Tajikistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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State Visit

Rahmon Looks to China as Tajikistan’s Options Narrow

Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon just finished a state visit to China. Rahmon has made trips to China many times during the nearly 34 years he has been in power in Tajikistan, but this visit came during a critical period. Simply put, Tajikistan is losing the international importance it once had, and China might now be the most dependable friend remaining for Rahmon and his country. A ‘Sweet’ Start China established diplomatic ties with all five Central Asian countries at the start of 1992. Just months later, a civil war broke out in Tajikistan that would last until June 1997, but that did not deter China from seeking investment opportunities in Tajikistan. China funded the construction of a sugar plant in Kurgan-Tepe in 1992, and later helped build confectioneries in large cities and towns in Tajikistan, as well as providing 10,000 tons of feed for livestock and, in 1994, extending a $50-million loan to Tajikistan. In April 1996, Rahmon and the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan met in Shanghai and formed the Shanghai Five, which, after the inclusion of Uzbekistan five years later, would become the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China used the SCO to improve economic ties with all the Central Asian members, but while Chinese investment in Tajikistan was far less than in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, it was extremely important for Tajikistan, which was, and remains, the poorest country in Central Asia. After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the start of the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan, China gave equipment and winter uniforms to Tajikistan’s border guards. Later, China also helped fund the construction of Tajik border posts along the frontier with Afghanistan, and Beijing is set to help finance nine more border posts. Security along Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan is also in China’s interest. China shares an approximately 475-kilometer border with Tajikistan. Eastern Tajikistan is mountainous, remotely inhabited, and shares a long border with Afghanistan. China is concerned about the ability of potential enemies to move from Afghanistan through eastern Tajikistan and enter China. That is why, less than ten years ago, China built a small, forward observation military post in eastern Tajikistan, not far from the Chinese border. Militant groups such as the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement, comprised mainly of Uyghurs from China’s Xinjiang Region, and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province, which has explicitly threatened China, are present in northern Afghanistan. Chinese companies have been building Tajikistan’s infrastructure for some 20 years: roads, power transmission lines, the Dushanbe thermal power plant, hydropower plants, factories, and other objects. In 2025, China finally surpassed Russia to become Tajikistan’s leading trade partner, and Chinese-Tajik trade turnover in the first three months of 2026 increased by more than 52% compared to Q1 in 2025. Changing Times China is likely to remain Tajikistan’s leading trade partner and more for the foreseeable future. The geopolitical situation in Central Asia has changed, and not in Tajikistan’s favor. The biggest change for Rahmon and his country...

Healthcare

Tajikistan Receives Nearly $1.9 Million in U.S. Medical Equipment

Tajikistan has received nearly $1.9 million worth of medical equipment under a healthcare cooperation program with the United States, with the main focus on improving emergency care, supporting maternity hospitals, and reducing infant mortality. According to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Health, the equipment was delivered as part of the Global Health Supply Chain Program - Procurement and Supply Management (GHSC-PSM). The total value of the shipment exceeded $1.87 million. The handover ceremony took place in Dushanbe and was attended by First Deputy Minister of Health and Social Protection Salomuddin Yusufi and Carson Relitz Rocker, chargé d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan. Officials said particular emphasis would be placed on equipping healthcare facilities with oxygen delivery systems and neonatal resuscitation equipment. Authorities expect the new supplies to improve the quality of emergency medical care and reduce health risks for mothers and infants. Part of the equipment has already been installed in five maternity hospitals and 11 additional medical facilities across the country. Representatives of the Health Ministry said the new equipment is especially important for intensive care and resuscitation units, where timely oxygen delivery and specialized care directly affect patient survival rates. They described the transfer as another example of long-term U.S. support for Tajikistan’s healthcare system. According to Yusufi, medical cooperation between the U.S. and Tajikistan has continued for many years and spans a wide range of areas, including equipment supplies, efforts to combat infectious diseases, sanitary and epidemiological safety, healthcare infrastructure modernization, and the training of medical personnel. Authorities in Tajikistan also expressed hope for further expansion of cooperation following the signing of a new memorandum of understanding between the country’s Ministry of Health and Social Protection and the U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan.

Geopolitics

Opinion: The U.S. Still Doesn’t Know Where Central Asia Belongs

Washington cannot decide where Central Asia belongs. Is it part of Europe? Asia? The Middle East? The confusion is on full display in how the House of Representatives has reassigned the region across subcommittees in rapid succession. In the 116th Congress, which convened in 2019, Central Asia fell under the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment. Two years later, in the 117th Congress, it was moved to the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation. That arrangement barely settled before the 118th Congress shifted it again—this time to the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Now, in the 119th Congress, it has been relocated to the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia. On the banks of the Potomac, Central Asia has taken on a nomadic life of its own—constantly on the move, never quite settling in one place. At the State Department, Central Asia is grouped under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs alongside Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. At the Pentagon, by contrast, the Middle East team oversees relations with Central Asia, alongside countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. These mismatches are not just clumsy; they are strategically dangerous. By misplacing Central Asia, Washington is misreading the geography of China’s rise. It is time for Washington to stop the bureaucratic musical chairs and place Central Asia within a coherent grand strategy. Far from being an afterthought, the region is one of the most consequential pieces of the geopolitical puzzle facing the United States: how to respond to China’s strategy. This is because Central Asia sits at the heart of China’s decades-long effort to move its critical lifelines away from the Indo-Pacific and onto the Eurasian landmass. Over the past 15 years, China has quietly reoriented its energy routes, reducing reliance on maritime pathways vulnerable to U.S. naval dominance—particularly chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—and expanded overland imports across Eurasia. Today, China imports significant volumes of natural gas via pipelines from Turkmenistan and Russia, as well as crude oil from Kazakhstan. These continental routes are largely insulated from maritime interdiction, giving Beijing strategic resilience. Central Asia should be understood through this lens. For China, the region is not peripheral—it is essential. The pipelines, railways and trade corridors that underpin China’s resilience all pass through Xinjiang and Central Asia. In this sense, Central Asia is not merely adjacent to China; it is embedded in China’s vision of the future. This is why Washington’s practice of grouping Central Asia with South Asia misses the mark. The two regions operate under fundamentally different strategic logics. South Asia is centered on the Indian subcontinent, shaped by maritime dynamics and the India‑Pakistan rivalry. Central Asia, by contrast, is a continental crossroads—defined by overland connectivity, energy flows and great‑power competition across Eurasia. India, meanwhile, is geographically constrained—lacking direct land access to Central Asia due to territory administered by Pakistan and separated from China by the Himalayas—leaving it...

Victory Day

No Tanks on Red Square as Moscow’s Victory Day Pull Fades in Central Asia

Russia’s Victory Day parade on May 9 is set to be more restrained this year, with tanks, armored vehicles, and missile systems absent from Red Square for the first time in nearly two decades. The Russian Defense Ministry cited the “current operational situation,” while the Kremlin blamed what it called Ukrainian “terrorist activity.” Russia also reported drone attacks aimed at Moscow in the days before the ceremony, and security around President Vladimir Putin has been tightened. The reduced scale of the parade carries a resonance beyond Russia. Victory Day remains one of the most emotionally charged dates in the post-Soviet calendar, including in Central Asia, where families still remember relatives who fought, died, or labored during World War II. But across the region, the holiday has increasingly been placed inside national calendars rather than left as part of Russia’s political script. The contrast with last year is sharp. In 2025, Moscow marked the 80th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat with its largest Victory Day parade since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Chinese troops marched on Red Square, Xi Jinping sat beside Putin, and foreign leaders attended from across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet space. Tanks, rocket launchers, missile systems, drones, and other military hardware rolled through the square. This year’s guest list is more limited. The Kremlin’s initial list of foreign delegations included leaders and senior figures from Belarus, Laos, Malaysia, Slovakia, the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska. Attendance has also been hard to read. Earlier reports said Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov were expected in Moscow, while the Kremlin’s initial published list of foreign guests did not include any Central Asian presidents. On May 8, however, Kazakh and Uzbek media reported that Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev were traveling to Moscow for Victory Day events. The late confirmations complicate the picture, but they do not restore the full regional show of unity seen in the last two years, when all five Central Asian presidents were present at the Moscow parade. It does suggest, however, that Moscow’s political ownership of the date is less automatic than it once was. Victory Day, which commemorates the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in what Russia calls the Great Patriotic War, has long been one of the main rituals of modern Russian power. It draws large television audiences, fills public space with military symbolism, and presents the Kremlin as the guardian of a sacred national memory. The holiday speaks of sacrifice and family loss, but also of nationalism and state control over history. Putin has used that language repeatedly. On May 9, 2024, after appearing on Red Square in snowfall, he said Russia was going through a “difficult, milestone period,” and warned: “We will not allow anyone to threaten us. Our strategic forces are always in combat readiness.” In 2025, he used the 80th anniversary parade to link Soviet wartime memory to Russia’s current war, saying...

Dostuk International Trade and Economic Park

Trade and Economic Park Planned at Border of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan

On May 6, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov visited the Dostuk Stele (Friendship) in the country’s southwestern Batken region, erected at the junction point of the state borders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, where he reviewed the concept and master plan for the proposed Dostuk International Trade and Economic Park. During a summit in the northern Tajik city of Khujand on March 31, 2025, Presidents Sadyr Japarov of Kyrgyzstan, Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan, and Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan signed a historic agreement on the junction point of the three countries’ state borders. The leaders also took part in a remote inauguration ceremony for the Friendship Stele, which marks the exact location where the borders of the three countries meet and symbolizes friendship among the three nations, the resolution of long-standing border issues, and a new stage of regional cooperation. The planned Dostuk International Trade and Economic Park would span 100 hectares and include administrative, tourism, logistics, production, commercial, and recreational zones. The project aims to strengthen trade and logistics links, attract investment, and create new economic opportunities. If implemented, the project is expected to create more than 5,000 jobs and increase cross-border trade. The concept also includes the development of tourism infrastructure and the organization of international cultural events, ethnic festivals, and exhibitions, contributing to stronger cultural and humanitarian ties while promoting the historical heritage of the Silk Road. Japarov said good-neighborly relations among Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan remain important, citing the role of joint infrastructure and economic initiatives in regional stability and sustainable development. He also expressed confidence that, with mutual support from the three neighboring countries, the project could become a major platform for trade and investment, as well as a symbol of peace, trust, and unity among the peoples of Central Asia.

Geopolitics

European Summit in Yerevan Sends a Signal to Central Asia

The 8th European Political Community summit in Yerevan highlighted deepening geopolitical fault lines while signaling that some post-Soviet countries, notably Azerbaijan and Armenia, are gradually shifting their geopolitical orientation away from Moscow. It is a realignment that Central Asian states are watching with increasing interest. On May 4, attention across post-Soviet space, from Russia and Belarus to Central Asia and the South Caucasus, turned toward Yerevan. Armenia, still a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Eurasian Economic Union and formally tied to the Collective Security Treaty Organization despite freezing its participation, hosted Europe’s political leadership. Among those attending were French President Emmanuel Macron, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President António Costa, and prime ministers including Donald Tusk, Keir Starmer, and Petteri Orpo. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev participated via video link. No Central Asian leaders attended the summit. Even so, the gathering carried a message for the region. Armenia hosted Europe’s political leadership while remaining tied to Moscow-led structures, including the CIS and the Eurasian Economic Union. For Central Asian governments pursuing their own multi-vector policies, the summit showed how a post-Soviet state can widen its diplomatic options without a clean break from Russia. The parallel is not exact, but it is visible. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan remain in the Eurasian Economic Union, while Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan remain in the CSTO. All five Central Asian states maintain working ties with Moscow, while expanding contacts with the EU, Turkey, China, and the Gulf, part of a wider effort to diversify foreign policy options through closer engagement with Europe and other outside powers. Turkey was represented by Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, the highest-level Turkish official to visit Armenia since then-President Abdullah Gül in 2008. Turkey and Azerbaijan largely positioned themselves as counterweights to the dominant European framing, marking one of the summit’s key geopolitical divides. Aliyev adopted a confrontational tone, announcing a suspension of relations with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. “Instead of addressing fundamental problems of some member states, such as xenophobia, Islamophobia, antisemitism, migration, competitiveness, and homelessness, the European Parliament targets Azerbaijan, spreading slander and lies,” Aliyev said. “And the reason is that Azerbaijan restored its territorial integrity and sovereignty, put an end to separatism, and brought war criminals to justice.” In response, António Costa sought to soften tensions, emphasizing the summit’s historical significance as the first of its kind held in the South Caucasus and highlighting Aliyev’s participation as a symbol of peace efforts in the region. Cevdet Yilmaz focused on bilateral diplomacy, meeting Romanian President Nicușor Dan to discuss trade, regional issues, and global challenges. He also held talks with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, the summit’s host. The two sides signed a memorandum of understanding on the joint restoration of the historic Ani Bridge, located on the border between the two countries and dating back to the 11th century. Yilmaz suggested that Armenia would benefit from closer alignment with Turkey...