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Nikola Mikovic

Journalist

Nikola Mikovic is a freelance journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia. He covers mostly the foreign policies of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, as well as energy-related issues. Nikola primarily focuses on Russia’s involvement in post-Soviet space, the Middle East, and the Balkans. He writes for several publications such as Diplomatic Courier, Byline Times, CGTN, Lowy Institute, Global Comment, and World Geostratregic Insights, among others.

Articles

Russia China EU Cooperation EU Relations Economic Diversification

Opinion: In Central Asia, the EU Defies Its “Geopolitical Dwarf” Label

As the United States and Russia reportedly aim to create a new global security architecture, other major actors in the international arena are working to improve their positions in the redefined world order. Often underestimated in terms of its geopolitical influence, the European Union has actively focused its attention on the post-Soviet space, particularly the strategically important Central Asian region. The EU, despite Russia’s and the United States' attempts to undermine its role in the settlement of the Ukraine War and to portray it as a “geopolitical dwarf”, is seeking to increase its presence in global affairs. In Central Asia, the 27-nation bloc is often viewed as a key actor that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan can rely on to balance China’s growing dominance, as well as their security and dependence on Moscow. The EU's desire to strengthen cooperation with Central Asia can be seen as Brussels’ attempt to reduce Russia's influence in the region. Indeed, bogged down in Ukraine, Moscow is slowly but surely being pushed out of Central Asia – a region that has traditionally been within the Kremlin’s geopolitical orbit. As a result, China has managed to significantly increase its economic presence in all five Central Asian nations. The EU is now attempting to do the same. The recent visit of the European Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela to Central Asia, as well as the upcoming EU-Central Asia summit scheduled for April 3-4, 2025 in Samarkand, clearly indicates the intensifying geopolitical competition between the EU and China over the region. One of Síkela’s major goals was to expand the scope of the EU's investment strategy, Global Gateway, in Central Asia. The project, launched in 2021, is often viewed as the EU’s version of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As part of its strategy to increase its economic presence in Central Asia, the European Union seems to have four priorities: the development of transport infrastructure (particularly the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor), cooperation in raw materials, digital connectivity, and the development of the water resources, energy, and climate sectors. The problem for Brussels is that China, due to its proximity to Central Asia and the lack of bureaucratic procedures, is ahead of the EU in most, if not all of these areas. Beijing has had 12 years to strengthen economic ties with the region through the BRI. As a result, in 2024, China’s overall turnover with Central Asia reached $94.8 billion, nearly double the EU's trade volume with the region in 2022, which stood at $47 billion. Last year, the world’s second-largest economy replaced Russia as Kazakhstan's biggest trade partner. In neighboring Uzbekistan, it remains the top trading partner, while in Tajikistan, over the past 18 years, China has become the major investor in the landlocked nation’s economy. The same applies to Tajikistan and China’s neighbor Kyrgyzstan. The European Union, however, is now intensifying its efforts to position itself as a major foreign power operating in Central Asia. According to...

1 day ago

Trade War China Politics Trump Administration USA

How Trump’s Trade War on China Affects Central Asia

When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on China and the European Union could have severe consequences not only for Brussels and Beijing, but also for economies around the world. Central Asia is no exception, as it could easily be caught in the crossfire. Although no country in Central Asia sees the United States as its major economic partner, Trump’s trade war with the EU and China is expected to impact all Central Asian nations in one way or another. Their strong economic ties with China and the growing EU presence in the region were once seen as a strategic advantage. Now, it seems to represent a double-edged sword. As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, all Central Asian states have sought to strengthen economic relations with Beijing and Brussels. Their partnerships with China and the EU have grown through trade and investments, but Washington’s tariffs on Chinese and European goods could result in a reduction in demand for various items in Central Asia. Trump’s tariff policy could also give Beijing certain leverage over Washington in the strategically important region. According to Mark Temnycky, Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council Eurasia Center, as a way to counter the impact of U.S. tariffs, the Chinese could increase their trade and energy relations with the countries of Central Asia. “This would further accelerate China’s relationship with Central Asia, and it could result in the regional states becoming more dependent on the Chinese for trade. Given the proximity of China to Central Asia, this may also result in the regional nations reducing their trade relations with the European Union as well as with the United States, as they favor Chinese prices,” Temnycky told The Times of Central Asia in an interview. U.S. bilateral trade in the region has never been particularly strong. The exception is Kazakhstan – the region’s largest economy – which is the only country in Central Asia whose trade with the U.S. exceeds one billion dollars. According to official statistics, in 2024 America’s total goods trade with Kazakhstan was estimated at $3.4 billion. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan combined have a lower trade volume with the United States than Kazakhstan. But all that is just a drop in the ocean compared to the $89.4 billion trade China reached with Central Asian in 2023. “Trump’s tariff policy could lead to an even greater Central Asian states’ dependency on China, potentially creating a Chinese monopoly on Central Asian trade and energy. In other words, regional countries would no longer have a diversified economy and market, thus tightening China's control over the area,” Temnycky stressed. That, however, does not necessarily mean that Beijing will, in the long term, benefit from Washington’s tariff policy. According to Tyler Schipper, an economist and Associate Professor at the University of St. Thomas, China is “arguably at one of its economically weakest points in the last several decades,” which means that any trade war with the...

3 weeks ago

What Awaits Central Asia When the War in Ukraine Ends?

U.S. President Donald Trump seems resolute in his goal to end, or at least freeze, the war in Ukraine. To achieve such an ambitious objective, he is using a strategy of gradually normalizing relations with Russia, with his recent talks with Russian leader Vladimir Putin playing an important part. But how will Trump’s Russia policy impact Central Asia – a region that has traditionally been in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit, but is now aiming to develop closer ties with the West? Ever since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, on February 24, 2022, Kazakhstan – the region’s largest country – has been offering its services as a mediator. Astana hoped to eventually host peace talks between Russian and Ukrainian representatives. Such a possibility, at least at this point, does not seem very realistic, given that Putin and Trump are reportedly scheduled to meet in Saudi Arabia, and Kyiv and Moscow still refuse to negotiate directly. In the month since Trump returned to the White House, he has not focused on Central Asia. That, however, does not mean that Kazakhstan, as well as the other Central Asian countries, will not play a significant role in the post-war period. Several Russian analysts claim that Washington’s ultimate goal is to “turn Russia against China” and use Moscow as an instrument against Beijing in a potential new Cold War between the United States and the People’s Republic. Given the strategic importance of Central Asia for both Russia and China, in the long term, the region could very well become a theater for various proxy conflicts. For the time being, however, such a scenario does not seem very probable, as there is no strong anti-Chinese sentiment in Russia, and Central Asian nations are determined to continue pursuing their “multi-vector” foreign policies, rather than picking a side in global conflicts. Thus, once the Ukraine war comes to an end, regional actors will undoubtedly seek to strengthen their political, economic, and military positions, aiming to avoid being involved in another Great Game. Although economic indicators in Central Asia are trending upwards in many respects, higher wages in areas such as construction and the broader services sector can still be earned outside the region. Although Russia has traditionally been the top destination for Central Asian migrants, that might soon change. Faced with the growing anti-migrant sentiment that came as a result of the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in 2024, and the fact that Russia is actively recruiting labor migrants to fight in Ukraine, many of them are expected to look for new destinations, where they can find safer conditions and better opportunities. A post-war Ukraine could be one of them. According to Vasily Voskoboynik, President of the All-Ukrainian Association of Companies for International Employment, in 2023 Ukraine needed 4.5 million migrant workers, while the International Organization for Migration and the International Labor Organization believe that it will need 8.2 million laborers. In Voskoboynik’s view, it is necessary to consider countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, and India, as...

1 month ago

Economy Investment Middle Corridor

Kazakhstan is Striving for Investment Amid “Resource Nationalism”

Amid the war in Ukraine, as well as various geopolitical turbulences that threaten to fundamentally change the current global order, Kazakhstan is aiming to attract more foreign investment. The war in Ukraine has so far had a relatively positive impact on the economies of most Central Asian nations, giving Astana room to achieve its ambitious goal of attracting $150 billion in foreign direct investment by 2029. Kazakhstan, along with other neighboring actors, used the Russian invasion of Ukraine to develop closer economic ties with the West, namely with the European Union. It is therefore no surprise that, in 2022 and 2023, the EU member Netherlands invested over $12 billion in the Kazakh economy, making it the leading foreign investor. The United States, according to the official statistics, is the second-largest investor, with Switzerland rounding out the top three. Although between 2005 and its total foreign direct investment (FDI) reached $402 billion, Kazakhstan’s innovation agenda aims to attract $150 billion of FDI in the next five years while doubling the country’s GDP. The problem is that in 2023 the inflow of foreign direct investment into Kazakhstan decreased by 32.3%, which suggests that Astana may have a hard time finding ways to attract more capital into the Kazakh economy. Experts claim that there is no comprehensive development strategy for both industries and regions in Kazakhstan, which limits investments in its economy. But the creation of platforms with tax preferences, an independent regulator, and a regulatory environment based on the principles of British law are believed to contribute to the active development of entrepreneurship. In other words, the authorities in Kazakhstan are using a model based on practices in Britain and the United Arab Emirates to attract investment, drawing inspiration from the British Common Law system, as well as the Dubai International Financial Center, which served as a reference for the Astana International Financial Center. Given that both Kazakhstan and the UAE are economies based on fossil fuel exports, it is unlikely to be a coincidence that Astana aims to use Abu Dhabi’s experiences to improve its existing arrangements with foreign corporations operating in Kazakhstan. "Large investments require a long-term planning horizon. Therefore, the government will have to intensify negotiations regarding the extension of production sharing agreements contracts on the updated terms, favorable to the country," Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said on January 28, as foreign companies reportedly claim that Astana is seeking to increase its shares in key oil and gas projects in what amounts to "resource nationalism". At the same time, the Kazakh government seeks to create a favorable investment climate for foreign companies by reducing bureaucratic obstacles, introducing tax breaks, eliminating financial audits, and ensuring the protection of the legal rights of investors. Kazakhstan has also recently introduced a Digital Nomad visa (also called a 'Neo Nomad' visa), which grants foreign nationals the right to reside in the country while working for a foreign employer. Such a move can be interpreted as another attempt to attract foreign investment in Kazakhstan. ...

1 month ago

Exploring What’s Behind Iran’s Push in Tajikistan

As Turkey increases its influence among Turkic Central Asian nations, Tajikistan – the only Persian-speaking country in the region – is looking to Iran as a potential strategic partner. Dushanbe is aiming to significantly strengthen bilateral ties with Tehran, hoping that such a move will have a positive impact on its economy; but what are the Islamic Republic’s interests in Tajikistan? On January 15, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian paid an official visit to Dushanbe, where he met with his Tajik counterpart Emomali Rahmon. The fact that he led a delegation of the Iranian business community suggests that Tehran plans to increase its economic presence in the landlocked Central Asian state. In 2024, the two nations increased their trade volume by nearly 50% compared to 2023. The problem, however, is that their total trade turnover reached “only” $378 million, which is rather modest compared to the $1,12 billion trade volume achieved by Tajikistan and Russia in the first seven months of 2024. From 1995 to 2013, the Islamic Republic actively invested in the economy of Tajikistan, which led to the construction of the Sangtuda-2 Hydroelectric Power Plant and the tunnel at the Anzob Pass. However, between 2013-2021, economic relations between Tehran and Dushanbe deteriorated significantly. Now, Tajikistan hopes to see more Iranian investments in its economy. "Trade and the economy are among the priority areas of our bilateral relations. We voiced our interest in developing investment cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Rahmon said at a press conference after talks with Pezeshkian. As a result of their summit, Tajikistan and Iran significantly deepened their bilateral ties by signing 23 memoranda of understanding in sectors such as trade, energy, infrastructure, cultural exchange, and security. Since Daler Juma, Tajikistan's Minister of Energy and Water Resources attended the meeting between Tajik and Iranian delegations, it is almost certain that energy was one of the main topics that was discussed. For Dushanbe, it is crucial to secure funding for the completion of the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant, the Istiklol tunnel (also known as the Anzob Tunnel), where the Iranian company Farob is engaged in the construction, as well as a number of small and medium-sized projects. For Tehran, the economic aspect of cooperation with Tajikistan is undoubtedly very important, although it seems to have other ambitions in the Central Asian state as well. “Iran’s primary interest in Tajikistan is related to cultural and religious bonds, as it sees the country as part of its Persian-Iranian-Islamic civilization,” Fereshteh Sadeghi, a Tehran-based journalist who has worked with Iran's Press TV and Al Jazeera English, told The Times of Central Asia. In her view, by maintaining a good political relationship with Dushanbe, the Islamic Republic can significantly strengthen these cultural connections. “Tajiks speak Farsi, love Farsi literature, and are said to be able to recite poems by Persian or Farsi-speaking poets from memory more easily than Iranians themselves can,” she explained, pointing out that religious aspect also plays an important role in Tajik-Iranian relations. Although Tajikistan is...

2 months ago