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Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Kazakhstan Opens Criminal Probe Over Calls to Attack CPC Oil Pipeline

Kazakhstan has opened a criminal investigation into public statements that authorities say encouraged attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the main export route for the country’s crude oil, after months of disruption at the system’s Black Sea terminal turned a foreign security risk into a domestic legal and political issue. Prosecutor General Berik Asylov confirmed the case in a written reply to a parliamentary inquiry on January 6. "On December 17, 2025, the Astana City Police Department launched a pre-trial investigation under Part 1 of Article 174 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (incitement of social, national, tribal, racial, class, or religious discord) into negative public comments regarding damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium," the Prosecutor General stated. The authorities have yet to name suspects, publish the posts under review, or announce any arrests. The file remains at the evidence-gathering stage, and prosecutors have left open whether any charges will ultimately be filed under Article 174, or reclassified under other provisions once investigators assess the intent and impact. The probe follows a request by Mazhilis deputy, Aidos Sarym, who said that some social media commentary crossed from opinion into encouragement of harm to strategic infrastructure, endorsed attacks on the CPC, and urged further strikes on critical sites. The political sensitivity is rooted in the 1,500-kilometer pipeline’s central role in Kazakhstan’s economy. CPC carries crude from western Kazakhstan to a marine terminal near Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, where the oil is loaded onto tankers for delivery to global markets. The pipeline is owned by a consortium that includes Kazakhstan, Russia, and several international energy companies. The system dominates Kazakhstan’s oil export economy. More than 80% of the country’s crude oil exports move through the CPC route, which also carries more than 1% of global oil supplies, making it a pressure point for both markets and state revenue when operations are disrupted. The investigation follows a period of repeated disruption at the Novorossiysk terminal in late 2025, after a naval drone strike damaged one of the offshore loading points used to transfer oil from the pipeline to tankers. The damage forced operators to suspend loadings and move vessels away while inspections and repairs were carried out, sharply reducing export capacity. The CPC relies on single-point moorings positioned at sea to load crude onto tankers, a critical constraint on the entire system; when one goes offline, capacity drops quickly. The pipeline cannot store large volumes, forcing upstream producers to cut or slow output. By late December, the impact was visible in Kazakhstan’s production figures. Oil output fell by about 6% during the month after the late November strike constrained exports. Production at the Tengiz oilfield, the country’s largest, dropped by roughly 10%. Exports of CPC Blend crude fell to about 1.08 million barrels per day in December, the lowest level in more than a year, as the terminal operated with only one functioning mooring while others remained offline due to damage and maintenance. Operational pressures continued as...

Reforms

Insider’s View: From Reform to Rights – Strengthening Uzbekistan’s Legal Foundations

New Uzbekistan is pressing ahead with democratic reforms while pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy, deepening dialogue with the international community, and rolling out reforms that reinforce guarantees for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Within the framework of the Uzbekistan–2030 Strategy - now paired with the State Program, “Year of Environmental Protection and the Green Economy” – the authorities are upgrading legal safeguards and institutional mechanisms aimed at protecting citizens’ rights. As President Shavkat Mirziyoyev stated, “The dreams and aspirations of our people, shaped over centuries through diverse ideas and practical endeavors, are today embodied in the concept of New Uzbekistan.” That vision has coincided with rapid socioeconomic change: GDP has topped $110 billion; preschool enrollment has risen sharply since 2017; higher-education participation has climbed from about 9% in 2017 to roughly 42%; and elite public schools - creative, specialized, and presidential - have taken root. Uzbek athletes placed among the top national teams at recent global competitions, and football milestones at both the youth and senior levels have broadened the country’s international profile. Together, these gains bolster Uzbekistan’s status as a sovereign, democratic, legal, social, and secular state, and as a more reliable partner on the global stage. The Pragmatic Diplomacy of New Uzbekistan Against a backdrop of armed conflicts, environmental emergencies, trade frictions, and evolving security threats, Uzbekistan has worked to strengthen peace and regional stability while educating its youth in the spirit of both national and universal values. In recent years, high-level outreach has rebuilt trust with neighbors and helped popularize concepts such as a “Central Asian spirit” and “Central Asian identity.” The March unveiling of a Friendship Stele at the junction of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan borders symbolized this thaw, while cooperation on transit, water and energy exchanges, and security has become more predictable. A “New Central Asia” is taking shape as a unified transport and logistics space. Mutual trade volumes in the region have multiplied, investment flows have increased, and cross-border ventures have expanded. Major projects—from the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway to rising cargo across the Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Türkiye corridor—are laying the ground for a trans-continental transit hub. At the same time, Uzbekistan’s convening role has grown. In April 2025, Samarkand hosted the first EU–Central Asia Summit, chaired by President Mirziyoyev and attended by EU leaders and all five Central Asian presidents - an event that elevated ties to a strategic partnership and set a broader agenda on connectivity, critical raw materials, energy, and digital links. Environmental diplomacy has also moved up the agenda. The Samarkand Climate Forum gathered UN deputy secretary generals, heads of major environmental organizations, and experts from dozens of countries, signaling a step-change in the region’s engagement on ecology, desertification, and resilience. The Parliamentary Dimension of New Uzbekistan Tashkent’s rising parliamentary diplomacy culminated in the 150th Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Assembly, held between 5–9 April 2025 - the first of its kind in Central Asia – which brought together some 2,000 parliamentarians from more than 140 countries, plus over 20 international organizations. The proceedings, themed “Parliamentary Action for Social...

Rule of law

Kazakhstan Proposes Polygraph Testing for Law Enforcement Officials

Kazakhstan’s General Prosecutor’s Office has drafted a decree proposing the use of polygraph examinations when appointing law enforcement officers to senior positions. Previously, there had been discussions about requiring all government job applicants to undergo lie detector tests. According to the proposal, polygraph testing could be applied to candidates for leadership roles in all law enforcement agencies, state protection services, and the State Courier Service. “The main objectives of the test are to identify hidden negative motives for seeking employment in law enforcement agencies, including affiliations with banned public associations, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups,” the draft states. Additionally, polygraph tests would aim to detect potential issues such as alcohol or drug addiction, gambling problems, concealed illnesses, suicidal tendencies, undisclosed income, dual citizenship, or the use of forged documents. Candidates may also be questioned about corruption-related offenses, unauthorized disclosure of classified or official information, and abuse of power. “The examination of an employee from a law enforcement agency, civil protection agency, or the State Courier Service of the Republic of Kazakhstan will be conducted when they are nominated for higher managerial positions - whether as part of regular or unscheduled attestation or through a competition for a leadership role. It may also be used during official investigations, with the individual's consent,” the draft decree states. The proposal, published on the Open NPA portal, is open for public discussion until February 14, 2025. Kazakhstan established a legal framework for polygraph use late last year. However, this is not the country’s first attempt to introduce lie detector tests for civil servants. In 2010, members of the Nur Otan party proposed using polygraphs to screen government officials involved in financial matters. At that time, the plan covered all government departments - both law enforcement and civilian - though it faced greater resistance from the latter. Ultimately, the proposal was not implemented in the civil service. Now, 15 years later, discussions have resumed, though with a narrower focus on law enforcement personnel. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, Kazakhstan also has plans to establish a register of corrupt officials.

Crime

Swiss Bank Implicated in Corruption Scheme Linked to Islam Karimov’s Daughter

Swiss bank Banque Lombard Odier & Cie SA faces allegations of violating anti-money laundering regulations concerning funds linked to Gulnara Karimova, the controversial daughter of Uzbekistan’s first president, Islam Karimov. The Swiss Attorney General's Office revealed that the bank managed nine suspicious accounts tied to Karimova’s organization, the "Office," despite clear violations of external regulations and internal policies. A former bank manager was also charged with facilitating the scheme between 2005 and 2012. According to investigators, the "Office" functioned solely as a front to launder funds derived from corruption in Uzbekistan’s telecommunications sector. It reportedly had no legitimate business operations and employed no staff. The investigation found that the banker deliberately provided false information to obscure Karimova’s role as the ultimate beneficiary of the accounts. The individual is also accused of destroying or concealing documents that could have exposed the illegal origins of the funds. From 2011 to 2012, the banker allegedly allowed unauthorized access to a safe linked to the “Office,” enabling the removal of critical evidence supporting fraudulent transactions. Gulnara Karimova was once a prominent figure in her father’s administration, known for her roles as a singer, fashion designer, socialite, businesswoman, and diplomat. At one point, she was even considered a potential successor to Islam Karimov. However, by late 2013, her relationship with her father deteriorated, resulting in her political downfall. By 2014, her residence was raided, and she was implicated in a corruption case involving Swedish telecom giant TeliaSonera. Her legal troubles escalated, with convictions in 2015 for embezzlement, public fund misappropriation, and tax evasion, leading to a five-year sentence. This was extended in 2017, placing her under house arrest alongside her daughter. In 2019, Karimova was moved to a penal colony for violating house arrest conditions. In 2020, she was sentenced to an additional 13 years for crimes including creating a criminal association, extortion, and embezzlement. In September 2023, the Swiss General Prosecutor's Office filed an indictment against Karimova in the Federal Court. Prosecutors allege that foreign companies seeking entry into Uzbekistan’s telecommunications market were coerced into paying bribes through entities within the “Office” structure.' Karimova’s legal troubles extend beyond Uzbekistan. British courts have confiscated properties linked to her, valued at over £20 million. The ongoing investigation into her global operations has drawn attention to her role in one of the largest corruption cases in Uzbekistan’s history. This latest scandal has deepened scrutiny of Karimova’s dealings and raised questions about the accountability of financial institutions enabling such schemes.

Rule of law

Out With the Old and in With the New: From Politicians to Felons: Part Two

The end of the first president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev’s era coincided with a wave of mass protests across the country. The widely-accepted cause was the death of five children in a fire in a dilapidated annex to a private house, the like of which there are many in the suburbs of Astana. This tragedy occurred on the night of February 4, 2019, when the girls, with ages ranging from a baby to twelve years old, were left home alone. The event sparked furious complaints from mothers of children across the country, and on March 19 of the same year, Nazarbayev resigned, handing power to the next in the constitutional hierarchy, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the speaker of the Senate (Kazakhstan's upper house of parliament). High-profile cases of the transition period From that moment until the events of January 2022, the country went through a transitional period, which is often spoken of as having been a time of dual power. By analogy with the “Kremlin Towers” (a popular theory about clans in Vladimir Putin's Russia being engaged in an irreconcilable struggle for resources and influence), the new president's entourage began to be called “Akorda” - after the head of state's residence in Astana. Supporters of Nazarbayev and the idea of his return to the presidency, meanwhile, were known as the “Library” – a reference to the Library of the First President. It was believed that the officials Tokayev inherited from his predecessor were more likely to run reports to the Library than to the Akorda. This division serves to explain how the new president was bound in his ability to implement changes. Tokayev initially announced a course of political, economic and social reforms, but only the latter were implemented, while the rest were sabotaged. Even support from the general public, which Tokayev managed to garner in the National Council of Public Trust, did not help matters.Even under such constraints, however, it was possible to begin a purge of the establishment. For example, in 2020, the country was shaken by the first high-profile criminal case under Tokayev, when Bulat Bakauov, akim of the Pavlodar region and a bellwether of high-profile scandals under Nazarbayev, was accused of abusing his authority and arrested. However, the influence of Nazarbayev's entourage remained strong, so the sentence handed down to the former Akim turned out to be a meagre restriction of freedom for 3.5 years. The court obliged Bakauov to refrain from leaving his residence and regularly report to the probation service. In addition, Bakauov was obliged to engage in a hundred hours of public labor, ordered to return $10,000, and banned from holding public office. In the same year, there was a glimmer of hope that the former Akim of Almaty, Bauyrzhan Baibek - who was elevated to the height of political power by his father's childhood friendship with Nursultan Nazarbayev – would be held to account. Urban legends still circulate about the illegal earnings of Baibek and his team from the reconstruction of the center of...

Rule of law

In the Wake of Bishimbayev: From Politicians to Felons – Part One

Eight days ago, a scandal shook Kazakhstani society: Kuandyk Bishimbayev allegedly escaped from the penal colony where he was serving his sentence. Bishimbayev is a former high-ranking official of the government of Nursultan Nazarbayev's era, who was sentenced to 24 years in prison for the brutal murder of his wife. The Interior Ministry's Criminal Correctional System Committee immediately denied this information and said that a criminal case had been opened over the dissemination of this misinformation. This is not the first time Bishimbayev has become a resident of a penal colony. In 2017, as the Minister of National Economy of Kazakhstan, he was arrested on suspicion of large-scale bribery and embezzlement. In 2018, he was sentenced to a ten-year term with the confiscation of property and deprivation of the right to hold public office for the rest of his life. However, he was released on parole in 2019. Kazakhstan has been shaken by Bishimbayev's new crime. The trial, which was broadcast live online for the first time in the country's history, was watched by millions of citizens, not only within the Republic, but also abroad in other post-Soviet countries, and even in the West. However, this is not the first and, in all likelihood, not the last sensational case in which a former high-ranking official becomes a defendant. The long list of convicted ministers and akims can be divided chronologically into three parts: the Nazarbayev era, the transition period, and the so-called “New Kazakhstan,” which started after the January Events - the failed coup in 2022. This article discusses the most notorious court cases from each of these periods. Akezhan Kazhegeldin Former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin was a politician known not only in Kazakhstan, but also in the West. He led the Government of Kazakhstan from 1994 to 1997. After falling into disfavor, in 1998 he attempted to challenge Nazarbayev in the upcoming presidential election. Kazhegeldin was not allowed to participate and had to leave Kazakhstan under the pretense of receiving medical treatment in Switzerland for unspecified health problems. In 1999, Kazhegeldin was put on an international wanted list, and in 2001 he was found guilty in absentia by the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan of abuse of power and authority, extortion and repeated bribes of millions of dollars, illegal acquisitions, the storage and transfer of weapons and ammunition, and tax evasion. Kazhegeldin was sentenced to ten years in prison, but has not returned to the country since. He continued to influence Kazakhstan's domestic politics from abroad until 2001 through the Republican People's Party of Kazakhstan, which he organized for this purpose. It was alleged that Kazhegeldin received kickbacks from a contract awarded to Tractebel in 1996 to run Almaty's electric company and power grid. A year later, the Belgian company also won a concession to manage gas pipelines in the south and west of Kazakhstan. In the U.S., meanwhile, the DOJ investigated claims Kazhegeldin received illegal payments of $6 million as part of a bribery scandal known as ‘Kazakhgate’. This...