Turkmenistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Fuel Prices

Central Asia Avoids Fuel Shock as Global Pressures Build

Central Asia has so far avoided the immediate fuel shocks spreading across much of the world following the U.S. and Israel’s war with Iran. There are no lines at gas stations, no visible shortages, and no signs of panic buying. But that stability sits within a rapidly tightening global market, where disruptions in Asia and policy responses in Europe are reshaping fuel flows in ways the region will struggle to avoid. Across Southeast Asia, governments are already taking precautionary steps. Some state agencies and private firms are shifting parts of their workforce to remote work to reduce fuel consumption and prepare for potential price spikes and logistics disruptions, while Thailand is preparing contingency measures, including possible fuel rationing. China, one of Asia’s largest suppliers of refined fuels, has moved to restrict exports of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel in an effort to prevent domestic shortages linked to the war. The move is expected to tighten supplies across Asia, especially for countries that rely on Chinese fuel imports. China supplied about one-third of Australia’s jet fuel last year, highlighting the wider regional impact, and roughly half of the Philippines’ and Bangladesh’s in 2024. Vietnam has already warned airlines to prepare for flight reductions in April due to the risk of shortages caused by these export restrictions. Indonesia is also imposing limits on fuel sales. Fuel-related pressures have begun to emerge in Europe as well. Poland has introduced tax measures aimed at reducing fuel prices, with the government saying this will lower prices for consumers. Slovenia, meanwhile, has introduced significant restrictions on fuel consumption. Under new rules, private motorists are limited to purchasing a maximum of 50 liters per day, while businesses and farmers may purchase up to 200 liters daily. The combined effect of war-driven energy shocks and renewed tariff barriers is raising global costs and adding pressure across trade, transport, and inflation. Against this backdrop, Central Asia’s apparent stability is misleading. It is highly unlikely that import-dependent states such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan will be as well protected as Kazakhstan, which may benefit in the short term from higher crude prices. Starting April 1, Russia is banning gasoline exports in an effort to stabilize its own domestic market. Russia is a key fuel supplier to Central Asia. However, according to assurances from the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, the temporary export ban will not affect supplies to Uzbekistan. Deliveries under intergovernmental agreements are expected to continue, ensuring that at least part of the region’s supply remains uninterrupted. In Kyrgyzstan, despite recent developments, fuel prices and supplies remain relatively stable. The government is considering lowering taxes or temporarily waiving excise duties for fuel importers should the crisis continue. Information from Turkmenistan is difficult to verify independently. Despite reports of fuel shortages at gas stations last year, official media are now indicating a significant increase in domestic gasoline production. The production plan for January-February 2026 was reportedly fulfilled at 122.7%, according to Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Guvancha...

Gas Exports

Berdimuhamedov’s Beijing Visit and the Reshaping of Central Asia’s Gas System

The visit by Turkmenistan’s Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty, to Beijing on March 17–19 did more than routinely reaffirm Turkmenistan’s ties with China. It opened onto a wider issue in Central Asian energy, not simply about continuing the cooperation between Ashgabat and Beijing, but about how the renewal of that cooperation would affect the Central Asia–wide gas production and transmission system that increasingly intersects with China’s wider infrastructural and industrial presence in the region. No dramatic announcement of any new export route highlighted that wider significance, which emerged from a narrower sequence of policy initiatives that carried broader implications. Xi Jinping used the visit to restate the importance of cooperation in natural gas while widening the agenda to include connectivity, clean energy, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. Within days of the meeting, Turkmenistan moved ahead on a new phase of development at Galkynysh with CNPC. These events signal a further deepening Chinese role in the upstream and systemic organization of Central Asian energy. What Beijing Actually Signaled Beijing’s own language about the matter was direct. In the official Xinhua account of Xi’s March 18 meeting with Berdimuhamedov, China called for the two sides to “expand the scale of cooperation in the natural gas sector” and to raise trade and investment levels. Such language confirms that gas remains at the center of the relationship even as the bilateral agenda widens. For all the parallel discussions of digitalization, transport links, and non-resource cooperation, the political weight of Sino-Turkmen ties still rests primarily on energy. The Chinese side, however, did not treat gas as a self-contained file. Gas remains the primary, but it is increasingly embedded within a wider pattern of regional engagement comprising energy, transport, and adjacent economic sectors. The same Beijing readout on the meeting with Berdimuhamedov placed connectivity, artificial intelligence, the digital economy, and clean energy alongside natural gas under a broader heading of expanded cooperation. This framing removes gas from its status as a stand-alone commodity and places it within a larger operational perspective. Neither the main Chinese readout nor the public official Turkmen framing of the visit highlighted Line D of the Central Asia–China gas pipeline system. Line D has long stood as the clearest indicator of a future expansion of Turkmen gas exports through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan into China. Had the visit produced a concrete breakthrough on that front, the official language would have been the obvious place to signal it. The practical movement after the trip lay elsewhere. Why It Matters Beyond Turkmenistan The focus lay at Galkynysh. In the immediate wake of the visit, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov authorized Turkmengaz to conclude a turnkey contract with CNPC Amudarya Petroleum Company Ltd. for Phase 4 of the Galkynysh gas field. The official Turkmen account linked the decision to meetings held during Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov’s visit to China and specified facilities capable of processing 10 billion cubic meters of marketable gas per year. TCA reported the same move as a new phase of CNPC-backed field development....

Tourism

Turkmenistan Promotes Tourism Abroad — While Keeping Its Borders Closed

Turkmen authorities are preparing to host an international tourism forum, once again emphasizing the sector’s potential. However, the reality appears less optimistic. The number of foreign visitors remains extremely low, while a strict visa regime continues to deter not only tourists but also business travellers. The Turkmen Travel international forum and exhibition is scheduled to take place in Ashgabat from April 14 to 16. Preparations are reportedly being carried out at a high level. Deputy Prime Minister for Culture, Bahar Seydova, briefed officials on the event, and President Serdar Berdimuhamedov has instructed organizers to present the country’s tourism potential in a dignified manner. At the same time, a paradoxical situation has emerged. Despite the construction of modern hotels in Ashgabat and the Avaza tourist zone, the opening of new airports, and the hosting of international events, foreign tourists visit Turkmenistan extremely rarely. Even travellers with a genuine interest in the country frequently encounter significant visa restrictions. According to sources, these challenges affect not only tourists. Representatives of international companies also face lengthy and complicated entry procedures. Market participants note that interest in Turkmenistan does exist. A representative of a travel agency in Ashgabat said that combined tours of Central Asia remain popular among tourists from China, the U.S., European countries, Australia, South America, and Russia. By 2024, demand for trips to Turkmenistan had increased by about 50% compared with the 2018-2020 period. Nevertheless, actual visitor numbers remain very low. Strict entry rules are also affecting business activity. For example, in February 2024, specialists from South Korea’s Hyundai Engineering were unable to arrive in Turkmenistan on time to carry out restoration work at the polymer plant in Kiyanly following an accident. Their visas were delayed due to bureaucratic procedures. Such cases are reported to occur regularly. While the state is seeking to attract foreign companies to major projects, it often fails to provide basic conditions for their operations. Against this backdrop, calls to reconsider current policies are becoming more frequent. Without a more open approach, Turkmenistan may struggle not only to increase tourist arrivals but also to support broader economic development.

Southern Corridor

The Iran Conflict Is Stress-Testing Central Asia’s Southern Corridors

Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal of Turkestan city as a venue for Iran-war negotiations shows how directly the conflict had already begun to affect Central Asia itself. The region is no longer simply observing events in Iran. By the time Tokayev made the offer, Central Asian governments were already dealing with evacuations, route disruption, emergency diplomatic coordination, and growing concern over the war’s economic effects. The Iran war has thus become a real test of Central Asia’s southern diversification strategy. Governments across the region have, in recent years, sought to widen access to world markets through Iran, the South Caucasus, and, in some cases, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These channels reduce dependence on northern routes by opening access to Türkiye, Europe, Gulf markets, and the Indian Ocean. The present crisis subjects that strategy to wartime conditions. The strain of war makes it easier to distinguish durable links, conditional ones, and routes that remain more aspirational than real. The C6 and Crisis Coordination The first effects have been practical. Turkmenistan has opened four additional checkpoints along its frontier with Iran, supplementing the Serakhs crossing, while Azerbaijan’s overland route through Astara became another critical outlet, evacuating 312 people from 17 countries between February 28 and March 2. Turkmenistan, according to official reporting, transited more than 200 foreign citizens from 16 countries during the same period. Uzbekistan used the Turkmen route to repatriate its citizens, while Kazakhstan directed its nationals toward overland exits through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Türkiye. The war is already affecting borders, consular work, and the regional diplomatic agenda. This immediate response gives sharper political meaning to the widening of the Central Asian C5 into a C6 with Azerbaijan. The March 2 call among the five Central Asian foreign ministers and Azerbaijan showed that the format was already there to be used under pressure. What had until now appeared mainly as a corridor framework shaped by summit diplomacy and expert work appeared instead as a working format for crisis coordination linking Central Asia to the South Caucasus. The C6 idea is becoming more practical and more overtly diplomatic. The Organization of Turkic States adds a second, broader layer. Its foreign ministers met in Istanbul on March 7 and issued a joint statement expressing concern over the escalation in the Middle East, condemning actions that endanger civilians, warning against further regional destabilization, and affirming that threats to the security and interests of member states concern the organization as a whole. The statement was cautious, and the OTS is not turning into a military instrument. Even so, the war is testing whether a Turkic political space extending from Turkey through the South Caucasus to Central Asia can do more than express concern as regional security deteriorates. The C6 is becoming a working format for immediate coordination, while the OTS remains the broader political frame within which that coordination takes on institutional meaning. Corridor Stress and Resilience The trans-Iran transit option offers Central Asia a continuous land arc from regional railheads and road networks...

Caspian

Caspian Escalation Raises Stakes for Central Asia

Central Asia, which has increasingly sought to present itself as a coordinated actor on the global political stage, has until recently maintained a cautious, non-aligned stance regarding the escalation in the Middle East. However, attacks affecting infrastructure in the Caspian region have altered the diplomatic balance. The Caspian Sea is a critical transit zone for Central Asia, linking Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and onward to European and Middle Eastern markets. It forms part of key east–west and north–south trade corridors that have gained importance since Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupted traditional transit routes. In recent years, regional dynamics have also been shaped by Azerbaijan’s growing engagement with Central Asian states, including its formal inclusion in the expanded Central Asian consultative format, which has effectively evolved from the C5 into the C6. Baku has played an important role in regional connectivity. It has developed close relations with both Turkey and Israel, factors that influence geopolitical calculations in the Caspian basin, which directly borders Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This growing alignment has reinforced efforts to develop the Middle Corridor across the Caspian, linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus. Turkey maintains political, economic, and cultural influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan through the Organization of Turkic States. Russian political discourse has at times portrayed this cooperation as part of a broader pan-Turkic geopolitical project, a characterization widely dismissed by officials and analysts in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Astana and Baku continue to maintain strong relations with Ankara, a development that has periodically caused concern in Moscow. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan has also strengthened ties with Gulf states. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have become significant investors in the country’s economy. In this context, Iranian attacks on Gulf states not directly involved in the conflict have shaped Astana’s diplomatic positioning during the current crisis. Reports of drone attacks widely blamed on Iran targeting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan have further heightened regional tensions. At the initial stage of the escalation, Kazakhstan’s response was largely limited to diplomatic contacts with regional leaders. At the same time, several Central Asian countries, along with Azerbaijan, expressed concern over the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and began dispatching aid to Iran. Azerbaijan sent nearly 30 tons of food and medical supplies on March 10, followed by another 82 tons of humanitarian aid on March 18. Uzbekistan delivered approximately 120 tons of humanitarian supplies, including flour, vegetable oil, sugar, and canned food, according to regional media reports. Turkmenistan also sent humanitarian aid consisting of medicines, medical supplies, and other goods, primarily intended for children. The Tajik government reported sending a convoy of 110 heavy trucks carrying humanitarian cargo to Iran, with a total weight of 3,610 tons. The diplomatic environment shifted further after Israeli air strikes on March 18 targeting Iranian naval facilities in the Caspian Sea. According to Israeli military statements cited by international media, the targets included a major port of the Iranian Navy, where, reportedly, "dozens of ships were destroyed,”...

Caspian Region

War Reaches the Caspian: Central Asia Faces Growing Regional Risk

The United States and Israel's war with Iran began on February 28, 2026. The intensity of the conflict has fluctuated, but daily reports of missile strikes and explosions are increasingly resonating across Central Asia. Meanwhile, Russia’s latest war against Ukraine has continued for 1,466 days since it began on February 24, 2022. Late last year, Ukrainian drones reportedly struck a Russian oil platform at the Filanovsky field in the Caspian Sea, more than 700 kilometers from Ukraine’s nearest border. Ukraine also said the operation targeted the patrol ship Okhotnik, although the extent of the damage was not independently verified. The war in Ukraine has also created serious challenges for Kazakhstan’s oil exports via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). Repeated attacks and disruptions have threatened export flows, increased logistical risks, and added pressure on Kazakhstan’s budget revenues. The war against Iran has now brought military action to the Caspian coast of Iran, raising concern for energy producers and transit routes across the wider region. On March 5, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that drones launched from Iranian territory struck the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. According to the ministry, one drone hit the terminal building at Nakhchivan International Airport, while another crashed near a school in the village of Shekerabad. Azerbaijan demanded a thorough investigation. Iran later stated that it had promised to investigate the incident. Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor General’s Office subsequently opened a criminal case. As of now, tensions remain high, with both sides continuing to exchange accusations, and Azerbaijan maintaining heightened alert measures. More recently, the Israeli Defense Forces confirmed carrying out airstrikes in northern Iran, targeting naval vessels in the port city of Bandar-Anzali on the Caspian coast. The straight-line distance from Bandar-Anzali to Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku, is just over 300 kilometers, and approximately 420 kilometers to Turkmenbashi, a major international seaport and the center of Turkmenistan’s oil-refining industry. The resort zone of Avaza is also located there. By comparison, the distance from Israel to Bandar-Anzali exceeds 1,300 kilometers. These developments are contributing to rising economic uncertainty across Central Asia. The consequences extend beyond transportation and logistics disruptions, with broader implications for regional economies. The U.S. and Israel have not always appeared aligned on what would constitute victory, meaning the measure of success remains difficult to gauge. While the United States and Israel have repeatedly stated that significant damage has been inflicted on Iran’s military infrastructure (including destroying a substantial part of the Iranian navy), there is no publicly available, independently verified evidence confirming the extent of the damage to Iran’s leadership structure following the death of Ali Khamenei, Ali Larijani and other senior Iranian figures, or on Iran’s ability to mount an effective defence. Analysts have described Iran’s military resilience as decentralized, sometimes using the term "mosaic defense," meaning units can continue operating under standing orders even when senior leadership is hit. It is understood that, as part of this strategy, the Iranian military has spent decades refining its ability to operate as independent nodes, each equipped to conduct strikes under...