Our People > Andrei Matveev

Journalist

Andrei Matveev is a journalist from Kazakhstan.

Articles

devaluation

Devaluation in Kazakhstan: Grim Forecast or Financial Strategy?

Expectations of a potential devaluation of Kazakhstan's national currency, the tenge, are gaining momentum in the country, despite its recent strengthening against the dollar. While the government projects stability, some financial players and experts openly support a weaker tenge. But are these fears grounded in economic reality, or do particular interests drive them? Kazakhstan’s currency is particularly sensitive to global market shifts because around half of the country’s export revenues come from oil and other raw materials. When commodity prices fall or external demand weakens, pressure on the tenge increases. The currency is also affected by high import dependence: many consumer goods, industrial inputs, and food products are priced in foreign currencies, making the economy highly responsive to exchange-rate movements. One of the most vocal proponents of a free-floating tenge is economist Aidarkhan Kusainov, a former adviser to the head of the National Bank. A long-time advocate for a free-floating tenge, Kusainov maintains that the currency remains overvalued. In 2021, he predicted the exchange rate would reach 500 tenge to the $1. As of now, the rate hovers around 510. Kusainov has recently gained broader attention following his criticism of rising taxes and utility tariffs during an appearance on a YouTube podcast hosted by Senate Speaker Maulen Ashimbayev. “Today, the singer of devaluation, a well-known but unpopular economist, woke up as a competent people’s professional (judging by the comments),” Kusainov wrote, replete with smiling emojis in assessing his newfound popularity on his Telegram channel. His prediction of a $1-to-1,000-tenge exchange rate has indeed gone viral. “If our National Fund runs out today, the exchange rate will instantly soar above 1,000. As soon as we stop injecting petrodollars and transfers into the economy, the tenge will drop to 800–900, and then quickly weaken to beyond 1,000. I've always advocated for these measures," he said in an interview with Ulysmedia. These debates are unfolding against a backdrop of persistent inflationary pressure. Although headline inflation has moderated from its earlier peaks, price growth in consumer-credit-driven segments remains elevated. Any significant weakening of the tenge would likely feed directly into consumer prices, especially for imported goods, which still account for a large share of household consumption. Kusainov's projection is not shared by the majority of analysts, however, who see such a scenario occurring only under the weight of severe external shocks. In contrast, the National Bank’s forecasts remain more conservative. According to analysts surveyed by the Central Bank in November 2025, the exchange rate is expected to reach 525.8 tenge by the end of 2025. For 2026 and 2027, the tenge is projected to weaken gradually to 548.2 and 565, respectively. Economist Serik Kozybaev, among others, rejects the idea of a sharp devaluation. He has attributed the tenge’s recent strength to currency interventions by the National Bank: “There are no serious reasons for such a significant weakening. On the contrary, over the past month, the exchange rate improved from 540 to 518 due to announced interventions. I expect this trend to continue, possibly bringing...

4 days ago

Freedom of Speech

Information Sovereignty? Central Asia Tightens Control Over Its Information Space

Across the post-Soviet space, governments are adopting new measures that affect the scope of free expression. Similar trends are visible in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and parts of Eastern Europe, reflecting wider global shifts in how states manage their information environments. In Central Asia, where journalism has long faced political constraints, recent policies indicate a renewed emphasis on controlling the flow of information. From Georgia to Kazakhstan: Pushback Against Foreign Narratives Recent events in Georgia highlight these changes. The adoption of a controversial “foreign agents” law, widely described as a Russian-style or “pro-Russian” measure, reflected the ruling party’s growing hostility to foreign-funded media and NGOs, many backed by European donors, and triggered mass pro-EU protests in Tbilisi. Similar dynamics are emerging in Central Asia, where officials increasingly view foreign narratives as interference in domestic affairs. In Kazakhstan, legislative restrictions on so-called "LGBT propaganda" have sparked both domestic protests and criticism from international partners. At the same time, well-known media figure Gulnar Bazhkenova, editor-in-chief of Orda.kz, has been placed under house arrest, an episode that underscores the tightening environment for journalists. The Bazhkenova Case: A Turning Point for Kazakh Media Bazhkenova, a prominent editor known for critical coverage of Kazakhstan’s political elite and security services, came under scrutiny after Orda.kz falsely reported the arrest of Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, an unverified claim that was quickly debunked. Although Nurtleu remained in his position immediately afterward, he was dismissed later in September, prompting speculation that the incident had political consequences. Soon after his departure, law enforcement launched an investigation into Bazhkenova. On December 1, Almaty police searched her residence and the offices of Orda.kz. Authorities stated that a 2024 article had disseminated false information regarding a law enforcement officer allegedly caught accepting a bribe, an incident that officials assert never occurred. Another article reportedly misrepresented details in a property dispute, allegedly damaging the business reputation of the involved party. The Almaty police have since opened additional investigations into past publications from Orda.kz that may contain misleading content. Media organizations have largely responded with condemnation, urging the authorities to decriminalize the dissemination of false information and instead treat such cases under civil law. However, the Union of Journalists of Kazakhstan issued a pointed statement calling on media professionals to “treat the preparation and dissemination of information responsibly. Individual cases for the dissemination of inaccurate information cast a shadow on the entire journalistic community of our country,” the organization said. An implicit acknowledgment, perhaps, that Bazhkenova’s actions may have crossed legal or ethical boundaries. Parallel Cases and Regional Patterns While suppression of the media in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan has long been widespread, Kyrgyzstan - long considered the most politically open country in Central Asia - has also moved to tighten control over its information space. In early 2024, authorities introduced a controversial “foreign representatives” law requiring NGOs and media outlets receiving international funding to register under a special status, echoing legislation seen in Russia and Georgia. Independent outlets such as Kloop, Temirov Live, and Azattyk...

1 week ago

Electoral Reform

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s Electoral Reforms – Why Officials and Experts Are Reconsidering Local Democracy

The metaphor that history moves in a spiral has resurfaced in Kazakhstan, where ongoing debates over electoral reform and information policy are testing the boundaries of the country’s democratic trajectory. Recent official messaging points toward a more managed model of political participation, framed as a necessary response to emerging challenges. This trajectory was articulated by State Councilor Erlan Karin in his article, "The Politics of Common Sense," published in the state-run Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. In the piece, Karin reflects on the formation of public values in Kazakhstan, portraying it as an evolutionary process. Simultaneously, Karin references government-led social programs, such as “Law and Order,” “Clean Kazakhstan,” and “Adal Azamat” - a program focused on building character, promoting civic responsibility, and fostering national unity - as instruments of state-directed civic education. Karin reiterates his previously stated position on the existence of “red lines” in public discourse, sensitive subjects such as interethnic relations, religion, language, and foreign policy. While insisting that these topics should not be off-limits, he calls for “common sense” in how they are discussed. “When it comes to public stability, the state will not compromise,” he asserts, adding that the government will lawfully oppose any attempts at “destructive information influence and incitement to hatred.” Karin also highlights what he describes as a new category of problematic actors: "This spring, I drew attention to a phenomenon known as ‘inforeket,’ in which certain bloggers and activists engage in outright extortion. This practice stems from past policies of appeasement toward disruptive elements, which encouraged the rise of pseudo-public figures, bloggers, and ‘tame oppositionists.’ Now abandoned by their once-powerful patrons and wealthy clients, they continue to seek income using outdated methods." In the same article, Karin names a group of experts, deputies, and public figures who contributed input to the new internal policy principles. Several of these individuals are currently advancing proposals to revise aspects of Kazakhstan’s electoral system—particularly the mechanisms for selecting district akims. Among them is Berik Abdygaliuly, political scientist, historian, and director of the National Museum of Kazakhstan. In a recent podcast, Abdygaliuly argued for reconsidering the model of electing district akims. He noted that while more than 3,000 rural akims and maslikhat deputies have been elected in recent years, the outcomes have been mixed. Voter fatigue is mounting, he said, and the financial costs of repeated campaigns - amounting to hundreds of millions of tenge - have not corresponded with visible improvements in local governance. His proposal is that district akims should be chosen not by direct popular vote but by maslikhats, the local representative bodies empowered to demand reports, assess performance, express no confidence, and initiate dismissals. This idea quickly gained support from other commentators participating in public discussions of governance reform. Political analyst Marat Shibutov wrote on his Telegram channel that the electorate is “simply getting tired of elections” after several consecutive voting cycles since 2021. Shibutov supported the idea of “revising or freezing” the election mechanism for district akims as “rational.” Meanwhile, political scientist Andrey Chebotarev highlighted...

2 weeks ago

CSTO

CSTO Summit in Bishkek: Armenia’s Boycott, Russia’s Agenda, and a New Secretary General

On November 27, Kyrgyzstan will host the annual summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Bishkek, bringing together foreign ministers, defense ministers, and security council secretaries from member states. While often portrayed in Russian media as an Eurasian analogue to NATO, the CSTO remains an organization heavily dependent on Russian military power. Should Moscow withdraw or reduce its support, the Organization’s relevance would likely collapse. A stark illustration of this fragility is Armenia, whose Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will boycott the summit entirely. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov confirmed that Armenia will not attend the session of the Collective Security Council, the CSTO’s highest governing body, though it does not object to the adoption of bloc-wide documents. According to the CSTO press service, the Council is expected to adopt a declaration outlining member states’ joint positions on current security challenges. Also on the agenda is the formal appointment of the next Secretary General for the 2026-2029 term, and the unveiling of Russia’s priorities for its upcoming presidency in 2026. President Vladimir Putin’s speech on these priorities is expected to dominate the summit. Armenia’s withdrawal highlights the CSTO’s waning cohesion, maintained largely by members' reliance on Russian security assistance, a dynamic in place since the Treaty’s inception in Tashkent on May 15, 1992. The original signatories included Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia joining in 1993. The treaty entered into force in 1994. Its central provision, Article 4, mandates collective defense: an attack on one member is considered an attack on all, obligating military and other forms of assistance in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter. In 1999, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan signed a protocol extending the treaty, establishing an automatic renewal every five years. The formal CSTO was created in 2002; its charter was registered with the UN the following year, and it has held observer status at the UN General Assembly since 2004. For Armenia, the CSTO’s relevance has waned dramatically since the bloc declined to intervene during the final phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. Yerevan’s disenchantment, however, predates 2023 and stretches back to the 2021–2022 border clashes, when it also felt the organization had failed to provide meaningful support. Kazakhstan, by contrast, remains a key beneficiary: the rapid CSTO deployment in January 2022 played a central role in stabilizing the country during a period of acute domestic unrest. As the current Secretary General, Imangali Tasmagambetov - an influential figure from the “Old Kazakhstan” elite - completes his term, the position is scheduled to rotate to Taalatbek Masadykov of Kyrgyzstan. Ushakov confirmed that Tasmagambetov will deliver a final report on the Organization’s activities and security concerns before officially stepping down on January 1. Masadykov, currently Deputy Secretary General, is expected to assume the role seamlessly. While Masadykov brings diplomatic gravitas, the question remains whether he can restrain Moscow and Minsk from pushing CSTO allies toward confrontation with NATO. Tasmagambetov leaves behind a significant legacy and an...

3 weeks ago

Lukoil

Lukoil ‘Garage Sale’ – Uzbekistan Bows Out, Kazakhstan Keeps Its Options Open

The story of the disposal of foreign assets by Lukoil, which has fallen under U.S. sanctions, is reaching its closing stages. A shortlist of potential buyers has already emerged, and in Kazakhstan intrigue remains: will the country’s national oil and gas company capitalise on the opportunity to acquire Lukoil’s shares in major projects? A recent Reuters report noted that potential buyers of Lukoil’s assets face two key complications: first, U.S. firms, such as Carlyle, Chevron, and Exxon, are seen by analysts as more likely to get licensed, meaning deals will only be recognised after proper U.S. licence approval. Second, Lukoil itself had preferred to sell its assets as a package deal rather than piecemeal. However, after a deal to offload assets to Guvnor collapsed, several analyses now say a full package sale is unlikely and that piecemeal deals are more realistic or even more profitable. A new negotiation deadline has now been set for December 13, 2025, for the completion of authorised transactions. Kazakhstan-based oil and gas market observer Oleg Chervinsky suggests that this could increase the likelihood of a “twostage process”. “Most likely, a single buyer with sufficient resources will purchase all of Lukoil’s foreign assets at a significant discount, then sell them off in parts,” Chervinsky said. Some media reports point to the U.S. investment firm Carlyle Group as showing interest in Lukoil’s assets. The firm is considered a plausible main buyer due to its former ties to U.S. presidents Bush senior and junior. In this scenario, Carlyle would act both as buyer and organiser of the subsequent 'garage sale' of individual assets. Other firms, such as Chevron Corporation and ExxonMobil, have already been linked in reports with interest in Lukoil’s Kazakh stakes in the Tengiz and Karachaganak oil fields, while Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) has shown interest in Lukoil’s Uzbek gas projects. Meanwhile, three weeks ago, Uzbekistan made its position clear: it will not participate in the acquisition of Lukoil’s assets. Uzbekneftegaz Chairman Bahodir Sidikov said that "Buying out Lukoil’s assets in Uzbekistan is not on the table right now.” In Kazakhstan, energy sector experts believe that this moment presents a real window of opportunity to acquire Lukoil’s shares in systemically important oil and gas projects. “Why hasn’t our Ministry of Energy asked: does the Ministry approve changes in the shareholder structure under the terms of the stabilized contracts for Tengiz and Karachaganak? These shares (if a sale takes place) should go to KazMunayGas. If KMG doesn’t have the cash, then the Chinese state-owned CNPC should be brought in. To balance interests, it would be optimal for one of the world’s largest oil corporations to enter Tengiz and Karachaganak,” argues specialist Olzhas Baidildinov. Baidildinov cited a review by Norway’s Rystad Energy estimating that Lukoil’s net cash flow from its Tengiz stake over the next five years will total $2.8 billion, and from Karachaganak $2.1 billion. However, Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Erlan Akkenzhenov recently stated that the government is not considering a purchase of Lukoil’s shares. At the same time,...

3 weeks ago