Tajikistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Iran

Iran War Highlights Central Asia’s Vulnerable Southern Trade Corridors

The widening war centered on Iran is reverberating far beyond the Middle East, exposing a structural vulnerability in Central Asia’s economic geography: the region’s reliance on transport corridors that pass through or near Iran and the Persian Gulf. As fighting escalates and shipping risks spread across the region, insurers, shipping companies, and logistics firms are reassessing operations across the Gulf. War-risk insurance premiums have surged while some commercial carriers have scaled back bookings to parts of the region amid growing security concerns. Tensions around the Strait of Hormuz have already pushed shipping costs higher as governments and logistics firms weigh the risks of operating in one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. For Central Asia’s landlocked economies, the crisis highlights how much regional connectivity strategies still depend on southern access routes linking the region to global markets. The conflict has also edged closer to the transport routes linking Central Asia with Europe after what were alleged to be Iranian drone strikes on Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan region, damaging facilities at the exclave’s airport and prompting diplomatic protests from Baku. While the strike did not directly disrupt trade corridors, it underscored how quickly the conflict could spill over into the South Caucasus, a key segment of the Middle Corridor. Nakhchivan is a landlocked Azerbaijani exclave bordering Iran and Turkey, separated from mainland Azerbaijan by Armenia, and lies at the frontier where Iranian territory meets the transport networks of the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus also hosts energy infrastructure with wider geopolitical significance. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline transports mostly Azerbaijani crude through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, from where it is shipped to global markets. In 2025, Azerbaijani oil accounted for 46.4% of Israel’s crude imports, most of it moving through this supply chain before being shipped onward by tanker. The pipeline also carries limited volumes of Kazakh crude - 2-3% of Kazakhstan’s overall exports - making it far more significant for Israel’s energy supply than for Kazakhstan’s export system. Iran’s armed forces have denied responsibility for the drone incident, instead accusing Israel of attempting to provoke tensions and disrupt relations between Muslim countries. The Geography of Connectivity Since independence, Central Asian governments have sought to overcome the constraints of geography. Landlocked and long dependent on Soviet-era transport networks running north through Russia, the region has spent three decades developing alternative corridors in multiple directions. Routes leading south have held particular appeal, offering the shortest overland access to ports on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Iran sits at the heart of several connectivity initiatives designed to connect Central Asian rail networks to ports on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Ashgabat Agreement — a multimodal transport framework linking Iran, Oman, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and designed to connect Central Asia with ports on the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman — was created specifically to facilitate international trade and transit between Central Asia and global shipping routes. For countries such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, rail routes...

CA5+UK

Central Asia and Britain Launch CA5+UK Ministerial Track

On February 26, 2026, the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in London with United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper at Lancaster House for the inaugural “Central Asia–UK” (CA5+UK) ministerial. Official statements described it as the first time since independence that all five Central Asian foreign ministers have met jointly with a UK foreign secretary in a single forum. They also presented the meeting as the start of a structured ministerial channel, intended to convene regularly, that can carry regional priorities while leaving bilateral agendas in place. The United Kingdom is framing the new CA5+UK channel as a replacement for scattered bilateral visits: a single ministerial venue can set shared priorities and route them into investment and services work. For the five Central Asian states, it adds another external track, widening options without forcing institutional choices. Public statements point to a practical agenda focused on trade and investment, transport connectivity, energy transition, and critical minerals, with security present chiefly as background context. The enabling layer of finance, standards, education, and professional services is also included. How the London Program Unrolled On February 25, meetings took place at the British Parliament as part of the London schedule. The five ministers met with House of Commons Speaker Sir Lindsay Hoyle and held a session with the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Central Asia, chaired by Pam Cox. The meetings in Parliament complemented the ministerial session at Lancaster House by widening contact beyond foreign ministries. The discussion emphasized committee-to-committee contacts, visits, and exchange of legislative practice as a complement to intergovernmental diplomacy. Parliamentary relationships and staff channels can carry attention between ministerial sessions, assisting with follow-up after cooperative contacts have been publicly established. They represent a second continuity layer: implementation often turns on routine access and working familiarity rather than on formal statements alone. Between the parliamentary program and the ministerial delegations, they also met with the United Kingdom business community at a reception in London. This was a practical companion to the new format, aiming at the conversion of diplomatic intent into projects that can be financed and executed. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev cogently highlighted the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), which operates under English common law with an independent court and arbitration system and British judges in the AIFC Court. Beyond the plenary session, a ministerial working lunch provided a venue to follow up on such initiatives. Early deliverables were not multilateral but bilateral. Kazakhstan and the United Kingdom signed a strategic roadmap on critical minerals through 2027 and paired it with education moves, including a licensed Coventry University campus in Almaty and plans involving British secondary and higher education institutions. Uzbekistan reported a Memorandum of Understanding on healthcare services that it presented as a platform for building pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, alongside separate discussions with investment and finance counterparts in London. Turkmenistan cited a 2026–2027 cooperation program between foreign ministries, and Tajikistan continued to emphasize investment and cooperation in science and education. CA5+UK Launches with Bilateral Packages...

Iran

Middle East Conflict Tests Central Asia’s Trade Routes and Energy Security

The escalating conflict between Iran, the United States, and their regional partners is raising economic concerns across Central Asia. Turkmenistan shares a long border with Iran, while other Central Asian economies depend on energy markets and trade routes that pass through or around the Persian Gulf. A wider conflict there could ripple across Central Asia through higher fuel prices, disrupted logistics, and pressure on key transport corridors. For countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the most immediate risk is rising fuel prices. Both depend heavily on imported fuel. Kyrgyz security expert Taalaibek Jumadylov has warned that Kyrgyzstan could face rising prices for food, clothing, and other essential goods. For Tajikistan, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would significantly increase import costs. Tajik media reports that trade between Tajikistan and Iran has grown rapidly over the past five years. Tajik-Iranian trade turnover increased from $377.7 million in 2024 to approximately $484 million in 2025, a rise of around 28%. Tajikistan’s exports totaled about $113 million, while imports from Iran exceeded $371 million, giving Iran a 4.5% share of Tajikistan’s total foreign trade turnover. If global oil prices rise significantly, Tajikistan could also face additional pressure on its budget. There are indirect risks as well: a slowdown in the economies of Russia, China, or other major partners could affect Tajikistan through trade, investment flows, and remittances. In Uzbekistan, analysts note that in recent years Iran has actively pursued transport diplomacy with Central Asia, seeking to strengthen its position as a regional logistics hub. Uzbek analyst Nargiza Umarova says this trend aligns with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Iran and China signed a 25-year cooperation agreement in March 2021, a deal widely described as deepening Iran’s role in Belt and Road-linked connectivity. Kazakh economist Almas Chukin highlighted the logistical advantages of transport routes through Iran. “If we take the point where the Turkmenistan railway connects with Iran and the route to the Persian Gulf, it is about 1,200-1,500 kilometers. This is comparable to the distance from Astana to Almaty. Once you cover this distance, you reach the Persian Gulf and its major ports, where you can handle anything from oil transshipment to grain shipments. From there, sea transport to Rotterdam takes about three to four weeks,” he stated. Chukin added that such routes could simplify exports compared with transporting oil through Russia to Novorossiysk and then via the Black Sea, the Bosphorus Strait, and the Mediterranean. According to his estimates, a rail route to Europe through Iran would be about 3,500 kilometers from the Turkmen border. The economist suggested that if Iran’s political system changes and sanctions are lifted, Central Asia could benefit significantly. “This would be a huge shift for Central Asia: a region with a population of 80 million, abundant resources, and a young workforce, but constrained by geography, suddenly gaining direct access to global markets,” Chukin argued. Some analysts also point to emerging competition among regional transport corridors. In the South Caucasus, a proposed Zangezur corridor has been promoted...

Islamic State – Khorasan

Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia

In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments. When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable. The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed. Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability. However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game. History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained. There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you. This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly. This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia. First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection. Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central...

CA5+UK

UK Expands Strategic Engagement in Central Asia Amid Growing Global Competition

The world’s largest economies have recently increased their focus on Central Asia. The United Kingdom, alongside the U.S., the European Union, and China, is seeking to strengthen partnerships in a region that was previously not among its top foreign policy priorities. Britain Replicates an Established Format Throughout the years of independence, Kazakhstan and its regional neighbors were often perceived as operating within Russia’s sphere of influence. The war in Ukraine and broader geopolitical shifts have altered international attitudes toward Central Asia. Major powers are now intensifying dialogue with the region, with particular emphasis on economic cooperation. At the end of February, foreign ministers met in London under the Central Asia-UK (CA5+1) format. Although this was the first meeting of its kind in the British capital, the format mirrors similar mechanisms already used by the U.S., the European Union, Russia, China, and Japan. Participants noted that the CA5+1 format has proven to be an effective mechanism for structured and substantive engagement with external partners. The regional agenda is addressed comprehensively, reflecting Central Asian priorities while creating additional opportunities to advance economic initiatives and implement joint projects. Particular attention has been paid to trade diversification, industrial cooperation, sustainable infrastructure development, and unlocking Central Asia’s potential in critical minerals and renewable energy. The meeting also covered economic growth prospects, key challenges facing Central Asian economies, and the expansion of trade and investment. Logistics was a central topic, including the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, widely known as the Middle Corridor. British Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper emphasized the strategic importance of Central Asia as a dynamically developing region characterized by sustained economic growth, expanding regional cooperation, and a growing role in international affairs. According to the British participants, the region’s countries are pursuing a pragmatic approach, strengthening connectivity and expanding their participation in shaping a modern architecture of economic and political cooperation. Education and Finance Interest in British education continues to grow across all five Central Asian countries. Four branches of British universities are operating in Kazakhstan, and nearly 6,000 students have earned British degrees through the Bolashak international scholarship program. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have announced plans to establish international financial centers modeled on the Astana International Financial Centre in Kazakhstan. British Ambassador to Uzbekistan Timothy Smart said that work is underway to create an international financial center in Tashkent based on international arbitration standards. Like the Astana model, the new center will operate under English common law. British Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Nicholas Bowler highlighted London’s role in assisting with legislation for the International Dispute Resolution Center, which will operate under English law and be located in the Issyk-Kul region. Greater participation by Central Asian companies on the London Stock Exchange is also anticipated. Logistics and Resources British diplomats have placed particular emphasis on cooperation in critical minerals, a priority within the United Kingdom’s global strategy. Projects are underway across the region, accompanied by new agreements and industrial partnerships. Agreements have reportedly been reached between the Kazakh producer Zhezkazganredmet and the British...

Iran

Central Asia Updates from Mideast Conflict

Kazakhstan has expressed sorrow over the deaths of young students in what appeared to be an air strike that hit a girls’ primary school in the southern Iranian city of Minab. “I received the news of the death of 160 schoolgirls in Iran - with deep distress. The interruption of the lives of children, who must get education and step into the future on a peaceful day, is an irreplaceable tragedy for all humanity,” Education Minister Zhuldyz Suleimenova said on Facebook on Monday. “As a parent, I believe that children should never be victims of any kind of conflict, or political disputes,” Suleimenova said. “Their safety and well-being is one of the most important values for the international community and for every state.” Health officials and state media in Iran have reported a higher death toll of at least 175 in the destruction at the school on Saturday, saying most of the dead were probably children. The U.S. military said it was looking into reports of civilian casualties during its operations against the Iranian government. Some reports say the school that was hit is near an Iranian military installation, one of many targeted by U.S. and Israeli strikes since the military air campaign began on Saturday. Kyrgyzstan is working to help hundreds of its citizens who are stranded in Gulf countries because of the Mideast conflict. Diplomats are negotiating with hotels to make sure that Kyrgyz nationals are not evicted, Seitek Zhumakadyr uulu, head of the consular department of Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said on Monday. He said there are 800 stranded Kyrgyz citizens in Qatar and about 1,000 in the United Arab Emirates, according to Kyrgyzstan’s state news agency Kabar. Most Kyrgyz citizens in Saudi Arabia are performing Umrah, the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca, the official said. Thousands of pilgrims have been affected by the air strikes on Iran and retaliation by Iranian forces. Airspace in many parts of the region is closed to commercial traffic and airlines have suspended flights. However, Ulukbek Maripov, Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador in Saudi Arabia, has said that airports there are operating relatively well. There are no reports of Kyrgyz civilian casualties in the conflict. Uzbekistan’s diplomats in Turkmenistan's capital Ashgabat are arranging assistance for Uzbek citizens who want to leave Iran and cross into neighboring Turkmenistan. “Embassy officials will meet citizens at the Turkmen-Iranian border crossing in the city of Sarakhs,” Uzbekistan’s state news agency Dunyo reported. “Official vehicles of the Embassy of Uzbekistan in Ashgabat have been mobilized to facilitate onward travel arrangements.” The Iranian city of Sarakhs is a key transit point for trade between Iran and Central Asia. The border between Iran and Turkmenistan is more than 1,000 kilometers. A Tajik citizen who was leaving Iran by crossing into Azerbaijan needed medical assistance at the border. “A female citizen of Tajikistan experienced health problems during the evacuation from Iran via the Azerbaijani border,” the Azerbaijani Press Agency reported. “She applied to a doctor present at the checkpoint. The Tajik citizen...