Tajikistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Regional Security

The Taliban’s Road Reaches China, but the Border is Closed

After several years of slow progress, the road connecting Afghanistan to China is finally ready. On October 4, Taliban officials inaugurated the 121-kilometer road through Afghanistan’s remote and arid northeastern Wakhan Corridor. China, however, has not been too keen on the project, and, according to one report, when the Taliban reached the Chinese border, the way was barred, with Chinese border guards ordering the Taliban to leave the area. The Hard Road The Wakhan Corridor was part of ancient trade routes through Asia, but was clearly only used by hardy merchants. The area is one of the most isolated regions on the planet. Nearly all of it is 4,000 meters or more above sea level, mostly bare stone mountains with some grass and a few trees and bushes growing on hillsides and in the valleys. The Wakhan Corridor officially appeared on maps as part of Afghanistan at the end of the 19th century. It was a buffer zone agreed to by representatives of the British and Russian empires. Today, the far eastern section of the Wakhan Corridor is the only place where Afghanistan directly borders China. That 74-kilometer border was easy to ignore due to the remoteness of the area, but not long after the Chinese revolution in 1949, officials in Beijing still ordered it closed. The harsh climate and rugged mountains make most of the corridor virtually unhabitable, but that did not stop some from believing a modern trade route could be opened through Wakhan that would connect Afghanistan to China. Dirt roads reached a few of the larger settlements in the western part of the corridor, villages of, at most, several hundred people. The Taliban just finished building a gravel road and four bridges that finally make it all the way to the Chinese border. By itself, this is far from sufficient to qualify as a legitimate trade route. There is no infrastructure to serve traffic through the region, no petrol stations, no accommodation, no places to buy food or drink, and temperatures are well below freezing for at least half the year. China’s Big Objection The bigger obstacle is that China has no strong interest in opening this route, and in fact, would prefer the Afghan border to remain closed. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is still present in Afghanistan. ETIM is comprised mainly of ethnic Uyghurs from China’s western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the same Chinese region that borders Afghanistan. ETIM’s goal is to topple Chinese rule in Xinjiang. ETIM fighters have been in Afghanistan for at least 25 years, and were allies of the Taliban during the years foreign troops were in Afghanistan. The Islamic State of Khorasan Province is active in northern Afghanistan, and that group has also made specific threats against the Chinese government. The Taliban have promised that they will not allow any group to use Afghan territory to plot or carry out attacks on neighboring countries. However, the Wakhan Corridor is part of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province, and the Taliban have...

Regional Security

China Seeks Closer Intelligence Cooperation with Tajikistan

China has called for closer intelligence cooperation with Tajikistan and stronger protection for Chinese citizens and businesses. Premier Li Qiang raised both issues during October 19 talks with President Emomali Rahmon in Dushanbe, following attacks that disrupted Chinese projects near the Afghan border. According to China’s Foreign Ministry, Li urged the two countries to “strengthen intelligence exchange and sharing” and deepen law enforcement cooperation. He also called for “strong measures” to protect Chinese nationals and enterprises in Tajikistan. Li placed those requests alongside proposals for closer economic ties, including cooperation in infrastructure and minerals. The Chinese account did not announce a new intelligence-sharing agreement or explain how the proposed cooperation would operate. Security concerns have already affected work on a major road connecting Tajikistan with China. Chinese specialists returned under armed protection to the Kalai-Khumb–Vanj section of the Dushanbe–Kulma highway earlier this year after construction stopped following the November 2025 killings. Tajikistan’s Transport Ministry said the specialists returned in April. Radio Ozodi subsequently described Tajik special forces guarding Chinese workers in Darvaz in late May. The project is funded by a $230 million Chinese grant and is being carried out by China Road and Bridge Corporation. The road runs through difficult mountain terrain toward the Kulma Pass on the Chinese frontier. Its reconstruction is intended to shorten journeys and improve year-round access. For workers on sections close to the Afghan border, however, returning to construction also required protection from armed attacks. On November 26, 2025, an assault on a company camp in Tajikistan’s Khatlon region killed three Chinese workers. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry said the attack came from Afghanistan and involved a drone carrying explosives. Four days later, gunmen targeted China Road and Bridge Corporation employees in Darvaz district. Two Chinese nationals were killed. Tajik border officials said the perpetrators came from Afghanistan, but did not publicly identify the organization responsible. Beijing subsequently pressed Dushanbe to protect its citizens. Rahmon convened senior security officials and ordered measures to prevent further attacks. Taliban officials announced two arrests in December 2025 in connection with the killings, but did not publicly identify the suspects. China’s economic connections with Tajikistan have continued to expand. On October 17, state-owned Tajiktelecom and China Mobile International launched a direct fiber-optic link through the Pamirs. The connection has an initial capacity of up to one terabit per second and provides an additional route to international communications networks. The Tajik section extends for 1,010 kilometers, including 435 kilometers through Gorno-Badakhshan, joining China’s network at the Kulma Pass. Together with the highway, the cable illustrates the importance of eastern Tajikistan to the countries’ cross-border infrastructure. For Tajikistan, the immediate issue is protecting the people building and operating these connections. Li’s request brings the protection of those workers into discussions about closer intelligence cooperation at the highest level.

Regional Security

Central Asia’s Afghan Engagement Faces Persistent Security Risks

Central Asian countries are expanding their trade with Kabul despite concerns about armed groups operating from Afghanistan. Russia has renewed warnings about militants seeking to infiltrate the region and is advocating cooperation with the Taliban authorities to contain them. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are interested in trade, energy, and transport projects connecting the region with South Asia. Tajikistan has traditionally taken a more critical position toward the Taliban and places particular emphasis on securing its lengthy border with Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Russia and China are seeking guarantees from the Afghan authorities against the activities of armed organizations that threaten their security. Speaking on October 16 at a joint conference of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said extremist organizations maintained a significant presence in Afghan provinces bordering Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. According to Lavrov, militants intend to use Afghan territory to expand their activities into Central Asia and Russia. Lavrov identified Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State terrorist organization, also known as ISIS-K, as the main threat, citing Russian security agencies. The group opposes the Taliban, carries out attacks in Afghanistan, and has struck beyond its borders. The name Khorasan refers to a historical region encompassing parts of present-day Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia. ISIS-K’s reach extends beyond Afghanistan’s border regions through propaganda, recruitment, and cross-border networks. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, people from Central Asia have been implicated in ISIS-K activities beyond the region itself, including within migrant communities. Lavrov claimed that militants in northern Afghanistan included ethnic Uyghurs, alongside fighters from Central Asia and the North Caucasus. His reference to Uyghurs echoes Beijing’s security concerns over Xinjiang, where China has used counterterrorism policies to justify sweeping repression. A 2022 UN assessment found that arbitrary detention and restrictions on the rights of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim groups could constitute crimes against humanity. The TASS report provided no evidence supporting his claims about the fighters’ origins. Lavrov also called for joint action against weapons and drug trafficking through Central Asia. The Taliban as a Security Partner Lavrov urged engagement with the Taliban authorities, who returned to power during the U.S. military withdrawal in August 2021. Russia formally recognized their government in July 2025. Moscow argues that the Taliban’s control of Afghan territory makes them responsible for security within the country, and is seeking international support for Kabul’s efforts to improve regional security. While relying on the Taliban to contain armed groups, Moscow is simultaneously questioning their ability to do so. ISIS-K has attacked Taliban officials, giving Kabul a direct reason to confront the organization. That conflict, however, offers no assurance that the Taliban will act against other armed groups operating in Afghanistan. China also favors working with Kabul on security, with concerns extending to the safety of Chinese nationals and regional trade routes. Two attacks launched from Afghan territory killed five Chinese nationals...

C5+1

Central Asian States Set Out Priorities After Rubio Talks in Samarkand

Central Asian governments backed closer cooperation on mineral processing and transport at the October 19 C5+1 meeting in Samarkand. Separate talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio covered possible aircraft purchases for Kyrgyzstan and further diplomatic engagement with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan announced a $12 billion package of agreements and prospective initiatives during the visit. For the other four Central Asian participants, the published accounts centered largely on cooperation priorities and follow-up discussions. The gathering followed the November 2025 White House summit and accompanied Uzbekistan’s signing of the Artemis Accords. It brought Rubio together with all five Central Asian foreign ministers, combining regional discussions with separate bilateral meetings. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi discussed implementation of earlier presidential agreements with Rubio. The talks addressed attracting American investment and technology, with energy and critical minerals among the priorities. Washington also expressed interest in cooperation on artificial intelligence and communications infrastructure. According to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry, Rubio expressed interest in visiting Kazakhstan after the December G20 summit in Miami. Kyrgyzstan’s talks included immediate obstacles to closer relations. Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev raised sanctions policy and visa restrictions with Rubio, alongside opportunities for American investment. The Kyrgyz side sought solutions that would facilitate educational and business exchanges. Presidential special representative Bakyt Sydykov briefed the U.S. delegation on Kyrgyzstan’s sanctions-related efforts, with Bishkek reaffirming its willingness to work with Washington to prevent sanctions circumvention. In a separate meeting, Kulubaev discussed possible Boeing aircraft deliveries to Kyrgyz airlines with company vice president Michael Schnabel. Financing options included possible involvement by the U.S. Export-Import Bank. The discussions also covered aircraft maintenance and aviation infrastructure. Tajikistan’s Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin discussed expanding trade and investment with Rubio. The ministry’s account also described an exchange on regional security and stability in Central Asia. Turkmenistan reported a more specific diplomatic follow-up. Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov and Rubio outlined a schedule of further meetings and political consultations. U.S. special envoy Sergio Gor also attended the talks. The shared C5+1 statement set out the broader economic agenda. The six governments supported further development of the Trans-Caspian Trade Route and more closely aligned customs procedures. They also backed stronger industrial cooperation within Central Asia. On minerals, the statement envisaged expanded extraction and processing, alongside more production of higher-value goods within the region. It also supported exchanging expertise on geological data. These were collective policy intentions, without country-by-country financing allocations or project completion dates. Security commitments covered stronger border protection and counterterrorism cooperation, alongside efforts against transnational crime. The governments also supported practical cooperation on nuclear security and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

C5+1

Uzbekistan Signs Space Accords as Rubio Opens Samarkand Talks

Uzbekistan joined the U.S.-led Artemis Accords on October 19 as Secretary of State Marco Rubio held talks in Samarkand. The signing accompanied the first Enhanced Strategic Partnership Dialogue between the two countries, with critical minerals among the priorities. Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov announced the signing after bilateral talks with Rubio. He said Uzbekistan had become the 77th country to join the framework for peaceful space exploration. Saidov said accession would support closer cooperation with NASA and other participating space agencies. He identified training for Uzbek specialists and access to space technologies as potential benefits. Established in 2020, the Artemis Accords set out principles for civilian space exploration. Signatories commit to peaceful operations and greater transparency, including sharing scientific data. The framework also addresses interference between missions and the preservation of historic sites in space. NASA describes the accords as nonbinding principles. Posting on X, Rubio confirmed he had met all five Central Asian foreign ministers during the C5+1 gathering. He said cooperation would expand commercial opportunities and strengthen regional security. American businesses also joined the visit as Washington seeks deeper economic ties across Central Asia. The visit follows the November 2025 White House summit, where Trump hosted all five Central Asian presidents. That meeting gave the partnership a stronger commercial focus, with aircraft orders and minerals projects featuring prominently. Samarkand brings ministers and businesses together to advance that agenda. The strategic dialogue focused on implementing agreements reached by the countries’ leaders and expanding economic cooperation. Saidov said the discussions covered energy and advanced technologies, alongside critical minerals. Education and security cooperation were also on the agenda. Rubio said separately that the talks addressed infrastructure and space cooperation, as well as engagement through C5+1, which brings together the United States and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In a separate meeting with Kazakh Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi, Rubio reaffirmed plans to expand economic and security cooperation. He thanked Kazakhstan for supporting “President Trump’s peace initiatives, including the Abraham Accords.” Speaking to reporters in Samarkand, Rubio said nearly 300 American businesses were represented, and that agreements potentially worth billions of dollars were under discussion. He presented the visit as the start of deeper U.S. economic engagement with Central Asia. “I think we’ll have some concrete deals to announce,” he said, according to Euronews. A final list of agreements and their value had not been circulated at the time of those remarks. Rubio identified critical minerals as a priority, arguing that concentrated supplies created risks for countries dependent on them. "This is not about coming here to say, stop talking to somebody else or stop working with some other country," he said. Days earlier, at the October 15 summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia in Baku, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed a transport strategy spanning several international initiatives. His proposal included China’s Belt and Road and the planned Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) through Armenia. It illustrated the region’s pursuit of transport links involving...

Migrant School Fees

Russian Lawmakers Propose School Fees for Central Asian Migrants’ Children

Russia relies on millions of workers from Central Asia, but lawmakers want to charge some of their children, typically aged 15–17, for the final two years of public schooling. The move comes after tougher enrollment rules that have left thousands of migrant children struggling to attend Russian schools. The proposal, submitted to the government by deputies from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) on October 14, would require foreign citizens and stateless people to pay for education in grades 10 and 11. LDPR leader Leonid Slutsky argued that migrant families should bear the costs of educating their children in Russian upper-secondary schools, allowing public funds to be redirected toward Russian students. The party claimed that more than 130,000 foreign children attend grades 10–11, costing the state over 37 billion rubles (about $440 million) annually. However, these figures contradict data from Russia's Ministry of Education analyzed by the data project Tochno, which found approximately 130,000 foreign pupils and another 3,000 stateless pupils enrolled across all school grades in 2025–26, with only 4% of foreign pupils attending grades 10–11. That would put the number of foreign pupils in the final two grades at roughly 5,200, casting doubt on the LDPR's estimated savings. Growing Pressure on Migrant Families The proposed fees follow a series of Russian restrictions that have already made it more difficult for Central Asian families to educate their children in Russia. Since April 2025, foreign children seeking admission to Russian schools have been required to demonstrate sufficient Russian-language proficiency and provide documentation establishing their legal residence. Enrollment among children from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan fell by 27% in the 2025–26 school year, from approximately 122,000 to 89,000. In January 2026, Tajikistan's Minister of Education and Science Rahim Saidzoda reported that approximately 9,000 Tajik children had returned from Russia during 2025 following difficulties continuing their education there. Kyrgyzstan's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) raises a separate legal question. The EAEU treaty recognizes the right of migrant workers' children to receive education in the country where their parents work, subject to that country's legislation. However, it does not explicitly guarantee free tuition, leaving unclear whether children of workers from EAEU member states would qualify for exemptions. For migrant families, the immediate consequences would depend on the eventual tuition charges and exemptions. Some parents might choose vocational education for their children after grade nine, while others could leave them with relatives in their home countries rather than incur additional schooling expenses in Russia. Additional education costs could discourage migrant workers from bringing their families to Russia, even as the country continues to rely on Central Asian labor. Central Asia's Dependence on Remittances The proposed fees would affect families whose earnings are often vital to their home countries' economies. Tajikistan is the most dependent on remittances relative to the size of its economy, Kyrgyzstan relies particularly heavily on earnings from Russia, and Uzbekistan receives the largest remittance inflows in absolute terms. According to The Times of Central Asia's Central Asia Balance...