Tajikistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Wildlife Conservation

Tajikistan Notes Conservation Success as Markhor Population Grows

Tajikistan’s population of markhors, a wild goat species known for its corkscrew-style horns, fell to an estimated several hundred in the 1990s, a tumultuous period marked by civil war following independence from the Soviet Union. Today, there are more than 7,000 markhors in the country, and their numbers are increasing, according to a survey conducted earlier this year. The population increase reflects years of conservation measures and local community efforts to protect the markhor, which is indigenous to mountain regions in parts of Central and South Asia. In 2014, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) listed the species as “Near Threatened” on its Red List, an improvement on its previous “Endangered” designation. At the time, the IUCN estimated the total markhor population, not just in Tajikistan, at around 5,700 “mature individuals,” excluding kids and yearlings. The markhor’s range includes parts of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, according to the conservation group. This year’s figure of more than 7,000 markhors in Tajikistan was reported by Isfandiyor Shukurzoda, a senior official in the country’s Committee for Environmental Protection, at a news conference on Thursday, the state news agency Khovar reported. Tajik officials also reported the figure in May at the United Nations. The number was based on a census carried out in February and March “using modern equipment that accurately monitors the movement of animals and their behavior in their natural environment without human intervention,” the agency said. It added that preliminary data indicated “the population of this rare animal species is stable and growing.” Members of the state Forestry Agency and the National Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan were involved in the census, which was conducted in the Danghara, Shamsiddin Shohin, and Darvoz districts. Those districts are in southern Tajikistan, with some areas bordering Afghanistan. Years ago, there were reports of markhors being poached for meat, including by Afghan hunters who crossed the remote border. Wood cutting for fuel and livestock grazing have also damaged markhor habitats by shrinking and fragmenting them. In recent years, there has been a push to raise the international profile of the markhor, including by Pakistan, where it is the national animal. The U.N. General Assembly declared May 24 the International Day of the Markhor and marked the occasion for the first time in 2024. The term markhor means “snake-eater,” although the animal is a herbivore.

Cultural Heritage

Rain Festival: How Ancient Tirgon Became an Official Holiday in Tajikistan

Until recently, Tirgon was remembered mainly through medieval poetry and scholarly references. In 2023, an apricot festival and dried-fruit exhibition were held in its honor in Dushanbe. Now, the ancient agricultural holiday is listed in Tajikistan’s official calendar of festive dates. In 2026, it was celebrated for the first time under its new official status. A Holiday Rooted in Antiquity Tirgon belongs to the ancient seasonal traditions of Iranian peoples and is mentioned in sources including Ferdowsi’s epic poem Shahnameh. Tajik sources trace these seasonal holidays back several millennia. Tirgon was traditionally associated with the 13th day of the month of Tir in the ancient Iranian calendar, with celebrations lasting several days. At its core, the holiday is connected with water and the fertility of the land. In ancient practice, people prayed to ancestral spirits for protection from drought before the new harvest was gathered. From Custom to Law Tirgon received official status only recently. An amendment to Tajikistan’s Law “On Holidays” added the festival to the country’s calendar of official holiday dates in 2025. The change was presented as part of Tajikistan’s effort to preserve national cultural heritage and revive ancient folk traditions. The country’s holiday calendar already contained dozens of dates, though not all official holidays are non-working days. Tirgon’s new status shows its place in the country’s cultural life and in the state-backed revival of ancient seasonal traditions. The First Official Tirgon In 2026, Tirgon was marked for the first time after being added to the official holiday calendar. The date is observed on July 1, but the 2026 production calendar did not make it an additional non-working day. To mark the holiday, the president addressed the nation with a message connecting the ancient reverence for water with Tajikistan’s modern water diplomacy. The message referred to the International Decade for Action “Water for Sustainable Development” and Tajikistan’s glacier-protection initiatives. Through that framing, the old ritual was tied to one of Tajikistan’s main foreign-policy themes: water. Part of a Seasonal Cycle Tirgon is part of Tajikistan’s revived cycle of ancient seasonal holidays. In that cycle, Sada is associated with fire and purification. Nowruz marks renewal, and Mehrgon is linked to the harvest. Tirgon occupies the place of water and rain, without which farming is impossible. Each holiday is tied to a time of year and a natural element revered in ancient tradition. Its return to the official calendar gives an old ritual a new public role. For many years, knowledge of Tirgon survived mainly in old manuscripts and scholarly descriptions. Its modern revival moved quickly. Public celebrations resumed in 2023. Official recognition followed in 2025, and the first observance under the new status came in 2026. Tajikistan has made water diplomacy a major part of its international agenda, including glacier protection. In that context, an ancient holiday dedicated to rain and the fertility of the land has taken on contemporary political meaning. Tirgon is a reminder that water in the region is a condition for agriculture and survival.

Religion

Opinion: Christian Missions in Central Asia: Religious Freedom and Social Tensions

Central Asia has long been a crossroads of civilizations, cultures, and religions. For more than two millennia, the region has connected East and West, with Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and indigenous belief systems coexisting, interacting, and, at times, competing. Christianity flourished here centuries ago through Nestorian and other Eastern Christian communities, while Russian Orthodoxy endured throughout the Soviet period. Under Soviet rule, religion was heavily suppressed, yet Christianity survived among Russians, Germans, Poles, Ukrainians, and other communities that had been deported or resettled across the region. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, decades of official atheism gave way to a religious revival, creating space for a new wave of missionary activity. The principles of Christian missionary work are similar across denominations, with preaching, charity, education, medical assistance, and moral renewal at their core. In practice, however, missionary efforts in the newly independent Central Asian states evolved far beyond religious services. Amid the economic hardship that followed the collapse of the Soviet system, many churches combined evangelism with humanitarian assistance, language courses, youth programs, computer training, sports clubs, and cultural activities. These initiatives proved particularly attractive to young people, students, socially vulnerable groups, and urban residents seeking new educational and social opportunities. Among the five Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan emerged as one of the most favorable environments for Christian missions. During the 1990s, its relatively liberal religious climate, large urban centers, multiethnic society, sizeable Korean diaspora, Russian-speaking environment, and comparatively open legal framework enabled numerous foreign churches to establish seminaries, schools, charitable foundations, and places of worship. South Korean Protestant organizations became especially active. Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, and Pentecostal churches initially found a natural base within the Koryo-saram community, but their activities gradually expanded well beyond ethnic Koreans. It is at this point that a more sensitive issue emerges. Missionary churches generally regard religious conversion as a legitimate expression of freedom of conscience. Many Muslim families, however, particularly in rural and traditionally conservative communities, view the conversion of their children as a rupture with family heritage, ancestral traditions, and communal identity. Across much of Central Asia, religion is not merely a matter of personal belief. It is closely intertwined with kinship, ethnic identity, marriage, burial customs, and family authority. As a result, active proselytizing among indigenous youth can provoke strong opposition from relatives and local Muslim communities. The issue reflects the interaction between missionary strategies and social pressures such as limited interfaith dialogue, economic hardship, youth vulnerability, foreign funding, government suspicion, and concerns over cultural continuity. When religious conversion becomes associated with financial assistance, educational opportunities, foreign sponsorship, or improved social mobility, critics may portray it as an attempt to “buy souls,” even when churches describe such activities as humanitarian or charitable work. One of the most serious examples occurred in Tajikistan on October 1, 2000, when bombs exploded during a Sunday service at Sonmin Grace Church, a Korean Protestant church in Dushanbe associated with South Korean missionaries. The congregation had attracted local converts. Several people were killed and dozens...

South Caucasus

As Azerbaijan Pushes Back Against Moscow, Central Asia Watches

The recent diplomatic escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia appeared to have run its course in April, after Moscow agreed to pay compensation over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan. Instead, the dispute has entered a new phase, and its implications now reach beyond the South Caucasus. On July 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov and handed him a formal note of protest over what Baku described as a Russian drone strike on a fuel station owned by Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region on the evening of July 5. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said the attack on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine was not an isolated incident. It cited previous strikes on the company’s gas distribution compressor station and oil depot in Odesa, which caused material damage and injured employees. Baku also pointed to earlier damage to the Azerbaijani embassy building in Kyiv and the honorary consulate in Kharkiv, calling on Moscow to investigate and comply with its obligations to protect civilian infrastructure and diplomatic missions. At the same time, Shusha — known to Armenians as Shushi, retaken by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war, and still regarded by many Armenians as occupied — hosted an international conference devoted to what participants described as Russia’s “colonial policy,” the “Circassian genocide,” and the situation of non-Russian peoples within the Russian Federation. The conference declaration called on Moscow to “recognize its historical crimes, abandon its chauvinistic policies, and end the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities into the war against Ukraine.” Experts from Azerbaijan, the United States, France, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Türkiye, and Georgia attended the conference. None of the Central Asian republics was represented. That absence was telling. Central Asian governments may be distancing themselves from Moscow in certain areas, but they remain reluctant to participate in openly anti-Russian political initiatives. For Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, the question is not whether Russia’s position has weakened, but how far they can move without provoking pressure from Moscow. For Central Asia, the dispute is not a distant quarrel in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is now a central link in the westward routes that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are trying to strengthen as alternatives to Russian territory. The Middle Corridor runs from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to Europe. Any deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russia relations therefore has practical implications for Central Asian transit, energy, and diplomatic room for maneuver. The first major rupture in relations between Baku and Moscow came after Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, traveling from Baku to Grozny, was damaged by Russian air-defense fire over Russian territory on December 25, 2024. The aircraft later crashed while attempting an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan blamed Russia and demanded an apology, accountability, and compensation. Relations deteriorated further in June 2025 following the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg and reports of torture. The most prominent victims were the...

Energy Security

Central Asia’s Fuel Squeeze Becomes a Winter Energy Security Problem

Central Asia’s fuel squeeze is moving from filling stations into winter planning. Governments are now tracking gasoline and diesel, gas pipelines, coal deliveries, power imports, jet fuel, and emergency repair crews. Seasonal fuel and power stress is familiar across the region, but the current pressure - tied to Russia, the main supplier for several regional fuel flows - has arrived early. Russia’s own fuel crisis has sharpened the risk. Ukrainian drone attacks and repair work have cut refinery output, while export limits have pushed more Russian supplies back into the domestic market. Reuters reported queues, regional restrictions, and gasoline above 100 roubles a liter at some independent stations. President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the strain on June 28. “You are well aware that problems for drivers and for businesses persist,” he said, adding that “the harvest depends on” keeping seasonal fuel schedules for farms. For Central Asia, Russian shortages travel through contracts, rail slots, import prices, and public nerves. Kyrgyzstan is among the most exposed. The country consumes about two million tons of fuels and lubricants each year, and almost 95% comes from Russia, according to Deputy Energy Minister Nasipbek Kerimov. “Due to the lack of adequate oil and gas production, we remain a country dependent on imports,” Kerimov said. Bishkek has asked Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan for help securing supplies. That dependence is now impacting households, farmers, and small transport firms. The cabinet has capped pump prices and set a subsidy mechanism through September 30. Kerimov said importers were seeing offers at several prices, but promised that “there should be no shortage on the domestic market.” Oil traders put AI-92 stocks at 30 to 45 days, while diesel remained available for harvest work. Kyrgyzstan is trying to buy time through domestic refining. The modernized Junda refinery in the Chuy Region has been pressed to raise gasoline output to 24,000 tons a month soon, then 50,000 tons a month by the end of 2026, with finished products directed to the domestic market. Those gains would help, but Russian supply still sets the pace. Uzbekistan has the Bukhara and Fergana oil refineries, the Altyaryk unit of the Fergana refinery, and the Uzbekistan GTL complex, but demand has still moved faster than domestic supply. In January-April 2026, gasoline imports reached 568,700 tons, worth $327.1 million, more than double the same period in 2025. Local refineries produced 417,500 tons over those four months. A shift away from AI-80 gasoline has also pushed drivers toward AI-92 and AI-95. The pressure reached the exchange in late June. AI-92 gasoline climbed to a record 13.919 million soums per ton on June 29, about $1,160, after an 11.8% rise since the start of the month. Jet fuel has become an issue, too. Uzbekistan Airways reduced some Russia flight frequencies in June, citing aviation fuel shortages and higher costs. Tashkent is now preparing for winter in concrete volumes. On July 6, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reviewed measures for the 2026-2027 autumn-winter season. The plan includes replacing 53.7...

Obituary

Comedian Bakhtiyor Rahimov, Who Lamented Decline of Satire in Tajikistan, Dies

Tajik satirist Bakhtiyor Rahimov, whose comic performances lampooned daily life and sometimes touched on power, corruption and bureaucracy, has died after longstanding health problems. He was 56 years old, according to media reports. Rahimov, founder of a comedy group called Gharibsho Company and a fixture on Tajikistan’s comedy scene over several decades, had performed at a resort in the western city of Hisor on the night before his death on June 30. He was buried in his home village of Nojii Bolo, near Hisor. “The news saddened thousands of his fans. Indeed, the death of such an artist is a great loss to Tajik culture,” news site Oila.tj reported. Several Tajik media outlets reported on a debate about why Rahimov was never awarded a state title recognizing his comedic contributions. In a news conference on Monday, Culture Minister Matlubakhon Sattoriyon expressed condolences to Rahimov’s family on his death and said that the satirist had received recognition, if not a title, from the state. “Others have criticized the attitude of the cultural authorities and suggest that, in recognition of his contribution to the development of Tajik satire, he be awarded an honorary state title after his death,” reported Azda TV, a Tajik-language site that is registered in Poland and aims to provide alternative perspectives to state-controlled media in Tajikistan. The name of Rahimov’s comedy group, Gharibsho, derives from Persian and refers to a wanderer or stranger, a description that echoed the experience of many young people in Tajikistan who were emigrating to other countries, particularly Russia, in search of work. The name also incorporates a term for king or noble. "We were kings on stage, but at the same time, like these wanderers, we had nothing behind us," Muhammadjon Kholov, an early member of Gharibsho, said in an interview with the Your.tj outlet several years ago. He recalled that fans who couldn’t get tickets to the group’s first show on a big stage were so eager to see the performance that they smashed windows and doors and stormed the concert hall where the comedians were appearing. The group, which started in 2000, had to donate all its proceeds from ticket sales to cover the damages. In a 2024 interview with the Asia-Plus publication, Rahimov said satire had been marginalized in official circles in Tajikistan and that he hadn’t been invited to state events or programs in nearly six years. Asked if there was still political or social satire in Tajikistan, he said: “Yes, but very rarely.”