• KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
18 September 2026

Viewing results 25 - 30 of 418

Daines’s Tour Signals an Emerging U.S. Caspian Corridor Strategy

Senator Steve Daines’s July 7–9 visit to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan brought three bilateral relationships into a single, compressed Caspian itinerary. In Baku, he met President Ilham Aliyev and senior economic and foreign-policy officials; in Astana, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and representatives of government and business; and in Ashgabat, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. Although official accounts treated each stop separately, the sequence suggests a regional pattern whose significance exceeds any single announcement. Daines had already supplied the clearest public articulation of the governing logic in his June 11 speech to the Caspian Policy Center’s Trans-Caspian Forum. There he joined Central Asia and the South Caucasus in a discussion about westward connectivity, investment, and supply-chain diversification. Daines identified critical minerals, energy, telecommunications, and physical and digital infrastructure as fields for public and private investment, while calling for TRIPP, a Caspian gas interconnector, and a continuous route from Central Asia to Western markets that avoids Russia and Iran. Together, these sectors give the proposed route both commercial and strategic content, though not the form of a single named program. Read against the June speech, Daines’s itinerary marks an emerging corridor-centered effort aligned with the Trump administration’s broader Caspian engagement, even without a formal declaration of purpose. Azerbaijan Anchors the Corridor’s Western Connections Baku gives the corridor logic its strongest institutional and bilateral footing. Aliyev and Daines discussed Azerbaijan’s geopolitical role, regional peace, and TRIPP’s importance for transport connectivity. Separate meetings with Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and Economy Minister Mikayil Jabbarov extended the agenda to economic cooperation. With SOCAR President Rovshan Najaf, Jabbarov and Daines took up the Middle Corridor, energy, transport, digital development, and critical-mineral extraction and processing. Across the meetings, political, commercial, and technical portfolios converged around Azerbaijan’s place at the corridor’s western Caspian egress. The U.S.–Azerbaijan Strategic Partnership Charter, signed in February, places the Middle Corridor alongside energy, trade, transit, digital connectivity, and critical-mineral movement. It identifies Azerbaijan as an energy, transport, trade, and logistics hub for the Caspian region. Working groups regularize cooperation on trade, energy, connectivity, digital development, and security. The charter also calls for project lists and implementation roadmaps within three months of signing and for meetings at least once a year. In June, the first Azerbaijan-U.S. Economic Dialogue began translating that direction into an operational agenda. Government, financial institutions, and private-sector participants met on regional connectivity and transit, energy security, investment, artificial intelligence, and digital infrastructure. The agenda connected the Middle Corridor and TRIPP with logistics, the Southern Gas Corridor, critical mineral supply chains, transport and energy investment, and the Alat Free Economic Zone. Closing documents covered digital infrastructure, technology transfer, and industrial solutions. The workstreams are clear, but the consolidated project portfolio and its financing have yet to take public form. Azerbaijan’s role also rests on physical infrastructure already in use. The established Middle Corridor crosses Kazakhstan and the Caspian before passing through Azerbaijan and Georgia, then onward toward Türkiye or Europe via the Black Sea. At Alat, 70 kilometers...

U.S. Strikes on Iranian Rail and Coastal Infrastructure Put Central Asia’s Southern Routes Under Pressure

U.S. strikes on Iranian rail and coastal infrastructure have put Central Asia's southern transport plans under new pressure. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have spent years building routes through Iran to reach the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and markets beyond Russia. Public statements so far do not show a confirmed halt in Central Asian freight, but bridge damage near Iran's border with Turkmenistan and strikes along Iran's southern coast have made the security picture more concrete. Reports and a video posted on July 9 showed damage to the Aq Taqeh Khan railway bridge, on Iran's rail link to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, after overnight U.S. strikes. Reuters said it verified the location by matching the bridge, riverbank, road, fields, and nearby town with satellite imagery, and found no earlier versions of the video online. Iran's Revolutionary Guard-linked Neynava Corps in Golestan said the area around the Aq Taqeh Khan railway bridge in Aq Qala County was targeted by U.S. cruise missiles early on July 9, with no casualties reported. The bridge sits on the Gorgan-Incheh Borun railway line, which reaches the Incheh Borun border crossing with Turkmenistan and links onward to Kazakhstan. Head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Railways, Jabar-Ali Zakeri, said engineers had rebuilt one damaged track on the Mashhad route and returned it to service in less than 15 hours, according to Fars News Agency. He said work on a second damaged line was continuing and was expected to finish within hours. That statement concerned the Mashhad route, however, and does not confirm the status of the Gorgan-Incheh Borun line. The route sits inside a wider transport effort that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, China, and Russia have all tried to expand. TCA has previously reported on a 2024 test container train on the China-Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran route, which ran from Xi'an to Tehran. It carried 45 forty-foot containers loaded with auto parts and cut the China-Iran delivery time to 15 days. The Gorgan-Incheh Borun railroad was inaugurated in December 2014, linking Iran to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan along the eastern side of the Caspian Sea. The wider Uzen-Bereket-Gorgan route runs for more than 900 kilometers from western Kazakhstan through Turkmenistan into northern Iran. It connects Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan’s rail networks to Iran’s system and onward to the Persian Gulf and Asian markets. The U.S. military has framed the latest strikes as a response to Iranian attacks on commercial shipping. U.S. Central Command said on July 8 that its forces had struck about 90 Iranian military targets, including air defense systems, coastal surveillance assets, missile and drone storage sites, naval capabilities, and military logistics infrastructure along Iran's coastline. CENTCOM said the operation was designed “to further degrade Iran's ability to attack commercial shipping and innocent civilian mariners in the Strait of Hormuz.” The coastal security picture also impacts Kazakhstan through Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. On June 28, Kazakhstan and Iran signed a 27-year Build-Operate-Transfer agreement for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal there. The Kazakh embassy in Tehran said the deal...

Turkmenistan’s Wage Puzzle: Official Salaries Rise, but Transparency Remains Elusive

In most Central Asian countries, checking the average salary is as simple as visiting the national statistics agency’s website. In Turkmenistan, however, wage data remain largely inaccessible. The State Statistics Committee does not publish salary figures online, and its annual statistical yearbooks are available only in printed form inside the country. Nevertheless, occasional official figures emerge, offering a glimpse into a labor market that differs markedly from those of its regional neighbors. As of January 1, 2025, Turkmenistan’s monthly minimum wage stands at 1,410 manats, equivalent to approximately $403 at the official exchange rate. An increase was introduced by presidential decree in July 2024 as part of a nationwide 10% rise in wages, pensions, and social benefits. The minimum wage was about $366 in 2024, and roughly $331 in 2023 at the official exchange rate. Unlike neighboring economies, where wages are increasingly shaped by labor-market conditions, inflation, and private-sector demand, Turkmenistan’s minimum wage is established exclusively by presidential decree and applies uniformly across all sectors, occupations, and age groups. The centralized system leaves little room for market-based wage formation. Although comprehensive official wage statistics remain unavailable, one rare set of figures attributed to the State Statistics Committee was published in 2017. According to those figures, the country’s highest-paid employees worked in the Merchant Marine Fleet, earning 2,387.6 manats per month, or about $682 at the official exchange rate then in use. They were followed by the National Space Agency under the President of Turkmenistan, at 1,909.9 manats, or about $546, and the state-owned Turkmenneft oil company, at 1,861.4 manats, or about $532. The lowest salaries were reportedly paid to employees of the Ministry of Trade and Foreign Economic Relations. The ranking, although dated, is revealing. Rather than finance or technology, which dominate wage tables in many countries, Turkmenistan’s highest-paid sectors in that snapshot were closely tied to state prestige projects and strategic natural-resource industries. A key factor complicating any assessment of income is the country’s dual exchange-rate system. The official rate has long been fixed at about 3.5 manats per U.S. dollar, which is used to calculate salaries in dollar terms for international reporting. However, the parallel market rate is substantially weaker, reducing the real international purchasing power of household incomes. Consequently, official salary figures converted into dollars should be interpreted with caution because they do not necessarily reflect the exchange rate available to ordinary citizens. The gap between official wages and actual living costs also appears significant. While the government continues to subsidize basic food staples such as bread and flour, shortages have often forced households to buy goods in private markets at much higher prices. Free natural gas and water supplies ended in 2019, and utility costs have gradually increased since then, despite continuing subsidies. Public cost-of-living data should be treated carefully, but they point in the same direction. The user-submitted database Numbeo estimates monthly costs for a single person in Ashgabat at about 6,475 manats before rent, more than four times the official minimum wage. Regional comparisons...

As Azerbaijan Pushes Back Against Moscow, Central Asia Watches

The recent diplomatic escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia appeared to have run its course in April, after Moscow agreed to pay compensation over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan. Instead, the dispute has entered a new phase, and its implications now reach beyond the South Caucasus. On July 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov and handed him a formal note of protest over what Baku described as a Russian drone strike on a fuel station owned by Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region on the evening of July 5. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said the attack on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine was not an isolated incident. It cited previous strikes on the company’s gas distribution compressor station and oil depot in Odesa, which caused material damage and injured employees. Baku also pointed to earlier damage to the Azerbaijani embassy building in Kyiv and the honorary consulate in Kharkiv, calling on Moscow to investigate and comply with its obligations to protect civilian infrastructure and diplomatic missions. At the same time, Shusha — known to Armenians as Shushi, retaken by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war, and still regarded by many Armenians as occupied — hosted an international conference devoted to what participants described as Russia’s “colonial policy,” the “Circassian genocide,” and the situation of non-Russian peoples within the Russian Federation. The conference declaration called on Moscow to “recognize its historical crimes, abandon its chauvinistic policies, and end the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities into the war against Ukraine.” Experts from Azerbaijan, the United States, France, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Türkiye, and Georgia attended the conference. None of the Central Asian republics was represented. That absence was telling. Central Asian governments may be distancing themselves from Moscow in certain areas, but they remain reluctant to participate in openly anti-Russian political initiatives. For Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, the question is not whether Russia’s position has weakened, but how far they can move without provoking pressure from Moscow. For Central Asia, the dispute is not a distant quarrel in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is now a central link in the westward routes that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are trying to strengthen as alternatives to Russian territory. The Middle Corridor runs from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to Europe. Any deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russia relations therefore has practical implications for Central Asian transit, energy, and diplomatic room for maneuver. The first major rupture in relations between Baku and Moscow came after Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, traveling from Baku to Grozny, was damaged by Russian air-defense fire over Russian territory on December 25, 2024. The aircraft later crashed while attempting an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan blamed Russia and demanded an apology, accountability, and compensation. Relations deteriorated further in June 2025 following the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg and reports of torture. The most prominent victims were the...

Kyrgyzstan’s Water Compensation Push Tests Central Asian Unity

Central Asia’s water diplomacy is entering a contentious phase. Kyrgyzstan, where much of the region’s runoff is formed, is reviving calls for economic compensation from downstream users. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have rejected the idea, saying current agreements do not provide for payments for transboundary river water. The dispute comes as the region tries to maintain annual water-allocation deals while adapting agriculture to worsening scarcity and climate pressure. Water has long tied together the region’s upstream and downstream states. The 2021 and 2022 clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border showed how disputes over land, border infrastructure, roads, security posts, and water access can escalate when local tensions are not contained. Yet political will alone does not guarantee agreements between countries. The Central Asian republics cooperate on water issues through two interstate bodies. One is the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, established in 1993 by all five Central Asian republics. Kyrgyzstan suspended its participation in IFAS in 2016, and now attends the fund’s meetings as an observer. The second body is the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination, whose meetings are held once a quarter. At its 93rd meeting in Bukhara in early April, the commission confirmed limits for water withdrawal from transboundary rivers, following decisions approved at the 92nd meeting in Dushanbe. For the Amu Darya, the 2026 water allocations set the total withdrawal limit for the water-management year from October 2025 to October 2026 at about 55.4 billion cubic meters. Of this, 15.9 billion cubic meters is allocated for the cold period, from October to April. Tajikistan has been allocated 9.8 billion cubic meters per year, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan each receive 22 billion. A significant part of the flow, 44 billion cubic meters, must pass through the adjusted section of the Kerki hydrological post, helping secure the lower reaches of the river. For the Syr Darya, the total water withdrawal limit for the non-growing season is 4.219 billion cubic meters. Kazakhstan will receive 460 million cubic meters through the Dustlik Canal, Kyrgyzstan 47 million, and Tajikistan 365 million, while the largest share will go to Uzbekistan, 3.347 billion cubic meters. The inherited framework is also facing pressure from outside the five-state system. Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal, which is being advanced outside the Soviet-era allocation structure, has added uncertainty on the Amu Darya. The Central Asian republics also cooperate in bilateral and trilateral formats. In January, Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan joint working groups met in Turkestan. The sides reaffirmed water cooperation, agreed to continue repairs on the Dostyk canal, and planned automated hydrological posts on the Syr Darya. In May, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan agreed on the operating regime of the Bahri-Tojik Reservoir for the summer of 2026. From June to August, the reservoir is to operate in a coordinated mode to supply irrigation water to farmers in the Maktaaral and Zhetysai districts of southern Kazakhstan. These agreements show that regional mechanisms still work, but experts continue to warn that climate pressure, data gaps, and uneven national interests could overwhelm existing formats. “Forecasting the...

New Study Finds Sharp Decline in Amu Darya Flows

Central Asia’s water woes continue to grow worse. The water flow in the Amu Darya, one of Central Asia’s two great rivers, is slowly but significantly diminishing in Tajikistan, where the river originates. A recently released report shows the Amu Darya’s water flow in the middle and lower reaches in Tajikistan has fallen over the course of recent decades by 54-77%. And the report lays the blame firmly on human activity, not climate change. Up In the Mountains of Tajikistan The study published on ScienceDirect looked at data collected over 90 years and concludes that “streamflow decreased by 54–77% in the middle and lower reaches” of the Amu Darya in Tajikistan. Interestingly, the report mentions that precipitation in the mountains of Tajikistan has actually increased between 6 and 13%, but the Amu Darya’s water level is falling because people are using more water. The expansion of agriculture is the reason, accounting for 92% of the water reduction in Tajikistan, but the recent construction of water reservoirs is also playing a role. Lower flows of water were noted on many of the tributaries in Tajikistan that feed into the Amu Darya, including the “Vakhsh, Kunduz, Kofirnihon, Surkhandarya, Zeravshan, and Kashkadarya (rivers),” which showed streamflow reductions of 4–34%. The report said that areas in the upper reaches of the Amu Darya should see increased water levels, but this is mainly due to climate change hastening the melting of snow and glaciers. Once the glaciers are gone, the water will rapidly decrease. Bad News Downstream Water problems upstream in Tajikistan translate to bigger problems downstream in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Both have already noticed a reduction in the amount of water in the Amu Darya, most visibly that the river has not reached the Aral Sea for about two decades now, contributing to the sea shrinking by some 90% since the 1960s. Every year the river recedes further south, forcing downstream communities suddenly without water to relocate. Climate change is now hastening this process in the arid, desert lands along the Uzbek-Turkmen border, but both countries are preparing for a bigger, impending shock. The Taliban started construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal in 2022, with the project scheduled to be completed in 2028. While Central Asia was liberally taking water from the Amu Darya for agricultural use, Afghanistan was in no position to claim its share until now. The canal will draw water from the Amu Darya at an area across from Uzbekistan and open up new agricultural land in northern Afghanistan, where food has long been in short supply. The 280-kilometer canal is expected to take some 16-20% of the water left in the Amu Darya after it leaves Tajikistan. Upstream Tajikistan’s falling water levels, of course, mean the Qosh Tepa Canal will also be receiving less and less water. The Combination For most of the 2020s, large areas of Central Asia have been experiencing droughts, prompting the governments there to implement water conservation measures. But as they find more ways to save...