• KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 806

Can Uzbekistan Challenge Kazakhstan as Leading Central Asia Logistics Hub?

Recent developments suggest that Uzbekistan is seeking to strengthen its position in regional logistics, potentially challenging Kazakhstan’s role as Central Asia’s principal transit hub. As geopolitical tensions increase, alternative transport routes are becoming increasingly important, and Central Asia stands out as a relatively stable region. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are investing heavily in expanding their transport infrastructure. The key question, however, is how practical and commercially viable these new projects will prove to be. Which country will ultimately be able to offer faster, cheaper, and more reliable transport corridors? Uzbekistan’s Plans In early July, Uzbekistan presented proposals for expanding its transport and logistics infrastructure, as officials sought to make greater use of what they described as the country’s underdeveloped transit potential. Officials noted that Uzbekistan occupies a strategic position connecting East and West. The country hosts approximately 4,000 kilometers (2,485 miles) of international transit corridors and has a railway network stretching 4,700 kilometers (2,920 miles). Modern logistics centers and “dry ports” are being developed in Tashkent, Navoi, and Namangan. Navoi Airport already serves as an important cargo hub on Eurasian air routes. Authorities believe that construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, together with the proposed Trans-Afghan Railway, could further strengthen Uzbekistan’s position within both regional and international transport networks. Project planners argue that, once completed, these corridors will make Uzbekistan a key segment of the shortest overland route between the Pacific Ocean and Europe. They estimate that cargo transit times could be reduced to eight days, roughly three times faster than many traditional routes. That said, the statement provided no methodology or precise endpoints for the estimate; existing China-Europe rail services generally take considerably longer. Officials also say access to Pakistan’s ports of Karachi and Gwadar would provide Uzbekistan with a gateway to the Indian Ocean and a shorter route to South Asian markets with a combined population of around 2 billion people. Gwadar is not yet connected to Pakistan’s main railway network, however, meaning that substantial additional infrastructure would be required. Significant Shortcomings Uzbek officials estimate that annual trade between China and Europe amounts to approximately $800 billion, while cargo volumes total between 120 million and 150 million metric tons each year. The government estimates that attracting an additional 15-20 million tons of international transit cargo annually could generate $400-600 million in revenue, draw around $3 billion into logistics facilities, and create approximately 50,000 permanent jobs. The presidential administration also said this could add 1.5-2 percentage points to annual economic growth, given that Uzbekistan currently captures only 1-2% of China-Europe freight – it did not explain how either figure was calculated. Although transit cargo volumes reached 15.3 million tons in 2025, an increase of 54% compared with 2021, officials believe the country’s existing infrastructure could support significantly higher volumes. At present, however, many border crossings lack sufficient capacity to process international freight efficiently. Uzbekistan currently operates 27 logistics centers that meet international standards, with a combined handling capacity of 27.2 million tons. Yet only one of them qualifies as a...

UN: Uzbekistan Makes Major Progress in Reducing Water Stress, but Challenges Remain

Uzbekistan has recorded one of the world’s fastest reductions in water stress in recent years, according to a new United Nations case study on the country’s water-management policies. The study points to efforts to conserve water, modernize irrigation, and expand regional cooperation. It also warns that Uzbekistan remains under pressure from climate change and rising water demand, while environmental damage linked to the Aral Sea disaster continues to affect the country. The study, prepared by UN-Water, examines how Uzbekistan managed to reduce water withdrawals while maintaining agricultural production and economic development. The report describes the country’s experience as particularly relevant for other water-stressed regions and countries seeking practical solutions to increasing pressure on freshwater resources. Water has long been one of Uzbekistan’s most strategic resources. Much of the country consists of arid and semi-arid landscapes, while agriculture remains heavily dependent on irrigation. The challenge has become even more urgent as climate change affects water availability across Central Asia. According to the UN report, Uzbekistan’s level of water stress increased steadily until 2017. Since then, the country has undertaken large-scale reforms aimed at reducing water consumption and introducing more efficient technologies. These efforts have produced measurable results. In 2017, Uzbekistan’s freshwater withdrawals reached 169% of its total renewable freshwater resources. By 2021, that figure had fallen to 122%. Although still above sustainable levels and considerably higher than the regional average of 69%, the reduction of 47 percentage points within four years represents one of the most significant improvements recorded globally under Sustainable Development Goal 6, which focuses on clean water and sanitation. Data cited by the report show that total freshwater withdrawals declined from 58.9 billion cubic meters in 2017 to 42.5 billion cubic meters in 2021. Most of the reduction came from agriculture, where irrigation withdrawals fell from 53.7 billion cubic meters to 38.5 billion cubic meters during the same period. The UN attributes much of this progress to strong political commitment. According to the report, water management has become a national priority supported at the highest levels of government. UN-Water notes that water-efficiency goals have been incorporated into several development programs. These include the 2017-2021 Action Strategy and the New Uzbekistan Development Strategy for 2022-2026. The goals also appear in the Uzbekistan-2030 strategy. Among the government’s targets are the introduction of water-saving technologies such as drip irrigation, sprinkler irrigation, and laser land leveling across all cultivated land by 2030. Authorities also aim to save up to 15 billion cubic meters of water annually, reduce irrigation losses by 25%, and fully digitize the management of 200,000 water intake points. The report identifies the expansion of water-saving technologies as one of the most important factors behind the country’s progress. Uzbekistan has combined financial incentives, soft loans, and subsidies with training programs for farmers and water specialists. According to UN-Water, this approach has helped reduce investment risks and encouraged wider adoption of modern irrigation systems. These measures are especially important because agriculture remains Uzbekistan’s largest water user. According to data from the...

Uzbekistan Bank Data Plan Sparks Privacy and Tax Debate

A draft government resolution that would establish unified rules for information sharing between banks and tax authorities has triggered widespread public debate in Uzbekistan, with supporters describing it as a necessary step to combat the shadow economy while critics warn it could weaken constitutional protections for banking privacy. The proposal, published for public discussion by Uzbekistan’s State Tax Committee, aims to regulate how banks provide information to tax authorities. According to the committee, the document does not introduce new powers for tax officials or abolish bank secrecy. Instead, it seeks to define the procedures, deadlines, formats, and electronic methods for exchanging information already permitted under existing legislation. The proposal attracted significant attention after some media reports suggested it would allow tax authorities to gain broad access to citizens’ bank accounts and deposits. Responding to the growing discussion, the State Tax Committee issued a public explanation, arguing that these interpretations do not accurately reflect the draft’s content. “The draft does not grant tax authorities new powers, does not abolish bank secrecy, and does not provide free access to the bank accounts of citizens or businesses,” the committee said. It stressed that banks would continue to provide information only in cases established by law. The committee pointed to Article 134 of the Tax Code and the Law on Bank Secrecy, which already allow banks to share information related to taxation with state tax authorities under specific legal procedures. It also emphasized that any information received by tax authorities is itself protected as tax secrecy and cannot legally be disclosed or used for purposes other than tax administration. Officials further argued that similar information-sharing mechanisms exist in many countries, including members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Uzbekistan has also joined the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, requiring the country to develop clear and transparent rules in this area. Despite these assurances, the proposal quickly became one of the country’s most discussed regulatory initiatives. One of the most controversial provisions concerns peer-to-peer (P2P) transfers. Under the draft, banks would report cases where an individual’s bank card or electronic wallet receives transfers totaling at least 500 times the base calculation amount during a calendar month from people other than close relatives. The measure is intended to identify cases where personal bank cards are allegedly being used for unregistered commercial activity. Economist Otabek Bakirov criticized the proposal, arguing that it contradicts constitutional guarantees protecting banking secrecy. Referring to Article 41 of Uzbekistan’s Constitution, he noted that the confidentiality of bank operations, deposits, and accounts is guaranteed by law. Bakirov also recalled that previous attempts to introduce similar monitoring of P2P transactions had been abandoned following constitutional reforms. “I hope this attempt will also fail,” he wrote, calling on parliament, the Central Bank, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, journalists, and the public not to remain silent during the discussion. Public comments submitted during the consultation have echoed many of these concerns. According...

As Azerbaijan Pushes Back Against Moscow, Central Asia Watches

The recent diplomatic escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia appeared to have run its course in April, after Moscow agreed to pay compensation over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan. Instead, the dispute has entered a new phase, and its implications now reach beyond the South Caucasus. On July 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov and handed him a formal note of protest over what Baku described as a Russian drone strike on a fuel station owned by Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region on the evening of July 5. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said the attack on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine was not an isolated incident. It cited previous strikes on the company’s gas distribution compressor station and oil depot in Odesa, which caused material damage and injured employees. Baku also pointed to earlier damage to the Azerbaijani embassy building in Kyiv and the honorary consulate in Kharkiv, calling on Moscow to investigate and comply with its obligations to protect civilian infrastructure and diplomatic missions. At the same time, Shusha — known to Armenians as Shushi, retaken by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war, and still regarded by many Armenians as occupied — hosted an international conference devoted to what participants described as Russia’s “colonial policy,” the “Circassian genocide,” and the situation of non-Russian peoples within the Russian Federation. The conference declaration called on Moscow to “recognize its historical crimes, abandon its chauvinistic policies, and end the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities into the war against Ukraine.” Experts from Azerbaijan, the United States, France, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Türkiye, and Georgia attended the conference. None of the Central Asian republics was represented. That absence was telling. Central Asian governments may be distancing themselves from Moscow in certain areas, but they remain reluctant to participate in openly anti-Russian political initiatives. For Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, the question is not whether Russia’s position has weakened, but how far they can move without provoking pressure from Moscow. For Central Asia, the dispute is not a distant quarrel in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is now a central link in the westward routes that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are trying to strengthen as alternatives to Russian territory. The Middle Corridor runs from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to Europe. Any deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russia relations therefore has practical implications for Central Asian transit, energy, and diplomatic room for maneuver. The first major rupture in relations between Baku and Moscow came after Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, traveling from Baku to Grozny, was damaged by Russian air-defense fire over Russian territory on December 25, 2024. The aircraft later crashed while attempting an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan blamed Russia and demanded an apology, accountability, and compensation. Relations deteriorated further in June 2025 following the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg and reports of torture. The most prominent victims were the...

Central Asia’s Fuel Squeeze Becomes a Winter Energy Security Problem

Central Asia’s fuel squeeze is moving from filling stations into winter planning. Governments are now tracking gasoline and diesel, gas pipelines, coal deliveries, power imports, jet fuel, and emergency repair crews. Seasonal fuel and power stress is familiar across the region, but the current pressure - tied to Russia, the main supplier for several regional fuel flows - has arrived early. Russia’s own fuel crisis has sharpened the risk. Ukrainian drone attacks and repair work have cut refinery output, while export limits have pushed more Russian supplies back into the domestic market. Reuters reported queues, regional restrictions, and gasoline above 100 roubles a liter at some independent stations. President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the strain on June 28. “You are well aware that problems for drivers and for businesses persist,” he said, adding that “the harvest depends on” keeping seasonal fuel schedules for farms. For Central Asia, Russian shortages travel through contracts, rail slots, import prices, and public nerves. Kyrgyzstan is among the most exposed. The country consumes about two million tons of fuels and lubricants each year, and almost 95% comes from Russia, according to Deputy Energy Minister Nasipbek Kerimov. “Due to the lack of adequate oil and gas production, we remain a country dependent on imports,” Kerimov said. Bishkek has asked Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan for help securing supplies. That dependence is now impacting households, farmers, and small transport firms. The cabinet has capped pump prices and set a subsidy mechanism through September 30. Kerimov said importers were seeing offers at several prices, but promised that “there should be no shortage on the domestic market.” Oil traders put AI-92 stocks at 30 to 45 days, while diesel remained available for harvest work. Kyrgyzstan is trying to buy time through domestic refining. The modernized Junda refinery in the Chuy Region has been pressed to raise gasoline output to 24,000 tons a month soon, then 50,000 tons a month by the end of 2026, with finished products directed to the domestic market. Those gains would help, but Russian supply still sets the pace. Uzbekistan has the Bukhara and Fergana oil refineries, the Altyaryk unit of the Fergana refinery, and the Uzbekistan GTL complex, but demand has still moved faster than domestic supply. In January-April 2026, gasoline imports reached 568,700 tons, worth $327.1 million, more than double the same period in 2025. Local refineries produced 417,500 tons over those four months. A shift away from AI-80 gasoline has also pushed drivers toward AI-92 and AI-95. The pressure reached the exchange in late June. AI-92 gasoline climbed to a record 13.919 million soums per ton on June 29, about $1,160, after an 11.8% rise since the start of the month. Jet fuel has become an issue, too. Uzbekistan Airways reduced some Russia flight frequencies in June, citing aviation fuel shortages and higher costs. Tashkent is now preparing for winter in concrete volumes. On July 6, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reviewed measures for the 2026-2027 autumn-winter season. The plan includes replacing 53.7...

Bukhara Biennial Sets 2027 Dates and Names New Artistic Director

Organizers of the Bukhara Biennial have announced key details of its second edition: the event will run from September 3 to November 21, 2027, with architect and designer Kulapat Yantrasast appointed artistic director. The announcement was made at the Fondation Beyeler during Art Basel in Basel, Switzerland, placing the Uzbek cultural project before an international art and museum audience. What Is Known About the 2027 Concept Yantrasast will succeed Diana Campbell, who curated the first edition in 2025. The biennial’s organizer remains Gayane Umerova, chairwoman of the Art and Culture Development Foundation of Uzbekistan (ACDF). In 2025, artists were paired with Uzbek master craftsmen. The 2027 format will expand that model by involving local ecologists, scientists, and economists. The central theme will be the connection between art, urban space, and sustainable development. Bukhara as Venue Biennial projects will be housed in restored caravanserais, madrasas, hammams, city squares, and other historic sites, some of which are expected to open to the public for the first time. The aim is to place contemporary art within Bukhara’s historic urban fabric. The city holds UNESCO Creative City status in crafts and folk art, giving the biennial a venue with international cultural recognition. [caption id="attachment_51635" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: bukharabiennial.uz[/caption] Who the New Artistic Director Is Kulapat Yantrasast studied architecture under Tadao Ando and founded the studio WHY Architecture in 2004. His recent projects include the reconstruction of the Michael C. Rockefeller Wing at New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art, the ILMI Science and Innovation Center in Riyadh, and the Dib art museum in Bangkok. His studio is also working on the Department of Byzantine and Eastern Christian Art at the Louvre in Paris and the National Museum of India, which is expected to become the largest museum in the world. Yantrasast has previously worked with ACDF on When Apricots Blossom, shown at Milan Design Week in 2026. The First Edition The first Bukhara Biennial ran from September 5 to November 23, 2025, under the theme Recipes for Broken Hearts, curated by Diana Campbell. It drew 1.8 million visitors, more than half of them from Bukhara and other regions of Uzbekistan. Participating artists included Antony Gormley, Marina Perez Simão, Erika Verzutti, Subodh Gupta, Delcy Morelos, and Dana Awartani. [caption id="attachment_51636" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: bukharabiennial.uz[/caption] Part of a Wider Cultural Strategy The Bukhara Biennial forms part of a wider ACDF program to expand Uzbekistan’s cultural infrastructure. The foundation is overseeing the Center for Contemporary Art in Tashkent, due to open on September 6, 2026, and the National Museum of Uzbekistan, designed by Tadao Ando. ACDF has also formed an international advisory board for the biennial, with members including Chris Dercon and Michael Govan. [caption id="attachment_51637" align="aligncenter" width="1024"] Image: bukharabiennial.uz[/caption] The Art Basel announcement suggests that Uzbekistan is positioning the biennial as a recurring international platform, while keeping Bukhara’s historic sites and local audiences at its center. In 2025, nearly two million people attended the event in the city’s restored historic spaces. For the 2027 edition, the challenge...