• KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10811 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 1767

Opinion: Eurasia’s New Corridors Are More Than a Transit Race

Across Eurasia, new transport corridors are usually described as instruments of rivalry: routes to bypass Russia, ports to outflank competitors, or rail links to shift influence between regions. The conflict around Iran, the rivalry between India and Pakistan, instability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan zone, crises in the Middle East, sanctions, competition over transport routes, and growing struggles for transit influence all reinforce the image of a continent divided by political contradictions. Increasingly, this is the lens through which Eurasia is viewed. The development of transport routes and connectivity is now often explained through the logic of rivalry. Some corridors are described as alternatives to others. Certain ports are positioned against competing ports. Routes are increasingly perceived as tools of competition, circumvention, or geopolitical influence. The continent can also be viewed differently. Alongside political crises, another reality is visible: the continent continues to connect itself through new routes and networks. Railways, ports, energy grids, dry ports, container corridors, digital cables, and trade chains are gradually linking spaces that only recently were seen as separate regions. In many ways, Eurasia has always been a space of movement, exchange, and connectivity. The Silk Road Was a Network, Not a Single Route A recent article by News Central Asia made a simple but important observation: the Silk Road functioned because it belonged to everyone. This idea contains one of the central lessons of Eurasian history. The Silk Road was never a single road. It was not one unified highway built according to a master plan or controlled by a single center. For centuries, the continent was connected by a vast network of caravan routes, maritime pathways, mountain passes, cities, and trade hubs through which goods, people, knowledge, and ideas circulated. Some routes gained importance while others temporarily declined. States, empires, and commercial centers changed. New pathways emerged. Yet the network itself endured. The strength of the Silk Road lay not in one route, but in the multiplicity of connections. When one corridor became unsafe, trade shifted elsewhere. When political conditions changed, commerce adapted to a new geography. The continental network remained flexible and multilayered. This offers an important lesson for today’s Eurasian space as well. Many modern transport corridors did not emerge from nothing. In many respects, they follow historical logic. Railways have replaced caravan paths, dry ports have succeeded old trade hubs, and container routes continue along directions in which goods moved for centuries. Corridors and the Logic of Rivalry Today, most transport and economic corridors are interpreted as competing projects. Nearly every new route is framed through confrontation, alternatives, or attempts to bypass another direction. The Middle Corridor is often described as an alternative to northern routes. The International North-South Transport Corridor is presented as a separate geo-economic axis. Trans-Afghan projects are portrayed as competitors to other links between Central and South Asia. Chabahar and Gwadar are depicted as rival ports. Even the South Caucasus transport hub is increasingly viewed through the prism of struggles over control of routes and flows. Yet historically,...

EAEU Leaders Meet in Astana Amid Growing Internal Trade Disputes

Astana is hosting Eurasian Economic Union events on May 28-29, with leaders arriving on Thursday and the main meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council scheduled for Friday, May 29. The first part of Thursday was dominated by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his delegation during Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan. At the Palace of Independence, Tokayev and Putin introduced their official delegations to each other during the Russian president’s state visit, while Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov said the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting would begin on Friday morning in narrow and expanded formats. The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council is the highest body of the Eurasian Economic Union, which came into force on January 1, 2015. Now more than a decade old, the bloc is facing deepening internal contradictions driven largely by external economic pressure on Russia, the Union’s core member. Some of those tensions are linked to the bloc’s expansion beyond its original Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan core. To understand the current state of Eurasian integration, it is necessary to revisit its origins, particularly the role played by Kazakhstan and its first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had sought to preserve a looser union among the Soviet republics as the USSR collapsed. As prime minister and later president of the Kazakh SSR, Nazarbayev understood the economic consequences that would follow the collapse of the integrated Soviet economic system, and how deeply Kazakhstan remained tied to Soviet-era supply chains, infrastructure, and decision-making structures centered in Moscow. Nazarbayev first publicly proposed the idea of Eurasian integration in 1994 during a lecture at Moscow State University. At the time, however, the administration of Russian President Boris Yeltsin showed little interest in the concept. That changed after Vladimir Putin came to power. In 2001, the Eurasian Economic Community, known as EurAsEC, was established, bringing together Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. The founding agreement had been signed in Astana in October 2000. Uzbekistan joined EurAsEC in 2006, but suspended its membership only two years later. Meanwhile, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan launched work in 2007 on creating a Customs Union, which officially came into existence in 2010. In the autumn of 2011, Putin announced plans to establish a Eurasian Economic Union based on a future Single Economic Space. Two years later, Nazarbayev proposed dissolving EurAsEC in connection with the planned creation of the EAEU by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia were invited to join the Customs Union. However, by 2014, when the treaty establishing the EAEU and dissolving EurAsEC was signed, neither Armenia nor Kyrgyzstan had initially been central to the Eurasian project. At that stage, much of the discussion revolved around the possible accession of Ukraine. Russian political commentator and current State Duma deputy Anatoly Wasserman devoted several books to the idea of integrating Ukraine into the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan project, including Ukraine and the Rest of Russia. Wasserman argued that Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine needed to move away from a raw-materials-based economic model by creating a unified market...

Opinion: Water Without a Guarantor – Central Asia’s Next Security Test

The Fourth High-Level International Conference on the International Decade for Action, “Water for Sustainable Development,“ taking place in Dushanbe on May 25-28, comes at a difficult moment. Central Asia's water problem is no longer only about environmental management; it is moving into the field of regional security. The conference agenda is familiar and necessary: climate, investment, innovation, transboundary cooperation, and the implementation of the Water Action Decade. The harder question is what happens outside the conference hall. Does Central Asia still have a credible way to stop water stress from becoming an interstate crisis? For decades, the region operated in a post-Soviet setting in which Moscow shaped many security calculations, even though it was never a formal water arbiter. That setting has weakened. Russia has not disappeared from Central Asia, and it still retains military, economic, and institutional leverage. But since 2022, its role as the assumed external stabilizer has become less convincing. The result is not a simple vacuum. It is a more awkward reality: a region with many outside actors, but no trusted water-security guarantor. The Old Backdrop Is Weakening Central Asia's water system was built around a Soviet-era division of functions. Upstream republics, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, controlled the mountains, reservoirs, and hydropower potential. Downstream republics, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, depended on seasonal water flows for agriculture, food security, and social stability. The Soviet system managed those tensions through central planning. After independence, cooperation became more fragile. Water, energy, borders, electricity, and agriculture were separated into national strategies. The rivers, however, remained transboundary. For many years, Russia remained the largest external power around which regional security calculations were organized. That did not make Moscow an effective water manager, but it helped shape the political environment. Today, that environment has changed. The CSTO did not prevent the Kyrgyz-Tajik border escalations of recent years. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan eventually reached a border agreement through direct negotiation rather than outside enforcement. That difference is not academic. Water disputes are rarely settled by conferences alone. They need trusted channels for mediation, compensation, and restraint when pressure builds. Central Asia has plenty of statements about cooperation. It has fewer tools for managing coercion when water becomes scarce. Three Pressure Points The region's water-security stress is already visible in three places. The first is Afghanistan's Qosh-Tepa Canal. The canal draws water from the Amu Darya, a river system critical for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Because Afghanistan was not part of the old Soviet water-allocation arrangements, the Taliban government is creating a new upstream reality outside the inherited regional framework. Estimates of the canal's downstream impact vary widely. Some analyses suggest it could divert between 15 and 30% of the Amu Darya's flow, depending on the completion timeline, irrigation efficiency, and water-management practices. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that reduced Amu Darya flows could indirectly affect Kazakhstan if Uzbekistan compensates by drawing more heavily on the Syr Darya. Carnegie has described the Qosh-Tepa as a serious test for regional water cooperation. The second pressure point...

Opinion: Silk Seven or the OTS? Central Asia May Not Have to Choose

A new proposal circulating in Washington – the Silk Seven Plus (S7+) initiative – aims to reshape Central Asia by linking its five post-Soviet states with Afghanistan and Pakistan into an integrated economic region. Azerbaijan is also seen as a potential addition. The idea, advanced by the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, is straightforward: connect landlocked Central Asia to the Black Sea and Arabian Sea through new trade corridors. On paper, the bloc looks compelling. The seven countries form a contiguous zone in the heart of Eurasia, potentially turning geography from a constraint to an advantage. “Central Asia needs an organization built by Central Asian states and for Central Asian states,” said Justin Burke, a resident senior fellow at the New Lines Institute, at a recent event in Washington. “If Central Asia can speak with one voice rather than five different voices, that will make it a more reliable investment destination.” There are signs of momentum. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev made back-to-back visits to Pakistan earlier this year, highlighting regional connectivity. Proponents argue that if Afghanistan stabilizes, the Silk Seven could become a formidable cluster. But that is a big “if.” It also raises a deeper question: why construct a new, geographically convenient bloc when an existing organization – the Organization of Turkic States (OTS)—already offers something deeper: shared language, history, and identity? While the Silk Seven spans broadly Muslim-majority countries, it is linguistically and culturally diverse. The grouping spans Turkic-speaking Central Asia, Persian-speaking Tajikistan, and Indo-Aryan Pakistan. ASEAN offers a cautionary example. Despite decades of cooperation, its religious, linguistic, and geopolitical diversity – combined with consensus-based decision-making – has often prevented it from speaking with one voice, particularly on China. In The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington wrote that when ASEAN was created in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, it was an organization of “one Sinic, one Buddhist, one Christian, and two Muslim member states.” Such multicivilizational regional organizations have limits, he said. The Silk Seven risks similar limitations. The OTS, by contrast, rests on a narrower but deeper foundation: its core members—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan—share closely related languages and overlapping historical experiences. Tucked away in the eight-page document issued after the informal OTS summit earlier this month was a revealing signal of intent: clauses dedicated to cataloguing Turkic cultural heritage, promoting youth engagement through Khiva’s designation as the 2026 Youth Capital, and launching a “Turkic Heritage” digital platform. Together, they show that the OTS is actively building a shared cultural space. Yet even as members emphasize common heritage, differences remain over how far the organization should evolve politically. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the summit host, stressed in his remarks that “the Organization of Turkic States is neither a geopolitical project nor a military organization,” but rather “a unique platform” for cooperation across trade, technology, culture, and humanitarian ties. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev struck a more ambitious note, saying that “the Turkic world must grow into one of the influential geopolitical centers of the 21st century,” and pledging...

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will focus on the newly released report from the European Neighbourhood Council on foreign information manipulation in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Samuel Doveri-Vesterbye, one of the report's authors, will be joining the team as a guest.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan Conduct First Cargo Shipments Using eTIR System

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have carried out their first international cargo shipments using the eTIR system, marking a step toward the digitalization of transport and customs procedures in Central Asia The move is part of a wider regional push to reduce paperwork at borders and speed up freight movement across Central Asia’s road transport corridors. The International Road Transport Union announced the development on May 12. According to the organization, the first operations represent an important milestone in the region’s transition toward electronic customs data exchange and digital transit management. One shipment involved the delivery of vehicles from Kyrgyzstan to Tajikistan, while a second operation transported vehicle parts in the opposite direction. Electronic eTIR guarantees were issued by the national international transport associations of both countries: the Association of the International Road Transport Operators of the Kyrgyz Republic, known as AIRTO KR, and the Association of International Road Carriers of Tajikistan, known as ABBAT. Both operations were processed through the eTIR National Application developed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The system allows countries to connect to digital international transit procedures without having to build complex IT infrastructure from scratch. Before the launch of the pilot shipments, specialists from the IRU and UNECE conducted a series of training seminars for customs officials and representatives of the transport sector. The training sessions were held in Osh, Kyzyl-Bel, and Khujand with support from transport associations and customs authorities in both countries. The IRU emphasized that the successful implementation of the first eTIR operations was the result of close cooperation among customs agencies, transport operators, international road transport associations, and United Nations structures. IRU said it plans to continue working with national authorities and regional partners to expand eTIR use across Central Asia. The traditional TIR system is widely used for international customs transit operations, allowing goods to move across borders in sealed cargo compartments under a unified guarantee and customs control mechanism. The digital eTIR platform is considered the next stage in the system’s development. It is expected to simplify information exchange between customs authorities, transport operators, and guarantee associations, while also accelerating border crossing procedures and reducing paperwork.