• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00208 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10414 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00208 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10414 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00208 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10414 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00208 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10414 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00208 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10414 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00208 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10414 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00208 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10414 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00208 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10414 -0.29%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 19 - 24 of 600

Germany Builds a Z5+1 in Central Asia

Germany’s meeting on February 11 with the five Central Asian foreign ministers in Berlin formalized the Z5+1 (“Z” for “Zentralasien”) format as a standing work channel. It joins other “plus-one” formats now crowding Central Asia that function as instruments of influence. The United States is using C5+1 to push a more deliverables-oriented agenda, including critical raw materials, and China has institutionalized leader-level summitry with accompanying treaties, grants, and transport-centered integration. The EU has elevated its relationship to a strategic partnership and is putting Global Gateway branding behind connectivity and investment. Germany’s Z5+1 is best understood as Europe’s effort to add a practical, tool-driven channel that can move faster than EU consensus in some domains while still feeding EU programming rather than competing with it. The concluding Berlin Declaration reads like a program sheet with named instruments, sector priorities, and established a direct link to the EU’s broader “Team Europe” posture through the participation of EU Special Representative Eduards Stiprais. Germany’s Z5+1 fits this competitive field as a European execution lane that can move projects forward with German instruments while staying aligned with EU programs. Berlin Defines the Tools The Z5+1 meeting in Berlin drew on a sequence that Germany has been building since its 2023 “Strategic Regional Partnership” and subsequent summits in Berlin (2023) and Astana (2024), with an explicit emphasis on Central Asian regional cooperation as a counterpart to bilateral ties. The Berlin meeting, therefore, did not attempt to invent a new regional architecture but rather added a stable ministerial format for pushing forward project lists, regulatory expectations, and finance conditions between higher-level meetings. In Berlin, Germany committed €2.7 million to a cooperation platform for the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor: a small sum by infrastructure standards, but targeted at unglamorous coordination like data-sharing, planning discipline, and institutional continuity, i.e., standards and transborder management regimes where corridor initiatives often stall. This profile complements the EU-backed Trans-Caspian Coordination Platform track, which is explicitly tied to a wider €10 billion commitment announced at the January 2024 Global Gateway investors forum for EU–Central Asia transport connectivity. and which has addressed the corridor less as a construction problem than as a finance-and-sequencing problem. Berlin also explicitly supported the commercial participation of German rail and logistics firms in transport and consulting projects, aligning with the intent to keep firm-level engagement attached to ministerial diplomacy. The declaration references export credits and investment guarantees, and links them to business-environment expectations. On the same day, the German Eastern Business Association convened a “Wirtschaftsgespräch” (economics talk) in the Foreign Office with the Central Asian delegations. There, the region was framed as strategically significant for Germany’s diversification agenda, and it was signaled that an autumn leaders’ summit is already in view. Germany’s public accounting of its regional engagement in Central Asia stresses its already-deep base of activity in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in particular, including dozens of projects and multi-billion-euro volumes. The energy transition was mentioned, as the Berlin Declaration points to renewables, hydrogen, and climate programming that Germany is already funding...

Up to 300 Tajik Women and Children Remain in Syria and Iraq

An estimated 250 to 300 Tajik women and children remain in Syria and Iraq, according to Suhaili Kodiri Abduhafizzoda, Head of the Department for State Protection of Children's Rights at the Office of the Human Rights Commissioner of Tajikistan. Abduhafizzoda stated that the repatriation process, previously overseen by a dedicated Tajik working group, has stalled since the change of government in Syria. At its peak, approximately 800 Tajik nationals, mainly women and children, were believed to be in the two countries. While more than half have returned home, hundreds remain stranded. Four Repatriation Waves Since 2019 Tajikistan has conducted four formal repatriation missions since 2019, resulting in the return of 382 individuals. These included: 2019: 84 children repatriated 2022: 144 women and children 2023: 104 individuals 2024: 47 women and children In addition, roughly 90 Tajik citizens returned independently, although their exact routes and methods of escape from conflict zones have not been officially disclosed. Final Stage Falls Short Officials had hoped the 2024 operation would mark the final stage of the repatriation effort. However, Abduhafizzoda confirmed that not all remaining women and children agreed to return. “We planned to return all remaining women and children, but this was not possible, primarily because they themselves refused,” he explained. Fear of legal consequences was the most commonly cited reason. Many of the women expressed concern that they would face criminal prosecution upon returning to Tajikistan. However, authorities insist these fears are largely unfounded. According to the ombudsman’s office, none of the women previously repatriated have been charged or prosecuted. Instead, they were reportedly met with state support and reintegration programs. “Some of the women who had already returned had similar fears. But once they came back, they saw that no criminal cases were initiated, and they were all forgiven,” Abduhafizzoda noted. Children Reunited With Families Officials report that all repatriated children have been reunited with relatives and received assistance in resuming their education and adjusting to civilian life. Nonetheless, the fate of those still in Syria and Iraq remains unclear. Legacy of the Islamic State According to official figures, more than 2,500 Tajik citizens joined the Islamic State group after 2013. Many men took their families with them to Syria and Iraq. By 2017, most of the men were reported killed or missing, and some women and children are also believed to have died during the conflict. With no current framework for further repatriation, the future of the remaining Tajik women and children in the region remains uncertain.

Tajikistan Seeks to Expand the Geography of Labor Migration

Tajikistan has stepped up efforts to expand destinations for labor migration, including countries in Europe and East Asia. The announcement was made by Minister of Labor, Migration and Employment Soleha Kholmahmadzoda at a press conference summarizing the ministry’s work in 2025. According to the Kholmahmadzoda, a memorandum of cooperation with relevant agencies of the Kingdom of Belgium was signed in November last year and is currently undergoing internal approval procedures. The agreement provides for the possibility of organized employment for Tajik citizens in the Benelux countries, namely Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The most in-demand sectors include agriculture, construction, social services, and healthcare. The Ministry of Labor said the initiative is intended to create transparent and legal employment channels, enhancing protection for migrant workers and reducing the risks associated with illegal employment. Cooperation with Japan is also advancing. The ministry has established a special working group and developed a mechanism to attract Tajik citizens as “specially qualified” workers. Relevant documents have been sent to the Tajik Embassy in Japan for publication on the website of the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO). In addition, the Agency for Employment Abroad has prepared a draft agreement with Japanese employers. As a result, the first 10 citizens of the republic have already secured jobs. Special attention is also being given to cooperation with South Korea. In 2025, the Korean side allocated 800 quotas for labor migrants from Tajikistan. After completing professional training and passing the EPS-TOPIK exam, 21 people were employed through the Korean job portal, while documentation is still being processed for 12 additional candidates. Despite the expansion of destinations, Russia remains the primary labor market for Tajik citizens. According to the Ministry of Labor, in 2025, 30 licensed entities sent 35,747 citizens abroad through organized channels, an increase of 18,805 compared with the previous year. Of these, more than 31,000 were employed in Russia, Deputy Minister of Labor, Migration and Employment Norzoda Sharif Sanginmurod said. These figures broadly correspond with estimates from the Russian side. Official data indicate that more than 1 million Tajik citizens are currently working in Russia, mainly in construction, housing and utilities, transport, and logistics.

What the U.S. Really Wants in Central Asia: Behind the B5+1 Forums

The B5+1 business forum continued in Kyrgyzstan’s capital on February 5, as government officials, regional business leaders, and a sizable U.S. delegation met to discuss trade, investment, and regulatory barriers shaping economic ties between Central Asia and the United States. As Washington signals a more pragmatic, commercially driven approach to the region, questions persist over why U.S. investment has lagged behind political engagement and which markets are truly seen as priorities. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Dmitry Orlov, director of the Strategy: East–West analytical center, about the structural obstacles deterring American capital, the shift in U.S. policy thinking, and how Central Asian states are positioned within Washington’s evolving economic calculus. TCA: What serious U.S. capital investments in Central Asia can we talk about today? ORLOV: It is important to understand the main point. Talk of large investments, the arrival of American business, and long-term economic cooperation only makes sense in one case: if the U.S. repeals the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which was adopted back in the 1970s and extended to all former Soviet republics after the collapse of the USSR. Today, it remains a formal and, in many ways, psychological obstacle to a fully-fledged business partnership. At the same time, it is necessary to establish contacts at a business level right now. This is because if the amendment is repealed - and such statements are regularly heard in Washington - it is difficult to predict which countries in the region will receive investment flows and in what volumes. Recent international forums, including Davos, have shown that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are of the greatest interest to the U.S. in Central Asia. Their economies are developing more dynamically, and they can offer large-scale projects and a clear export base. The other countries in the region, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, are still perceived by investors as lower priorities. TCA: Previously, the U.S. actively promoted a political agenda in the region, including human rights and freedom of speech. Now these are rarely mentioned. Why do you think this is the case? ORLOV: The approach has become more pragmatic. The history of U.S. foreign policy shows that strategic and economic interests have always taken precedence. If a territory is attractive in terms of resources or transit routes, a format for cooperation will be found. In Europe, relatively speaking, the rule of law prevails. In Asia, the situation is different, and the Americans understand this perfectly well. Issues of ideology and human rights can move to the background if economic expediency comes first. This is especially true in Central Asia, where many issues are resolved through personal agreements and informal connections. Washington understands this. TCA: What exactly can Central Asia offer the U.S.? ORLOV: In terms of individual countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are again in the lead. They offer oil, gas, and, no less importantly, control over transit routes. There is currently a lot of discussion about rare earths and critical minerals, but their development is always long and expensive. As a result, interest in...

The “Central Asia 2030” Roundtable in Astana: From External Interest to Regional Choice

Discussions about Central Asia’s long-term strategic future are increasingly shifting from a focus on external attention to one of growing regional agency. On Monday, Astana International University hosted the first roundtable in the series Central Asia 2030: Strategic Horizons and Regional Choices. Speakers included Andrew D’Anieri, Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center; Yerkin Tukumov, Special Representative of the President of Kazakhstan; Ambassador-at-Large Zulfiya Suleimenova; and Dauren Aben, Deputy Director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan. Pragmatism, Regional Choice, and the Logic of the “Grand Bargain” In his remarks, Andrew D’Anieri emphasized that Central Asia is increasingly viewed in the U.S. not as a peripheral zone but as an independent strategic partner. He noted that “environmental, water, and climate issues considered within a regional framework are fully supported by the U.S.” However, he added that “long-term commercial and investment projects are impossible without long-term stability, which in turn requires coordination between neighbors, engagement on sensitive issues, and pragmatic regional cooperation.” D’Anieri also pointed to Afghanistan as “an integral part of regional logic,” and described formats such as C5+1 as evidence of Central Asia’s growing subjectivity. He highlighted the first-ever C5+1 summit at the presidential level in Washington as a landmark event, especially under the administration of Donald Trump, known for its preference for bilateral over multilateral formats. Trump and the Possibility of a Visit: Only with a “Big Deal” When asked whether a visit by President Trump to Central Asia is realistic, D’Anieri offered a candid assessment: “Such a visit is only possible if there is a large, symbolically and economically significant deal.” Whether in aviation, technology, or infrastructure, these high-visibility projects are typically what draw Trump’s engagement. He added that “the region has work to do in developing a package of initiatives that could interest the U.S. president and justify a high-level visit.” Potential areas include mining, transport, and logistics. Reframing Afghanistan’s Role in the Region Special Representative Yerkin Tukumov focused on the importance of reframing the region’s relationship with Afghanistan. For too long, he said, Afghanistan has been viewed primarily “through the prism of security threats,” resulting in a narrow and often misleading approach. Tukumov argued for a broader, more pragmatic view that considers economic, humanitarian, and cross-border dimensions. He described the C5+1 format not as a replacement for bilateral diplomacy, but as “an additional level of coordination where Central Asia can speak with a more consolidated voice without losing national autonomy in foreign policy.” He stressed the need to move beyond “ideological and declarative approaches,” toward practical, interest-based mechanisms of cooperation. Ecology, Water, and the Case for a Global Water Agency Ambassador-at-Large Zulfiya Suleimenova addressed the strategic urgency of regional coordination on water and climate. She emphasized that “water issues are transboundary in nature,” and that efforts to resolve them solely within national frameworks are bound to fall short. “Regional coordination in Central Asia is not a political slogan, but a functional necessity,” she said. Suleimenova argued that jointly promoting...

Tajik Border Troops Kill Three Afghans Suspected of Opium Smuggling

An armed clash occurred on the evening of January 29 along the Tajik-Afghan border, in Tajikistan's Shamsiddin Shokhin district, as local border forces intercepted an attempted drug smuggling operation. According to the Border Troops of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB), the incident occurred around 7:30 p.m. in the area overseen by the Bahorak border post of military unit 0341. The GKNB reported that five Afghan nationals illegally crossed into Tajikistan. Once the group was located, border guards attempted to apprehend them. The intruders resisted arrest and opened fire in an attempt to retreat across the border. In the ensuing exchange, three were killed on the spot. The GKNB identified the deceased as Jovid Valadi Davlatmand and Rashid Valadi Davlatmand, residents of Kariai Vorich, and Sobir Valadi Zohir from Kariai Andjir, Takhar province. Two others managed to flee under the cover of darkness, retreating toward Afghan territory. The Tajik-Afghan border has seen a steady rise in armed incidents over the past year, driven largely by drug trafficking and the movement of armed groups across remote mountain crossings. Tajik authorities have repeatedly warned that narcotics smuggling networks operating out of northern Afghanistan remain a persistent security threat despite stepped-up patrols and surveillance. At the scene, border guards recovered three Kalashnikov rifles with four magazines, approximately 150 rounds of mixed-caliber ammunition, a large number of spent cartridges, and four bags containing 73 packages of narcotics, identified as hashish and opium. A boat, likely used for crossing the border, was also discovered. Officials say drug trafficking remains the primary driver of cross-border violence in the region. Afghanistan remains the world’s largest producer of opiates, and Tajikistan is a key transit route for narcotics moving north toward Central Asia and Russia, making the border a frequent flashpoint for armed encounters. The January 29 clash adds to a series of escalating incidents along the Tajik-Afghan border. Two weeks ago, on the night of January 18, Tajik security forces killed four armed individuals, whom they identified as members of a terrorist organization, in the same border zone. Border violence has intensified since last November. In two separate incidents, five Chinese citizens were killed in attacks originating from Afghan territory. In December, two Tajik border guards were killed during a confrontation with armed intruders in the Sarchashma border detachment's area of responsibility. Tajik security forces maintain that full control over the national border is being upheld, and have vowed to respond to all threats with force and immediacy.