Tajikistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team is covering one of Central Asia's leaders openly calling on Vladimir Putin to bring the war in Ukraine to an end, Russia moving to tear up a number of its military agreements with two Central Asian states, upcoming elections in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, a deepening crackdown on opposition media and journalists in Kazakhstan, and a growing wave of fighting in northern Afghanistan that is already beginning to spill across the border into neighbouring Tajikistan. Before turning to our main story this week, where we look back at the decade since Islam Karimov's death and Shavkat Mirziyoyev's rise to power, and ask just how much Uzbekistan has changed over the ten years since. Special guest: Central Asia journalist and author of Silk Mirage: Through the Looking Glass in Uzbekistan, Joanna Lillis.

Energy Security

Tajikistan Seeks 2.55 Million Tons of Iranian Oil and Fuel as Russian Supplies Falter

Tajikistan has asked Iran to supply 2.55 million metric tons of crude oil and petroleum products as Dushanbe looks for alternatives to increasingly unreliable Russian fuel supplies. The request includes 2 million tons of crude oil, 300,000 tons of diesel, 150,000 tons of gasoline, and 100,000 tons of aviation fuel, according to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport. The ministry said the volume would require about 51,000 railway tank cars. The proposal was discussed in Tehran on August 15 during talks between Tajik Transport Minister Azim Ibrohim and Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh. It is not yet a purchase agreement, and Tajikistan has not announced a delivery timetable, price, or supplier. The timing, however, places the proposed trade directly inside a worsening sanctions environment. On August 20, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened economic consequences for countries providing support to Iran, promising “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not announced specific new measures linked to that statement. Significant purchases and transport of Iranian petroleum already carry U.S. sanctions exposure. Executive Order 13846 authorizes sanctions against people and financial institutions involved in significant transactions for the purchase, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum from Iran. A temporary U.S. authorization covering Iranian crude and petroleum products, issued in June, was revoked on July 7, with its wind-down period ending on July 17. Russia’s Fuel Crunch Reaches Tajikistan Dushanbe’s request to Iran is driven by a more immediate problem: dependence on Russian fuel. In 2025, Tajikistan imported about 1.7 million tons of fuel and lubricants, more than 1.2 million tons of which came from Russia. Tajik officials said in July that Russia supplied 84% of imported petroleum products. That dependence has become more difficult to manage as Ukrainian drone attacks have reduced Russian refinery output and forced Moscow to protect its domestic market. Russian fuel shortages began spilling into Central Asia in early summer. Tajikistan’s fuel imports fell sharply in July, pushing Dushanbe to seek additional supplies from China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Iran. Russia still accounted for 72.3% of fuel supplied to Tajikistan in the first half of the year, while talks with Kazakhstan had reached presidential level by the end of July. The pressure was already visible in Dushanbe. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others imposed sales limits. On July 10, Energy and Water Resources Minister Daler Juma said Tajikistan had roughly two months of petroleum reserves and was seeking alternative suppliers. The scale of the request is striking. At 2.55 million tons, it exceeds Tajikistan’s total fuel and lubricant imports in 2025, although 2 million tons of the proposed volume is crude oil rather than finished fuel. The Ministry of Transport has asked Iran to help organize dedicated tanker trains and create a “green corridor” giving Tajik fuel cargoes priority on the Iranian rail network. Further transit arrangements would still be needed because Tajikistan and Iran do not share a border. The Refinery Question The large crude component also highlights...

Archaeology

Ancient Royal Seal Discovered in Tajikistan

Archaeologists from Tajikistan’s National Museum say they have made a significant discovery, a royal seal made of fired clay from the Kushan period, which began about 2,000 years ago and lasted for several centuries. The circular, pea-green seal has a perforation for threading a cord and was found in very good condition in the Abdurahmoni Jomi district of Khatlon region in southwest Tajikistan, the museum said on August 14. “This discovery may mark a new stage in the study of the Kushan period in the region, providing a solid scholarly basis for reassessing certain existing theories and interpretations concerning its history,” the museum said in a statement. The Kushan Empire extended across a vast area at the height of its power, including swaths of present-day Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and northern India. It emerged from the Yuezhi, a nomadic people who had migrated from what is today northwestern China and established themselves in Bactria, an ancient Central Asian region. The decorated surface of the newly discovered seal, engraved within a circular field measuring six centimeters in diameter, features what the museum’s archaeologists describe as significant political, cultural and artistic elements of the Kushan period. “The composition includes a Bactrian inscription, geometric ornamentation, a bust of a king wearing a crenellated crown, depictions of mountain goats, symbols associated with the royal authority and statehood of the Kushan rulers, as well as motifs associated with the authority of local rulers and other symbolic elements,” the Tajik museum said. Specialists from the Department of Archaeology and Numismatics at the National Museum are analyzing the seal and, once finalized, their findings will be shared with a wider circle of researchers. Arkeonews, an archaeology news platform, said the Bactrian inscription on the seal could be especially important because it might “help determine whether the seal belonged to a royal official, a local ruler or another figure operating within the Kushan political system.” The platform said “the seal may ultimately provide evidence for the relationship between Kushan rulers and regional elites in what is now southern Tajikistan.” Arkeonews said that until the museum’s analysis is complete, some of the “most important questions -- who used the seal, what it was intended to authenticate, and how it functioned within Kushan administration -- remain unanswered.”

Middle East Crisis

Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean....

Tourism

Tajikistan Creates Tourism Fund as Visitor Numbers Rise

Tajikistan has created a dedicated fund to reinvest money collected from tourists and travel companies in the country’s tourism industry. The move comes amid rising visitor numbers, with nearly 890,000 foreign tourists visiting the country in the first half of 2026, up 16.7% from a year earlier. The tourist fee predates the fund, which the government formally established by a resolution adopted on July 1. The fund will be used to improve tourism infrastructure and service standards. The money will be kept in a separate account at the Ministry of Finance’s Central Treasury, while the Tourism Development Committee is required to report to the government every six months on how the funds are used. Tourism permit fees and fines for nonpayment will provide additional revenue. The fund will also receive 5% of the value of outbound tour packages sold to citizens of Tajikistan, channeling money from trips abroad into tourism development at home. For foreign travelers, the fee depends on the type of accommodation and is based on Tajikistan’s “calculation indicator,” a government-set benchmark used for official charges. In 2026, one calculation indicator is set at 78 somoni, or about $8.40. Under the current rates, the fee is 0.2 of the indicator per day at hotels and similar accommodation, and 0.15 at guesthouses and hostels. That works out to 15.6 somoni a day in the first category and 11.7 somoni in the second, roughly $1.70 and $1.30 respectively. The charge is small relative to the overall cost of a trip to destinations such as the Pamirs. The government resolution does not state how much revenue the fund is expected to collect. Uzbekistan was the largest source market, accounting for more than half of the total, or 510,400 tourists. Russia accounted for 175,800 and Kyrgyzstan for 89,000. Another 23,100 came from Kazakhstan and 22,700 from China. The committee expects Tajikistan to receive more than 2 million foreign tourists in 2026. Russia remains one of the country’s main source markets. Russian tour operators report growing demand for the Pamir Highway and the Wakhan Corridor. The Fann Mountains and combined trips through Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are also popular. Operators cite expensive airfares and insufficient tourist infrastructure as obstacles familiar to independent travelers. Tajikistan has difficulty competing with Uzbekistan for travelers drawn primarily by the architecture of its Silk Road cities. Its appeal lies elsewhere, particularly in trekking and road trips through the mountains. Some infrastructure problems have eased in recent years as electronic visas and eSIM services have become available and more hotels and restaurants are operating. Tourist information centers have opened, and sections of the Pamir Highway are being repaired. Service quality outside Dushanbe and Khujand, however, remains uneven. There are also security concerns for travelers heading toward the Afghan border. Some of the country’s most spectacular routes pass through the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. After attacks from Afghan territory killed Chinese citizens in late 2025, Dushanbe increased security in border areas. The fund’s effectiveness will depend on how much it raises and...

Digital Finance

Opinion: Tajikistan’s Digital Finance Boom Faces Its Next Challenge – Keeping Money Digital

Tajikistan’s e-wallet numbers are striking. As of June 30, 2026, 28 credit financial institutions reported 19.8 million electronic wallets, up 25.9% from a year earlier. In the first half of 2026, e-wallets were used for 14.6 million non-cash transactions worth 3.6 billion somoni. But those figures should not be read as if 19.8 million people are actively using wallets. The National Bank of Tajikistan’s published aggregate data do not state how many wallets belong to unique users or how many are active. Nor do they show how usage is distributed among them. Without that denominator, the headline figure tells us much less about actual use. Tajikistan has clearly expanded digital access. It now needs a clearer picture of usage and stronger reasons for people and businesses to keep money inside the digital system. I call this the shift from digital access to digital retention. The headline number is 19.8 million wallets out of an official population of 10.721 million as of January 1, 2026. The more useful number would be how many are meaningfully active. Do Not Confuse Registration With Usage A registered wallet is an access point, not proof of financial behavior. One person may hold several wallets, and some may sit dormant. Usage may also be concentrated among a smaller group of frequent users. Without active-wallet and unique-user data, none of those possibilities should be assumed as fact. What we can say is that non-cash activity is growing. The National Bank reports that cashless payments for goods and services made with electronic payment instruments reached 41% in the first half of 2026, 13 percentage points higher than a year earlier. It also reports 9,425 POS terminals at trade and service points and 33,620 QR codes. That 41% figure covers electronic payment instruments, including bank cards and e-wallets. It is not an e-wallet usage rate. To understand how wallets are actually being used, Tajikistan needs a clearer view of active wallets, transaction frequency, and what happens to money after it enters a digital account. Trust Is Part of the Infrastructure For many people, the move from cash to bank cards was already a significant behavioral change. They learned to trust money represented by a balance on a screen rather than notes in a hand. Wallets, QR payments and app-based financial services require another layer of trust. Users need to know where their money is and whether a payment went through. They also need a clear route when something goes wrong. Fees should be easy to understand. This is why simplicity is part of financial trust, not merely user experience. Tajikistan’s Financial Literacy Program for 2026–2030 makes the same connection at a policy level. It links financial literacy and consumer protection with public confidence as digital financial services expand. A good digital-finance service should be usable by ordinary people without making money feel harder to understand. Users should not need fintech expertise to trust the product. Merchants Need a Reason Not to Cash Out Consumers are only one part of...