Turkmenistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Labor Migration

Central Asian Labor Migration Shifts as Russia Loses Some of Its Pull

Russia remains the main destination for many Central Asian labor migrants, but its dominance is weakening. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, tougher Russian migration rules, and rising hostility toward migrants have pushed workers from the region to look elsewhere. South Korea, the Gulf states, the United Kingdom, Poland, Belarus, and other destinations are increasingly competing with Russia for Central Asian labor. The result is not a collapse of the old migration model, but a visible diversification of flows as the geography of labor migration from the region expands. Kazakhstan: From Destination Country to Source of Skilled Migrants Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, most labor migrants from Central Asia have traveled to Russia in search of work. A shortage of local labor, relatively decent wages, familiarity with the language, and a similar mentality have driven many to seek jobs in major Russian cities. Kazakhstan is an exception. It has not seen mass migration of its own citizens into lower-skilled jobs in Russia such as janitorial or construction work. Kazakhstan’s own economy offers such jobs, unemployment has remained low, and employers continue to report shortages in both manual work and skilled professions. The Bureau of National Statistics put unemployment at 4.5% in the first quarter of 2026. For this reason, Kazakhstan has also long been a destination for migrants from neighboring states, even if Russia has traditionally attracted larger flows. Kazakh citizens working abroad generally aim for higher-paying jobs in sectors requiring qualifications. The government was already tracking this in 2024, when the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection reported, using Foreign Ministry data, that 137,000 Kazakh citizens were abroad for employment purposes. The largest numbers were in Russia, South Korea, Turkey, and the UAE, with smaller numbers in Europe, North America, and elsewhere. A later Ministry report showed the same pattern, with Russia still dominant but alternatives clearly visible: of 126,000 Kazakh citizens employed abroad, 102,000 were in Russia, 15,000 in South Korea, and around 2,000 in the United Kingdom and European Union member states. Those leaving include economists, lawyers, technical specialists, teachers, and medical workers. Although outward labor migration remains limited compared with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan, it is adding to official concerns about the loss of qualified specialists. Officials believe Kazakhstan’s labor market is vulnerable to external competition, and a large share of those leaving have higher or technical vocational education. Salary gaps and differences in living standards make these destinations attractive. Qatar has recently joined the list of preferred destinations for labor migration. This has been made possible in large part by intergovernmental agreements signed between Qatar and Kazakhstan. Qatar is now actively recruiting Kazakh specialists, particularly in the oil and gas sector. According to Arman Shokparov, co-founder of People Consulting, around 600-700 Kazakh white-collar professionals currently work in Qatar. Nearly half work in the oil and gas sector, mainly in engineering and production roles. This trend does not mean Kazakhstan is only losing workers. It continues to attract immigrants and...

State-Controlled Religion

Turkmenistan’s Chief Mufti Replacement Recalls Earlier Dismissals

Only two people in Turkmenistan, the chairman of the Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) and the president, have what could be considered job security. Everyone else is expendable, at a moment’s notice, and that extends to the country’s top clergy. Turkmenistan has replaced the country’s top mufti, and while the reasons for the sudden move are not clear, the removal process is very familiar for Turkmenistan. Frantic Friday On June 19, the mufti of all Turkmenistan, Yalkap Hojagulyyev, led Friday prayers at the Turkmenbashi Ruhy Mosque in Gypjak, some 11 kilometers from the capital, Ashgabat. Saparmurat “Turkmenbashi” Niyazov was Turkmenistan’s first president. The country’s compliant parliament and Halk Maslahaty bestowed the title of “Turkmenbashi,” meaning head of the Turkmen, on Niyazov. Gypjak was Niyazov’s home village, and when he was alive, he spent $100 million building a mosque that could accommodate 10,000 worshipers. After he died in late 2006, he was laid to rest at the nearby mausoleum built specially for him and his family. The June 19 Friday prayers were attended by a special visitor, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who also paid his respects at Niyazov’s mausoleum. After prayers ended, the top figures from the muftiate, the spiritual board overseeing Islamic affairs in Turkmenistan, and select elders from around Turkmenistan met at the mosque for a discussion. That discussion included the announcement that the muftiate had appointed a new chief mufti. That person was Rahman Gurbanmyradov. Gurbanmyradov, who had been the head mufti for Ahal Region, was not at the meeting in Gypjak. He was saying prayers at the Seyit Jemaleddin Mosque in Ak Bugday District, Ahal Region, for a sadaqah (voluntary giving of charity) organized by Halk Maslahaty Chairman Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. Berdimuhamedov was marking the first Friday of the Islamic year 1448, which started on June 16. Back in Gypjak, senior clerics and elders were also considering what to name the new mosque being built in the newly built city of Arkadag, some 30 kilometers outside Ashgabat. Berdimuhamedov succeeded Turkmenbashi as president and held the office for roughly 15 years. During that period, government officials and state media gave him the title “Arkadag,” or “Protector.” Not surprisingly, when one of the elders at the Gypjak meeting proposed naming the new mosque in Arkadag city the Arkadag Spiritual Mosque, there was unanimous support. Why Hojagulyyev was fired is unclear, though there is speculation that Berdimuhamedov had been angry with the mufti since 2023, when Hojagulyyev brought his wife to make the Hajj at state expense. Hojagulyyev had been the head mufti since 2019. Turkmenbashi Tames the Clergy First President Niyazov is credited with bringing the entire state apparatus under his full control in the first years after Turkmenistan’s 1991 independence. However, it took him longer to achieve the total submission of Islamic clergy. Toward the end of 1999, leading Islamic cleric and scholar Khoja Ahmed Orazgylych criticized Niyazov’s public support for the traditional New Year celebration that included dancing around a Christmas tree." The practice dated back to the...

Middle Corridor

Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan Tighten Ties, Supporting Middle Corridor

The main maritime route between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan is about 300 kilometers long, linking the area around the Azerbaijani capital of Baku on the west coast of the Caspian Sea to Turkmenbashi port on the east coast. Now the leaders of the two countries are pursuing a years-long effort to bring their nations closer together – economically and diplomatically. The growing cooperation has broader implications for international trade because the Caspian Sea route is a critical part of a trade network dubbed the Middle Corridor, which connects China and Europe via Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Türkiye. The Middle Corridor has become more important because Russia and Iran, two other countries that have Caspian coastlines, have seen their economies and trade links come under pressure because of war, regional tension, and sanctions. North of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan also borders the sea and views it as a key alternative to more traditional trade routes through Russia that have become problematic because of Western sanctions aimed at punishing Moscow over its war with Ukraine. President Serdar Berdimuhamedov of Turkmenistan visited Azerbaijan earlier this week and was welcomed by President Ilham Aliyev, who noted the value of their governments’ collaboration on transport and logistics to the wider world. “Of course, cooperation between our countries in this area is already long-term, I would even say that it is of strategic importance not only for us, not only for our neighbors, but also for a wide geography,” Aliyev said on Monday. “Because today in the world there are not so many very reliable, safe transport routes connecting countries that cooperate with each other.” Aliyev thanked Turkmenistan for welcoming Azerbaijan into the Consultative Council of Heads of State of Central Asia, even though the South Caucasus country is not geographically part of Central Asia. The step, the Azerbaijani president said, recognizes cultural and historical ties as well as regional challenges, creating “the prerequisites for the recognition of the great Central Asia as a single geopolitical and geoeconomic region.” Turkmenistan’s state media said upgraded port facilities in Baku and Turkmenbashi were making the transit of cargo between Asia and Europe more efficient. The leaders of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan signed deals on energy, trade, and agriculture during Berdimuhamedov’s visit. Several years ago, the two countries resolved a dispute over an offshore oil and gas field in the Caspian, agreeing to jointly develop it in a deal that removed a hurdle to warmer relations. There were also personal touches by the two men, both of whom succeeded their fathers as president. Berdimuhamedov laid flowers at the grave of Heydar Aliyev, a former Soviet official who became president of Azerbaijan and was succeeded after his 2003 death by Ilham, his son. The Turkmen president then paid tribute to Zarifa Aliyeva, a prominent ophthalmologist who was Heydar Aliyev’s wife and the mother of the current president. She died in 1985. On Thursday, after Berdimuhamedov´s visit to Azerbaijan, the Turkmen president’s father discussed “priority areas” of the relationship between the two countries in...

Middle East Crisis

The Fragile U.S.–Iran Truce: What Central Asia Stands to Gain and Lose

The preliminary memorandum signed in mid-June between the United States and Iran, followed by renewed talks between Washington and Tehran, has extended a U.S.–Iran truce and opened a 60-day window for negotiations on a final agreement. The nuclear terms remain unresolved, while Israel’s continued military presence in southern Lebanon, despite U.S. pressure for a withdrawal, underscores how fragile the broader regional de-escalation remains. At the end of this period, the parties may sign a final agreement, return to hostilities, or mutually agree to extend the interim arrangement. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, along with neighboring Azerbaijan, have welcomed efforts to de-escalate the conflict between the United States and Iran. The fighting briefly boosted demand for alternative routes through Central Asia, but prolonged instability would disrupt trade, raise transport and insurance costs, and increase security risks. The question now is what the region could gain if the pause holds. Those effects would vary across the region. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan stand to benefit most directly from safer southern rail access through Iran to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are less directly connected to these corridors and less exposed to oil price swings, would feel the consequences mainly through freight costs, fuel prices, and wider regional trade. For Azerbaijan, a sustained pause would reinforce its role as the Caspian link between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye, while renewed instability would push more freight toward Trans-Caspian alternatives. That interest is not merely theoretical. Tajik-Iranian trade reached $119.6 million in the first quarter of 2026, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are developing access to Iranian maritime infrastructure through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The opportunity, however, is conditional. A truce can reduce military risk, but it does not by itself remove the banking, insurance, and compliance problems that have long complicated trade through Iran. For Central Asian exporters and logistics companies, the question is not only whether routes are physically open, but whether carriers, lenders, insurers, and buyers are prepared to use them during a temporary 60-day window. Analysts interviewed by Deutsche Welle said the framework leaves several important provisions unresolved, making a final agreement uncertain. For Central Asia, the most immediate economic variable is the Strait of Hormuz. Kazakh historian and political analyst Sultan Akimbekov identifies its reopening as the key to easing global supply fears. A durable reopening, combined with the temporary U.S. waiver allowing Iranian oil sales through August 21, could put downward pressure on global energy prices. The effects would vary across Central Asia: weaker prices could strain hydrocarbon revenues, while lower fuel, fertilizer, and freight costs could ease imported inflation in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. For Kazakhstan, lower global oil prices would have significant implications. National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov has said oil generates more than 50% of the country’s export revenues and over 30% of the state budget and National Fund revenues. That would reverse one of the conflict’s few short-term economic benefits for Kazakhstan. Higher crude prices had briefly improved the outlook for export revenues,...

Connectivity

EU Launches Platform to Mobilize Up to €2 Billion for Europe–Central Asia Connectivity

The European Commission launched a Connectivity Agenda Platform on June 23, 2026, and concluded statements of intent with international financial institutions expected to mobilize up to €2 billion ($2.3 billion) for transport, border-crossing and trade-facilitation projects across the Black Sea region and the South Caucasus. The initiative was unveiled at a high-level ministerial meeting in Brussels, hosted by European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos, Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela, and Commissioner for Sustainable Transport Apostolos Tzitzikostas. The meeting brought together transport ministers and senior officials from EU member states, as well as representatives from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, alongside international lenders, to advance connectivity projects under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy. The new platform is designed to coordinate investments and policy actions across transport, energy, digital connectivity, and trade. Participants also agreed to improve the operational efficiency of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, a wider framework that includes the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or TITR, also known as the Middle Corridor. The route links China and Europe through Central Asia and the South Caucasus, offering an alternative to transport routes crossing Russia. The European Commission said the expected financing would support transport infrastructure, border-crossing modernization, and trade-facilitation projects aimed at improving freight movement across the corridor. “The Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor is becoming a vital bridge between Europe and Asia,” Síkela said, adding that the investments would help make the route faster, more reliable, and better integrated. Tzitzikostas said stronger transport links were critical for economic competitiveness and regional resilience. The platform’s launch came during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s official visit to Brussels, where he met with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. In an EU–Kazakhstan joint statement, the leaders reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Trans-Caspian corridor and pledged deeper cooperation under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy. They also highlighted the EU’s role as Kazakhstan’s largest trade and investment partner and agreed to deepen cooperation in critical minerals, energy, transport, digitalization, and emerging technologies. Speaking at the Kazakhstan-EU roundtable in Brussels, Tokayev said Kazakhstan was investing heavily in infrastructure to position itself as a regional logistics hub connecting Europe, Central Asia, China, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. According to Tokayev, cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor have risen fivefold over the past six years, from 0.8 million tons to 4.1 million tons annually, with Kazakhstan targeting a capacity of 10 million tons. He said Kazakhstan has invested more than $35 billion in transport and logistics infrastructure over the past 15 years, with the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk serving as major transit gateways. Tokayev also welcomed logistics agreements worth nearly $1 billion signed on June 23 by the Development Bank of Kazakhstan: one with the European Investment Bank, and a separate agreement with a banking syndicate including Commerzbank, JPMorgan Chase, and Standard Chartered, backed by guarantees from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). A day earlier, Kazakhstan and European partners announced four transport-related agreements worth...

Water Security

Opinion: The Amu Darya Stress Test – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and the Politics of Agricultural Adaptation

Central Asia’s water crisis is usually discussed as a problem of rivers, reservoirs, and diplomacy. But in 2026, the Amu Darya is also becoming something else: a test of state adaptation. The river basin entered the irrigation season under acute pressure. According to data cited by Kabar, the flow of the Amu Darya stood at only 66.8% of its normal level as of February 11, compared with 101.8% a year earlier. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the river’s flow could fall to around 65% of its historical norm, raising risks for food security and agriculture across downstream states. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal is advancing. The canal, one of the Taliban government’s most ambitious infrastructure projects, is designed to divert water from the Amu Darya to irrigate large areas of northern Afghanistan. Carnegie Politika has estimated that, once fully operational by 2028, it could take up to 10 cubic kilometers of water annually from the river. For Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the implications are direct. Both rely heavily on Amu Darya water. Both inherited agricultural systems shaped by Soviet-era irrigation, cotton production, and centralized planning, and both are now facing a combination of climate stress, upstream extraction, and aging water infrastructure. Yet their responses are increasingly different. The emerging contrast is not simply between two agricultural policies; it is between two institutional logics: adaptation and control. Uzbekistan’s Adjustment Strategy Uzbekistan is one of the most exposed countries in the region. Its population is large, its agriculture remains water-intensive, and some of its most vulnerable regions, including Khorezm and Karakalpakstan, sit near the lower reaches of the Amu Darya. For decades, the old model relied on large-scale irrigation, cotton, rice, and the assumption that water would continue to move through the regional system much as it had before. That assumption is now weakening. Tashkent’s response remains costly and far from complete. Uzbekistan still faces serious water losses, degraded land, salinization, and uneven implementation of reform. But the direction of travel is visible: the state is trying to reduce exposure by changing crops, infrastructure, and diplomatic behavior. Rice is one example. Traditional flooded rice cultivation is extremely water-intensive, and water shortages have already pushed some Uzbek rice farmers away from traditional Amu Darya regions toward areas with more stable access to water. Uzbekistan has also begun experimenting with less water-intensive methods. In Karakalpakstan, UNDP has supported the introduction of upland rice, which can reduce water consumption by up to 40% compared with traditional rice cultivation. Separately, Uzbekistan has announced plans to expand resource-efficient rice cultivation, including drip irrigation and drought-resilient rice varieties. The state is no longer treating the old water-intensive model as untouchable. In 2026, Uzbekistan allocated significant public financing for water-saving technologies. Government-linked reporting has described plans to expand drip irrigation, sprinkler systems, and laser land leveling across hundreds of thousands of hectares, with a broader target of expanding water-saving technologies to 3.5 million hectares by 2028. Laser leveling may sound technical, but its use reflects a shift from simply demanding more...