Kazakhstan Business & Economy - The Times Of Central Asia

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Internet Outages

Telegram Outage Affects Users Across Kazakhstan

Telegram users across Kazakhstan reported widespread disruptions to the messaging service on August 13. Messages were delayed and media files failed to load, while some users were unable to access Telegram on mobile or desktop devices. The outage monitoring service Detector404 recorded a sharp rise in reports from several regions. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development confirmed that it had received complaints and was examining them, although its initial statement did not identify the cause of the disruption. Telegram is widely used in Kazakhstan for personal communication and news, while government agencies and businesses also use the platform. The influence of Telegram channels has led officials to raise concerns about anonymous accounts and disinformation. Kazakhtelecom, the country’s largest telecommunications operator, said its network was operating normally, with no disruptions detected in its infrastructure. However, the company recorded a sharp drop in Telegram traffic at international interconnection points in Frankfurt and Moscow and asked Telegram’s administrative team for an explanation.

Transport Infrastructure

Kazakhstan’s Largest City to Bring Back Trams as Almaty LRT Targets 2027 Launch

Kazakhstan’s largest city plans to bring back tram service more than a decade after it was suspended. Almaty aims to launch the first light rail transit (LRT) line by the end of 2027, dedicating part of one of the city’s busiest transport corridors to the new system. For Almaty, the project is primarily an attempt to cope with growing pressure on its roads. The city had a population of about 2.37 million as of June 1, 2026, while many more people commute daily from the surrounding metropolitan area. Rail-based public transportation is currently limited to a single metro line, whose first section opened in 2011 after more than two decades of construction. The first phase of the LRT will run for 18.3 kilometers. Preparatory work is underway, including the removal of infrastructure from the former tram system and the relocation of utility networks. City authorities have said late 2027 remains the target for launching the line, although the timing could change depending on the manufacture and delivery of the trains. Unlike Astana’s LRT, the Almaty line will run entirely at street level, with no elevated sections planned. Trains will operate on dedicated tracks, including along Bauyrzhan Momyshuly and Tole Bi streets. On these sections, two center lanes will be allocated entirely to the LRT once the line begins operating. Before the main construction work can proceed, 375 sections of utility infrastructure must be relocated, including water, sewer, heating, gas, and electricity networks. This work is already creating additional traffic problems along Tole Bi, one of Almaty’s main thoroughfares. In some places, the roadway has been narrowed and traffic temporarily redirected into opposing lanes. The trains will be capable of speeds of up to 65–70 kilometers per hour, but their average operating speed will be considerably lower, at around 30–35 kilometers per hour. The main reason is that stops will be spaced about 700 meters apart on average. The line’s main advantage is expected to come less from the trains’ speed than from physically separating the LRT from regular road traffic. For Almaty, this marks a return to a familiar form of transportation. Trams first appeared in the city in 1937 and remained part of its transport system for almost eight decades. Service was suspended in 2015 following two serious accidents, and the network was never restored. The idea of replacing the old tram system with a modern LRT has been discussed for years. The project has repeatedly changed and been delayed, with different financing models and routes considered. The current line is part of a broader overhaul of Almaty’s transport system, which also includes expansion of the metro, bus rapid transit (BRT) corridors, and dedicated bus lanes. Under the city’s long-term master plan, the LRT network is expected to reach 76 kilometers by 2040. Kazakhstan has already gained its first experience operating this type of transport in the capital. Astana’s LRT began carrying passengers in 2026 after years of construction and repeated delays. During its first two weeks of full...

Oil and Gas

U.S. Firm to Test Oilfield Water Recycling in Kazakhstan

U.S.-based IBL Elements will test technology in Kazakhstan for treating water produced during oil and gas extraction. The treated water could be reused, while the substances it contains will be studied to determine whether valuable and critical minerals can potentially be recovered. IBL Elements, the National Hydrogeological Service Kazhydrogeology, and oil producer Kazakhoil Aktobe have signed a memorandum of cooperation. The parties are preparing a pilot project to test technologies for treating industrial and produced water at oil and gas facilities. Produced water occurs naturally in underground formations and is brought to the surface along with oil and gas. Once separated from hydrocarbons, it can be treated for reuse or disposal, or reinjected underground. The new project is intended to determine whether some of this water can be returned to industrial use. Specialists will also study its composition and the possibility of recovering minerals. For now, the project is limited to research and testing. No commercial extraction of any elements has been announced. IBL Elements is based in Oklahoma and develops technologies for treating oilfield wastewater and recovering minerals from brines. The company says it is developing iodine extraction technology and also plans to recover lithium and other minerals. If the trials are successful, the technology could also be used at other oil and gas facilities in Kazakhstan, according to Bolat Bekniyaz, chairman of Kazhydrogeology. The project comes as American interest in Kazakhstan’s critical minerals is growing. In June, representatives of more than 20 U.S. companies and government agencies attended the AMM 2026 mining and metallurgy congress in Astana. Washington is looking at projects in Kazakhstan involving not only mining, but also processing and the development of new supply chains. For the IBL Elements project, critical minerals are only one part of the equation. The other is growing pressure on Kazakhstan’s water supplies. The country uses about 25 billion cubic meters of water annually, with industry accounting for roughly a quarter of that amount. Kazakhstan’s new Water Code requires industrial enterprises and heat producers to gradually transition to circulating and reused water supply systems. So far, 168 transition plans have been prepared. The authorities aim to increase the share of reused water in industry from 13% to 28% by 2030. The issue is particularly acute in Kazakhstan’s oil-producing west, where freshwater shortages coincide with large volumes of water brought to the surface during oil production. The outcome of the pilot will therefore depend on two factors: whether this water can be treated for reuse and whether it contains minerals at concentrations high enough to make their recovery economically viable.

Growth Forecasts

Why Central Asia Growth Forecasts Differ So Sharply

How fast can Central Asia continue to grow? The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) give markedly different answers. The contrast is sharpest in Kyrgyzstan, where the EDB expects another year of double-digit growth, while the IMF sees a much more pronounced slowdown. Both institutions are looking at the same countries and have access to broadly the same set of macroeconomic data. Their forecasts, however, reflect different assessments of how much of Central Asia’s recent momentum can be sustained. The EDB expects strong investment to keep growth high, while the IMF is more cautious about how long the recent pace of expansion can continue. The EDB is itself a regional development institution. It was established by Russia and Kazakhstan in 2006, with Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan later becoming shareholders. Uzbekistan joined the bank in 2025. The EDB is headquartered in Almaty. The comparison covers the four Central Asian states that are EDB members; Turkmenistan is not included. Its latest forecast for Central Asia is optimistic. In 2026, the EDB expects growth of 10.2% in Kyrgyzstan, 8.3% in Tajikistan, 7.9% in Uzbekistan, and 5.5% in Kazakhstan. The region’s economy as a whole is expected to grow by more than 6.5%, with its combined GDP exceeding $600 billion for the first time. The IMF gives lower figures. Its latest available country projections put 2026 growth at 4.6% for Kazakhstan, 6.8% for Uzbekistan, 6.1% for Kyrgyzstan, and 6.0% for Tajikistan. These projections were published at different times rather than as a single set of four country forecasts. The largest gap is in Kyrgyzstan, where the forecasts differ by 4.1 percentage points, but there are nevertheless modest percentage point gaps between the forecasts for Tajikistan (2.3), Uzbekistan (1.1), and Kazakhstan (0.9). These differences are large enough to raise the question: why the difference in expectations? Part of the answer lies in how the institutions assess the effect of a more uncertain global economy. The IMF expects the world economy to grow by 3% in 2026 and 3.4% in 2027. Its July update said the conflict in the Middle East was weighing particularly heavily on energy importers and warned that renewed conflict or financial-market disruption could weaken the outlook. For the four countries, this means different things. Kazakhstan exports oil and benefits from high prices, although it also depends on the condition of export routes and external demand. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan import a significant share of their fuel, while their economies are closely linked to migrant remittances. Uzbekistan has a larger domestic market and its own resource base. Kazakhstan illustrates the logic of the IMF forecast particularly well. Its GDP grew by 6.5% in 2025, one of its strongest performances in recent years. The Fund does not expect that surge to be repeated. Oil production is expected to stabilize after last year’s increase, with growth slowing to 4.6% in 2026, according to the IMF forecast. This does not mean that the Fund attributes everything to oil. Domestic demand remains strong,...

Uranium

Kazakh Uranium for Asia: Japan Returns for Fuel, South Korea Expands Cooperation

Kazakhstan accounts for around 40% of global uranium production. China already receives not only raw material from the country but also finished fuel assemblies; Japan is signing new contracts after bringing some of its reactors back online; and South Korea is expanding cooperation with Kazakhstan’s nuclear industry. Kazakhstan itself, which for decades exported almost all of its uranium, is preparing to build its own nuclear power plants. These developments are gradually changing the country’s place in Asia’s nuclear energy sector. In December 2025, Kazatomprom, the world’s largest producer of natural uranium, agreed on new supplies with Kansai Electric Power, one of Japan’s major nuclear power operators. The agreement for the supply of uranium oxide concentrate, U₃O₈, was signed during events connected with a visit by a Kazakh delegation to Japan. This is not finished reactor fuel. U₃O₈, known in the industry as yellowcake, must undergo conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication after mining. For Kansai, the agreement provides another source of raw material for its nuclear fleet, while for Kazakhstan it continues cooperation with the Japanese company that began almost two decades ago. Japanese demand is rising again after a prolonged decline. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in March 2011 led to the gradual shutdown of all the country’s commercial reactors. Restarts began in 2015 after new safety requirements were introduced. In February 2025, the Japanese government approved an energy policy that envisages increasing nuclear power’s share of electricity generation to around 20% by 2040. To achieve this, Tokyo will need not only to restart existing reactors but also to secure their fuel supply. Kansai has a particularly important role in this process. The company operates seven reactors at three sites: Mihama, Takahama, and Ohi. In 2025, it also resumed work to assess the possibility of building a new reactor at the Mihama site. No final decision on construction has yet been made. Kansai’s links with Kazakhstan began long before the current revival of Japan’s nuclear energy sector. In 2006, the company and Sumitomo joined the APPAK uranium mining project in southern Kazakhstan. Kazatomprom currently owns 65% of the company, Sumitomo 25%, and Kansai 10%. APPAK develops the western section of the Mynkuduk deposit in the Turkistan region. For the Japanese company, this provides a presence directly at the source of the raw material. For Kazakhstan, the partnership became one of the first major examples of Asian energy companies participating in its uranium mining industry. China Already Receives Finished Fuel Kazakhstan has gone further with China than simply supplying uranium concentrate. Ulba-FA operates in Ust-Kamenogorsk as a joint venture between the Ulba Metallurgical Plant and China’s CGNPC-URC. The Kazakh side owns 51% and the Chinese side 49%. The plant produces fuel assemblies for Chinese nuclear power plants. Industrial production began in 2021. In December 2022, the first shipment was sent to China, containing just over 30 tonnes of low-enriched uranium in finished fuel assemblies. By the end of 2024, the plant had reached its design capacity of 200 tonnes a year....

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Black Sea Risks Elevate Azerbaijan and Turkey in Kazakhstan’s Export Strategy

Bloomberg reported on August 8 that the Turkish authorities were withholding or delaying transit permission for some vessels bound through the Dardanelles for Novorossiysk. Some applicants were reportedly told that permits were not being issued, while others faced additional review. The practice appeared selective: vessels bound for some other Black Sea destinations continued to transit, while some Ukraine-bound vessels were also reportedly affected. On August 9, however, Turkish officials told Reuters that shipping through the Turkish Straits was proceeding smoothly and described the actions as temporary security measures rather than an ongoing restriction. The reported restrictions followed a sharp increase in attacks on commercial shipping around the Black Sea, including Turkish-linked vessels near Novorossiysk. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry expressed concern after attacks on the Turkish-owned Yaşar and Nadezhda and called on Russia and Ukraine to ensure navigational safety. Novorossiysk is especially important for Kazakhstan, because the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal there handles the overwhelming majority of its oil exports. Although the CPC pipeline itself remains operational, the episode showed how quickly traffic serving Kazakhstan’s principal oil-export outlet could face an additional constraint. The events shed light on an export strategy Kazakhstan began developing several years before the current problems. Tokayev’s July 2022 instructions addressed both oil-export diversification through the Trans-Caspian route and alternative transport chains for other cargo. In particular, he called for greater use of Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports and the development of alternative railway routes. Later that year, KazMunayGas (KMG) and SOCAR established a framework for moving Kazakhstani oil from Aktau across the Caspian Sea and onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, initially for up to 1.5 million tons annually. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey also adopted a 2022–2027 roadmap to remove bottlenecks along the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan continued to develop transport links with Russia and China as it expanded Trans-Caspian routes through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The strategy extended Kazakhstan’s longstanding geopolitical multi-vector policy, which balances relations with partners in multiple directions, into the geoeconomic sphere. Tokayev made the combination explicit in his 2023 State of the Nation address. Relations with Turkey had meanwhile been elevated to an enhanced strategic partnership in May 2022, including transport cooperation and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan deepened their strategic and allied cooperation later that year, likewise emphasizing transport and logistics. Closer ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey widened Kazakhstan’s options without displacing established routes through Russia. The CPC pipeline remains so dominant in Kazakhstan’s oil exports that no other existing route approaches its present scale. Of the 78.7 million tons of oil that Kazakhstan exported in 2025, the Energy Ministry reported the volume moving through the CPC pipeline at 64.8 million tons (the CPC itself reported about 63 million tons), meaning that more than four-fifths of Kazakhstan’s exported oil depended on the CPC system. Kazakhstan moved only about 1.4 million tons through the Aktau–Baku–Ceyhan (ABC) route in 2024, and about 1.3 million tons in 2025. Diversification cannot at present mean replacing CPC. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline gives Kazakhstani oil a westbound egress...