Supply Chains - The Times Of Central Asia

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opinion

Turkmenistan and the New Geopolitics of Silicon

Central Asia is not foreign to the emerging geopolitics of silicon and artificial intelligence (AI). Kazakhstan especially has made itself noticed, joining the US-led Pax Silica initiative in June and the Chinese-led World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) in July. Kazakhstan is the only country participating in both initiatives, which is characteristic of Astana’s multi-vector diplomacy. Whilst other Central Asian states have joined WAICO, Turkmenistan, consistent with its permanent neutrality stance, has joined neither. Neutrality, however, does not prevent economic participation, and a case has to be made for Turkmenistan. Two Frameworks for International Cooperation Although both initiatives respond to the same underlying reality - the growing strategic importance of artificial intelligence - they differ in scope and emphasis. Pax Silica is built around the material and economic foundations of AI, focusing on securing and coordinating the physical supply chains that make computation possible and aiming implicitly to reduce reliance on China. WAICO, by contrast, is centered on the political and normative dimension of AI, prioritizing governance, safety standards, and international coordination, where Beijing could push its rhetoric in favour of open-source artificial intelligence as a model for AI development. Taken together, they reflect two complementary but distinct ways of structuring the emerging AI order: one rooted in industrial capacity and supply-chain control, the other in multilateral rules. On that matter, Turkmenistan's possible relevance does not lie in software, semiconductor fabrication or AI regulation, but much further upstream: silicon metallurgy. From Gas to Silicon Silicon is abundant in nature, but transforming it into industrial materials is an energy-intensive process. Quartz or quartzite is used to produce both silicon ferroalloys and silicon metal. Ferrosilicon is principally consumed by the iron and steel industries, where it serves as a deoxidizing and alloying agent. Silicon metal, meanwhile, is used in aluminum alloys and chemical production, while a small share is further purified into the extremely high-purity silicon required by the semiconductor industry. Ferrosilicon should not be presented as a material that goes directly into AI chips. But establishing competitive ferrosilicon production can constitute a first industrial step into the broader family of silicon metallurgy. And Turkmenistan has already begun considering precisely that. In 2020, the Turkmen authorities reported that the Ministry of Industry was studying the production of metallurgical-grade silicon using local resources. Practical tests had already been conducted using quartz sand, metal mixtures and petroleum coke, while the government presented the development of domestic mineral resources as part of a broader strategy of industrialization and export diversification. The ambition became more concrete in January 2024. Turkmenistan's Ministry of Industry and Construction Production launched an international tender for a feasibility study for a ferroalloy plant intended to manufacture ferrosilicon, silicon carbide, and technical silicon. A 2024 feasibility study for such a project envisions a plant in Balkan Velayat capable of producing 15,000 tons of FeSi75 ferrosilicon annually. The proposed complex would operate two 12,500 kVA furnaces. Rather than depending exclusively on domestic raw materials, the study envisages sourcing quartzite from nearby Iran and...

Caspian Sea

As Two Wars Reach the Caspian, Central Asia’s Middle Corridor Holds

On July 25, two wars met in waters that Central Asian governments had tried to keep apart. Ukraine reported successful long-range strikes in the Caspian Sea. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the targets included vessels involved in carrying military cargo from Iran and a warship. Tehran said an Iranian commercial vessel had been struck, killing one sailor and injuring another, and accused Kyiv of trying to widen the war. It remains unclear whether the vessel identified by Iran was among the targets described by Zelenskyy. Diplomacy produced a limited off-ramp. On July 28, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha told his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araqchi, that the strike on the Iranian ship was unintended. Both governments said they wanted to avoid further escalation. The call reduced the immediate risk of retaliation, but it did not remove the new danger. The Caspian is now one of the places where Russia’s war against Ukraine and the war involving Iran, Israel, and the United States intersect. Central Asia is exposed through the infrastructure and trade routes linking them. A “Sea of Peace” Under Pressure Turkmenistan responded to the incident with unusually direct language. Its Foreign Ministry called attacks on vessels in the Caspian “inadmissible” and described the waterway as a “sea of peace, harmony and good-neighborliness.” Ashgabat did not name Ukraine or endorse Iran’s account. Its restraint was characteristic, but the public criticism was unusual. Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality normally produces guarded statements during external conflicts. The intervention showed that Ashgabat viewed the attack as a challenge to the regional order. Turkmenistan faces Iran across a 1,148-kilometer land border and the southern Caspian. Turkmenbashi port is also central to its plans for a larger role in Eurasian trade. The principle is set out in the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, signed in Aktau in 2018. Its text calls for the peaceful use of the sea, prohibits the use or threat of force, and bars armed forces belonging to non-Caspian states. The convention has not entered into force because Iran has not ratified it. Its provisions were designed to govern relations among the five littoral states. They do not address a long-range strike carried out by a non-littoral state. But modern drones can cross distances that once provided strategic shelter. A landlocked sea can no longer be assumed to sit beyond the reach of surrounding wars. The Iran-Russia Link Ukraine has clear military reasons to look toward the Caspian. Iran has supplied Russia with drone technology used against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. The sea also provides a direct commercial route between Iranian ports and Russia’s Volga region. Kyiv now treats vessels on that route carrying military cargo as part of Russia’s military logistics. Iran described the vessel struck on July 25 as civilian. The dispute over the ship’s cargo is central because commercial and military supply chains can overlap. A vessel may be civilian by flag and registration while carrying goods that Ukraine considers part of Russia’s war effort. That uncertainty reaches beyond...

opinion

Kazakhstan’s Mineral Future Still Carries an Oil Risk Premium

In June, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev went to Brussels with a future-facing offer: Kazakhstan could become Europe’s non-Chinese option in critical minerals. Astana presented the country as a base for processing, long-term offtake, and industrial cooperation, rather than another source of ore. A month later, Kazakhstan’s older vulnerability reappeared. Drone attacks near the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal at Novorossiysk disrupted loadings and forced production cuts in Kazakhstan. By July 27, loading had resumed, with tankers receiving crude supplied by Tengizchevroil. The interruption was brief, but it exposed a structural problem. Kazakhstan’s future mineral offer still rests on an economy whose main export artery runs through Russia and the Black Sea. That is the central tension in Kazakhstan’s new resource diplomacy. Astana wants Europe to help build a future supply chain. Its present still depends on an oil corridor it does not fully control. Kazakhstan is asking Europe to make future demand bankable. A mineral deposit does not become part of a European supply chain when officials announce it in a joint statement. It needs geological confirmation, financing, processing technology, reliable power, water, logistics, and customers prepared to sign contracts years before the first shipment. This is why offtake sits at the heart of Tokayev’s proposal. Long-term purchase commitments can turn European concern over Chinese dominance into financeable projects. If Europe wants another source tomorrow, it must help fund extraction, processing, and internationally accepted standards today. Kazakhstan says it is ready to supply 21 of the 34 materials on the EU’s critical raw materials list. It also wants more of the value chain to remain at home. European capital and technology would support local processing, laboratories, skills, and higher-value production instead of simply moving raw materials abroad. Europe has good reason to listen. China dominates the processing of many minerals used in batteries, advanced manufacturing, digital infrastructure, and defence. European industry wants alternatives, but diversification cannot be improvised after a supply shock. Mines and processing plants take years to finance, permit, construct, and qualify. For Kazakhstan, the minerals offer is also an attempt to upgrade an older relationship. Western companies already know the country through Tengiz, Kashagan, and decades of oil investment. Astana now wants to move from extraction towards processing and a stronger position in industrial supply chains. But the old oil story still prices the new minerals story. The CPC episode showed why. The pipeline carries crude from Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak through Russian territory to Novorossiysk. It handles more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports and ties much of the country’s hard-currency income to a route outside Astana’s full control. A short halt was enough to cut output sharply at fields more than 1,500 kilometres away. Tokayev’s call in Omsk to freeze the war in Ukraine should be read partly in that context. It reflected more than the diplomatic caution expected from a neighbour of Russia. The war is now touching Kazakhstan’s export system through tanker security, insurance risk, production schedules, and investor confidence. Astana wants European finance for...

Critical Minerals

Resources, Capacity, Connectivity: Kazakhstan and the Critical Minerals Nexus

Kazakhstan’s place in diversified critical mineral supply chains rests on an unusual combination: a broad resource base, an established mining and metallurgical sector, and transport infrastructure extending across Eurasia. The task is to make these assets work together. Their strategic value depends on converting resources into financeable projects, existing capacity into internationally qualified products, and geographic connectivity into contractually reliable delivery. Kazakhstan approaches this task with an established industrial base. The world’s leading uranium producer, it also has production or processing capabilities in chromite and ferroalloys, titanium sponge, copper, zinc, aluminum, beryllium, molybdenum, rhenium, and other strategic materials. Much of that base was established during the Soviet period and extends beyond mines and plants to freight rail and experienced technical personnel. These assets reduce the burden of greenfield development for projects able to use them economically. By joining the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative in June 2026 as its first Central Asian participant, Kazakhstan brought these questions into a wider strategic setting. Pax Silica connects critical minerals and energy to an industrial agenda extending from semiconductor production to artificial-intelligence infrastructure. Membership creates an institutional opening for higher-value processing and technology cooperation. For Kazakhstan, the opportunity is to retain more value domestically through technology transfer, skilled employment, and a broader range of processed exports. From Resources to Financeable Projects Mineral abundance makes projects possible but not automatically bankable. Current drilling and internationally recognized resource statements must first establish the size, grade, and confidence level of the resource. Feasibility work must then show that it can be developed, and permits must authorize development. The project must still secure an off-taker and financing able to withstand commodity and construction risk. Predictable permitting and clear ownership help lenders assess risk. Traceability is important to lenders and buyers alike. Kazakhstan has begun to make its geological information more usable. More than 4.6 million primary geological records have been digitized. In 2025, the country also developed 20 projects for detailed 1:50,000 surveys covering 100,000 square kilometers; the government plans approximately $470 million in exploration spending during 2026–28. Digitization can open inherited records, but surveys and spending acquire commercial relevance only through completed fieldwork and usable results. Those results must then support economically recoverable reserves and financeable projects. Bankability also depends on the institutions through which capital is raised and transactions governed. The Kazakhstan Stock Exchange and Astana International Exchange give issuers access to investors. The Astana International Financial Centre operates under a legal framework based on common law and has a separate court. Parties may also agree to international arbitration. Kazatomprom’s initial public offering in London and Astana demonstrated access to global capital for a mature national producer. Glencore’s controlling stake in Kazzinc and production by Central Asia Metals at Kounrad since 2012 provide evidence of sustained foreign participation. Taken together, these cases show that Kazakhstan’s system can support substantial transactions and long-term partnerships. Still, each new venture must establish its own economics under commodity and construction risk. From Industrial Capacity to Qualified Products The OECD identifies...

fuel imports

Fuel Squeeze Leaves Kyrgyzstan Competing for Costly Alternatives

Kyrgyzstan is moving to secure alternative fuel supplies from China and Belarus as disruptions in Russia’s refining sector expose Bishkek’s dependence on a single supplier. The new arrangements may ease immediate pressure, but they also show how costly and limited Kyrgyzstan’s options remain. First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Daniyar Amangeldiyev said China has confirmed a contract to supply the first 3,000 tons of jet fuel, while negotiations are under way for an additional 5,000 tons of diesel fuel. The government has also signed agreements with Belarus covering 3,000 tons of jet fuel and approximately 10,000 tons of diesel. On July 1, the Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) extended the zero customs duty regime within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) for gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation fuel, marine fuel, and other petroleum products for another year. EEC Minister of Trade Andrey Slepnev said the previous zero rates had expired on June 30 and that proposals from several member states to extend them were quickly coordinated. “The zero rates have been extended for another year,” he said. That buys time but does not remove the main risk. Russian refining disruptions, seasonal demand, and export controls could still reduce the flow of petroleum products to Kyrgyzstan. Imports from alternative suppliers are also likely to come at higher prices and on less favorable terms than those traditionally offered by Moscow. Russia has been Kyrgyzstan’s primary fuel supplier for decades. The country began receiving Russian petroleum products at preferential prices on October 10, 2000, when the prime ministers of Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Mikhail Kasyanov and Amangeldy Muraliev, signed an intergovernmental agreement in Astana governing indirect taxation in bilateral trade. Since then, Kyrgyzstan has received basic petroleum products duty-free at domestic Russian prices. In 2011, then-adviser to the Kyrgyz prime minister Farid Niyazov told the news outlet 24.kg that Russia would supply all petroleum products to Kyrgyzstan indefinitely without export duties, except aviation fuel. “At present, Russia’s export duty on these fuel products is $245 per ton. You can imagine how much we would otherwise have to pay for fuel,” he said. The 2000 bilateral agreement was terminated in 2015 after Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU. Since then, the country has operated under the union’s common customs rules as well as bilateral agreements with Russia. This has left Kyrgyzstan heavily dependent on a single supplier. According to official statements and industry estimates, more than 90% of the country’s fuel consumption for households and agriculture is currently covered by Russian imports. Despite Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak’s assurances that domestic fuel reserves remain sufficient, shortages began to emerge in Russia in early June. Russia has since moved to tighten exports further as refinery disruptions have continued. As a result, Kyrgyzstan’s Cabinet of Ministers has begun searching for alternative suppliers while introducing daily monitoring of existing fuel deliveries. Rising gasoline and diesel prices had already prompted the government to introduce temporary state regulation of motor fuel prices in late May. It has since rolled...

TCA Interviews

Kazakhstan Seeking to Turn Transit Routes Into Investment Growth, Vice Minister Says

The development of transport and logistics has become one of the main priorities of Kazakhstan's economic policy as the country seeks to turn its position between China, Russia, the Caspian Sea, and Europe into long-term growth. Government transport data show the broader transport and warehousing sector grew in January-May 2026, although rail freight and cargo turnover remained under pressure. Large-scale rail, road, port, warehouse, and digital projects now sit at the center of that effort. The sector requires tens of billions of dollars in investment, while the reshaping of Eurasian supply chains since 2022 has raised the importance of the Middle Corridor and Caspian-linked routes. Can Kazakhstan attract the capital needed to implement large-scale infrastructure projects? How will changing investment priorities affect regional development? And how could new investment reshape the country's transport market? The Times of Central Asia discussed these questions with Maksat Kaliakparov, vice minister of transport of the Republic of Kazakhstan. TCA: How would you assess the current investment attractiveness of Kazakhstan's transport sector? How much foreign investment has the industry attracted recently? Maksat Kaliakparov: The investment attractiveness of the sector is high and continues to strengthen. In 2025 alone, gross foreign direct investment into Kazakhstan's economy reached $20.5 billion, an increase of 14.4% compared with the previous year. Investment is increasingly flowing into transport and logistics alongside manufacturing, digital infrastructure, and the financial sector. The transportation and warehousing sector was among the country's fastest-growing industries in January-May 2026, expanding by 8.4%. Investor interest is also reflected in the fact that, in 2025, Kazakhstan signed 88 commercial agreements worth more than $69.5 billion with partners from China, the UAE, the United States, and European countries. A significant share of these funds will be directed toward transport and logistics projects. More broadly, Kazakhstan's investment policy framework includes a target of increasing annual foreign direct investment inflows to $25.5 billion while raising investment in fixed capital to 25.1% of GDP. TCA: Which segments of the industry are currently attracting the greatest investor interest: railways, highways, aviation, ports, warehousing, or digital logistics? Which areas will require the largest investments in the coming years? Maksat Kaliakparov: Investor interest is spread across several major segments. Railways remain a key priority. Kazakhstan is implementing modernization and new construction projects, including the recently commissioned Dostyk-Moyynty railway section, as well as the Darbaza-Maktaaral and Moyynty-Kyzylzhar lines. By 2030, the country plans to build or modernize approximately 5,000 kilometers of railway infrastructure. Maritime and port logistics are also attracting substantial investment. Expansion is underway at the ports of Aktau and Kuryk, while a new container hub in Aktau is being built with the participation of China's Lianyungang Port Group. The project is expected to increase capacity to 240,000 TEU by the end of 2026. Road infrastructure has secured a landmark private investment through the Car Park Transformer roadside service network. Warehouse and multimodal logistics continue to develop, including through Kazakhstan's terminal at Georgia's Port of Poti. Digitalization is another important area. In particular, the pilot Smart...