• KGS/USD = 0.01150 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01150 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01150 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01150 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01150 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01150 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01150 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01150 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00190 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 -0.42%
14 December 2024

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 201

West Monitors Syria for Plans of Jihadis, Some From Central Asia

Some counterterrorism experts in the West are assessing whether the ouster of Bashar Assad´s regime in Syria will lead to a recalibration of the Islamic militant groups that opposed him, some of which include especially hardline recruits from Central Asia. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian group that led an offensive into Aleppo and Damascus and forced Assad to flee in a span of two weeks, is trying to turn to governance with a relatively moderate image even though it was associated with Al-Qaeda earlier in the Syrian civil war and is labeled a terrorist organization on some Western lists. It’s too early to say whether HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Golani will stick to a message of tolerance or can make it work in a fractured country with gutted institutions, but there are signs that some jihadis object to his message of inclusiveness. “Many of them are Central Asians and they may look to go somewhere else. I think we’re inevitably going to see a certain amount of splintering from what happens in Syria,” said Colin Clarke, a terrorism researcher and author of After the Caliphate. At an Atlantic Council event in Washington on Wednesday, Clarke said there is an “interplay” between religious extremism in Afghanistan and Syria, and that a number of groups with Central Asian members have those connections. Clarke said he will be watching to see whether the connections grow following Assad’s abrupt exit after more than two decades in power. Some estimates put the number of Islamic militants who have traveled from Central Asia to Syria and Iraq over the years at around several thousand, though the figures vary and are difficult to confirm. Many joined the Islamic State group, which was defeated in Iraq and is much diminished in Syria although the U.S. recently carried out air strikes to prevent any resurgence by the group amid Syria’s current upheaval. One jihadist group with Central Asia links that collaborated with HTS in the successful campaign against Assad is Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad, designated a terror group by the U.S. State Department in 2022. The group carried out a Saint Petersburg, Russia metro attack in 2017 that killed 14 passengers and injured 50 others, as well as a suicide car bombing of the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in 2016 that injured three people, according to the U.S. Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad is comprised mainly of Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz combatants, according to Daniele Garofalo Monitoring, which traces jihadist propaganda and military activity. There are an estimated 400-500 fighters in the group. Another HTS ally is Katibat Mujaheddin Ghuroba Division, which has between 200 and 400 fighters, according to the Garofalo site. Many are Uzbeks, Tajiks and Uyghurs, though the group also has Arab militants. There is also Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, which dates to the early stages of the Syrian civil war that began in 2011. The jihadist group is believed to have 400-500 fighters, mostly Chechens, Tajiks, Dagestanis, Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs and Ukrainians, as well as...

Central Asia Braces for Return of Radical Islamists Amid Syrian Turmoil

According to experts, the recent collapse of President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria raises concerns about potential destabilization in Central Asia. This development may force regional governments to repatriate citizens who were lured by Islamist propaganda, while the future of the Astana format negotiations on Syria remains uncertain. The swift coup d'état in Syria saw opposition forces capture Damascus and much of the country within days. Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow, leaving a chaotic landscape dominated by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, often described as a successor to ISIS and Al-Qaeda. The situation has plunged Syria into further instability. The Impact of Operation Zhusan Kazakhstan has firsthand experience dealing with the repercussions of Syria's instability. Between 2013 and 2017, hundreds of Kazakh citizens succumbed to Islamist propaganda, crossing borders illegally to join the conflict, often with their families. In response to the humanitarian crisis, Kazakhstan launched Operation Zhusan ("Wormwood") in January 2019 to repatriate citizens trapped in Syria. The operation, conducted in five stages and completed by February 2021, repatriated 607 citizens, 37 men, 157 women and 413 children (34 of whom were orphans). The government set up a rehabilitation center near Aktau on the Caspian Sea to provide treatment, restore documents, and offer vocational training for adults and education for children. All 37 repatriated men were detained and later convicted of terrorism-related activities, receiving sentences ranging between 6 and 14 years, whilst 18 women faced prosecution. Despite the operation’s success, many in Kazakhstan fear the returnees and their children might spread radical ideologies within the country. Lessons from the Region Other Central Asian countries have also grappled with the challenge of repatriating citizens from Syria. Bakhtiyor Babadjanov, an expert from the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under Uzbekistan’s president, detailed the experiences of Uzbek women lured to conflict zones. These women often found themselves deceived and abandoned in dire conditions, as described in an interview. "The 'happy caliphate' turned out to be a myth," Babadjanov explained, recounting stories of women and children abandoned without food or shelter during battles in Mosul. Survivors reported forced marriages, child abuse, and exploitation under the guise of religious duty. The Uncertain Future of the Astana Process Another significant connection between Central Asia and Syria has been the Astana process, a series of negotiations aimed at resolving the Syrian conflict. Since 2017, Kazakhstan has hosted 22 rounds of talks, including discussions on hostages, missing persons, and settlement efforts. However, the recent escalation in Syria casts doubt on the process. In late November and early December, armed opposition groups launched a large-scale offensive, capturing key cities, including Aleppo and Damascus. Despite this upheaval, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov insisted the Astana process remains relevant as a platform for dialogue and consultation, notwithstanding the fact that Assad is now in Moscow. Heightened Risks of Destabilization Experts in Kazakhstan and Central Asia have warned that the fall of Assad's regime could lead to prolonged anarchy, ethnic and religious conflicts, and a refugee crisis. Political scientist,...

Central Asia Prioritizes Food Security Amid Shared Challenges

Food security remains a top priority for Central Asian nations, yet they face shared challenges that threaten regional stability. Deteriorating water resources, climate change, reliance on external food markets, and geopolitical pressures have intensified the need for regional cooperation in addressing these issues. Bilateral and Regional Efforts Talks between the presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, on August 8 underscored the importance of collaboration. The two leaders witnessed the signing of an agricultural cooperation agreement between their respective ministries. This followed Tokayev’s November 2022 visit to Tashkent, which was particularly productive in advancing food security. Agreements included joint production of mineral fertilizers and a bilateral cooperation program worth $1.3 billion aimed at boosting mutual trade and developing agricultural projects. Trade within Central Asia has grown significantly, with Uzbekistan’s trade volume with its neighbors nearly doubling between 2017 and 2019. Kazakhstan, the region’s leading grain supplier, plays a central role: • Uzbekistan accounts for 60% of Kazakhstan’s grain exports. • Tajikistan consumes 18%. • Kyrgyzstan takes 14%. • Turkmenistan absorbs 6%. Despite this growth, experts highlight the untapped potential for expanding trade and cooperation in agriculture. Common Challenges Food security challenges are compounded by shared threats, including demographic growth and dwindling water resources. The region’s population has reached 75.5 million, while irrigated land per capita has decreased by more than 25% over the past 15 years. Water availability in the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins—crucial for irrigating 10 million hectares - faces a projected 15% decline. This is exacerbated by the alarming retreat of glaciers that feed these rivers, jeopardizing long-term agricultural sustainability. The Need for Regional Solutions While each Central Asian country primarily relies on its resources to address food security, the interconnected nature of these challenges calls for a collective approach. Enhanced regional cooperation is essential to develop resilient agricultural systems, manage water resources effectively, and ensure sustainable growth in food production.

Harnessing Diplomacy: Qosh Tepa Canal as a Bridge to U.S. Influence in Central Asia

The Center for the National Interest, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, has released a report titled Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal and Water Security in Central Asia. The report outlines how U.S. support for the Qosh Tepa Canal project could provide an opportunity for the incoming Trump administration to strengthen its influence in the region. Project Overview Currently under construction in northern Afghanistan, the Qosh Tepa Canal aims to divert water from the Amu Darya River to support agriculture and economic growth. The canal will stretch 287 kilometers, with a depth of 8.5 meters and an average width of 100 meters. Once completed, it will irrigate more than 1.2 million acres of farmland and generate approximately 200,000 jobs in northern Afghanistan. While the Taliban has championed the project as a cornerstone of Afghanistan’s development, the canal poses significant challenges for downstream countries reliant on the Amu Darya, particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Concerns include potential water scarcity, environmental degradation, and heightened regional tensions. Implications for Central Asia The report highlights that the canal could exacerbate existing disputes over water allocation in a region already plagued by scarcity. Unlike its Central Asian neighbors, Afghanistan is excluded from water-sharing agreements rooted in the Soviet era. The poorly designed Soviet canals along the Amu Darya continue to undermine water security in the region decades after their construction, a fate experts hope to avoid with Qosh Tepa. Recommendations for U.S. Engagement The report urges the United States to seize this opportunity to engage Afghanistan and the broader region diplomatically and technically: 1. Support for a Well-Engineered Canal The United States should advocate for a well designed canal that prioritizes water-use efficiency. By offering technical assistance and backing the project in principle, the U.S. could pave the way for multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Asian Development Bank, to provide financial and technical support. 2. Promote Regional Water Diplomacy Washington should encourage negotiations for a regional water-sharing agreement among Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 3. Assist Downstream States Additional investments in modernizing irrigation systems in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan could mitigate the canal's impact on downstream water availability. Strategic Context The report underscores the geostrategic importance of Afghanistan and Central Asia, which border three of Washington’s primary global competitors: China, Russia, and Iran. By supporting the Qosh Tepa Canal project and fostering regional water-sharing cooperation, the U.S. could counterbalance the growing influence of Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran in the region. A Watershed Moment As construction progresses into its second phase, involving thousands of workers and heavy machinery, the Qosh Tepa Canal stands at the nexus of development and diplomacy. The report concludes that U.S. involvement in this critical project could serve not only to address Central Asia’s pressing water security challenges but also to reinforce Washington’s strategic position in one of the world’s most complex geopolitical arenas.

A Final Deal Along Central Asia’s Deadliest Border

It took some 33 years, but on December 4, Kyrgyz and Tajik officials reached a final agreement on delimitation of the last sections of their 972-kilometer border. It is a relief for the entire Central Asian region. In those 33 years the five Central Asian countries (including Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have been independent, the only open conflicts between the armed forces of two Central Asian countries happened between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In the southern Kyrgyz city of Batken on December 4, Kyrgyz security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev and Tajik counterpart Saimumin Yatimov announced an agreement that Tajik state news agency Khovar said “fully completed the delimitation of the remaining sections of the Tajik-Kyrgyz state border.” Most of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border runs through the Pamir Mountains. The eastern part, approximately two-thirds of the common frontier, passes through remote and sparsely inhabited areas. Agreement on where the dividing line between the two countries was easy to reach in this section. The remaining one-third of the border in the west proved far more difficult to find compromises. [caption id="attachment_26293" align="aligncenter" width="2256"] Road near the Kyrgyz village of Ak-Sai. On one side of the road is Tajikistan, the other side, Kyrgyzstan; image: Bruce Pannier[/caption] Kyrgyz and Tajiks are two of the oldest peoples in Central Asia. Their ancestors lived in what is now the border area many hundreds of years before there were any borders. The Soviet Union changed that when it created the Kyrgyz and Tajik Soviet Socialist Republics, not only drawing lines on a map, which were redrawn more than once, but also including enclaves on either side of the border. Roads in the area zigzagged back and forth, one minute through Kyrgyzstan, and few minutes later through Tajikistan, over and over again. As border tensions began to appear toward the end of the 2000-2010 period, both countries started building roads to avoid crossing into the neighboring state, but the terrain is rugged, limiting possibilities for alternate routes. Also, new road construction is expensive and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are both poor countries. [caption id="attachment_26294" align="aligncenter" width="2256"] The entrance to Tajikistan's Vorukh enclave; image: Bruce Pannier[/caption] The lone road leading from Batken to the Kyrgyz village of Ak-Sai and the Tajik enclave of Vorukh weaves through both countries several times and in some places, the road is the border. Visible from any village in this area are the snow-capped mountains, but down in the valleys, water has always been a problem. Like the roads, small rivers and canals meander across both sides of the border, and unsurprisingly, water use is a major source of tensions and has been a significant obstacle in deciding where the border should be. The first hints of trouble came after 2000 and involved petty vandalism, usually children throwing rocks at passing vehicles with license plates from the neighboring country. This escalated and after 2010, when incidents of physical altercations between members of border communities started, followed by vandalism targeting homes and businesses in border villages. Since much of...

Kyrgyz, Tajik Delegations Finalize Border Deal After Long Dispute

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have fully agreed on the demarcation of their border, Kyrgyz officials said Wednesday, in a major step toward ending the conflict between the two Central Asian countries that spilled into violence as recently as 2022.  Delegations from the two nations “reached agreements and fully completed the description of the remaining sections of the Kyrgyz-Tajik state border,” Kyrgyzstan’s state-run Kabar news agency reported. It cited the press service of the Cabinet of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan. The delegation chiefs of the two sides ordered working groups to finalize documents on the border agreement, Kabar said. It published photos of the meeting in the Kyrgyz town of Batken, including an image of the delegation chiefs in military uniform and shaking hands with each other.  The Kyrgyz-Tajik border is nearly 1,000 kilometers long and the agreement followed months of negotiations over various stretches of the mountainous territory.  In 2014, the border between the two countries was closed to Kyrgyz and Tajik citizens following clashes over a bypass road in disputed territory; mortars were fired and both armies suffered casualties. Violence broke out again in 2021 and 2022, resulting in more casualties and the evacuation of more than 100,000 civilians.