcibly return Central Asian nationals, often into incredibly dangerous situations. - Steve Swedlow (Associate Professor of the Practice of Human Rights) - Bakhtiyor "Bakh" Safarov (Central Asia Consulting)

Russian Fuel Shortages Revive Tajikistan’s Search for Oil and Gas

On July 10, Tajikistan’s Energy Minister Daler Juma said the country had enough fuel to last two more months. This situation is due to Tajikistan’s dependence on Russian petroleum products, which are in short supply in Russia itself because of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries. Located in the southeast corner of Central Asia and ringed by mountains on three sides, Tajikistan has few options to replace those Russian supplies, so the Tajik authorities are preparing to try again to find domestic hydrocarbon supplies. Looking to Strike Oil at Home Estimates of the share of Tajikistan’s petroleum imports supplied by Russia range from 70% to 80%. Tajikistan’s head of civil aviation, Habibullo Nazarzoda, said on July 9 that his country is facing shortages of airplane fuel and is in talks with Turkmenistan. Russia has a prohibition on exporting aviation kerosene that runs from June 1 to November 30. Tajikistan does have hydropower and coal, but neither one of those helps with shortages at petrol stations, and much of the internal transport of people and goods in mountainous Tajikistan is done via the road network. So, Tajikistan is again looking at the potential to develop domestic hydrocarbon fields, this time with the help solely of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). On July 7, the head of the Tajik government’s Geological Department, Ilhom Oymuhammadzoda, said CNPC was already carrying out exploration at several potential hydrocarbon deposits in Tajikistan. “I think [CNPC] will present a progress report on the seismic survey operations by the end of the year,” Oymuhammadzoda told a press conference in Dushanbe. He named the Tajik Depression, in southwestern Tajikistan, and the Ferghana Basin, in northwestern Tajikistan, as two of the more promising sites. However, Oymuhammadzoda indicated that work in northern Tajikistan could require drilling down to a depth of 7,000 meters. Tajikistan’s Search for Oil and Gas Past studies of Tajikistan’s potential oil and gas fields point especially to the southwest of the country as a logical place to seek these hydrocarbons. Southwest Tajikistan is adjacent to gas and oil fields in southern Uzbekistan that have been producing for decades, to fields in northern Afghanistan, where exploration has confirmed commercial flows, and not too far east from the giant gas fields in Turkmenistan. Looking at a map, it seems logical that southwest Tajikistan is part of this same hydrocarbon structure. In 2008, Canadian company Tethys started exploring the Bokhtar area about 100 kilometers south of Dushanbe. Tethys found both oil and gas in the area. In 2012, the Canadian company estimated the area’s gross prospective resources at 8.5 billion barrels of oil and condensate and 3.22 trillion cubic metres of gas. For a small country like Tajikistan, it was potentially enormous, although these resources remained unconfirmed and commercially unproven. However, getting to that oil and gas required drilling wells that were 3,500 meters or deeper, which greatly added to production costs. In 2013, Gazprom International drilled a well at the Sarykamysh field in southwest Tajikistan that was...

Kazakhstan’s Persian Gulf Port Plan Faces New Iran Risk

Kazakhstan has moved a long-planned southern trade project from talks to contract. The move gives Astana a possible foothold on the Persian Gulf, but it comes as a second night of U.S. strikes on Iran and Iranian retaliation around the Gulf states have raised the cost of using that route. On June 28, Kazakhstan and Iran signed a 27-year BOT agreement to build a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Iran’s Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. The contract gives the project two years for construction and 25 years for operation, with commercial activity expected in the third year. Aman Malgazhdarov of QazExportPromotion signed for Kazakhstan, and Hossein Abbas Nejad of Hormozgan’s Ports and Maritime Organization signed for Iran. The project is designed to plug Kazakhstan into the International North-South Transport Corridor and widen export access to the Persian Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Africa. The $25 million investment covers a 15-hectare logistics center that could handle 1.5 million tons of goods a year. Mohammad Shakibi-Nasab, the head of Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization, said it would “create jobs… increase the operational capacity” of Shahid Rajaee and “boost ports along the North-South corridor.” Malgazhdarov called it the “core of a future Kazakh port” within Shahid Rajaee. That ambition now sits beside a worsening security picture. On July 8, U.S. President Donald Trump declared the interim agreement to end the Iran war “over” after attacks on three cargo ships in the Strait of Hormuz. Asked about the deal, Trump said: “It’s over. I don’t want to deal with them.” The U.S. then launched a new round of strikes, and Iran fired on U.S. sites in Bahrain and Kuwait. U.S. Central Command said the attacks were meant to “further degrade” Iran’s ability to threaten navigation in the strait, with Trump warning, “If it happens again, it will get much worse!” By July 9, the U.S. military said it had struck 170 Iranian targets in 48 hours. Iran had fired at U.S. bases in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, and Iran’s health ministry said U.S. strikes on July 7 and 8 killed 14 people and wounded 78. The attacks hit Bandar Abbas, where Shahid Rajaee is located, and other southern coastal areas. Crude oil prices rose by 5% as the risk widened. For Kazakhstan, the timing is uncomfortable. Shahid Rajaee sits near the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway that connects the Persian Gulf to the open sea. The port offers one of Central Asia’s shortest southern outlets, but the approach depends on a zone where security, insurance premiums, and naval risk can change quickly. A terminal can lower handling costs and improve control over cargo, but it cannot remove war risk at the maritime end of the corridor. The risk may not be limited to the Gulf. The Financial Times reported that a railway bridge near Aqqala in Golestan Province was hit with cruise missiles, citing Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. The bridge lies on the Gorgan-Incheh Borun line, which carries passengers and cargo...

As Azerbaijan Pushes Back Against Moscow, Central Asia Watches

The recent diplomatic escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia appeared to have run its course in April, after Moscow agreed to pay compensation over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan. Instead, the dispute has entered a new phase, and its implications now reach beyond the South Caucasus. On July 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov and handed him a formal note of protest over what Baku described as a Russian drone strike on a fuel station owned by Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region on the evening of July 5. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said the attack on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine was not an isolated incident. It cited previous strikes on the company’s gas distribution compressor station and oil depot in Odesa, which caused material damage and injured employees. Baku also pointed to earlier damage to the Azerbaijani embassy building in Kyiv and the honorary consulate in Kharkiv, calling on Moscow to investigate and comply with its obligations to protect civilian infrastructure and diplomatic missions. At the same time, Shusha — known to Armenians as Shushi, retaken by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war, and still regarded by many Armenians as occupied — hosted an international conference devoted to what participants described as Russia’s “colonial policy,” the “Circassian genocide,” and the situation of non-Russian peoples within the Russian Federation. The conference declaration called on Moscow to “recognize its historical crimes, abandon its chauvinistic policies, and end the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities into the war against Ukraine.” Experts from Azerbaijan, the United States, France, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Türkiye, and Georgia attended the conference. None of the Central Asian republics was represented. That absence was telling. Central Asian governments may be distancing themselves from Moscow in certain areas, but they remain reluctant to participate in openly anti-Russian political initiatives. For Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, the question is not whether Russia’s position has weakened, but how far they can move without provoking pressure from Moscow. For Central Asia, the dispute is not a distant quarrel in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is now a central link in the westward routes that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are trying to strengthen as alternatives to Russian territory. The Middle Corridor runs from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to Europe. Any deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russia relations therefore has practical implications for Central Asian transit, energy, and diplomatic room for maneuver. The first major rupture in relations between Baku and Moscow came after Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, traveling from Baku to Grozny, was damaged by Russian air-defense fire over Russian territory on December 25, 2024. The aircraft later crashed while attempting an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan blamed Russia and demanded an apology, accountability, and compensation. Relations deteriorated further in June 2025 following the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg and reports of torture. The most prominent victims were the...

The Fragile U.S.–Iran Truce: What Central Asia Stands to Gain and Lose

The preliminary memorandum signed in mid-June between the United States and Iran, followed by renewed talks between Washington and Tehran, has extended a U.S.–Iran truce and opened a 60-day window for negotiations on a final agreement. The nuclear terms remain unresolved, while Israel’s continued military presence in southern Lebanon, despite U.S. pressure for a withdrawal, underscores how fragile the broader regional de-escalation remains. At the end of this period, the parties may sign a final agreement, return to hostilities, or mutually agree to extend the interim arrangement. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, along with neighboring Azerbaijan, have welcomed efforts to de-escalate the conflict between the United States and Iran. The fighting briefly boosted demand for alternative routes through Central Asia, but prolonged instability would disrupt trade, raise transport and insurance costs, and increase security risks. The question now is what the region could gain if the pause holds. Those effects would vary across the region. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan stand to benefit most directly from safer southern rail access through Iran to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are less directly connected to these corridors and less exposed to oil price swings, would feel the consequences mainly through freight costs, fuel prices, and wider regional trade. For Azerbaijan, a sustained pause would reinforce its role as the Caspian link between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye, while renewed instability would push more freight toward Trans-Caspian alternatives. That interest is not merely theoretical. Tajik-Iranian trade reached $119.6 million in the first quarter of 2026, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are developing access to Iranian maritime infrastructure through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The opportunity, however, is conditional. A truce can reduce military risk, but it does not by itself remove the banking, insurance, and compliance problems that have long complicated trade through Iran. For Central Asian exporters and logistics companies, the question is not only whether routes are physically open, but whether carriers, lenders, insurers, and buyers are prepared to use them during a temporary 60-day window. Analysts interviewed by Deutsche Welle said the framework leaves several important provisions unresolved, making a final agreement uncertain. For Central Asia, the most immediate economic variable is the Strait of Hormuz. Kazakh historian and political analyst Sultan Akimbekov identifies its reopening as the key to easing global supply fears. A durable reopening, combined with the temporary U.S. waiver allowing Iranian oil sales through August 21, could put downward pressure on global energy prices. The effects would vary across Central Asia: weaker prices could strain hydrocarbon revenues, while lower fuel, fertilizer, and freight costs could ease imported inflation in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. For Kazakhstan, lower global oil prices would have significant implications. National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov has said oil generates more than 50% of the country’s export revenues and over 30% of the state budget and National Fund revenues. That would reverse one of the conflict’s few short-term economic benefits for Kazakhstan. Higher crude prices had briefly improved the outlook for export revenues,...

Putin’s Astana Visit Shows What Russia Still Wants From Kazakhstan

The Eurasian Economic Union summit in Astana gave Vladimir Putin's state visit a wider stage. The summit produced technical documents and familiar language about integration. The bilateral Russia-Kazakhstan package around it was more concrete. It showed what Moscow still wants from Kazakhstan, and what Astana expects in return. The detail lies in infrastructure, where contracts can last for decades. The setting echoed history. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed the treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana on May 29, 2014, with Armenia joining in January 2015, and Kyrgyzstan in August of the same year. In 2026, the bloc returned to Astana for the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and the V Eurasian Economic Forum. The theme of the forum was artificial intelligence, digital regulation, and the EAEU's place in the global technology race. Its website said 14 integration documents were signed on the sidelines, including memoranda, agreements, protocols, and joint action plans. Those documents gave the visit a regional frame. The larger result came on May 28, when Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Putin oversaw a broad set of bilateral agreements. Akorda listed nuclear power, Russian export credit, expanded oil-sector cooperation, a tenge-ruble currency swap, education projects, financial monitoring, transport digitalization, and nuclear safety regulation. That package points to the real agenda: energy, transit, payments, industrial production, and public-facing alliance language. For Moscow, Kazakhstan’s primary value is geographic: it sits between Russia and China, and across routes that connect Central Asia to Europe, the Caspian, and South Asia. Russian crude already crosses Kazakhstan on the Priirtyshsk-Atasu-Alashankou route to China. A KazTransOil contract keeps transit at 10 million tons a year until the end of 2033. The tariff is $15 per ton, excluding VAT. The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline has a design capacity of 20 million tons a year and belongs to Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP, a 50-50 venture between KazTransOil and China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company. Reuters has reported that Russia and Kazakhstan agreed last year to raise that flow by 2.5 million tons, although the extra volume had not started flowing before Putin’s visit. The new agreement on oil-sector cooperation gives the issue a political push. For Moscow, the route strengthens access to China as Western sanctions keep pressure on Russian exports and payments. For Kazakhstan, it brings fees and gives Astana a useful position in Russia-China energy flows. The nuclear agreement, meanwhile, gives Russia a long-term role in Kazakhstan’s shift to nuclear power. Kazakhstan and Russia signed a $16.5 billion agreement for the Balkhash nuclear power plant at Ulken, near Lake Balkhash. The project covers two VVER-1200 III+ reactors. Kazakhstan held a groundbreaking ceremony for the plant in August 2025, with the active construction phase expected to begin in 2027, and the first reactor expected in early 2034. Russia will provide export credit for the first plant, with Rosatom leading the Balkhash project after competition with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), France’s EDF, and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power. But Kazakhstan has not handed the wider program to Moscow....