Our People > Andrei Matveev

Journalist

Andrei Matveev is a journalist from Kazakhstan.

Articles

Military Defense

Uzbekistan’s Reported Chinese Jet Deal in a Changing Arms Market

China’s J-10CE could become Uzbekistan’s first new combat fighter in decades that was designed neither in Russia nor the Soviet Union. This summer, defense publications and analysts reported that Tashkent had allegedly already received the first aircraft and could eventually acquire 24 jets. Neither Uzbekistan nor China has confirmed the deal. If the reports prove accurate, the purchase would mark a notable shift for a region whose armed forces still rely heavily on Soviet- and Russian-made equipment. For decades, Russia was the natural source of new weapons, spare parts and maintenance. Its position is no longer unchallenged. China can offer combat aircraft and air-defense systems, Turkey has established itself in the drone market, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are developing their own defense industries. Whether or not the reports prove accurate, they point to two broader trends: Central Asian countries are increasingly looking beyond Russia for newer military technology, while some are also trying to produce more equipment at home. Shadow Purchase In July, reports emerged of the alleged delivery of four J-10CEs to Uzbekistan. The aircraft is the export version of the Chinese J-10C multirole fighter manufactured by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. Its export variant has already been purchased by Pakistan. Subsequent reports spoke of a possible contract for 24 aircraft and of Uzbek pilots undergoing training in China. Uzbek news outlet Kun.uz attempted to verify the claims and contacted the country’s Ministry of Defense. The ministry responded that it had no information it could provide on the matter. Chinese authorities and manufacturers have also made no public announcement of a sale. Nevertheless, throughout the summer, reports of Uzbekistan purchasing J-10CEs have refused to die down. Russian Weapons Remain the Backbone of Existing Arsenals Uzbekistan inherited a combat aircraft fleet from the Soviet Union built primarily around MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters. These aircraft were developed in the Soviet era, and after the collapse of the USSR, Russia remained the main source of compatible spare parts, weapons, repairs, and upgrades. The reports about the J-10CE challenge this established model. A new fighter comes with a different weapons, maintenance and training ecosystem. Over time, this creates dependence on a new supplier. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, Russian exports of major arms in 2021–2025 were 64% lower than during the previous five-year period. Russia’s share of global arms exports fell from 21% to 6.8%, leaving it the world’s third-largest supplier after the United States and France. Those figures do not mean that China has replaced Russia as Central Asia’s dominant arms supplier. Russia retains a strong position, above all because of the equipment Central Asian militaries already operate. Kazakhstan is perhaps the clearest example. According to SIPRI data for 2021–2025, Russia accounted for 83% of Kazakhstan’s imports of major arms. Spain accounted for 7.9% and France for 3.6%. Kazakhstan operates Russian Su-30SM fighters, as well as helicopters, armored vehicles and air-defense systems. Any abrupt change in procurement policy would raise questions over the compatibility of ammunition, communications systems, maintenance, and the training of crews...

4 days ago

Cyberattacks Cyber Security

SilkParasite Cyberespionage Campaign Targets Central Asian Governments

Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a cyberespionage campaign targeting government bodies across all five Central Asian states, as well as Georgia. Bitdefender Labs discovered the campaign after detecting malware at an unnamed Central Asian government institution involved in economic decision-making. Researchers later found malicious documents tailored to government targets in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia. The documents were designed to look legitimate and trick recipients into opening files that could infect their computers. Bitdefender has been tracking the campaign, dubbed SilkParasite, since late 2025 and assesses with medium confidence that it is linked to Chinese cyberespionage activity. However, the company has not identified a specific group behind the operation, nor does it claim Chinese government involvement. How the Attack Works The attackers appear to have gained access through targeted phishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office documents, sometimes hidden inside password-protected archives. The password is supplied in the email, a technique that can make the attachments harder for automated security systems to inspect. Once opened, the documents can run malicious code that installs software giving the attackers remote access to the computer. Bitdefender found seven families of remote access trojans, or RATs, five of which had not previously been documented. RATs are programs that allow attackers to control an infected device from a distance, including running commands and accessing files. One of the new tools, DriveSilkRAT, uses Google Drive to exchange data with an infected machine, allowing malicious traffic to blend in with traffic from a legitimate cloud service. Bitdefender also found signs that artificial intelligence had been used to assist in developing some of the malware. However, the researchers say the software was primarily built by skilled human developers rather than generated by AI. Why Bitdefender Points to a China Nexus Bitdefender bases its China assessment on several technical clues. These include links between malware used by SilkParasite and tools previously associated with China-based espionage groups, as well as several IP addresses tied to China Unicom’s network. Researchers also found overlap with malware previously seen in the FamousSparrow campaign. Martin Zugec, technical solutions director at Bitdefender, told cybersecurity news publication Dark Reading that the tools used in the campaign are designed to remain hidden and preserve long-term access. The attackers also use trusted services and legitimate applications, which can make malicious activity more difficult to detect. Zugec argues that Central Asia has become a more important intelligence target as China’s economic role in the region has expanded. What Is Known About the Potential Damage Kazakhstan has already experienced a sharp rise in cyber incidents. Around 30,000 information security incidents were recorded in the first months of 2025, roughly twice the number reported a year earlier. In May 2025, a large-scale DDoS attack disrupted access to government websites, banking services, and telecommunications networks. SilkParasite represents a different type of threat. Unlike DDoS attacks, which are designed to overwhelm online services, the RATs identified by Bitdefender are designed to gain and maintain remote access to compromised systems. Bitdefender has not disclosed what information, if any,...

1 week ago

Oil Exports

Push for Kazakhstan Oil Exports Diversification as CPC Disruptions Expose Capacity Gap

Kazakhstan has spent years looking for more ways to export its oil without relying so heavily on Russia. This summer has shown how difficult that remains. Shipments to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline have been suspended since May, disruptions on the Black Sea in July forced Tengiz to more than halve production, and now Russia is rerouting Kazakh crude from Ust-Luga to Novorossiysk to free Baltic capacity for its own oil. The shift comes as exports from Russia’s western ports ran 15% below plan in the first half of August, with Novorossiysk shipments of Russian Urals and Kazakh KEBCO falling to around 400,000 barrels per day. At least two cargoes of Kazakhstan’s KEBCO crude scheduled for loading at Ust-Luga in late August will instead be shipped through the Black Sea. No KEBCO loadings are currently planned at the Baltic port in September. The move will free up about 100,000 barrels per day of export capacity at Ust-Luga for Russian crude. Kazakh producers support the arrangement because shipments through Novorossiysk are currently more profitable. From a commercial standpoint, the decision is understandable. But Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk give Kazakhstan access to two different seas while remaining Russian ports. And Novorossiysk, where the KEBCO cargoes are now being redirected, had itself suspended crude loadings only a few days earlier. On August 14, loadings at the Sheskharis terminal, Novorossiysk port’s main oil-export facility, were halted following a drone attack. The facility handles around 700,000 barrels per day and loads Russian Urals and Siberian Light as well as Kazakhstan’s KEBCO. Operations resumed on August 16, and one of the first tankers to load was carrying Kazakh crude. Another 80,000-ton KEBCO cargo was due to begin loading on August 18. Kazakhstan’s far larger vulnerability, however, is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Its marine terminal near Novorossiysk is separate from Sheskharis. In 2025, the country exported 78.7 million metric tons of oil, of which 64.8 million tons were shipped through CPC. Volumes through the pipeline rose by 18% compared with 2024, largely as production increased following the Tengiz expansion. The July disruptions showed how quickly problems on that route can affect production inside Kazakhstan. After drone attacks near the CPC terminal forced restrictions on loadings, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production fell by about 21% by July 22 to roughly 1.63 million barrels per day, from a July average of 2.07 million barrels per day. Tengiz output dropped from a July average of around 925,000 barrels per day to about 406,000. A few days later, the situation deteriorated further. On July 26, Kazakhstan produced around 1 million barrels per day of oil and gas condensate, down from an average of 2.16 million barrels per day in June. Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak all had to reduce production. On July 27, CPC resumed loadings after a week-long suspension. CPC accounts for more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, so replacing it quickly with other routes is impossible. The pipeline typically carries around 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day....

1 week ago

Former Presidents

What Do Former Presidents Do? From Akayev to Nazarbayev, the Fates of Central Asia’s Ex-Leaders

Central Asia has produced remarkably few former presidents who simply retired from public life. In Kyrgyzstan, former leaders have been driven from office, prosecuted, imprisoned, or forced into exile. Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev has followed a different path, largely withdrawing from public view after losing much of his political influence. Elsewhere, some of the region’s founding presidents died in office, leaving no post-presidential career to examine. The Times of Central Asia has previously examined how political succession has developed across the region. The fate of leaders after they leave office reveals another side of that political tradition. The architect of Kyrgyzstan’s early post-Soviet political model was its first president, Askar Akayev, who remained in office until 2005. Akayev introduced democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan, but gradually tightened the pressure on his opponents as his presidency progressed. His rule was badly shaken by the Aksy shootings in 2002, which followed the prosecution of opposition lawmaker Azimbek Beknazarov and a territorial dispute with China. Akayev’s government had agreed to transfer disputed border territory to China, a decision fiercely criticized by the opposition. In March 2002, demonstrators in southern Kyrgyzstan demanded Akayev’s impeachment. Security forces opened fire during the unrest, killing several people. The shootings became one of the defining political crises of his presidency. In a 2003 referendum, Akayev significantly strengthened presidential powers at parliament’s expense. Economic hardship, unemployment, widespread corruption, and allegations of fraud in the 2005 parliamentary elections eventually helped trigger the Tulip Revolution in March of that year. Akayev had to flee, with rumors at the time claiming that he was smuggled out in the trunk of an official car, wrapped in a carpet. Criminal cases involving corruption were opened against him and members of his family in Kyrgyzstan. The authorities repeatedly sought his extradition from Russia, but were unsuccessful. After leaving Kyrgyzstan, Akayev lived in Moscow and taught at Moscow State University. In 2006, he became a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In August 2021, Akayev reappeared in Bishkek. He unexpectedly flew into the country and was immediately questioned as part of the criminal investigation into corruption surrounding the Kumtor gold mine. Afterward, he said he had come to Bishkek for a week and was prepared to assist investigators. “I came to speak honestly and sincerely about how we built Kumtor, why we built it, and what mistakes may have been made. The investigation will continue,” he said. In 2023, Kyrgyzstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office announced that the criminal prosecution of Akayev had been terminated because the statute of limitations had expired. Tajikistan’s former president Rahmon Nabiyev was also forced from power. The former Soviet politician lost power amid the country’s civil war in 1992. He died at his home in Khujand the following year, at the age of 62, reportedly from a heart attack. According to his wife, Nabiyev spent his final months in Khujand in conditions resembling house arrest and received a pension of just five rubles. While Tajikistan did not repeat the experiment of violently...

2 weeks ago

Kurultai Election

Kazakhstan Kurultai Election: Can a Third Party Break Through?

With only weeks remaining before Kazakhstan elects its new 145-member Kurultai on August 23, three national surveys point to a commanding victory for Adilet and place Auyl in second. The less certain question is whether Ak Zhol, Respublica, or another smaller party can clear the 5% electoral threshold and join them in the new legislature. Seven political parties have been registered to contest the vote. All 145 seats will be allocated through nationwide party lists, so small changes around the threshold could have a large effect on the composition of Kazakhstan's first Kurultai. The election is the first under Kazakhstan's new constitutional framework, which replaced the former bicameral parliament with a single-chamber Kurultai. The constitutional reform represents the most significant redesign of the country's political institutions in decades and places greater weight on political parties in the legislative process. The available polls differ in timing, method, sample size, and the proportion of undecided voters. Their exact figures are therefore not directly comparable. However, they agree on the broad shape of the race: Adilet leads by a wide margin, Auyl holds second place, and several parties remain close to or below the threshold. The latest Institute of Eurasian Integration survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews with 4,000 respondents in all 17 regions, as well as Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent, from July 16 to 26. Its stated margin of error was no more than 1.54%. That poll put Adilet on 65.1% and Auyl on 5.9%. Ak Zhol stood at 4.7%, marginally ahead of Respublica on 4.6%. The Nationwide Social Democratic Party, or NSDP, received 4.2%, the People's Party of Kazakhstan 4.1%, and the Baytaq Green Party 0.5%. An earlier DATAmetrics poll, commissioned by the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, interviewed 8,000 people face-to-face from June 13 to July 2. It gave Adilet 54.2%, Auyl 7.3%, Ak Zhol 4.6%, and Respublica 3.4%. One in five respondents had not chosen a party. A telephone survey by the Kazakhstan Institute of Public Development covered 1,200 respondents from July 8 to 20. It put Adilet on 64.8%, Auyl on 5.4%, Respublica on 4.8%, and Ak Zhol on 4.7%, with 10.9% undecided. Taken together, the surveys do not identify a clear third-place party. They do show that Ak Zhol and Respublica are the most consistent contenders for an additional place in the Kurultai. The latest Institute of Eurasian Integration poll also places the NSDP and the People's Party within striking distance, although the other surveys put both further behind. Adilet's lead is unsurprising. Although the Adilet Party was officially registered only this year, it is not starting from scratch. Amanat, formerly known as Nur Otan, merged into Adilet in June, transferring the organization and political network that dominated Kazakhstan throughout most of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev's rule. The merger also placed the former ruling party inside a new organization led by allies of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. It completed a change of political branding while preserving a strong pro-presidential electoral machine. The sharper contest is therefore not for...

4 weeks ago

Regional Cooperation

Central Asia and Azerbaijan: What the Region’s Leaders Agreed at Issyk-Kul

The Kyrgyz resort town of Cholpon-Ata, on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul, briefly became Central Asia’s political capital as it hosted a series of high-level meetings, including bilateral talks between the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the state visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Only a few years ago, such a format would have seemed unlikely. Today, however, regional leaders are discussing joint railway projects, energy security, transport corridors, investment, and foreign-policy coordination rather than managing old disputes. The agreements reached in Cholpon-Ata suggest that the consultative format is gradually evolving from a platform for political dialogue into a mechanism for practical regional cooperation. From Conflict to Alliance Ahead of the informal multilateral meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held bilateral talks that set the tone for the broader regional meeting. Relations between the two countries now stand in sharp contrast to the situation sixteen years ago. Following the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, relations between Bishkek and Tashkent entered one of their most difficult periods since independence. The agenda between the two neighbors has since changed dramatically. Speaking in Cholpon-Ata, Mirziyoyev said relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had reached “a historic peak.” Bilateral trade has increased almost tenfold in recent years, reaching $1.2 billion last year. The two countries now have around 450 joint ventures, operate a joint Development Fund to support cooperative projects, and have established 15 air routes and five bus services linking their cities. Mirziyoyev described the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway as one of the most important joint initiatives between the two countries, arguing that the project would reshape transport links across Eurasia. “This railway will fundamentally change the geopolitical landscape. Those who understand what it took to make this happen know what a major achievement it is,” Mirziyoyev said. The talks concluded with the signing of a Treaty on Allied Relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The two sides also exchanged several bilateral documents, including agreements covering sections of their common border and the joint use of the Chashma spring. A Broader Regional Agenda While the Japarov-Mirziyoyev talks focused primarily on bilateral relations, the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan broadened the discussion to regional integration, transport connectivity, energy security, and foreign-policy coordination. Opening the meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov said one of the clearest results of closer regional cooperation had been the Central Asian countries’ growing support for one another on the international stage. As an example, he cited the region’s joint support for Kyrgyzstan’s successful bid for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2027-2028 term. Japarov also revived the idea of introducing a single tourist visa for foreign visitors traveling across Central Asia, proposing that the region’s foreign ministries intensify consultations on the initiative. Azerbaijan’s participation as a full member gave the meeting additional significance. Baku joined the consultative format as a...

4 weeks ago

e-Commerce

Wildberries Kazakhstan Sellers Count Losses After Ukraine Strikes

Over the past month, Ukrainian forces have carried out a series of strikes on the facilities of Russia's largest online marketplace, Wildberries. As with previous attacks on Russia's energy infrastructure, including that of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the consequences are again being felt by citizens and businesses in neighboring countries, highlighting the extent to which the war's economic effects now extend far beyond the battlefield. Since July 18, Ukrainian strikes have hit Wildberries logistics facilities in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Crimea, as well as in Tver and Tambov Oblasts. According to the Russian business daily Kommersant, the attacks damaged logistics facilities representing more than 10% of Wildberries’ total warehouse floor space, with a combined area exceeding 550,000 square meters. Alongside Wildberries, another major Russian marketplace, Ozon, also operates in Kazakhstan. Its logistics network has so far not been affected by similar attacks. Together, the two companies account for more than 85% of Kazakhstan’s cross-border online marketplace segment, according to data presented in June by Mazhilis deputy Aituar Koshmambetov during parliamentary discussions on the development of e-commerce. E-commerce has become one of Kazakhstan’s fastest-growing sectors, expanding roughly fivefold since 2020. The market was valued at $6.7 billion in 2025, and the government aims to increase that figure to $19.5 billion by 2029. Against that backdrop, Kazakh sellers were always likely to be affected sooner or later. On Tuesday, Kazakhstan’s National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, Atameken, said it had begun collecting information on Kazakh businesses affected by the attacks on Wildberries facilities in Russia. According to preliminary estimates by the Ecommerce-KZ Association, more than 100 member companies suffered losses as a result of fires at the marketplace’s logistics centers. Their combined losses exceed $2.1 million. Following an request from Atameken to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration, the ministry has approached Russian authorities and the Wildberries for further information. For neighboring Kyrgyzstan, the situation surrounding Wildberries has proved even more painful. Compensation for lost goods is now being discussed at the level of the country’s economy minister, who is negotiating with the marketplace’s management. Much of Kyrgyzstan’s garment industry and trading sector now depend on Wildberries. According to the country’s association of garment manufacturers, individual producers have suffered losses ranging from 1 million to 100 million Kyrgyz soms, or approximately $11,400 to $1.14 million. While businesses in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are counting their losses, Wildberries itself appears to be reconsidering its logistics strategy. According to a report in Kommersant, the company has begun searching for vacant warehouse space in Kazakhstan and is prepared to lease virtually all of the country’s available modern warehouse capacity. According to NF Group, only 5.8% of Kazakhstan's modern warehouse space was vacant at the end of 2025. Stanislav Akhmedzyanov, managing partner at IBC Global, said the Kazakh market has no single warehouse facility of 100,000 square meters, which is reportedly the amount of space Wildberries requires. As of the end of June 2026, only 130,000 square meters of warehouse space remained available across the country, scattered...

1 month ago

U.S. Tariffs

U.S. Imposes 12.5% Tariff on Kazakhstan Over Third-Country Import Controls

Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian economy included in a new U.S. tariff action covering 60 trading partners. An additional tariff of 12.5% has been imposed on a range of Kazakh goods, excluding products listed in the annexes to the final decision. The rate applies to goods entered for consumption in the United States from July 24, 2026. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration said about 95% of the country’s exports to the United States would remain outside the measure because of the exemptions. It also said the new tariff replaces an expired temporary 10% surcharge and will not be added to it. Kazakhstan already prohibits forced labor in domestic employment under Article 7 of its Labor Code. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) did not allege that Kazakh exporters use forced labor. Its finding concerned a separate gap: Kazakhstan lacks a customs prohibition capable of excluding foreign goods produced wholly or partly with forced labor. The investigation was launched in March under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, a mechanism that allows Washington to respond to foreign practices it considers discriminatory or restrictive to U.S. commerce. In June, USTR concluded that the policies of all 60 economies under review warranted action. The final decision followed more than 1,600 written comments and testimony from over 100 witnesses. Most of the economies were divided into two rate groups, while the European Union, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Switzerland received special treatment linked to existing most-favored-nation tariffs. This was not a Kazakhstan-specific finding. USTR identified the same deficiency in 53 other economies, including Australia, Japan, Norway, Singapore, and South Korea. Together, the 60 economies under investigation accounted for 99.4% of U.S. imports. A 10% tariff was imposed on countries that had introduced at least a partial ban on imports associated with forced labor or made corresponding commitments to Washington. Kazakhstan was placed in the 12.5% category alongside Australia, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and several other U.S. trading partners, as well as China and Russia. The immediate cost to Kazakhstan will depend largely on the scope of the exemptions. Washington exempted raw materials where tariffs could leave the U.S. market without sufficient domestic supply, products whose higher cost could cause wider economic disruption, and goods that the United States cannot produce in sufficient quantities or obtain elsewhere. The 12.5% rate therefore does not mean that all Kazakh exports will become more expensive in the American market. The structure of bilateral trade further limits the likely damage. Kazakhstan’s exports to the United States are concentrated in commodities, particularly oil, uranium, metals, and semi-processed materials. Many serve U.S. energy and industrial needs. The Kazakh government’s estimate that about 95% of exports remain exempt indicates that the largest trade flows should avoid the additional tariff, although the U.S. notice does not provide a Kazakhstan-specific calculation. According to U.S. figures, goods trade between the two countries reached $5 billion in 2025. U.S. imports from Kazakhstan rose by 73%...

1 month ago

Kashagan

Kazakhstan’s $5 Billion Kashagan Fine Moves Into New Legal Phase

Kazakhstan has escalated its dispute with the foreign investors behind the Kashagan oil field, warning the consortium’s managing director that he could face administrative and criminal liability over its failure to pay an environmental fine of nearly $5 billion. The warning to Giancarlo Ruiu, managing director of North Caspian Operating Company, was reported by Reuters, which cited two sources and a document it had reviewed. NCOC’s shareholders include Eni, ExxonMobil, Shell, and TotalEnergies, each with a 16.81% stake; Kazakhstan’s state-owned KazMunayGas, with 16.88%; CNPC, with 8.33%; and Inpex, with 7.56%. The dispute began after the Department of Ecology for the Atyrau Region inspected the consortium’s production facilities in 2022 and identified about ten alleged violations. Inspectors said that by November 1, 2022, more than 1.7 million metric tons of sulfur had accumulated at a storage site within the Bolashak oil and gas processing complex. NCOC’s permit allowed it to store no more than 730,000 tons. According to the environmental authorities, the operator had exceeded the permitted limit by more than twofold. In early 2023, the regional environmental department issued a notification seeking 2.356 trillion tenge in penalties, equivalent to about $5.4 billion at the exchange rate at the time. NCOC rejected the allegations and maintained that its sulfur-handling operations complied with Kazakh law and the permits issued for the project. The proceedings continued for more than three years. In August 2025, a court set aside the original notification because of procedural deficiencies in the way it had been issued. The ruling did not dismiss the environmental allegations themselves. The authorities subsequently issued a new notification, allowing the case to proceed. After further domestic proceedings, the Atyrau Regional Court upheld the penalty on June 19, allowing the ruling to enter into force. It later emerged that members of the consortium had been aware of the risk posed by the growing sulfur stockpiles for years. In 2017, Eni warned that the project was heading towards exceeding the permitted storage capacity. By late 2020, NCOC had also cautioned that Kazakhstan’s new Environmental Code, adopted the following year, would increase the risk of substantial penalties. According to internal documents reported by Bloomberg, Eni executives proposed processing more of the sulfur for sale on international markets. ExxonMobil, TotalEnergies, CNPC, and Inpex were not planning comparable measures at the time, while KazMunayGas had yet to settle on a position. On July 14, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Justice said the domestic court ruling had entered into force and gave NCOC until July 20 to pay voluntarily. The ministry said compulsory enforcement proceedings could begin if the consortium failed to meet the deadline. NCOC did not pay by July 20. The Justice Ministry subsequently warned Ruiu of possible liability for non-compliance, marking a further escalation in a dispute that had already moved beyond the original question of sulfur storage. The consortium continued to deny wrongdoing and maintained that the penalty could not be enforced while international arbitration proceedings were under way. Its foreign shareholders are separately challenging the fine...

1 month ago

Azerbaijan

Aliyev Sees Azerbaijan and Central Asia’s Interests Converging

The Shusha Global Media Forum, an annual gathering held in Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region and conceived as a platform for journalists and media representatives from dozens of countries across Europe and beyond, including the United States, acquired broader regional significance last year because of its consequences for several Russian participants. Last year’s forum attracted widespread attention in Russia after two prominent Russian participants faced repercussions at home. Mikhail Gusman, then first deputy director general of the state news agency TASS, was dismissed shortly after attending the event and praising Azerbaijan, although no official reason was given. The following month, pro-Kremlin political analyst Sergei Markov was designated a “foreign agent” after facing criticism for his favorable comments about Azerbaijan. It was therefore unsurprising that this year’s forum attracted close attention from media outlets around the world. Beyond the forum’s Russia-related significance, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev’s remarks pointed to a broader regional shift. Azerbaijan increasingly sees its political and economic interests converging with those of Central Asia, particularly through the Middle Corridor, cross-Caspian energy links, and infrastructure cooperation. According to official figures, approximately 160 journalists, experts, and public officials from 53 countries attended the event. The forum brought together representatives of around 30 international news agencies, more than 60 leading media organizations, and roughly 10 international organizations and companies. Former TASS executive Mikhail Gusman attended the fourth Shusha Global Media Forum and highlighted its growing international profile. “There are very few, if any, media platforms in the world that bring together representatives of media organizations from every region to exchange views and engage in dialogue. That is precisely why the importance of this forum cannot be overstated,” he said. As in previous years, President Aliyev opened the forum and spent nearly three hours answering questions from journalists representing a wide range of countries. Given the latest deterioration in relations between Baku and Moscow, many observers were watching to see whether questions would prompt unusually sharp comments about Russia. The organizers did not shy away from potentially sensitive questions. Ukrainian journalist Dmytro Gordon, who has been designated an extremist in Russia, was once again invited to the forum and made full use of the opportunity. Gordon noted Ukrainian drone and missile strikes deep inside Russia before asking Aliyev what counsel he would offer Ukraine and President Vladimir Putin. “What advice would you give Putin today, when, in my view, he no longer has any good options left?” Gordon asked. Aliyev avoided an overtly confrontational response, stating that Ukraine should “never agree to occupation” and that the war “must be stopped—and stopped immediately.” Aliyev’s exchange with journalists and analysts from Europe and the United States painted a clear picture of Azerbaijan’s worldview and the role it sees for itself internationally. That perspective remains heavily shaped by the three-decade conflict between Baku and Yerevan over Karabakh. According to Aliyev, the United States, France, and Russia all sought to preserve the status quo during that period. He described those decades as a “time of war,” arguing that...

2 months ago

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