Our People > Andrei Matveev

Journalist

Andrei Matveev is a journalist from Kazakhstan.

Articles

Rule of law Corruption Crime Government Justice Court Cases Oligarchs officials Anti-Corruption

Out With the Old and in With the New: From Politicians to Felons – Part Two

The end of the first president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev’s era coincided with a wave of mass protests across the country. The widely-accepted cause was the death of five children in a fire in a dilapidated annex to a private house, the like of which there are many in the suburbs of Astana. This tragedy occurred on the night of February 4, 2019, when the girls, with ages ranging from a baby to twelve years old, were left home alone. The event sparked furious complaints from mothers of children across the country, and on March 19 of the same year, Nazarbayev resigned, handing power to the next in the constitutional hierarchy, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the speaker of the Senate (Kazakhstan's upper house of parliament). High-profile cases of the transition period From that moment until the events of January 2022, the country went through a transitional period, which is often spoken of as having been a time of dual power. By analogy with the “Kremlin Towers” (a popular theory about clans in Vladimir Putin's Russia being engaged in an irreconcilable struggle for resources and influence), the new president's entourage began to be called “Akorda” - after the head of state's residence in Astana. Supporters of Nazarbayev and the idea of his return to the presidency, meanwhile, were known as the “Library” – a reference to the Library of the First President. It was believed that the officials Tokayev inherited from his predecessor were more likely to run reports to the Library than to the Akorda. This division serves to explain how the new president was bound in his ability to implement changes. Tokayev initially announced a course of political, economic and social reforms, but only the latter were implemented, while the rest were sabotaged. Even support from the general public, which Tokayev managed to garner in the National Council of Public Trust, did not help matters.Even under such constraints, however, it was possible to begin a purge of the establishment. For example, in 2020, the country was shaken by the first high-profile criminal case under Tokayev, when Bulat Bakauov, akim of the Pavlodar region and a bellwether of high-profile scandals under Nazarbayev, was accused of abusing his authority and arrested. However, the influence of Nazarbayev's entourage remained strong, so the sentence handed down to the former Akim turned out to be a meagre restriction of freedom for 3.5 years. The court obliged Bakauov to refrain from leaving his residence and regularly report to the probation service. In addition, Bakauov was obliged to engage in a hundred hours of public labor, ordered to return $10,000, and banned from holding public office. In the same year, there was a glimmer of hope that the former Akim of Almaty, Bauyrzhan Baibek - who was elevated to the height of political power by his father's childhood friendship with Nursultan Nazarbayev – would be held to account. Urban legends still circulate about the illegal earnings of Baibek and his team from the reconstruction of the center of...

3 days ago

Dzhakishev Kazhegeldin Rule of law Corruption Crime Criminal Responsibility Khrapunov Ablyazov Bishimbayev Court Cases Justice

In the Wake of Bishimbayev: From Politicians to Felons – Part One

Eight days ago, a scandal shook Kazakhstani society: Kuandyk Bishimbayev allegedly escaped from the penal colony where he was serving his sentence. Bishimbayev is a former high-ranking official of the government of Nursultan Nazarbayev's era, who was sentenced to 24 years in prison for the brutal murder of his wife. The Interior Ministry's Criminal Correctional System Committee immediately denied this information and said that a criminal case had been opened over the dissemination of this misinformation. This is not the first time Bishimbayev has become a resident of a penal colony. In 2017, as the Minister of National Economy of Kazakhstan, he was arrested on suspicion of large-scale bribery and embezzlement. In 2018, he was sentenced to a ten-year term with the confiscation of property and deprivation of the right to hold public office for the rest of his life. However, he was released on parole in 2019. Kazakhstan has been shaken by Bishimbayev's new crime. The trial, which was broadcast live online for the first time in the country's history, was watched by millions of citizens, not only within the Republic, but also abroad in other post-Soviet countries, and even in the West. However, this is not the first and, in all likelihood, not the last sensational case in which a former high-ranking official becomes a defendant. The long list of convicted ministers and akims can be divided chronologically into three parts: the Nazarbayev era, the transition period, and the so-called “New Kazakhstan,” which started after the January Events - the failed coup in 2022. This article discusses the most notorious court cases from each of these periods. Akezhan Kazhegeldin Former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin was a politician known not only in Kazakhstan, but also in the West. He led the Government of Kazakhstan from 1994 to 1997. After falling into disfavor, in 1998 he attempted to challenge Nazarbayev in the upcoming presidential election. Kazhegeldin was not allowed to participate and had to leave Kazakhstan under the pretense of receiving medical treatment in Switzerland for unspecified health problems. In 1999, Kazhegeldin was put on an international wanted list, and in 2001 he was found guilty in absentia by the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan of abuse of power and authority, extortion and repeated bribes of millions of dollars, illegal acquisitions, the storage and transfer of weapons and ammunition, and tax evasion. Kazhegeldin was sentenced to ten years in prison, but has not returned to the country since. He continued to influence Kazakhstan's domestic politics from abroad until 2001 through the Republican People's Party of Kazakhstan, which he organized for this purpose. It was alleged that Kazhegeldin received kickbacks from a contract awarded to Tractebel in 1996 to run Almaty's electric company and power grid. A year later, the Belgian company also won a concession to manage gas pipelines in the south and west of Kazakhstan. In the U.S., meanwhile, the DOJ investigated claims Kazhegeldin received illegal payments of $6 million as part of a bribery scandal known as ‘Kazakhgate’....

4 days ago

Grain export Agriculture Russia Agricultural Export International trade Wheat export

Grain War: Has Kazakhstan Become Russia’s Victim?

The fall brought two headaches for Kazakhstani farmers: a rich grain harvest that coincided with an oversupply of grain on world markets, and Russia's ban on exporting Kazakh wheat to and transiting through Russia. Experts complain about the 40% failure of Kazakhstani grain exports, and representatives of farmer associations complain about low prices and high production costs and ask the government to buy their surplus products. The background is talk of a grain war between Moscow and Astana. Phytosanitary ban According to Kazakhstan's Ministry of Agriculture, this year the harvested area of crops amounted to 23.3 million hectares, of which 16.7 million were sown with cereals. Fieldwork has been completed by 99.7%. 26.5 million tons of grain were threshed. Proponents of the opinion that the agricultural authorities of Kazakhstan and Russia have entered into a hidden confrontation for external grain markets argue that Kazakhstan is a victim of this trade war. They cite the restrictions imposed by Rosselkhoznadzor in October as evidence. On October 1, the Russian agency asked Kazakhstan's Ministry of Agriculture to suspend the issuance of phytosanitary certificates for grain and its products, tomatoes, peppers, and sunflower seeds exported to the Russian Federation. On October 3, journalists asked Vice-Minister of Agriculture Ermek Kenzhekhanuly about the stage of fulfillment of this wish. He replied that the Russian side received a reply letter requesting evidence of phytosanitary control violations. According to him, Rosselkhoznadzor had not responded as of October 3. On October 17, the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance temporarily banned imports of several types of agricultural goods from Kazakhstan. Transit of wheat, lentils, and oilseed flax seeds through Russia's territory is allowed. Still, a phytosanitary certificate for the country of final destination must be issued, and grain must be transshipped directly from railcars into the ship's holds. At the same time, deliveries of tomatoes, peppers, sunflower seeds, and melons from Kazakhstan are prohibited, even for transit. Obstacles in response to the ban However, let's carefully review the Kazakhstani press. We will find that as early as September 3rd, Kazakhstani farmers sounded the alarm—Russia is pushing our grain out of traditional markets. Representatives of the Grain Union of Kazakhstan discussed the problems Kazakh traders face with the transit of domestic grain through the territory of the Russian Federation at a session with journalists at the Agricom forum. However, they cited only two cases of such restrictions but tried to convey another message—Russia has introduced hidden obstacles because of Kazakhstan's ban on grain imports from the Russian Federation, which was imposed as early as August 1. As reported by Kazakhstan's Ministry of Agriculture, the restrictions imply a complete ban on wheat imports by all modes of transportation. Previously, the restrictive measures provided for a ban on imports of goods by road, water, and rail (except for imports to poultry and flour mills) since April. The decision was made because, despite the previous ban, grain imports from Russia exceeded 1.1 million tons in six months. Experts considered...

2 weeks ago

Mongolia Bilateral Relations International Cooperation Foreign trade turnover Foreign Policy International Diplomacy

Diplomatic Renaissance: How Tokayev’s Visit to Mongolia Went

The recent state visit by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Mongolia, the first by a Kazakh president in 16 years, demonstrated an excellent approach to expanding Astana's strategic ties. After all, despite 32 years of diplomatic relations and a relatively extensive Kazakh diaspora in Mongolia, under the first president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Astana's ties with Ulaanbaatar were essentially put on hold. This pause in relations likely arose due to Mongolia's political reputation in the region. Protests often erupt in the country, sometimes becoming particularly violent. In 2008, when the Kazakh authorities justified their failures in the economy with the outbreak of the global economic crisis, a state of emergency was imposed in Mongolia for four days in July. The reason was violent opposition protests against the results of the parliamentary elections. Protesters smashed the headquarters of the ruling party and set fire to several buildings in the center of Ulaanbaatar, killing five people and injuring 300. For Mongolia, with its population of 3.4 million, this was a significant shock, as it was for its neighbors in the Eurasian region, where three leaders fell between 2003 and 2005 -- Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia, Leonid Kuchma in Ukraine, and Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan. All this was declared in the region as an “export of revolutions,” building around this notion, a conspiracy theory about the machinations of the U.S. State Department and George Soros. Tokayev's state visit to Mongolia 16 years after Nursultan Nazarbayev refers to the Kazakh leader's key idea about the renaissance of Central Asia. Mongolia is no stranger to the region in one way or another. The main thing for Kazakhstan is the strong Kazakh diaspora, which exceeds 117,000 people. This is the largest national minority in Mongolia and the second largest ethnic group after the titular one. A Kazakh newspaper is published in Mongolia, some Kazakh TV channels are shown on television, and there is an hour of radio news in Kazakh. In short, the basis for strengthening relations is powerful. Tokayev and the president of Mongolia, Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh, who received him, spoke in both narrow and extended formats about reaching the level of strategic partnership. Tokayev and Khurelsukh, even before the one-on-one meeting, had revitalized diplomatic and trade ties between Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Data from the Statistics Committee of the Ministry of National Economy of Kazakhstan provides evidence. Since 2017, there has been a steady decline in trade turnover between the countries. In 2017, its level was $74.8 million; in 2018 - $67.4 million; in 2019 - $59.9 million. In 2020, it fell to $29.3 million. COVID restrictions can explain such a sharp drop. In 2021, the turnover reached almost $61 million, but at the end of 2023, the trade volume jumped to $150 million. Therefore, when Tokayev said at a joint press briefing that he and the Mongolian president had agreed to turn over $500 million in the “foreseeable future,” this did not seem overly optimistic. The Kazakh delegation did not come empty-handed; during Tokayev's visit, the parties...

3 weeks ago

International Diplomacy Foreign Policy Geopolitics International Relations BRICS India China Russia

Kazakhstan’s Strategic Stand: Navigating BRICS Amidst Geopolitical Tensions

In recent days, BRICS - an intergovernmental organization comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE - has become one of the most critical topics on the Eurasian region's information agenda. Russian propaganda has presented the BRICS summit, which is taking place in Kazan, as a global event. However, the press secretary of Kazakhstan's president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, has stated that the republic has no plans to apply for BRICS membership in the foreseeable future, which has caused an adverse reaction in the Russian media, and led to a seemingly retaliatory Russian ban on Kazakhstan's agro-products. The Kazakhstani side, represented by the expert community, has tried to explain that its reasoning is based not only on Astana's national interest, but also on its obligations to its partners in Central Asia. Perhaps the most convincing argument is that the C5+1 mechanism is effective as a format for the region's interactions with the outside world. Therefore, it is not worth breaking this mechanism. No Central Asian country besides Kazakhstan has been invited to join BRICS, but Astana cannot afford to damage the established alliance by creating the conditions for distrust from its neighbors; Central Asia has already gone through a period of distrust. At the same time, rejecting the idea of joining BRICS, where India, Russia, Brazil and China are the founding members, does not unduly affect Kazakhstan's interactions with these powers. Kazakhstan works with China and Russia within the framework of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union), and has signed multiple partnership and alliance agreements with Beijing and Moscow. In other words, the information hysteria that Kazakhstan will exit Russia's sphere tomorrow and join the "Global West" (a term used in the Russian media) has no basis in reality. At the same time, however, it is evident that most Central Asian countries are trying to distance themselves from Russia as much as possible, maintaining cooperation only along certain economic lines. Even banks in Kyrgyzstan, a republic maximally dependent on Moscow on several essential issues, have stopped working with Russian banks. The Kazakhstan Stock Exchange, meanwhile, recently announced the end of cooperation with the sanctioned Moscow Stock Exchange. Moreover, Rosselkhoznadzor's ban on imports of a wide range of agro-industrial products from Kazakhstan, if not a response to the refusal to join the BRICS, clearly hints that behind the scenes, economic relations between Astana and Moscow are not all that smooth. Another argument against joining BRICS was voiced not just within Kazakhstan, but also by Russian experts. Despite the organization's purportedly representative nature, which includes countries with a combined population of 3.5 billion people (45% of the Earth's population), the association has no structure. Russian analysts opposed to the Kremlin believe that BRICS is a club where one can come, sabre-rattle at the West, conclude bilateral agreements, and forget about everything until the next summit. No coordinating center monitors the implementation of any agreements reached. BRICS was conceived as an intercontinental organization, uniting similar economies in volume and GDP. Thus, it initially included Brazil, representing...

4 weeks ago