Geopolitics - The Times Of Central Asia

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Geopolitics

Political Analyst Karazhanov: Stability Is Central Asia’s Greatest Advantage

International events where Kazakhstan and Central Asia present their agenda and demonstrate the benefits of predictability bring significant advantages to the region. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Kazakh political analyst Zamir Karazhanov explains how the region is gradually changing its approach to addressing key challenges. According to Karazhanov, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, particularly Uzbekistan, have recently begun positioning themselves on the international stage in a far more pragmatic and modern way. A prime example is the speech delivered on April 17 by Kazakhstan’s President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Turkey. Observers noted that Tokayev outlined the role Kazakhstan is seeking to play in the evolving geopolitical landscape. The key message was that global governance is becoming less effective through traditional institutions, while the role of so-called “middle powers” is increasing. These countries may not define the global order on their own, but they are capable of promoting peaceful solutions, engaging in dialogue, and offering predictability. In addition, on April 22, Astana hosted the first Regional Environmental Summit (RES), which brought together around 1,500 participants from Central Asia, the European Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Middle East. The forum aimed to develop practical solutions to environmental and climate challenges facing both the Eurasia region and the wider world. During the discussions, representatives of Central Asian countries presented a realistic assessment of environmental issues and proposed a number of solutions. Environmental Threats Karazhanov noted that Kazakhstan has long faced difficult environmental conditions. “In addition to urban pollution, we have zones of ecological disaster, such as the Aral Sea. The country [Kazakhstan] hosts numerous extractive industries, and it is landlocked, located deep within the continent. Any environmental catastrophe here would have far more severe consequences than in countries without such constraints. Climate change is intensifying, temperatures are rising, and Central Asia is already experiencing acute water shortages. Without timely measures, the situation could become critical,” he said. According to him, Kazakhstan has long been dealing with environmental migration and has proactively begun building the necessary legal and social frameworks. Conflicts over water resources have already occurred in Central Asia. Karazhanov emphasized the importance of including representatives of countries that regulate the region’s water systems in the Astana forum. “This creates an opportunity for dialogue. Take the example of the two rivers that feed the Aral Sea, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. At one point, Kyrgyzstan suspended its participation in the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea because it felt its interests were constrained. It is essential to create a platform where all five countries in the region are satisfied with water distribution,” he said. He also highlighted Afghanistan as an increasingly important factor that has not been fully accounted for. As the country rebuilds after decades of conflict, its agriculture and other sectors will expand, increasing demand for water from transboundary rivers. “That is why the summit should be viewed in the broader context of regional development and good neighborly...

Iran

Central Asia Recalculates as the Iran War Enters a New Phase

Central Asia’s first response to the Iran war was public and urgent. Governments organized evacuations, welcomed a ceasefire, and watched the Strait of Hormuz because the region’s trade routes, fuel costs, and food prices were already under pressure. The next phase looks different. Following the April 12 collapse of U.S.-Iran talks in Islamabad, Washington moved to block maritime traffic entering and leaving Iranian ports. That step does not formally close Hormuz to all shipping, but it pushes the crisis into a more serious phase for any country or company still treating Iran as a viable corridor. That distinction is important in Central Asia because the region does not need a formal legal closure of Hormuz to feel the shock. It only needs insurers, banks, freight forwarders, airlines, and traders to decide that the southern option has become too risky for routine planning. That process was already underway. The route through Iran had come under strain in southern corridor traffic, food systems, and in the wider pricing of regional connectivity. A U.S. move against Iranian ports is likely to reinforce that view. Official statements across Central Asia still reflect the ceasefire moment more than the latest escalation. On April 8, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev welcomed the truce and said he hoped it would support global trade and prosperity. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire and praised efforts to reduce tensions. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry did the same, calling the truce an “important step toward de-escalating tensions,” and stressing that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire agreement between Iran and the United States. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, had already taken a practical line, saying on March 4 that it was keeping all international checkpoints open and providing passage for foreign citizens, vehicles, and rail stock across the Turkmen-Iranian border. Since then, public messaging has lagged behind the latest escalation. By April 13, Qazinform’s foreign news flow had shifted to the failed Islamabad talks and Trump’s blockade order, while the latest publicly visible official positions elsewhere in the region still reflected the April 8 ceasefire. That does not mean backchannel diplomacy has stopped, but it does suggest that Central Asian governments prefer caution in public as the conflict shifts from direct strikes to pressure on shipping and trade. For the region, the economic logic is now clearer than the politics. Approximately 20% of global oil supplies and one-third of global fertilizer trade move through the Strait of Hormuz, while urea prices surged by almost 46% between February and March 2026. The World Bank’s April Europe and Central Asia Economic Update said growth in the developing economies of Europe and Central Asia is expected to slow to 2.1% in 2026, down from 2.6% in 2025, as the Middle East conflict, wider geopolitical tension, and trade fragmentation weigh on the region. Those pressures were already significant. The collapse of the main post-ceasefire diplomatic effort, followed by oil rising back above $100 a barrel, has made them harder...

CIS

Moldova Moves to Leave CIS as Post-Soviet Bloc Loses Another Member

Moldova’s parliament approved, in final reading on April 2, the country’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with 60 deputies voting in favor. President Maia Sandu then promulgated the denunciation decrees, which were published in the Official Journal on April 8 and entered into force, with the Foreign Ministry set to notify the CIS. If Moldova’s withdrawal takes full legal effect after notification and the relevant notice period, eight CIS member states would remain: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The CIS was created immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a framework to manage the breakup and maintain post-Soviet cooperation among former republics. Moldova’s denunciation concerns a structure originally formed by 11 former Soviet states, not all 15 Soviet republics. Moldova’s exit further weakens the CIS politically, though the bloc will continue to exist if the remaining member states stay in place. Moldova has already approved the denunciation of the 1991 Agreement on the Establishment of the CIS, the related Protocol, and the 1993 CIS Statute. The Moldovan authorities say the CIS’s core values and principles are no longer being respected, especially the recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. They cite Russia’s war against Ukraine, acts of aggression against Georgia, and the illegal military presence of Russian troops on Moldovan territory. Chisinau says the move is consistent with Moldova’s European path, while the European Union remains its main economic partner. Economic ties with the Commonwealth have significantly declined: in 2025, CIS countries accounted for 5.9% of Moldova’s exports, while the European Union accounted for 67.5%. Moldova’s final withdrawal from the CIS may not, therefore, come as a surprise to its other members. On January 19, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi announced the start of the process to denounce the three core CIS agreements underpinning Moldova’s membership. “We are already in the process of getting approvals for the denunciation of three agreements with the CIS. They are the agreements that form the basis of our affiliation to the CIS, namely: the CIS Statute, the CIS Founding Agreement, and the Annex to this agreement,” Popșoi said. He added that this would mean Moldova was no longer a CIS member legally, while participation had already been suspended de facto. Moldova set a course toward breaking its remaining ties with its Soviet past after the 2020 presidential elections, when new president, Maia Sandu, announced a path toward EU integration and refused to participate in CIS summits. Moldova has spent the past several years unwinding CIS-linked agreements. As of January 2026, Moldovan officials said the country had signed 283 CIS agreements, of which 71 had already been rescinded, and about 60 more were in process. On December 12, 2025, Moldova’s parliament approved the denunciation of the 1992 Bishkek agreement on visa-free travel for CIS citizens. For Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and several other states, visa-free travel with Moldova remains in place under bilateral agreements. Moldovan authorities said the denunciation of the Bishkek agreement would affect...

Oil and Gas

Kazakhstan Gains Weight in China’s Energy System

The newly extended U.S. waiver for Russian oil transit through Kazakhstan and the reported giant onshore hydrocarbon discovery in western Kazakhstan point in different directions, yet they belong in the same analytical frame. One concerns an existing flow that already reaches China through working infrastructure, while the other concerns a possible future source that has not yet reached the stage of commercially proven reserves. Together, they mark a change in Kazakhstan’s position. The country is increasingly important to China both as a corridor and as a possible larger upstream partner. The U.S. waiver now runs until March 19, 2027. Kazakhstan is not a giant direct oil supplier to China in the way that Russia or Saudi Arabia is; China’s import structure is broader. But Kazakh-origin oil shipments, Russian transit oil, and adjacent energy links now constitute a single, more complex relationship. According to official Chinese sources, oil imported from Kazakhstan enters mainly through the China-Kazakhstan crude pipeline. More Than Kazakhstan’s Own Barrels Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP reported that in 2024, the Atasu-Alashankou route carried 1.2 million tons of oil and 9.989 million tons of transit oil, against a design capacity of 20 million tons a year. Official Chinese figures sharpen the point. By the end of 2024, total cumulative throughput on the pipeline had reached 280 million tons, including 19.139 million tons in 2024, while cumulative crude imported from Kazakhstan was lower. Kazakhstan’s significance to China is therefore larger than Kazakhstan’s own volumes would suggest, because the route carries more than Kazakhstan’s own oil. A glance at Europe keeps that proportion straight. Eurostat reports that Kazakhstan supplied 12.7% of the European Union’s petroleum oil imports in 2025. The European External Action Service said that Kazakhstan accounted for 10.9% of EU oil imports in the first quarter of 2024. This made it the bloc’s third-largest supplier in that period, and a more important direct oil supplier to Europe than to China. The significance of Kazakhstan’s geographic proximity to China becomes clearer when one looks beyond crude oil. Kazakhstan is not only a direct oil supplier, but also a transit corridor for multiple China-bound energy flows. The Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline is one of China’s major import routes. At the same time, while Kazakhstan’s own gas exports to China remain limited due to rising domestic demand, gas from Turkmenistan and Russia both pass through its territory. Oil and gas do not form a single operational system, but together they show that China’s energy connection with Kazakhstan extends beyond one commodity and beyond Kazakhstan’s own barrels. The Source Side May Be Growing In this context, the reported discovery on the Zhylyoi carbonate platform makes a difference because it widens the source side of the relationship without changing present flows. According to public statements by KazMunayGas officials, the Karaton, Kazhygali, and Zhylyoi formation has resource potential of 4.7 billion metric tons of hydrocarbons, and the broader Zhylyoi carbonate reservoir may hold as much as 20 billion metric tons of oil equivalent. The field is onshore in...

Middle East Crisis

Central Asia Welcomes Ceasefire, Urges Talks as Energy Risks Persist

Central Asian governments have cautiously welcomed the two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran, describing it as a necessary pause in a conflict that has already begun to affect regional stability, trade, and energy flows. Across the region, official statements struck a consistent balance: support for the truce, alongside calls to translate it quickly into negotiations rather than allow it to become a temporary pause in hostilities. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev described the agreement as a “ceasefire and truce” reached through international mediation, including efforts involving Pakistan’s leadership. According to the presidential press service, Tokayev said that “this agreement became possible due to the goodwill and wisdom of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the senior leadership of Iran, as well as all countries involved in the military conflict.” Tokayev went on to express his hope that the agreement would prove sustainable and contribute to global trade and economic stability. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry described the ceasefire as an “important step toward de-escalating tensions” and stressed that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tashkent called for “all parties to exercise restraint, [and] refrain from actions that could further escalate the situation, warning that further escalation risks widening the conflict and undermining regional stability. The statement reaffirmed Uzbekistan's “unwavering position on the need to resolve conflicts exclusively by peaceful means in strict accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the agreement, expressing hope that the ceasefire would open the way to a comprehensive and long-term peace. Dushanbe emphasized that the conflict has “no military solution and its continuation will only worsen the already difficult situation in the Middle East and cause colossal damage to all countries in the region.” The statement urged all parties to “abandon the use of force” and use political and diplomatic mechanisms in accordance with international law and the UN Charter. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry said it “welcomes the achievement of a ceasefire agreement in the Middle East,” highlighting the role of Pakistan’s mediation efforts in reducing tensions. Bishkek reaffirmed that disputes must be resolved exclusively through political and diplomatic means on the basis of the UN Charter and international law, and expressed its “hope for achieving sustainable and long-term peace in the region.” Turkmenistan had not issued an official public statement on the ceasefire at the time of publication, in line with its longstanding policy of neutrality and cautious approach to external conflicts. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the “announced ceasefire” and praised the efforts of mediators who helped broker the agreement. Baku called on all parties to “engage in productive dialogue aimed at resolving existing problems and strengthening mutual trust” and signaled its readiness to “support initiatives aimed at strengthening lasting peace, security, and cooperation in the region.” The convergence in tone reflects more than diplomatic routine. The conflict has already spilled into Central Asia’s political and humanitarian agenda, prompting coordination on evacuations, aid deliveries, and contingency planning....

Critical Minerals

Opinion: Supply Chains of Power: How Critical Minerals Are Shaping China–U.S. Competition in Central Asia

Central Asia is no longer a distant frontier for global geopolitics. It is developing into a central arena of competition for critical minerals, supply chains, and industrial power, where minerals are no longer simple commodities but have instead become key components of contemporary statecraft. In essence, this transformation highlights a recognition in Washington and other capitals that critical mineral supply chains are fundamental to next-generation energy systems, the development of artificial intelligence (AI), and strategic defense capabilities. Even as the global economy is multipolar, critical mineral supply chains remain highly concentrated and dominated by China. Control of rare earths is increasingly geopolitical, with clear economic, political, and security consequences. The significance of that imbalance is now shaping U.S. foreign policy, Central Asia’s development strategies, and the future of global economics. China’s Strategy: Control the Chain, Not Just the Mine Though many years in the making, China’s critical minerals strategy is still often misunderstood as focused primarily on resource access. However, Beijing’s efforts are far broader and more effective. Not only securing raw materials, the Chinese leadership has also worked to control the entire supply chain—from extraction to processing, refining, and manufacturing. China’s long-term focus and investments began in the 1980s with efforts that culminated in the Made in China 2025 plan for national and overseas manufacturing. In 2023 alone, Chinese firms invested more than $120 billion in overseas mining and processing, targeting key elements used in energy supply chains. Beijing also fed its industrial base by providing over $220 billion for the production of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable infrastructure. As a result, China now controls approximately 60% of lithium processing, more than 70% of cobalt refining, and over 90% of battery material manufacturing. Strategically, China controls roughly 90% of global rare earth refining and associated technologies. Early investments in supplies enabled Beijing to subsequently concentrate funds into refining capacity to feed its industrial sector. This integrated approach has shifted the power dynamic for global supply chains tied to the critical minerals economy. As evidenced by Beijing’s near monopoly on processing, market control is not just associated with geological supplies but with processing capacity. China’s willingness to weaponize access not only to rare earths but also to processing technology demonstrates Beijing’s market muscle. This distinction is critical. Rare earth elements are not inherently scarce, but they are rarely found in concentrated deposits, making them difficult to extract and refine. Over decades, Beijing developed unique refining capabilities and subsidized an industrial base that disincentivized competition and encouraged processing to shift to China. The Vicious Circle Prohibitive investment costs, long development timelines, and market volatility have discouraged Western investment in alternative supply chains. Each stage (mining, processing, refining, manufacturing) is interdependent: miners won’t invest without buyers and offtake agreements, processors and refiners need secure financing and stable mineral supply, and manufacturers need steady inputs. Such interdependence creates an investment standoff and heightens perceptions of risk. By integrating all stages, Beijing exerts influence across global markets, from pricing to production. This has conditioned global markets...