Tajikistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Archaeological Heritage

Paleolithic Sites and Pamir Petroglyphs Added to Tajikistan UNESCO Tentative List

Tajikistan has added two groups of archaeological sites to UNESCO’s World Heritage Tentative List: Paleolithic sites in southern Tajikistan documenting early human occupation, and petroglyph complexes in the high-altitude Pamirs. Tajik authorities announced the additions on September 21, although both entries were submitted to UNESCO on June 19, 2026. The first group comprises Kuldara, Lohuti, Obi Mazor, and Khonakho in the Khovaling district of southern Tajikistan’s Khatlon region. UNESCO describes the archaeological complex as one of the most significant Paleolithic heritage areas in Central Asia. The sites provide evidence of early human occupation and adaptation to mountainous and semi-arid environments and help researchers study the dispersal of early human populations across Eurasia. Kuldara is particularly significant. According to UNESCO, the site preserves cultural layers dating to the Lower and Middle Paleolithic periods and has yielded numerous stone tools. Together with the neighboring sites, the complex documents different stages of early human history and changes in stone-tool technology. The second group lies nearly at the opposite end of the country, in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO), which covers much of eastern Tajikistan and the Pamirs. The nomination includes five petroglyph complexes: Langar, Darshair, Shakhta, Nayzatash, and Bakhmaljilga. The rock carvings were created over thousands of years, from the Mesolithic and Neolithic periods through the Bronze and Iron Ages and into the medieval period. They depict ibex, argali sheep, deer and predators, as well as human figures, hunting scenes, symbolic compositions, and geometric motifs. The hunting scenes and other images give archaeologists a record of life in high-mountain communities. They also document cultural contacts in the Pamirs, a region that has long stood at a crossroads between Central, South, and East Asia and the Iranian cultural sphere. UNESCO's Tentative List is an inventory of properties a country intends to consider for future nomination. A property must first appear on that list before the country can formally nominate it for World Heritage status. With the two additions, Tajikistan now has 18 properties on its Tentative List. Five properties in the country are already inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List. They include Sarazm, a settlement dating from the fourth to the third millennium BCE near Panjakent; the Cultural Heritage Sites of Ancient Khuttal in southern Tajikistan; and Tajik National Park, which encompasses a vast area of the Pamir Mountains. Archaeological finds in southern Tajikistan include a royal seal from the Kushan period. Around two millennia ago, the Kushan Empire extended across parts of present-day Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and northern India.

Digital Policy

Central Asia Common Digital Space Proposed at Astana Roundtable

Experts and business representatives from across Central Asia have proposed mutual recognition of electronic documents to make cross-border business easier. Their draft agreement also calls for closer alignment of rules on data and artificial intelligence. The draft Agreement on Cooperation among Central Asian States in Digital Policy and Artificial Intelligence Governance was presented at a regional roundtable in Astana on September 28. The business-led proposal aims to connect the region’s five digital markets, serving more than 80 million people. The initiative is being developed within B5+1, a business cooperation platform linking the United States and the five Central Asian states and designed as a private sector counterpart to the diplomatic C5+1 format. E-commerce and information technology are among its priority areas. Over the past year, the regional IT & AI working group has held consultations with entrepreneurs, industry associations, and experts. In the previous cycle, consultations involved business communities representing more than 60 companies and organizations from Central Asia and the United States, including Meta, Mastercard, and Google. Under the draft, the five countries would retain their own regulations while making their digital systems and laws more compatible. It covers electronic document management, digital identification, personal data protection, cybersecurity, and AI regulation. The proposals would allow electronic documents, electronic signatures, and digital identification tools to be recognized across borders. This could reduce administrative barriers for companies expanding into neighboring markets. “Our task is not to create another layer of regulation. We need to build digital bridges between the countries of Central Asia. If electronic documents, digital identification, data rules, and approaches to AI are mutually compatible, it will become significantly easier for technology companies to scale across the entire region,” said Aziza Shuzheeva, Chair of the Board of the TechnoWomen non-profit organization. A draft Code of Ethics for the Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence in Central Asia was also presented in Astana. The document is advisory and sets out common ethical principles for the use of AI across the five countries. Its authors propose that decisions significantly affecting a person’s rights and interests should not be left solely to algorithms. Practices identified as unacceptable include harmful manipulation, exploitation of the vulnerabilities of children and other groups, discrimination, unlawful use of personal data, and the creation of synthetic content for fraud or other harmful purposes. Another priority is the development of language resources and datasets for Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen. The aim is to improve the ability of AI systems to work with the region’s languages. Similar forms of digital integration are already being developed elsewhere. In the European Union, the European Digital Identity framework is designed to allow digital identity wallets to be used across borders to access public and private services. ASEAN, meanwhile, concluded negotiations at the end of May 2026 on its Digital Economy Framework Agreement, or DEFA, covering digital trade, data, cybersecurity, AI, and other areas of regional digital integration. The proposals also overlap with efforts to digitize transport and trade. On September 28, the...

Ferghana Valley

Cementing Peace in the Ferghana Valley

The Ferghana Peace Forum was just held in Tajikistan’s northern city of Guliston. There were some useful proposals and discussions during the September 28-29 event, but the greatest significance of this peace forum is that it happened at all. For most of the 35 years since the three countries that share the Ferghana Valley – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – became independent, the three governments were often at odds with each other, and the valley was the most dangerous part of Central Asia. Keeping the Momentum This was the second Ferghana Peace Forum. The first was in Uzbekistan’s eastern city of Ferghana on October 15-16, 2025. The title of that first forum was “Fergana Valley: Uniting Efforts for Peace and Progress,” and it followed the historic agreement the presidents of the three countries signed in Khujand, Tajikistan, on March 31, 2025, fixing the point where the borders of the three countries meet. The three presidents had met before at multilateral events, such as summits of the Commonwealth of Independent States or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. But the Khujand meeting was the first time just the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan had met. The Ferghana Valley is one of the most densely populated and fertile areas in Central Asia. Its communities long predate the borders that now divide the valley. Those lines were drawn as internal Soviet administrative boundaries and became international frontiers after 1991. The discussions in Guliston were about how to expand cross-border movement, trade, and mutual development. The heads of the three provinces that border each other in the Ferghana Valley were in Guliston: Khairullo Bozorov from Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Province, Rajabboy Ahmadzoda from Tajikistan’s Sughd Region, and Mamirjan Rakhimov from Kyrgyzstan’s Batken Region. EU Special Representative for Central Asia Eduards Stiprais also attended and addressed the forum, alongside representatives from the EU, OSCE, UN, and other international organizations, along with officials and experts from the three Central Asian countries. Eldor Aripov, Director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan, summed up the purpose of the Guliston gathering, saying it was intended to turn mutual understanding into joint initiatives and projects. Among the main goals were facilitating cross-border movement, establishing joint ventures and facilities, educational exchanges between university students in Ferghana Valley cities, and even hosting children from neighboring countries at summer camps. These might seem like small matters, but for those who have watched events in the Ferghana Valley since independence in 1991, they mark a striking change. The third Ferghana Peace Forum will be held in Kyrgyzstan in 2027. The Most Dangerous Area in Central Asia The borders drawn in Moscow during the years Central Asia was part of the USSR were quickly disputed throughout the region after the Soviet Union disintegrated. Nowhere was this more pronounced than in the Ferghana Valley, and predictably so. Agriculture and livestock remain important to livelihoods across much of the valley, so disputes over agricultural land and access to water were inevitable. As the...

Islamic State

ISKP and Central Asia: How the Threat Extends Beyond Afghanistan’s Borders

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is developing transnational networks, complicating assessments of the threat to Central Asia. The group also retains territorial ambitions. One conventional way to assess the threat is to look at a map: the situation in Afghanistan’s northern provinces, their proximity to the borders of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the number of militants, and the possibility of infiltration into neighboring states. An August report by the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, based on information received through June 9, said the ability of terrorist groups to operate in Afghanistan remained an enduring threat to neighboring countries and Central Asia. The report also said ISKP had reportedly moved toward northern Afghanistan. During the period under review, the group suffered serious setbacks amid Taliban and Pakistani operations and was in the process of rebuilding. But looking only at Afghanistan’s borders is no longer enough. The Central Asian dimension of ISKP encompasses the group’s activities in Afghanistan, risks to the five Central Asian states themselves, and the involvement of some individuals from the region in transnational networks operating outside it. Old Networks and New Structures ISKP’s Central Asian dimension did not emerge from nowhere. Even before the group appeared in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, armed organizations formed by people from Central Asia were active there. Among them was the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). At different times, the IMU maintained ties with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In 2014, the Islamic State declared a “caliphate.” A year later, a faction of the IMU pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Lucas Webber, a researcher of extremist networks, and Bruce Pannier, a longtime analyst of Central Asian politics and security, have highlighted the role of an Uzbek-language propaganda infrastructure associated with the IMU in ISKP’s outreach to Central Asian audiences. Their analysis was published by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET). The region’s older militant organizations have not simply been absorbed into ISKP. A July 2025 UN report separately mentions IMU members and fighters from other groups being used by Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities in law-enforcement and army units. A single “Central Asian network,” however, would misrepresent this fragmented environment of different connections and organizational affiliations. The same report described the recruitment of people from Central Asia, their significant presence among ISKP’s rank and file, and the group’s attempts to operate outside Afghanistan. In a 2024 article for CTC Sentinel, researchers Noah Tucker and Edward Lemon examined the involvement of Tajik citizens in a number of ISKP-linked attacks and networks. They argued that the recent surge in attacks and arrests was partly the “long tail” of the earlier Islamic State mobilization, including networks that had persisted after it. A February 2026 report by the UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team said ISKP continued to develop a network of cells capable of projecting a threat across the region and internationally. Propaganda Does Not Equal Mass Support Central Asian audiences occupy a noticeable place in ISKP propaganda....

Central Asia-U.S. Relations

Opinion: Central Asia Is More Than Minerals

For years, Central Asia was one of those regions that Washington periodically rediscovered and then forgot. Officials visited and announced new initiatives, but the relationship hardly changed. That is no longer the case. Many pundits see the current surge of American interest in Central Asia through the lens of transactional foreign policy: nowadays the focus has been on critical minerals, supply-chain security, and competition with China. Valid so far as it goes, this approach misses the larger story. Central Asia is not suddenly important because of its minerals or because Washington has decided that it is. Increasingly, Washington must pay attention to Central Asia because the region itself is changing, and in largely positive directions. Over three decades, American investors largely dismissed the region as too poorly governed and too distant. Now the region itself is working to change the conditions that made it unattractive. The transformation is far from complete, but it is real. When the Central Asian states emerged from the Soviet Union in 1991, they faced grave disadvantages. State enterprises dominated their economies, and they fell short of Western investors’ expectations in both the rule of law and transparency. While such problems have not disappeared, they are everywhere being worked on. Uzbekistan provides the clearest example. Since 2017, Tashkent has undertaken reforms to liberalize its economy and improve the environment for private investment. The World Bank now describes Uzbekistan as one of the world's top reformers. Kazakhstan has also built more sophisticated financial and regulatory institutions. Its goal is to position itself as a regional hub for logistics, energy, and finance. The World Bank's new 2026–31 country strategy emphasizes a "business-ready Kazakhstan," with greater private-sector participation, improved infrastructure, and better natural-resource management. The pace of change in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan has been slower, for understandable reasons. Kyrgyzstan’s early political reforms long left the government rudderless, Tajikistan endured a five-year civil war, and Turkmenistan was stymied by Russia’s total control of its gas industry. Now these countries, too, are belatedly advancing. Central Asia has not become Switzerland. Corruption, political interference, and governance problems still afflict the countries’ economies, and the OECD continues to identify these as important obstacles to investment. The question is not whether Central Asia has solved these problems but whether it has changed enough to become investable. The answer increasingly is yes, it has. Moscow's offensive in Ukraine accelerated changes Washington had sought for decades. Secondary sanctions compelled Central Asians to develop new commercial avenues not subject to international restrictions. While Central Asian governments maintain important relations with Russia, they all seek pragmatic alternatives that reduce their former reliance on Moscow. The countries are expanding regional cooperation while reaching across the Caspian to the South Caucasus and beyond. The resulting Middle Corridor promises direct access to global markets. The measure of its success will be whether Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan gain trans-Caspian pipelines to transport their resources directly to Europe. In short, Central Asia is doing what Washington has long wanted it to do: become more...

Why Central Asia Is Diversifying Its Arms Suppliers

India could become another supplier of major weapons to Central Asia. Indian Masterminds reported in July that Samir V. Kamat, former chairman of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), said India had exported Akash surface-to-air missile systems to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The reported deliveries remain unconfirmed by the recipient governments. Publicly available accounts give no contract values, quantities, or delivery schedules. DRDO says an initial Akash battery has been flagged off for export to friendly foreign countries, without naming the recipients. Akash is a mobile medium-range surface-to-air missile system designed to counter aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and drones. If the reported deliveries are confirmed, they would mark the first publicly known Akash exports to Central Asia following India’s deal with Armenia. The region’s armed forces still rely heavily on Soviet- and Russian-designed equipment, but governments are increasingly buying newer systems from other suppliers. Russia retains a strong position where countries need to maintain Soviet- and Russian-designed equipment already in service. Other suppliers are winning orders for drones and aircraft, extending their role in the region’s defense procurement. The figures illustrate the persistence of Russian influence. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia accounted for 83% of Kazakhstan’s imports of major arms in 2021–25. These figures measure transfers of major weapons, rather than the full range of military supplies and support. Russia’s exports of major arms, however, fell by 64% in 2021–25 compared with the previous five-year period. Nearly three-quarters of its exports went to India, China, and Belarus. SIPRI attributes much of the fall to reduced deliveries to Algeria, China, and Egypt. The most visible shift has occurred in Uzbekistan. In late August, official footage showed Chinese-built J-10CE fighter jets carrying Uzbek markings. At least six aircraft could be seen. For three decades, Soviet-designed MiG-29s and Su-27s formed the backbone of Uzbekistan’s fighter fleet. Operating the J-10CE requires different training and maintenance arrangements, alongside compatible weapons and ground equipment. The transition moves a key component of the Uzbek Air Force outside its traditional supply chain. On September 25, Brazil’s Embraer delivered the first C-390 Millennium military transport aircraft to the Uzbek Air Force. The handover ceremony took place at the company’s facility in Gavião Peixoto, making Uzbekistan the first C-390 operator in Central Asia. The late-2024 contract includes training to operate the aircraft and covers its upkeep with technical support and spare parts. The aircraft can carry payloads of up to 26 metric tons and can be configured for troop and cargo transport, aerial refueling, medical evacuation, and search-and-rescue missions. Kazakhstan’s military has put Turkish Aerospace Industries’ ANKA drone into service after military trials. In its review of 2024, Kazakhstan’s Defense Ministry reported discussions with Baykar, another Turkish drone maker, on a roadmap for local production of tactical drones and loitering munitions. The latter can remain airborne while searching for a target before striking it. The same review said the Turkish side had offered to provide Bayraktar Kalkan and Bayraktar Mini reconnaissance drones, along with the...