• KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
20 September 2026

Viewing results 19 - 24 of 3597

Kazakhstan Courts South Korean Investment During Tokayev’s Seoul Visit

Kazakhstan is using President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s state visit to Seoul to press for deeper South Korean involvement in its critical-minerals sector, seeking to extend a relationship already built around cars, energy, and infrastructure into mining and processing. On September 15, Tokayev is holding talks with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, with a packed agenda that includes trade, energy, critical minerals, and artificial intelligence. The two sides are expected to exchange 13 bilateral memorandums of understanding following the meeting. Ahead of the visit, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi told South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency that artificial intelligence and critical minerals were among the promising areas for expanded cooperation. South Korea is a major producer of cars, batteries, electronics, and semiconductors, but is heavily dependent on imported critical minerals and other raw materials. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has a large mineral resource base and is seeking foreign technology and capital for exploration, mining, and processing. On September 14, Nurlan Zhakupov, CEO of Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund Samruk-Kazyna, met South Korean Minister of Trade, Industry and Resources Kim Jung-kwan in Seoul. They discussed oil and gas projects, energy, and the mining and metallurgical sector. Zhakupov held separate talks with Kwon Yi Kyun, president of the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources (KIGAM), focused on geological exploration and the extraction of critical minerals. KIGAM has been cooperating with Tau-Ken Samruk since 2024, when it signed a memorandum with the Kazakh mining company and the Ministry of Industry and Construction. The two sides are exploring opportunities in mineral resources and processing technologies. Kazakhstan and South Korea are also establishing a joint research center in Almaty to study rare-earth elements and other strategically important metals.. The center is intended to support research into processing technologies and train specialists. Korean business is already well established in energy. Hyundai Engineering is part of the consortium selected to build a gas processing plant at the Karachaganak field with an annual capacity of 5 billion cubic meters. QazaqGaz is leading the project, with Hyundai Engineering and Italy’s SICIM serving as EPC contractors. The presence of South Korea’s automotive industry in Kazakhstan dates back even further. Hyundai vehicles are produced in Almaty, while Kia opened a $310 million plant in Kostanay in 2025 with capacity to produce up to 70,000 vehicles a year. South Korea and the Broader Region Seoul is stepping up its engagement with Central Asia as a whole. On September 14, South Korea held its first industry ministerial meeting with the five countries of the region, with critical minerals and supply chains among the main topics. The first South Korea-Central Asia Summit is scheduled for September 16. Major economies are already competing for mineral projects in the region. China has long been involved in mining and processing, the European Union is developing raw-material partnerships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and the United States is stepping up its work on critical minerals. South Korea is also gaining a financial tool for such projects. In May, Korea Eximbank and the state-backed...

Kazakhstan Hijab Debate Exposes Divide Over Secularism

Kazakhstan’s long-running controversy over hijabs in schools has collided with a wider public argument about religion, exposing sharp differences among prominent public figures and institutions over the boundaries of the country’s secular model. The latest religious controversy in Kazakhstan’s social media space was triggered by two statements made within the span of a week. On September 3, well-known Kazakhstani film and entertainment producer and former television host Bayan Alaguzova wrote on Threads that she was “tired of religion and its propaganda.” “I’ll say this right away,” she added. “There’s no need to frighten me with hell – it doesn’t exist for me. Not a single person in the world can claim to have seen hell, or heaven for that matter. Now that is reliable information! The same goes for the 72 virgins thrown into the bargain.” She went on to sarcastically ask how a disembodied spirit was supposed to deprive the heavenly maidens of their virginity. The deliberately provocative tone used by the prominent film and entertainment figure stirred debate among social media users. Soon afterward, another Threads user posted a screenshot of an official complaint submitted through Kazakhstan’s eOtinish system against the producer, calling for Alaguzova’s posts to be examined for possible incitement of religious discord. There have so far been no official reports of further action on the complaint. Even so, Kazakhstanis on social media began joking about how the complainant intended to prove the existence of heaven and hell. Journalists and other users also spoke out in support of Alaguzova. On September 8, in response to the backlash, Alaguzova acknowledged on Instagram that her “words had hurt believers” and offered her “sincere apologies,” explaining that she respected “every person and every faith, as long as it does not harm others.” She then said her remarks had been misunderstood. “All those accusing me of ‘offending the feelings of believers,’ read carefully: I said that I am against the imposition of dogmas alien to our people, against radical and fanatical propaganda, not religion itself... Do you want girls to be married off at the age of nine? To be denied education or medical care? To be beaten supposedly ‘as a preventive measure against the influence of shaitan’? To be taken as wives without anyone assuming responsibility for them? To be easily abandoned simply by loudly saying ‘talaq’ three times? Do you want your daughter or sister not to be an individual in her own right, but simply an appendage to someone else? To be unable to appear in public or speak without permission? To be unable even to protect herself and her children? I am categorically against this!” the producer said. That same day, journalists at a government briefing asked Kazakhstan’s Education Minister Zhuldyz Suleimenova about reports that some private schools had allowed pupils to wear hijabs. Each new school year in Kazakhstan has brought renewed disputes over hijabs in schools. Some Muslim parents, particularly in western Kazakhstan, require their teenage daughters to wear hijabs to school. This conflicts...

South Korea and ADB Expand Central Asia Critical Minerals Push

Two days before South Korea hosts its first summit with all five Central Asian countries on September 16, Seoul held a series of talks with the Asian Development Bank over how Korean technology and financing could be used in critical-mineral projects in the region. On September 14, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung met ADB President Masato Kanda in Seoul, where they agreed to work more closely on critical-mineral supply chains, artificial intelligence, and energy. Kanda later held separate talks with South Korean Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol. More specifically, the two discussed combining ADB financing with the technology and expertise of South Korean companies for projects in Central Asia. The talks build on a financing mechanism that was already in place. ADB formally launched its Critical Minerals-to-Manufacturing Financing Partnership Facility at its annual meeting in Samarkand in May. It is designed to support critical-mineral supply chains across ADB’s developing member countries in Asia and the Pacific. The facility has two components. The first is a grant window that pays for early-stage work, including feasibility studies, environmental and social assessments, and technical assistance. At its launch, ADB announced a $20 million contribution from Japan and $1.6 million from the United Kingdom to this part of the facility. The second is designed to mobilize additional capital and share risk. This is where South Korea comes in. Korea Eximbank and Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (K-SURE) each signed a memorandum covering up to $500 million in potential financing, giving the two South Korean institutions a combined potential cofinancing commitment of up to $1 billion. The facility is intended to support projects across the value chain, from mining and processing to manufacturing and recycling. ADB is already working on critical-minerals initiatives in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, the bank is supporting the development of a critical-minerals strategy, while in Uzbekistan it is working on AI-driven critical-metals production and circular approaches to raw materials. At an ADB seminar launching the facility during the bank’s annual meeting in Samarkand, Kanda said the aim was to ensure mineral-producing countries benefited from more than extraction. “Asia and the Pacific should be more than a source of raw materials. The region should also capture the jobs, technology, and value these minerals provide,” Kanda said. Central Asia's Critical Minerals Play Kazakhstan is already a major producer of uranium and chromite and also produces or processes titanium, beryllium, tantalum, zinc, and other strategic materials. In July, Kazakhstan and South Korea began establishing a joint research center for rare and rare-earth metals at Satbayev University in Almaty. The center is expected to work on processing technologies and specialist training. Ahead of the summit, Kazakhstan said it wanted to expand cooperation with South Korea beyond the already established automotive industry into AI, advanced technologies, and critical minerals. Astana is interested in deeper processing of raw materials and producing higher-value-added goods. Uzbekistan is moving in the same direction. The country has a $4.2 billion critical-minerals program for 2026–2030 comprising 120 projects. Tashkent plans to increase industry...

Central Asian Women Journalists Set Regional Priorities Through 2029

The Coalition of Women Journalists of Central Asia is preparing a multi-year program. At a conference that opened in Tashkent on September 14, more than 100 media professionals from across Central Asia are discussing common priorities through 2029 and developing a regional guide to gender-sensitive journalism. For the coalition, the program is an attempt to move from periodic conferences toward a permanent professional network. The Second Central Asian International Conference of Women Media Professionals runs from September 14 to 15 under the theme “Regional Solidarity, Digital Security and an Inclusive Future for Journalism.” The event is organized by Uzbekistan’s Modern Journalism Development Center, with the National Coalition of Women Journalists of Tajikistan serving as its regional partner. The coalition emerged after the first such meeting in Dushanbe. On May 3, 2024, participants signed a memorandum establishing it. A planned follow-up conference in Dushanbe in May 2025 was abruptly canceled after two venues declined to host it. No official explanation was given. Participants are now discussing a program for 2026–2029 covering mutual support and exchanges of experience. It would also provide for coordinated responses to threats against journalism. Digital security is a major focus of the Tashkent program. The agenda covers online harassment and how deepfakes are used to spread disinformation. Separate sessions address the psychological toll on journalists and ways to protect personal data and newsroom systems during a digital attack. Those concerns reflect a wider problem for women working in journalism. According to a report published by UNESCO in May 2026, 45% of surveyed women journalists and other media workers said they self-censored on social media because of online violence, up from 30% in 2020. About 22% reported self-censorship in their professional work. Roughly a quarter had been diagnosed with or treated for anxiety or depression linked to online violence, while 13% reported post-traumatic stress disorder. Regional newsrooms are also working to improve reporting on violence against women. On September 8–9, just days before the Tashkent conference, journalists from across Central Asia gathered in Almaty for training on ethical reporting of gender-based violence. The event, held with the participation of UN Women, focused on professional and ethical standards for covering such cases. The Tashkent meeting is also intended to make regional solidarity more practical. Participants are discussing ways to provide rapid professional support when journalists face online attacks or other pressure. Another expected outcome is a unified regional guide to gender-sensitive journalism. It is intended to bring together recommendations for reporting on gender-related issues in a responsible and balanced way. Tashkent will also host the Women Media Awards Central Asia, a regional award for women working in the media. The program includes an audiovisual performance, “Echo: The Power of Invisible Voices,” addressing hate speech and digital attacks involving bots and deepfakes. After Tashkent, the test will be whether the network works between conferences, when journalists are separated by national borders and a colleague may need help that same day.

For the CSTO, Afghanistan Might Be the Last Credible Threat

The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization is conducting its “Rubezh (Frontier) 2026” military exercises from September 12-19. Those exercises are designed with Afghanistan in mind, a country that the CSTO has been talking about frequently in 2026, and also one where militant groups pose a shared threat to its members. And even the Taliban are no longer viewed as the threat they once were. Frontier 2026 The Frontier 2026 exercises are taking place at the Koktal training ground in southeastern Kazakhstan’s Zhetysu Province. The CSTO’s Rapid Deployment Force is practicing to repel cross-border incursions in mountain and desert terrain. The exercises come this time as concerns about infiltration by militants in Afghanistan into CIS territory are increasing. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov said on September 8 that Russia is paying special attention to strengthening Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan. The Tajik authorities have been calling for additional aid for the country’s border forces since a series of attacks from Afghanistan in November 2025 left five Chinese workers in southern Tajikistan dead, followed by an attack in December that killed two Tajik border guards. Tajikistan has regularly asked for international help in guarding its frontier with Afghanistan since independence in 1991. But after the violence at the end of 2025, the Tajik government appealed especially to its fellow members in the CSTO for increased assistance. CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov said at the end of August that the first shipment of weapons and equipment would be sent to Tajikistan this autumn. Raison D’être The Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in 1992 by representatives from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia joined. The purpose was simple. If any of the member states was attacked by an external enemy, that state could request aid, including military assistance, from the other members. In the early 1990s, there were potential enemies for the Treaty members in practically every direction. The Soviet Union had collapsed in late 1991. There were questions about how the former Communist Bloc countries and their new Western allies might act. The theocratic regime in Iran was a possible threat to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and the latter region had unstable Afghanistan to worry about also. China was a concern for Central Asia and Russia. Back then, banding together made sense for the nine newly independent states that signed the treaty. When Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan dropped out in 1999, it appeared the Collective Security Treaty was on the brink of becoming irrelevant. After Vladimir Putin became Russia’s president, he put a new emphasis on a security bloc within the CIS, and in 2002, the remaining six treaty members signed a new charter. However, now, in 2026, the list of the CSTO’s potential external threats is greatly reduced. Far from being a security concern, China is now a leading trade partner for Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and provides military assistance to all four countries. Iran’s relations with the West remain...

How Almaty and Astana Built Central Asia’s Deepest Business Ecosystem

Every region has cities that pull people and money toward them. New York, London, Dubai, and Singapore became places where ambitious people went to make careers, companies went to find talent, and investors went to put money to work. Once that concentration takes hold, it feeds on itself. More companies create more jobs, more talent attracts more companies, and banks, lawyers, consultants, airlines, schools and restaurants grow around them. Central Asia has developed its own version of that gravitational pull. Almaty has long been the region’s main commercial center and was Kazakhstan’s capital until 1997. It remains effectively tethered to Astana by intense passenger traffic and the constant movement of businesspeople, officials and professionals between the two cities. Astana has grown around government, international finance, technology and diplomacy. Together, they function as a two-city economic and political engine. The numbers explain much of this. The Times of Central Asia’s Central Asia Balance Sheet puts Kazakhstan at $306.2 billion of the five Central Asian economies combined $543.4 billion in GDP, or 56.4%. Its share of accumulated foreign investment is even larger. The Balance Sheet puts Central Asia’s inward foreign direct investment (FDI) stock at $235.6 billion at the end of 2025, of which Kazakhstan held $156.4 billion, or 66.4%. FDI stock represents capital accumulated over years rather than announced agreements or one unusually strong year of inflows. Almaty and Astana Play Different Roles Almaty accounted for 22.7% of Kazakhstan’s GDP in 2025 and Astana another 12.3%, putting their economies at roughly $69 billion and $38 billion respectively. Together they produced around $107 billion. Almaty is Kazakhstan’s main business and financial center. Kazakhstan’s largest banks, investment firms, multinational offices, lawyers, accountants and consultants are concentrated there. The Globalization and World Cities research network (GaWC) placed Almaty in its Gamma+ group in 2024, alongside Austin, Antwerp, and Kuwait City. GaWC bases the classification on the networks of major international business-service firms, offering a measure of how closely a city is connected to the global corporate economy. Consistent with that ranking, multinational companies have also chosen Almaty as a base for regional operations. Mars runs its eleven-country regional headquarters from Almaty, covering all five Central Asian states, the South Caucasus, Belarus, Mongolia, and Turkey. Mastercard describes Almaty as a regional hub and the heart of its consulting operations for the CIS, Central and Eastern Europe. Kazakhstan is unusual in Central Asia in having two major hubs. In functional terms, Astana complements Almaty much as Washington D.C. complements New York: Almaty is the deeper commercial center, while Astana concentrates government, sovereign institutions, diplomacy, and national policy. Astana has also developed regional corporate operations of its own. Alstom runs its Western and Central Asia cluster from the capital, and Mercuria opened a regional office there in 2026 headed by its CEO for Central Asia and the Caspian region. U.S. rail company Wabtec has made Astana a regional locomotive production and engineering base, reinforced by its $4.2 billion agreement as Kazakhstan expands its Middle Corridor links to...