Tajikistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Counterterrorism

China to Supply Tajikistan With Intelligence and Counterterrorism Equipment

China will provide Tajikistan with intelligence, police, and counterterrorism equipment worth more than $7.6 million under a grant assistance program approved by the two governments. The governments of the two countries signed the corresponding memorandum of understanding on May 8. The agreement provides for the transfer of equipment by China for the needs of Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. Under the terms of the deal, the Chinese side will deliver 34 intelligence devices along with additional police and counterterrorism equipment. The shipment is expected to enter Tajikistan through the Karasu border crossing. China will also dispatch eight specialists to Tajikistan to install and configure the equipment and train Tajik personnel. Their mission is expected to last 45 days. The total value of the equipment and services amounts to 52 million Chinese yuan, or approximately $7.64 million. All associated costs will be fully covered by the Chinese side. Tajikistan, for its part, has agreed to handle customs clearance, transportation and storage of the equipment once it arrives in the country. Authorities will also exempt the deliveries from taxes and customs duties and provide the necessary conditions for the Chinese specialists, including visas, accommodation, and security arrangements. A special working group will be established to coordinate with Chinese engineers during installation and personnel training. The document separately emphasizes that after delivery the two sides will jointly inspect the quality, quantity and technical specifications of the equipment before signing a formal acceptance certificate. Future operation and maintenance costs will then become the responsibility of the Tajik side. China remains one of Tajikistan’s largest strategic partners. Following President Emomali Rahmon’s recent state visit to China, Tajik officials said more than 80 cooperation documents were signed as a result of high-level talks and business meetings, while China’s Foreign Ministry referred separately to more than ten state-level cooperation documents. Earlier, Tajikistan’s parliament also approved an agreement under which China would finance the construction of nine border facilities along the Tajik-Afghan frontier. The new grant comes amid renewed scrutiny of China’s expanding role in Tajikistan’s security sector. Reports and speculation about a possible Chinese military facility in Gorno-Badakhshan have surfaced periodically, including in 2021 and again in 2024. However, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have denied the existence of a Chinese military base on the country’s territory.

Border Disputes

UN General Assembly Adopts Kyrgyzstan-Led Resolution on Border Disputes

On May 20, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus a Kyrgyzstan-backed resolution titled “Peaceful Settlement of Border Disputes,” Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry announced. More than 40 countries co-sponsored the document. The resolution was presented by Kyrgyzstan jointly with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. According to the ministry, the main purpose of the resolution is to share with the international community the historic achievement of the three Central Asian countries in resolving border disputes through peaceful means, including dialogue and negotiations, in accordance with the UN Charter and international law. The resolution proposes what Kyrgyz officials described as a simple and universal principle: when states face border disputes, the way forward should be peaceful, lawful, and based on dialogue. According to the ministry, the Central Asian achievements highlighted in the resolution offer the international community an example of good-neighborly relations and peaceful dispute resolution. The adoption of the resolution is another confirmation of the ability of Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors to peacefully resolve complex issues that had remained unsettled for decades, the ministry stated. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have recently resolved long-standing border delimitation disputes in the Ferghana Valley inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During a summit in Khujand, northern Tajikistan, on March 31, 2025, Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov, Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon, and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed a historic agreement on the junction point of the three countries’ state borders, effectively ending decades-long territorial disputes. The three leaders also inaugurated the Friendship Stele, marking the exact point where the borders of the three countries meet. The monument symbolizes friendship among the three nations, the resolution of long-standing border issues, and a new stage of regional cooperation. The Times of Central Asia previously reported on Kyrgyzstan’s initiative to establish the Dostuk (Friendship) International Trade and Economic Park jointly with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the border area where the three countries meet. The proposed project is expected to increase cross-border trade, attract investment, and create new economic opportunities across the region.

Middle Powers

Opinion: Middle Powers and the “Voice of the Region” – Is Central Asia Becoming a Coordinated Actor?

Against the backdrop of growing global fragmentation and the weakening of universal international institutions, the role of so-called middle powers is increasing. These are states able to influence regional agendas without possessing great-power status. In this changing system, Central Asia is gradually moving beyond its long-standing image as a geopolitical periphery and is beginning to act more like a region with shared interests. For decades, the region was viewed mainly as a space where the interests of external powers, including Russia, China, the U.S., and others, intersected. Today, that paradigm is beginning to shift. Central Asia is showing greater signs of agency through what may be described as a cluster effect: individually, the countries have limited influence, but collectively they form an important transit hub between Europe and Asia, a growing market, a significant resource base, and a strategic security zone. This creates the conditions for a more coordinated regional position, even if a single regional voice is still emerging rather than fully formed. C5+Azerbaijan as a Foundation for Regional Architecture The institutional foundation of this process is the Central Asian leaders' consultative format, which is now expanding through Azerbaijan's participation. That is turning what was once a C5 dialogue into a looser C5+Azerbaijan, or C6, framework focused on transport, energy, and practical cooperation. Within this framework, the countries of the region are learning to act in a more coordinated manner without supranational pressure. In practice, this process is developing through three main areas. The first is transport and logistics. Azerbaijan's participation has strengthened efforts to make the Middle Corridor more coherent, though the route still faces bottlenecks in capacity, customs coordination, and Caspian crossings. Through tariff coordination, simplified border procedures, and investment in port and rail infrastructure, Central Asia and the Caucasus are increasingly functioning as parts of a single transport artery. That gives the region a faster option for cargo between China and Europe, even if it remains far smaller than traditional maritime routes. Shipping goods via the Suez Canal or the northern route can take between 35 and 45 days, whereas the Middle Corridor can reduce transit times to around 13-21 days under favorable conditions. According to forecasts cited by BCG, shipping volumes along the route could increase three- to fourfold during the current decade. Beyond logistics, the project is creating a new economic framework for the region. Its status as a crossroads is attracting investment in transport hubs and manufacturing facilities along the route, with the potential to turn transit corridors into zones of economic growth. This gives participating countries not only transit revenue but a stronger basis for long-term strategic resilience. The second major area is energy integration, where historical disputes over water and fuel resources are increasingly being supplemented by models of joint development. The Kambarata HPP-1 hydropower project in Kyrgyzstan, being developed with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, has created an important precedent for shared management of water and energy interests. The project is expected to support cleaner electricity generation while helping stabilize irrigation flows...

State Visit

Rahmon Looks to China as Tajikistan’s Options Narrow

Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon just finished a state visit to China. Rahmon has made trips to China many times during the nearly 34 years he has been in power in Tajikistan, but this visit came during a critical period. Simply put, Tajikistan is losing the international importance it once had, and China might now be the most dependable friend remaining for Rahmon and his country. A ‘Sweet’ Start China established diplomatic ties with all five Central Asian countries at the start of 1992. Just months later, a civil war broke out in Tajikistan that would last until June 1997, but that did not deter China from seeking investment opportunities in Tajikistan. China funded the construction of a sugar plant in Kurgan-Tepe in 1992, and later helped build confectioneries in large cities and towns in Tajikistan, as well as providing 10,000 tons of feed for livestock and, in 1994, extending a $50-million loan to Tajikistan. In April 1996, Rahmon and the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan met in Shanghai and formed the Shanghai Five, which, after the inclusion of Uzbekistan five years later, would become the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China used the SCO to improve economic ties with all the Central Asian members, but while Chinese investment in Tajikistan was far less than in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, it was extremely important for Tajikistan, which was, and remains, the poorest country in Central Asia. After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the start of the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan, China gave equipment and winter uniforms to Tajikistan’s border guards. Later, China also helped fund the construction of Tajik border posts along the frontier with Afghanistan, and Beijing is set to help finance nine more border posts. Security along Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan is also in China’s interest. China shares an approximately 475-kilometer border with Tajikistan. Eastern Tajikistan is mountainous, remotely inhabited, and shares a long border with Afghanistan. China is concerned about the ability of potential enemies to move from Afghanistan through eastern Tajikistan and enter China. That is why, less than ten years ago, China built a small, forward observation military post in eastern Tajikistan, not far from the Chinese border. Militant groups such as the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement, comprised mainly of Uyghurs from China’s Xinjiang Region, and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province, which has explicitly threatened China, are present in northern Afghanistan. Chinese companies have been building Tajikistan’s infrastructure for some 20 years: roads, power transmission lines, the Dushanbe thermal power plant, hydropower plants, factories, and other objects. In 2025, China finally surpassed Russia to become Tajikistan’s leading trade partner, and Chinese-Tajik trade turnover in the first three months of 2026 increased by more than 52% compared to Q1 in 2025. Changing Times China is likely to remain Tajikistan’s leading trade partner and more for the foreseeable future. The geopolitical situation in Central Asia has changed, and not in Tajikistan’s favor. The biggest change for Rahmon and his country...

Healthcare

Tajikistan Receives Nearly $1.9 Million in U.S. Medical Equipment

Tajikistan has received nearly $1.9 million worth of medical equipment under a healthcare cooperation program with the United States, with the main focus on improving emergency care, supporting maternity hospitals, and reducing infant mortality. According to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Health, the equipment was delivered as part of the Global Health Supply Chain Program - Procurement and Supply Management (GHSC-PSM). The total value of the shipment exceeded $1.87 million. The handover ceremony took place in Dushanbe and was attended by First Deputy Minister of Health and Social Protection Salomuddin Yusufi and Carson Relitz Rocker, chargé d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan. Officials said particular emphasis would be placed on equipping healthcare facilities with oxygen delivery systems and neonatal resuscitation equipment. Authorities expect the new supplies to improve the quality of emergency medical care and reduce health risks for mothers and infants. Part of the equipment has already been installed in five maternity hospitals and 11 additional medical facilities across the country. Representatives of the Health Ministry said the new equipment is especially important for intensive care and resuscitation units, where timely oxygen delivery and specialized care directly affect patient survival rates. They described the transfer as another example of long-term U.S. support for Tajikistan’s healthcare system. According to Yusufi, medical cooperation between the U.S. and Tajikistan has continued for many years and spans a wide range of areas, including equipment supplies, efforts to combat infectious diseases, sanitary and epidemiological safety, healthcare infrastructure modernization, and the training of medical personnel. Authorities in Tajikistan also expressed hope for further expansion of cooperation following the signing of a new memorandum of understanding between the country’s Ministry of Health and Social Protection and the U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan.

Geopolitics

Opinion: The U.S. Still Doesn’t Know Where Central Asia Belongs

Washington cannot decide where Central Asia belongs. Is it part of Europe? Asia? The Middle East? The confusion is on full display in how the House of Representatives has reassigned the region across subcommittees in rapid succession. In the 116th Congress, which convened in 2019, Central Asia fell under the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment. Two years later, in the 117th Congress, it was moved to the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation. That arrangement barely settled before the 118th Congress shifted it again—this time to the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Now, in the 119th Congress, it has been relocated to the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia. On the banks of the Potomac, Central Asia has taken on a nomadic life of its own—constantly on the move, never quite settling in one place. At the State Department, Central Asia is grouped under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs alongside Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. At the Pentagon, by contrast, the Middle East team oversees relations with Central Asia, alongside countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. These mismatches are not just clumsy; they are strategically dangerous. By misplacing Central Asia, Washington is misreading the geography of China’s rise. It is time for Washington to stop the bureaucratic musical chairs and place Central Asia within a coherent grand strategy. Far from being an afterthought, the region is one of the most consequential pieces of the geopolitical puzzle facing the United States: how to respond to China’s strategy. This is because Central Asia sits at the heart of China’s decades-long effort to move its critical lifelines away from the Indo-Pacific and onto the Eurasian landmass. Over the past 15 years, China has quietly reoriented its energy routes, reducing reliance on maritime pathways vulnerable to U.S. naval dominance—particularly chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—and expanded overland imports across Eurasia. Today, China imports significant volumes of natural gas via pipelines from Turkmenistan and Russia, as well as crude oil from Kazakhstan. These continental routes are largely insulated from maritime interdiction, giving Beijing strategic resilience. Central Asia should be understood through this lens. For China, the region is not peripheral—it is essential. The pipelines, railways and trade corridors that underpin China’s resilience all pass through Xinjiang and Central Asia. In this sense, Central Asia is not merely adjacent to China; it is embedded in China’s vision of the future. This is why Washington’s practice of grouping Central Asia with South Asia misses the mark. The two regions operate under fundamentally different strategic logics. South Asia is centered on the Indian subcontinent, shaped by maritime dynamics and the India‑Pakistan rivalry. Central Asia, by contrast, is a continental crossroads—defined by overland connectivity, energy flows and great‑power competition across Eurasia. India, meanwhile, is geographically constrained—lacking direct land access to Central Asia due to territory administered by Pakistan and separated from China by the Himalayas—leaving it...