Military - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 255

Drones

Kazakh Military Advances Domestic Drone Production

Kazakhstan’s Airborne Assault Forces (AAF) are establishing an independent production base for unmanned aerial systems (UAS), signaling a strategic shift toward greater self-reliance in military technology. According to the Ministry of Defense, approximately 100 drones have already been assembled and deployed across various branches of the armed forces. Unmanned units were formally established within the AAF two years ago. Since then, military personnel have gained hands-on experience in drone operations and developed in-house capabilities for maintenance, repair, and assembly. This has significantly reduced dependence on foreign supplies and accelerated the integration of unmanned systems into the military structure. A dedicated workshop for the production and servicing of drones began operations in December 2025. Within two months, the facility had launched a full production cycle from hardware assembly and software configuration to testing and delivery. “The 100th drone was recently assembled here,” the Ministry of Defense reported in a statement. The facility is staffed by contract personnel who have completed specialized technical training. All drones undergo mandatory testing before being dispatched to military units. Military experts note that the development of domestic UAV production is driven by the evolving nature of warfare. Recent armed conflicts have underscored the growing role of drones in reconnaissance, fire correction, target designation, and unit coordination. In 2026, systematic training of UAV operators will begin at the AAF’s training center. Instruction will be led by specialists with operational experience across various UAV platforms. Kazakhstan’s UAV units have already seen active deployment during the Desant-2025 military exercises, held from September 2-12, 2025, at the Koktal training ground in the Zhetysu region. More than 3,000 AAF personnel participated in the drills. The military's drone development effort mirrors a broader trend in Kazakhstan, where drones are increasingly used in civilian sectors. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, a pilot project for drone-based delivery services is set to launch in Almaty in 2026. Elsewhere, researchers in East Kazakhstan are employing drones and artificial intelligence to monitor soil and crop conditions, while engineers in Karaganda have unveiled prototypes of safety-enhancing UAVs for public use.

Military

Food Conditions in the Turkmenistan Army Under Scrutiny

Conscripts returning from military service in Turkmenistan have reported severe food shortages, stark inequality between soldiers and officers, and institutional indifference. Against a backdrop of chronic malnutrition, instances of illness, interpersonal conflict, and even fatalities have been documented. According to former soldiers, food rations in the Turkmen armed forces are grossly inadequate and fall far short of nutritional standards. Daily meals typically consist of boiled pumpkin, stewed cabbage, beets, and rice porridge for breakfast and dinner. Lunch includes a thin soup reportedly containing only "pieces of carrot" and little else. Bread quality is a major concern. Flatbread made from locally sourced flour is often undercooked, forcing conscripts to eat it half-raw, leading to widespread gastrointestinal issues. Meanwhile, soldiers from wealthier families reportedly fare much better. Their relatives send money, which conscripts use to pay canteen cooks for preferential treatment. These soldiers are served separately, receiving meat dishes, salads, fruit, soft drinks, and properly baked bread. In some regions, such as the Balkan region, entrepreneurs have been officially allowed to open cafes near military checkpoints. There, soldiers can purchase rice, samsa, and other local dishes, funded either by family support or their own limited savings. One tragic incident occurred this summer at a base in the Balkan region. A fight broke out outside the canteen when a soldier from a well-off family refused to share his meal. The altercation escalated, ending in the death of one private and a lengthy prison sentence for the other. Discontent is also reportedly growing among officers. Despite earning relatively high salaries for the region, between $860 and $1,140 per month, many do not receive housing, forcing their families to pay substantial rents, which significantly reduces their disposable income. Graduates of the Ministry of Defense’s Military Institute are required to serve a minimum of five years before becoming eligible for discharge. However, approval for resignation remains at the discretion of the command, and with ongoing personnel shortages, such requests are frequently denied.

Middle Powers

Which Central Asian States Qualify as Middle Powers in 2025?

As global power shifts toward multipolarity, Central Asia’s states are emerging as active regional players. This article assesses which of the five republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—qualify as middle powers in 2025, based on economic strength, diplomatic reach, strategic capacity, and governance. Kazakhstan stands as the region’s only consolidated middle power, balancing fiscal stability, institutional reform, and multi-vector diplomacy. Uzbekistan is a rising aspirant, propelled by reforms but still reliant on external financing and centralized authority. The remaining states remain constrained by dependence and limited institutional depth. Together, they reflect a region increasingly capable of shaping, rather than merely absorbing, global and regional change. A comparative analysis of five Central Asian republics shows how far each has advanced toward this status. [vc_row][vc_column][vc_raw_html css=""]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[/vc_raw_html][vc_column_text css="" woodmart_inline="no" text_larger="no"] As global power shifts toward multipolarity, Central Asia’s states are emerging as active regional players. This article assesses which of the five republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—qualify as middle powers in 2025, based on economic strength, diplomatic reach, strategic capacity, and governance. Kazakhstan stands as the region’s only consolidated middle power, balancing fiscal stability, institutional reform, and multi-vector diplomacy. Uzbekistan is a rising aspirant, propelled by reforms but still reliant on external financing and centralized authority. The remaining states remain constrained by dependence and limited institutional depth. Together, they reflect a region increasingly capable of shaping, rather than merely absorbing, global and regional change. A comparative analysis of five Central Asian republics shows how far each has advanced toward this status. Economic Power Economic autonomy is a defining attribute of middle-power capability, enabling states to project influence, sustain policy independence, and finance external engagement. In Central Asia, dependence on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and remittances often reflects constrained fiscal capacity and limited domestic capital formation, while diversified, resilient economies underpin strategic autonomy. Key indicators—GDP per capita, credit ratings, debt sustainability, and export diversification—illuminate the region’s economic hierarchy. Kazakhstan stands as Central Asia’s only consolidated economic middle power. Resource-backed growth, a prudent fiscal regime, and a sovereign wealth fund (the National Fund of Kazakhstan) have anchored macroeconomic stability. With a “BBB” credit rating or equivalent from major agencies, Kazakhstan demonstrates sound debt management and policy credibility. Ongoing diversification efforts under the new economic policies—from renewables to financial modernization—aim to reduce hydrocarbon dependence and deepen integration into global supply chains. Its role as a trans-Caspian logistics hub enhances both strategic and commercial influence. Uzbekistan, by contrast, is an emerging frontier market propelled by post-2017 reforms in currency liberalization, taxation, and state-enterprise restructuring. Rapid GDP growth and expanding private-sector activity mark its trajectory toward fiscal autonomy, though continued ODA inflows averaging around $1.1 billion to 1.3 billion annually, primarily from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, and bilateral partners such as Japan, the United States, and the European Union, highlight its residual dependence on external concessional financing. To achieve genuine middle power status, Uzbekistan must roughly double its real economic output over the next decade, a scale of growth aligned with the shift...

SCO Summit

Opinion: Victory Day Parade Puts China’s Military Might and Alliances on Full Display

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit coincided with China’s lavish commemorations of the "80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the broader World Anti-Fascist War." The culminating moment, a grand military parade, was followed by a formal reception hosted by President Xi Jinping for visiting foreign dignitaries. All five Central Asian heads of state attended the parade. As the summit concluded, Xi seized the opportunity to issue a pointed warning to the West, particularly the United States and President Donald Trump, who had made it clear that he was closely following events in Tianjin and Beijing. In a post on Truth Social, Trump wrote, "Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un as you conspire against the United States of America." Kim Jong Un’s high-profile visit to Beijing, including a prolonged meeting with Putin, signaled the emergence of a visible military alignment between North Korea and Russia. This visit served as a strategic complement to China's Victory Day display of military might. [caption id="attachment_35739" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: president.uz[/caption] For the first time, China publicly exhibited components of its strategic nuclear triad: the air-launched Jinglei1 missile, submarine-launched Julang3, and land-based ICBMs such as the Dongfeng61 and Dongfeng31 (and reportedly the DF5C). Analysts saw this as a deliberate signal to the U.S., regional powers like India and Russia, and potential international arms buyers, positioning China as a formidable strategic actor. Also on display were China’s anti-drone “triad”, missile-gun systems, high-energy lasers, and high-power microwave weapons, highlighting advances in counter-drone technology. Additionally, the parade showcased hypersonic and cruise missiles, unmanned aerial and underwater systems, and even robotic dog units, demonstrating China’s futuristic military capabilities. While noting the parade's impressive visuals, analysts cautioned that the true readiness of many showcased systems, for example, torpedo drones or laser weapons, remains uncertain. [caption id="attachment_35741" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: president.uz[/caption] Diplomatically, the summit also reinforced Sino-Russian ties. Putin, who described relations with China as “unprecedentedly” close, and Xi signed over 20 bilateral agreements, including a major energy deal, Power of Siberia 2, a gas pipeline delivering 50 billion cubic metres annually to China via Mongolia. Meanwhile, China announced a trial visa-free entry policy for ordinary Russian passport holders, effective from September 15, 2025, to September 14, 2026, allowing visits up to 30 days for tourism, business, or family purposes. Together, the military spectacle and deepening diplomatic and people-to-people ties affirm Xi’s confidence as he prepares for crucial negotiations with President Trump, an unmistakable projection of strength and strategic resolve.

Military

Kazakhstan: Aircraft Debris Found in Search for Missing Military Helicopter

Search teams in Kazakhstan have discovered an oil slick on a lake and aircraft fragments that appear to belong to a military-operated helicopter carrying three people that was reported missing. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Emergency Situations launched an intensive search and rescue operation after contact with the EC145 helicopter was lost on Friday in the area of Otar, a village west of Almaty. Satellite detection methods spotted oily water on Lake Sorbulak, about 40 kilometers northwest of Almaty, and searchers working through the night found aircraft debris “presumably belonging to” Kazakhstan’s Air Defense Forces, the ministry said on Friday. It said echo sounders as well as aerial and underwater drones were being used in the operation. “About 200 personnel, 40 units of equipment, 15 watercraft, 4 canine units, and 2 aircraft of the Ministry of Emergency Situations are involved,” the ministry said. The Ministry of Defense said the helicopter had been on a scheduled flight and that “a special commission has been dispatched to determine the circumstances of the incident.” The Eurocopter EC145 is a twin-engine, light utility aircraft.

Caspian Sea

Opinion: A Sea of Discord? Intensifying Military Drills Threaten Stability in the Caspian Region

On Monday, Russia and Iran launched joint military exercises in the Caspian Sea under the banner “Together for a Safe and Secure Caspian Sea.” Officially, the drills aim to enhance maritime security and naval cooperation between the two countries and are being coordinated by Iran’s Northern Fleet. While such exercises might once have passed without much notice, their timing and frequency reflect a shifting dynamic: the Caspian region is rapidly emerging as a potential hotspot in global geopolitics. Just one month prior, the same waters hosted joint military exercises between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, held in Aktau, western Kazakhstan. These were followed by the “Tarlan-2025” air and tactical drills in Azerbaijan from July 8-10, which focused on enhancing UAV operations and military coordination. Baku’s strategic alliance with Ankara is a key factor here. Azerbaijan, a close Turkish partner, is now engaged in a more strained relationship with Russia. Moscow’s muted reaction to this cooling suggests an awareness that Ankara is increasingly shaping a Turkic military-political bloc, an emerging force in a region of strategic importance to both Russia and China. Earlier this month, Turkey launched its annual Anadolu-2025 special forces exercises. Participants included troops from 33 nations, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and others but notably excluded Russia. For the first time, in 2024, military exercises were held in the Caspian without Russian involvement. The Birleistik (Unity) 2024 drills were conducted at Kazakhstan’s Oymasha training ground and Cape Tokmak along the Caspian coast. Troops from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan rehearsed scenarios including conflict zone identification, night maritime operations, and amphibious landings. Previously, regional military cooperation had been limited to bilateral engagements, such as the 2023 UZAZ exercises (Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan), Kanzhar-2023 (Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan), and Hazri-2023 (Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan). The spike in joint drills during 2024-2025 underscores growing rivalries between regional and global powers. These operations are not mere formalities but reveal emerging security alignments and geopolitical signals. Three distinct blocs appear to be coalescing in the Caspian, with implications for Central Asia as well. The first bloc includes Russia, Iran, and China. These nations have held annual “Maritime Security Belt” exercises since 2019, with the most recent in March 2025 off the Iranian coast. The second bloc comprises Turkey, Azerbaijan, and members of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Defense ties among these countries are becoming a core element of OTS cooperation. At the 10th OTS Summit in Astana in 2023, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized defense as the main guarantor of member state security, citing ongoing regional conflicts and violations of international law. The third bloc, more pragmatic and focused, is the Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan partnership. These countries are cooperating on the basis of the 2018 Caspian Convention to secure maritime communications. Azerbaijan contributes military expertise, particularly in UAV and drone warfare developed during the Karabakh conflicts. Kazakhstan brings diplomatic credibility and promotes regional governance and connectivity, offering a stabilizing complement to Azerbaijan’s military strengths. In sum, the Caspian Sea, once colloquially referred to as “Russia’s lake”, is steadily losing that identity. It is transforming into...