Uzbekistan Environment - The Times Of Central Asia

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Aral Sea

From Solastalgia to Solutions: What the First Aral School Cohort Discovered in Karakalpakstan

“They are producing food in a place where people believe there is nothing,” said Martina Manterola. In Karakalpakstan, the autonomous republic in western Uzbekistan where the retreat of the Aral Sea has left large areas increasingly arid, farmers continue to grow crops, while fishing survives in pockets of water near Moynaq. The Mexican researcher and artist, whose work focuses on food systems, ecology, and feminism, spent six months in the region as one of 22 participants in the first Aral School, an interdisciplinary residency based in Nukus, the regional capital, that brought together postgraduate researchers and specialists working across architecture, anthropology, water management, and food systems. Their task was to examine how environmental change is reshaping daily life and what outside researchers can learn from people who have remained in the region. What they found challenged familiar images of a landscape defined solely by environmental collapse: alongside farming and fishing, traditional buildings offer practical lessons in coping with heat, dust, and water scarcity. The Uzbekistan Art and Culture Development Foundation, the state-backed body behind the school, has opened applications for a second cohort. The next residency will run from January to June 2027 under the theme “Climate and Landscape.” The Times of Central Asia spoke with four members of the first cohort about what they learned. [caption id="attachment_56544" align="aligncenter" width="657"] Image: Aral School[/caption] Adapting to Heat, Dust, and Water Scarcity For Akhmed Kaipbergenov, an architect from Nukus, the program changed how he looked at the city where he grew up. “I always knew the environment around me. I knew how hot the summers are, how strong the wind can be, how much dust there is. But when you are a child, you don’t really think about these things as part of architecture.” After studying architecture and urban regeneration in Rome, Kaipbergenov began paying closer attention to the ways traditional buildings in Nukus respond to local conditions. Courtyards create shade and protected spaces away from the street. Building materials and orientation can reduce exposure to the sun, while ventilation matters in a city where summers are extremely hot and rainfall is scarce. “I don’t see them only as old or traditional elements,” Kaipbergenov said. “I see them as solutions that were developed because people had to live with this climate.” For him, that means contemporary architecture in Karakalpakstan should begin with simple measures rather than importing designs developed for very different environments. “Orientation, shading, ventilation, courtyards, materials and the relationship between indoor and outdoor spaces can make a big difference before we even start talking about complicated technologies,” he said. Landscaping also needs to reflect the scarcity of water. Instead of trying to reproduce water-intensive green spaces, Kaipbergenov argues that planners could make greater use of shaded pedestrian areas, courtyards, and places to sit. “I would start with shade,” he said. “It sounds very simple, but in Nukus, shade can completely change how you experience a public space.” Traditional courtyards, he believes, could also be reinterpreted in schools, libraries, and cultural...

Nuclear Waste

Central Asia Makes Progress on Uranium Cleanup, but Major Risks Remain

Radioactive waste lies beside the river in Mailuu-Suu, a former uranium town in Kyrgyzstan’s picturesque mountain landscape. Engineers preparing to secure it found a problem inside one of its dams. Additional drilling revealed tailings within the dam structure itself. Two subsequent studies concluded that waste from two connected ponds would have to be moved to a safer location. The discovery changed the cleanup design and increased its cost, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s revised master plan. Material that planners had intended to secure in place could no longer safely remain there. Once known as Mailbox 200, the town was founded in 1946 for a secret Soviet uranium program. Its workforce included Germans treated as politically suspect and former Red Army soldiers punished for surrendering during World War II. Uranium mining and processing at Mailuu-Suu ended in the late 1960s, leaving waste buried along the river. Cleanup is expected to continue until 2032. Even then, the authorities will need to maintain the restored sites and check that contamination remains contained. Mailuu-Suu illustrates why Central Asia’s uranium cleanup has stretched across decades. The waste sits in places where rivers and unstable slopes can carry it beyond the original industrial sites. Making those places safer requires extensive engineering, followed by public oversight that must outlast the contractors. [caption id="attachment_56370" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Archival photograph of Mailuu-Suu’s old mill and uranium tailings; image: Peter Waggit/IAEA[/caption] The International Atomic Energy Agency’s latest assessment, published in January 2026, records substantial progress. Four out of seven priority sites have been remediated since the original regional plan was adopted in 2017. But Mailuu-Suu remains one of the largest and most complex projects, with work expected to extend beyond the updated regional plan’s 2030 horizon. Across the region, former uranium operations left radioactive residue after mining and processing ended. The IAEA describes facilities abandoned without adequate plans for safe closure. National governments inherited responsibility for sites where no private owner remained to pay for the work. The geography compounds the situation. The IAEA’s original planning framework identifies tailings ponds near major rivers in seismically active areas. Flooding or a landslide can undermine containment and lead to contaminated materials traveling downstream. The location of a deposit therefore helps determine the urgency and design of its cleanup. At Mailuu-Suu, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) announced a €23 million grant in 2023. The original design included soil covers two meters thick to reduce water entering the waste and prevent access to it. The project concerned more than two million cubic meters of tailings along the river and its tributaries. Following the devastating 2023 earthquake in Turkey and Syria, Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Construction required further checks on the dams’ stability. Drilling revealed tailings inside the dam at pond seven. Subsequent studies found that the waste in ponds five and seven could not safely remain in place. The IAEA plan warns that a strong earthquake could cause the dam to collapse, allowing water-saturated waste to liquefy and enter the river....

Central Asia Water Cooperation

Water in Central Asia: Can the Five States Reach an Agreement?

Central Asia is entering a period of growing water stress, as climate change makes supplies less predictable while demand continues to rise. Populations are growing, economies require new energy and industrial capacity, glaciers are shrinking, and agriculture continues to consume most of the available water. The region’s two main rivers – the Amu Darya and Syr Darya – cross national borders, making it impossible for any one country to solve the problem on its own. After decades of disputes, Central Asian states are increasingly trying to manage water jointly. In 2026, that cooperation has produced further practical steps, from plans for automated water accounting in the Syr Darya basin to new proposals for reforming regional mechanisms. The question now is whether the five countries can agree on rules when their water needs remain different. Water and Energy: An Old Conflict The structural conflict is rooted in the region’s geography. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are upstream states and use water in part for hydropower generation, particularly in winter. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are downstream and need large volumes in summer during the irrigation season. During the Soviet period, a centralized exchange system was in place: upstream republics stored water in winter and released it in summer, receiving energy resources in return. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, that unified mechanism disappeared. Interstate agreements preserved a degree of coordination but did not eliminate the tension between upstream energy needs and downstream agricultural interests. Climate change is now adding another layer to the problem. Retreating glaciers in the Pamir and Tien Shan mountains are altering the timing and reliability of river flows, while populations and consumption are increasing. Countries across the region are planning new power plants, industrial facilities, mining projects, and data centers, while agriculture remains the largest consumer of water. From Seasonal Quotas to Joint Management The main formal mechanism for coordinating river allocations remains the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia (ICWC), established in 1992. Through it, countries coordinate water withdrawal limits and reservoir operating regimes in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins. In late 2025, the countries agreed on water allocations for 2026: for the Amu Darya, the total withdrawal limit for the water-management year from October 2025 to October 2026 was around 55.4 billion cubic meters, while the Syr Darya allocation for the non-growing season was approximately 4.2 billion cubic meters. The five-state framework does not, however, cover every major user of the Amu Darya. Afghanistan is outside the regional allocation system, while its Qosh Tepa Canal, now under construction, has added another source of uncertainty over future downstream flows. Such agreements keep the shared system functioning, but many decisions are still made ahead of each new season. Climate change and rising demand require a longer-term model. In February of this year, Kazakhstan proposed developing a Central Asian Framework Convention on Water Use, while joint infrastructure projects, including Kyrgyzstan’s Kambarata-1 hydropower plant with the participation of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are gradually adding shared economic interests...

Cotton

Uzbekistan Cotton: Mirziyoyev Decries ‘Slaves to Cotton’ Past

For decades now, anyone driving through Uzbekistan, especially through agricultural areas, would likely at some point along the road have encountered a hill with rocks arranged near the top to spell out “Paxta – Bizning Oq Oltinimiz.” It translates from Uzbek as “Cotton is our white gold” and it was a mantra in Uzbekistan going back to the days of the Soviet Union. However, Uzbekistan’s current president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, does not share this view of cotton’s value to his people and was recently cited as saying the crop turned many people in Uzbekistan into “slaves of cotton.” A Black History of White Gold Going back to the early years after the Russian Tsarist Empire seized what is now Uzbekistan in the 1860s, Moscow viewed the area as an ideal source of cotton and promoted giving over agricultural land for cotton growing. Uzbekistan remained a major cotton producer as part of the Soviet Union and the emphasis on growing the crop increased. Soviet propaganda stressed production of cotton as a patriotic duty and every year, hundreds of thousands of people, including children, were forced into the cotton fields to work as “volunteers” at harvest time. The practice and the propaganda carried over when Uzbekistan became independent in late 1991. If anything, cotton gained a new importance in independent Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan did not have much to sell on international markets and cotton sales were an important means of earning hard currency. This was true for years. In 1995, Uzbekistan’s cotton sales totaled some $1.6 billion and two years later totaled $1.4 billion. While the price of cotton fell on world markets, Uzbekistan’s cotton sales were still bringing in nearly $1 billion in 2008 and in 2013 cotton and textile sales amounted to just over $1 billion. The continued use of forced labor, mainly women and children, drew international criticism and sparked calls to boycott Uzbek cotton. The Cotton Campaign launched efforts to persuade international brands to stop using cotton from Uzbekistan in 2009, with more than 330 brands eventually joining the boycott. But countries such as China, Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Iran still bought Uzbek cotton and forced labor in Uzbekistan’s cotton fields continued. In 2014, a Human Rights Watch report said, “The Uzbek government forcibly mobilized nearly 2 million adults and children during the autumn cotton harvest to pick cotton in abusive conditions for little to no pay.” Local officials, the heads of factories and other businesses had to meet quotas for the labor force in the fields. Imams used sermons to exhort worshippers to go pick cotton, saying it was a religious duty. The Luster Wears Off Even before he was president, Mirziyoyev indicated he took a different view of the use of forced labor in the cotton fields. In late July 2016, as international pressure was mounting, then-Prime Minister of Uzbekistan Mirziyoyev told all the provincial governors, “Each of you will be held personally accountable for the use of child labor” and added, “If I see even a single child...

Opinion

Can Uzbekistan’s Green Transition Offset Its Gas Decline?

Uzbekistan faces a widening energy gap. Natural gas production peaked in 2008 and, after a partial recovery in the late 2010s, has fallen sharply. Official figures show output dropped from 61.6 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2018 to 41.5 bcm in 2024. Production fell another 15% year on year in the first quarter of 2026. The gap is already being filled from abroad. Russian gas deliveries rose 15% in 2025 to nearly 6.5 bcm, while Uzbekistan also imports gas from Turkmenistan. Renewable electricity cannot replace every household or industrial use of gas. It can reduce the volume burned in power stations, leaving more domestic fuel available elsewhere. Declining output is already changing Uzbekistan’s external position. The country, once a net gas exporter, became a net importer in 2023. Imports help protect households and factories from shortages, but they add costs and increase exposure to Russian and Turkmen supplies. Renewable generation therefore serves an energy security purpose even before its climate benefits are counted. Natural gas remains the central concern. In its 2022 review, the International Energy Agency said it provided about 85% of Uzbekistan’s total energy and electricity supplies. The government expected gas demand to rise by 30% to 65 bcm by 2030, while electricity demand would roughly double. The IEA also warned that reserves would last fewer than 20 years at the production rate then prevailing. This was a reserve-to-production estimate, not a fixed depletion date. New discoveries or investment could extend it. Lower consumption would do the same. The government has responded with a rapid renewable buildout. In 2025, solar and wind plants generated more than 10.5 billion kWh of electricity. Renewable generation, including hydropower, reached 16.8 billion kWh. The Ministry of Energy said this saved about 3.2 bcm of natural gas. That saving was equivalent to roughly half the volume Russia supplied during the year. It shows that renewables already ease the shortage. Yet 3.2 bcm remains far below the roughly 20 bcm fall in annual gas production since 2018. On current figures, the green transition is slowing the impact of the decline, not yet offsetting it. The buildout forms part of Uzbekistan’s 2019 Green Economy Transition Strategy. Renewable projects bring foreign investment and create opportunities for domestic suppliers. In December 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said local companies had supplied $700 million of materials and electrical equipment while also providing services to energy projects. Renewable generation also limits import demand by reducing the gas burned in power stations. Large projects depend heavily on decisions by the state. Procurement and land allocation affect who receives contracts. Grid access and investment approvals shape how quickly plants are completed. RFE/RL has documented concerns over opaque subcontracting in Uzbekistan’s solar sector. Its 2024 investigation found that two subcontractors on the Sherabad project were absent from publicly available documents. One company had been incorporated only two days after construction began. A founder denied accusations of corruption, while principal contractor Masdar did not respond to questions. The investigation did not establish that the...

Aral Sea

Aral Sea Restoration Could Prevent 605 Million Tons of CO2 Emissions

The drying of the Aral Sea has created another environmental problem: according to a study, exposed lakebed sediments released about 748 million tons of CO2 into the atmosphere between 1960 and 2022. Organic carbon remains stored in the sediments, and restoring part of the water cover could prevent the release of another 605 million tons of CO2. This gives efforts to restore the Aral Sea region a new climate dimension. The study, conducted by an international team of researchers led by scientists from Spain’s Centre for Advanced Studies of Blanes (CEAB-CSIC), was published in Science on July 16. The findings add another consideration to restoration efforts already underway across the region, from refilling part of the sea in Kazakhstan to planting saxaul and rehabilitating degraded land in Uzbekistan. The Aral Sea’s Carbon Legacy When the Aral Sea was still a fully-fledged body of water, plants and algae absorbed carbon dioxide, while some organic matter settled on the lakebed. As the water retreated, those sediments were exposed to the air, organic matter began to decompose, and the stored carbon started returning to the atmosphere as CO2. At the same time, winds carry salt and dust from the newly formed Aralkum Desert, spreading the consequences of the sea’s disappearance far beyond its former shoreline. In 2022, researchers conducted an expedition to the dried Aral Sea bed, collecting sediment samples and measuring how much CO2 was being released. Combined with satellite data, this allowed them to estimate carbon losses as the sea retreated. According to the researchers’ calculations, exposed sediments lost about 204 million tons of carbon between 1960 and 2022, equivalent to roughly 748 million tons of CO2. New vegetation growing on the dried lakebed has offset less than 1% of those emissions. A significant amount of organic carbon remains in the sediments. The researchers estimate that restoring water cover could prevent the release of another 605 million tons of CO2. The authors also considered the economics of such an effort. Using 2024 voluntary carbon market prices for land-use and forestry projects as a benchmark, they estimate that the avoided emissions could potentially be worth $3.6 billion to $18 billion in carbon credits. That money could theoretically become one source of funding for ecosystem restoration. Researchers estimate that about $9.7 billion in water-management improvements could increase inflows enough to restore roughly half of the area covered by the Aral Sea in 1960, while potentially generating about 323 million tons of CO2-equivalent carbon credits. Restoring the Entire Aral Sea Is No Longer the Goal Under current conditions, fully restoring the sea is widely considered unrealistic. The central issue is water. The Amu Darya and Syr Darya flow through several Central Asian countries. Significantly increasing the amount of water reaching the Aral Sea would be impossible without basin-wide agreements, irrigation modernization, and reductions in water losses. This is why restoration of the Aral Sea remains a regional issue rather than solely an Uzbek or Kazakh one. Central Asian countries coordinate part of this work...