Uzbekistan Environment - The Times Of Central Asia

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Water Security

Opinion: Water Without a Guarantor – Central Asia’s Next Security Test

The Fourth High-Level International Conference on the International Decade for Action, “Water for Sustainable Development,“ taking place in Dushanbe on May 25-28, comes at a difficult moment. Central Asia's water problem is no longer only about environmental management; it is moving into the field of regional security. The conference agenda is familiar and necessary: climate, investment, innovation, transboundary cooperation, and the implementation of the Water Action Decade. The harder question is what happens outside the conference hall. Does Central Asia still have a credible way to stop water stress from becoming an interstate crisis? For decades, the region operated in a post-Soviet setting in which Moscow shaped many security calculations, even though it was never a formal water arbiter. That setting has weakened. Russia has not disappeared from Central Asia, and it still retains military, economic, and institutional leverage. But since 2022, its role as the assumed external stabilizer has become less convincing. The result is not a simple vacuum. It is a more awkward reality: a region with many outside actors, but no trusted water-security guarantor. The Old Backdrop Is Weakening Central Asia's water system was built around a Soviet-era division of functions. Upstream republics, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, controlled the mountains, reservoirs, and hydropower potential. Downstream republics, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, depended on seasonal water flows for agriculture, food security, and social stability. The Soviet system managed those tensions through central planning. After independence, cooperation became more fragile. Water, energy, borders, electricity, and agriculture were separated into national strategies. The rivers, however, remained transboundary. For many years, Russia remained the largest external power around which regional security calculations were organized. That did not make Moscow an effective water manager, but it helped shape the political environment. Today, that environment has changed. The CSTO did not prevent the Kyrgyz-Tajik border escalations of recent years. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan eventually reached a border agreement through direct negotiation rather than outside enforcement. That difference is not academic. Water disputes are rarely settled by conferences alone. They need trusted channels for mediation, compensation, and restraint when pressure builds. Central Asia has plenty of statements about cooperation. It has fewer tools for managing coercion when water becomes scarce. Three Pressure Points The region's water-security stress is already visible in three places. The first is Afghanistan's Qosh-Tepa Canal. The canal draws water from the Amu Darya, a river system critical for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Because Afghanistan was not part of the old Soviet water-allocation arrangements, the Taliban government is creating a new upstream reality outside the inherited regional framework. Estimates of the canal's downstream impact vary widely. Some analyses suggest it could divert between 15 and 30% of the Amu Darya's flow, depending on the completion timeline, irrigation efficiency, and water-management practices. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that reduced Amu Darya flows could indirectly affect Kazakhstan if Uzbekistan compensates by drawing more heavily on the Syr Darya. Carnegie has described the Qosh-Tepa as a serious test for regional water cooperation. The second pressure point...

Irrigation Water

Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan Agree on Summer Water Releases from Bahri Tojik Reservoir

Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have agreed on water releases from Tajikistan’s Bahri Tojik reservoir for the June-August 2026 irrigation period, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation has announced. The agreement was formalized in a trilateral protocol signed by Kazakhstan’s Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Nurzhan Nurzhigitov, Tajikistan’s Minister of Energy and Water Resources Juma Daler, and Uzbekistan’s Minister of Water Resources Shavkat Khamrayev. Under the agreed schedule, water from the Bahri Tojik reservoir will be released during the summer to support agricultural producers in Kazakhstan’s Turkestan region, particularly in the Maktaaral and Zhetysai districts, where irrigation demand rises sharply during the growing season. “The issue of supplying irrigation water to the southern regions remains under special control,” Nurzhigitov said in comments released by Kazakhstan's ministry. “The agreements reached are the result of constructive interaction and mutual support between Central Asian countries. The measures taken will help ensure a stable growing season and support domestic farmers.” The ministers also reaffirmed their intention to strengthen regional cooperation on the rational and mutually beneficial use of shared water resources, a longstanding challenge in Central Asia, where agriculture depends heavily on transboundary rivers and reservoirs. The Bahri Tojik reservoir, formerly known as the Kairakkum reservoir before being renamed in 2016, is one of Tajikistan’s largest artificial water bodies. Located in the northern Sughd region on the Syr Darya River, it has operated since 1959 and plays an important role in seasonal water distribution across the region. The latest agreement follows a similar arrangement reached in June 2025, when the three countries approved the coordinated use of reservoir water during the summer irrigation season. At the time, Kazakhstan expected to receive 491 million cubic meters of water to help offset shortages in southern farming areas.

Aral Sea

Opinion: Can the Aral Sea Be Saved? Central Asia’s Water Cooperation Test

For most people, the Aral Sea is known through climate documentaries and satellite images as shorthand for ecological disaster. Once the world’s fourth-largest lake, it withered after Soviet planners diverted its two lifelines, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, to turn Central Asia into a cotton empire. Over almost five decades, as much as three-quarters of the water in these river systems has leaked into desert soils rather than reaching the sea. NASA satellite data show that the blue inland ocean has been replaced by dusty basins. We all know that story. But the more urgent question is different: can the Aral Sea still be “saved” in any meaningful sense, in a century of climate stress and water shortages? Is it still capable of being restored to health? The honest answer is yes, but only if Central Asian states and their international partners stop treating it as a frozen symbol of Soviet failure and begin governing the entire basin as a shared, climate-vulnerable commons. Anything less is nostalgia with good drone footage. From Lake to Warning Signal The Aral Sea once covered about 68,000 square kilometers and supported fishing communities along what is now the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border. Before the large-scale Soviet irrigation projects of the 1960s, its level depended mainly on inflow from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, with smaller contributions from precipitation and groundwater. In the arid climate of the basin, the sea’s stability depended on a fragile balance between river inflow and water loss through evaporation. That balance began to collapse after Soviet planners expanded irrigation for cotton and rice, diverting water from rivers that had fed the sea for centuries. Evaporation continued while river inflow fell, and the sea shrank rapidly. By the early 2000s, time-lapse images published by NASA’s Earth Observatory showed large areas of deep blue water turning into exposed seabed and dust plains within a generation. The consequences went far beyond a retreating shoreline. As the water receded, the exposed seabed became the Aralkum Desert, a source of toxic dust contaminated with salt as well as fertilizer and pesticide residues. Winds carry that dust across farms and towns, degrading soil and crops while exposing residents to serious health risks. The IFAS Agency in Uzbekistan, a working body of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, coordinates projects and programs in the Aral Sea basin. The collapse of fisheries also devastated local livelihoods and food supplies. Researchers have linked the wider Aral Sea crisis to higher rates of respiratory disease and anemia. Some studies have also reported elevated cancer risks. The loss of such a large body of water has changed the local climate. Without the sea’s moderating effect, summers have become hotter and drier, while winters have become colder. These pressures are now compounded by climate change and the retreat of glaciers in the upstream mountains that feed Central Asia’s river systems. The Aral Sea is therefore more than an environmental tragedy. It is a warning of what can happen when political...

Water Crisis

Tajikistan and UN to Host Water Crisis Conference in Dushanbe

Tajikistan and the United Nations will co-host the 4th High-Level International Conference on the International Decade for Action "Water for Sustainable Development " 2018-2028 next week, as Central Asia and other regions face increasing water scarcity because of climate change, higher consumption, and other factors. Delegates to the May 25-28 water conference in Dushanbe include government officials, scientists, executives from financial institutions and civil society members from around the world. The goal of creating “sustainable” water resources is especially critical in Central Asia, where there is growing concern that shortages could threaten public health and stir tension between upstream and downstream countries. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, for example, are in mountainous regions and have relatively significant water resources that they share with neighboring countries. However, the resources are under strain. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, in turn, rely on the cross-border water supply that flows downstream. Central Asian governments have begun joint projects on water infrastructure to avoid the kind of tensions that emerged in the past. The Dushanbe conference is another step in that process, even though the event is global in perspective. Tajik diplomats have held briefings in Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia and other countries to promote the conference, describing Tajikistan as a leader in “water diplomacy” as the world faces a water crisis that is increasingly evident in floods, droughts, pollution and melting glaciers. Dushanbe has already hosted several international conferences on water. Saidjon Shafizoda, spokesman for Tajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at a briefing in the Tajik capital on Wednesday that the conference can help accelerate innovation and mobilize funding for the “sustainable and inclusive” management of water, the state Khovar news agency reported. Organizers say more than 2,500 people are expected to participate.

Water Consumption

Central Asian Countries Rank Among World’s Highest Water Consumers

Several Central Asian countries rank among the world’s highest consumers of water per person, according to data compiled by the Worldometer portal. The figures, based on statistics from UN agencies including UNESCO and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), place Turkmenistan first globally, with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan also in the top ten. The figures highlight a long-standing regional challenge: heavy dependence on water-intensive agriculture combined with aging irrigation systems that lose substantial amounts of water before it reaches fields. Turkmenistan leads the global ranking with daily water consumption of 15,445 liters per person. Uzbekistan ranks fourth worldwide at 4,778 liters per capita per day, followed by Tajikistan with 4,460 liters and Kyrgyzstan with 4,153 liters. Kazakhstan recorded the lowest level among Central Asian states, at 3,397 liters per person daily, though that still places it among relatively high-consuming countries internationally. In terms of total annual water use, Uzbekistan consumes the largest volume in the region at 54.56 billion cubic meters a year. It is followed by Turkmenistan with 27.9 billion cubic meters, Kazakhstan with 22.77 billion, Tajikistan with 11.49 billion, and Kyrgyzstan with around 8 billion cubic meters. Experts say agriculture explains much of the region’s high consumption. Globally, farming accounts for about 70% of freshwater use, compared with 20% for industry and 10% for households. In Central Asia, agriculture represents more than 80% of water consumption, while up to 40% of water is estimated to be lost through deteriorating irrigation infrastructure. The problem has become increasingly significant as freshwater demand rises worldwide. According to UN estimates, freshwater withdrawals have tripled over the past 50 years, while global demand continues to grow by around 64 billion cubic meters annually because of population growth, changing consumption patterns, energy production, and biofuel development. Several Central Asian governments have begun introducing reforms aimed at reducing water losses. In Uzbekistan, authorities joined the World Bank’s Water Forward initiative and announced plans to expand water-saving technologies across 4.1 million hectares of irrigated farmland while reducing irrigation losses by 25%. Kazakhstan has also faced recurring shortages. Seasonal water restrictions are regularly introduced in southern regions, and this year the government approved consumption limits because of expected shortages during the agricultural season. The issue is closely linked to energy production in upstream countries. Studies by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicate that more than 80% of electricity generation in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan comes from hydropower, creating a close link between irrigation needs and energy supply. Limited coordination over water releases and electricity generation has contributed to summer shortages in some years. The figures show the scale of the challenge for Central Asian governments seeking to reduce water losses and manage shared rivers more effectively.

Toktogul Reservoir

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan Agree on Toktogul Water Releases

Energy and water ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a trilateral protocol in Tashkent on May 7 establishing agreed water release volumes and schedules from the Toktogul Reservoir for the next two months. The Toktogul Reservoir plays a central role in maintaining water and energy stability across Central Asia. The Toktogul Hydropower Plant, located on the Naryn River, the main tributary of the Syr Darya, is Kyrgyzstan’s largest power station and supplies around 40% of the country’s electricity. The reservoir serves a dual purpose: generating electricity for Kyrgyzstan while regulating water flows essential for downstream agriculture in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. During winter, Kyrgyzstan typically increases electricity generation to meet heating demand, often lowering reservoir levels and reducing the amount of water available for irrigation during the following spring and summer. According to Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry, the newly signed protocol removes uncertainty for farmers in southern Kazakhstan at the start of the agricultural season and allows both Kazakh and Uzbek farmers to begin irrigation activities on schedule. To ensure stable water supplies throughout the remainder of the growing season, the three countries agreed to continue coordination in stages. The next ministerial meeting is scheduled for mid-June in Bishkek, where officials plan to finalize water release schedules for the critical summer months of July, August, and September. The agreement highlights the continued functioning of the region’s interstate water-energy exchange mechanism. Coordination over summer irrigation flows was preceded by extensive cooperation during the winter season. From September 2025 to April 2026, Kazakhstan supplied more than 1.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity to Kyrgyzstan, helping the upstream country reduce winter water releases for heating and preserve additional reserves in the Toktogul Reservoir for summer irrigation needs in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. According to Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Energy Minister Altynbek Rysbekov, the Toktogul Reservoir held 7 billion cubic meters of water on April 1, 2026, down from 9.14 billion cubic meters on January 1 after the winter heating season. The reservoir’s so-called “dead water level,” the threshold below which turbines can no longer operate, stands at 6.5 billion cubic meters.