Uzbekistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Environmental Assessment

Uzbekistan’s $5 Billion Sea Breeze Resort Awaits Environmental Review

Uzbekistan’s environmental authorities have still not received the full set of documents for Sea Breeze Uzbekistan, a controversial $5 billion resort planned on the shore of the Charvak Reservoir. Azerbaijani businessman Emin Agalarov presented the project to Uzbek authorities in late 2024, and Agalarov Development is participating in the venture. Although the government approved the investment project in August 2025 and public hearings were held in January, key technical documents required for the second stage of the state environmental review remain outstanding. Sea Breeze is planned to cover 577 hectares on the eastern shore of Charvak, around 80 kilometers from Tashkent. The year-round resort is expected to include hotels and residential developments, along with dining and entertainment facilities. Gayrat Mukhamedov, director of the State Center for Environmental Expertise, told Gazeta.uz that “only the first stage of the procedure,” involving the selection and allocation of land, has been completed. The center has not yet received the documents needed to assess the environmental impact of the complex itself. The location has been one of the main sources of controversy surrounding the project. Charvak lies in the foothills of the Western Tien Shan and remains one of Uzbekistan’s most popular recreational areas. After the Sea Breeze plans were published, environmentalists and civic activists called for more information about the potential impact of development on the reservoir. In the summer of 2025, the #SaveChorvoq campaign emerged on social media. On August 1, 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the investment project. It is being implemented by Sea Breeze Uzbekistan LLC, a joint venture established with the participation of Agalarov Development. One of the conditions is protecting Charvak from pollution. Wastewater must be taken outside the coastal zone and sent to a centralized treatment system, with no discharge into the reservoir. The requirement applies both during construction and during the subsequent operation of the resort. Mukhamedov said the environmental review center is still waiting for final technical data on the treatment system, including its capacity, as well as definitive figures for the resort’s accommodation capacity and the number of cottages, homes, and other facilities. Public hearings on the environmental impact assessment for Sea Breeze were held in Bostanlyk District on January 23, 2026. The issues scheduled for discussion included the project’s impact on water, air, and soil, waste management, preservation of green areas, and environmental monitoring. At the hearings, project representatives discussed the future sewage system, wastewater treatment, and measures to preserve biodiversity. The plan envisaged wastewater being collected through a centralized sewage system for treatment away from the reservoir. The public hearings, however, do not replace the second stage of the state environmental review. More than six months later, the technical documents for that stage have still not been submitted. Mukhamedov said the next phase will depend in part on seasonal studies by Uzbekistan’s Institute of Botany and Institute of Zoology into the possible effects on local flora and fauna. The work is expected to span autumn, winter, and spring, while the environmental review...

Succession

The Tradition of Power – Why Political Succession in Central Asia Follows Its Own Rules

In January 2027, Kyrgyzstan will hold a presidential election, an event that is anything but routine for the Central Asian republic. Over the past three decades, political crises, often surrounding disputed elections, have repeatedly ended in the removal of presidents. Kyrgyzstan remains an outlier in the region, although it, too, has gradually been moving towards a political model that has long become the norm across the rest of Central Asia. This year marks 35 years since the Soviet republics embarked on independent political lives following the collapse of the USSR. Yet many of the mechanisms governing the transfer of supreme power, shaped during the Soviet era, continue to define politics across the independent states. In Central Asia, three decades of independence have produced a distinctive model of political succession. The final years of the Soviet Union became known as the era of the so-called "gun-carriage race." As one ageing General Secretary after another passed away, an unwritten rule appeared to emerge: the official who chaired the state funeral commission for the deceased leader often became his successor. A remarkably similar pattern later emerged in Central Asia – first in Turkmenistan, then in Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan's first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, died in December 2006. The state funeral commission was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Health Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who simultaneously became acting president. It was during those funeral ceremonies that the wider public was introduced for the first time to the family of Turkmenbashi. Under the constitution, parliamentary speaker Ovezgeldy Atayev should have assumed the presidency. Instead, he was stripped of immunity and arrested, clearing the way for Berdimuhamedov to take the acting presidency. After assuming the presidency in 2007, Berdimuhamedov gradually abandoned the more eccentric elements of his predecessor's personality cult while building a political system centered on his own leadership. If Niyazov styled himself Turkmenbashi – Leader of All Turkmens – his successor adopted the title Arkadag, or Protector of the Nation. In February 2022, Berdimuhamedov unexpectedly announced that he would step down following an early presidential election scheduled for March 12. He explained the decision by saying it was time to "give the younger generation an opportunity to govern the country." Few doubted that he was referring to his son Serdar Berdimuhamedov, who by then had already occupied most of the key positions within the state hierarchy. That is precisely what happened. Serdar Berdimuhamedov became president, while his father moved to the chairmanship of the Halk Maslahaty, retaining the title of National Leader of the Turkmen People. Uzbekistan followed a similar pattern, although under different circumstances. Islam Karimov built a highly centralized presidential system that left virtually no room for political competition. This applied not only to political opponents, but also to those closest to the president. His eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, was placed under house arrest while her father was still alive. Following his death, she was convicted and remains imprisoned in Uzbekistan. When Karimov died in September 2016, reports of his death circulated for several days...

Russia's War in Ukraine

How the Russia–Ukraine War Is Reshaping Central Asia’s Geopolitical Balance

More than four years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the conflict continues to alter political and economic relations across the former Soviet space. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Uzbek political scientist Mukhtor Nazirov examined Moscow’s evolving regional role, Central Asia’s search for wider external partnerships, and the areas in which Russia remains difficult to replace. “The war changed Russia,” Nazirov said. “It became more closed, more militarized, and its political logic increasingly became military. Central Asian countries suddenly found themselves dealing with a Russia that was no longer the same as it had been before the war.” Before 2022, Russia’s relations with Central Asia rested on long-established political, economic, and security ties. Since the invasion, international isolation and wartime pressures have complicated that relationship. “The war consumed everything,” Nazirov explained. “It influenced not only politics and the economy, but also public thinking, the country’s openness, its ideology, and the overall direction of the state. As Russia changed during the war, its dialogue with Central Asian countries became increasingly difficult.” “Central Asian states gained a moral justification to look for other options,” he said. “Russia is no longer the Russia it used to be.” Russia nevertheless remains deeply embedded in the region’s economy. Infrastructure, logistics networks, export routes, and labor migration still bind Central Asian states to the Russian market. Kazakhstan exports most of its oil through Russia’s Novorossiysk port, while trade from Uzbekistan and other countries continues to rely heavily on northern corridors. Millions of Central Asian citizens also work in Russia. “The economic foundation still exists,” Nazirov told TCA. “Much of Central Asia remains part of an economic structure that was formed during the Soviet period. Infrastructure is shared, and many export routes still pass through Russia.” However, the durability of Moscow’s influence is under closer scrutiny as other powers expand their regional presence. “Political closeness alone is not enough,” Nazirov said. “Any partnership eventually comes down to economics. If Russia wants to remain influential, it must have a strong economic foundation. If it cannot provide that, then others will naturally begin filling the gap.” China and the European Union have expanded their economic engagement as sanctions and wartime demands have constrained Russia. Interest has also grown in the Middle Corridor, or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which offers an alternative to routes through Russia. “The rhetoric surrounding the Middle Corridor became much stronger during the war,” he said. “The project already existed, but the war created momentum.” The EU’s Global Gateway initiative and new connectivity financing have given Central Asian governments additional channels for trade, investment, and transport. “This space is being filled partly by China and partly by the European Union,” he said. “They are proposing alternatives, and naturally Central Asian countries are turning toward those opportunities.” Russia remains the main destination for Central Asian labor migrants, although governments are pursuing employment opportunities in South Korea, Europe, and the Gulf states. “I would not say diversification has already taken place,” Nazirov...

Bride Kidnapping

Bride Kidnapping in Central Asia: Why the Practice Persists Despite Tougher Laws

Bride kidnapping for the purpose of forcing women into marriage remains one of the least visible forms of gender-based violence in Central Asia. Although abduction and coercion into marriage are punishable under criminal law across the region, the offenses are defined differently from country to country. Their true scale is difficult to measure. Many victims never report the crime, while some cases are still viewed as a continuation of tradition rather than a violation of criminal law. Over the past decade, governments across Central Asia have begun revising their approaches to the problem. Kyrgyzstan strengthened criminal penalties following several high-profile cases. Kazakhstan did not close a legal loophole that allowed many perpetrators to avoid prosecution until 2025. Uzbekistan has a specific criminal provision covering the abduction of women for marriage, while Tajikistan does not appear to define bride kidnapping as a separate offense. In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, however, assessing the prevalence of the practice remains particularly difficult because of limited research and incomplete official data. The term “bride kidnapping” has not always referred to the same practice. Anthropologists note that historically it covered a range of marriage customs, from mutually agreed elopements and staged abductions to the violent kidnapping of women. Contemporary researchers stress that the presence or absence of a woman’s free consent is the key distinction between these practices. Comparable customs once existed among a number of Central Asian peoples. One documented motive has been the desire to avoid kalym, the traditional bride price paid by the groom’s family to the bride’s relatives. Economic motives, however, did not alter the nature of the crime when a woman did not consent to the marriage. The issue has been studied most extensively in Kyrgyzstan. A nationally representative survey conducted in 2015–2016 by the National Statistical Committee with support from UN Women, UNFPA, and the International Organization for Migration found that 22.1% of marriages involved some form of bride abduction. Of these, 16.3% were reported as taking place with the woman’s consent, while 5.8% occurred without it. The frequently cited claim that more than one in five Kyrgyz marriages begins with bride kidnapping therefore combines consensual and non-consensual practices. It should not be presented as an estimate of forced abduction. The figures were based on respondents’ accounts and may not capture every form of family or social pressure surrounding consent. Known locally as ala kachuu, or “grab and run,” the non-consensual abduction of a woman for marriage is a criminal offense in Kyrgyzstan. In 2013, the penalty for abducting an adult woman for marriage against her will was increased to between five and seven years in prison. The corresponding sentence when the victim was under 17 was increased to between five and ten years. Tougher penalties, however, have not prevented further tragedies. One of the best-known cases was the 2018 murder of Burulai Turdaaly Kyzy, a 20-year-old medical student. After she was abducted, her family contacted the police. Officers brought both Burulai and her abductor to a police station but left...

Artificial Intelligence

Uzbekistan AI: Can Its Tech Boom Deliver an AI Economy?

Uzbekistan has spent the past several years positioning itself as a fast-growing Central Asian market for IT outsourcing. The government is now seeking to build an artificial intelligence economy on that export-oriented technology sector. While the state is investing in computing infrastructure and public-sector projects, Tashkent is looking to private technology companies to drive much of AI's commercial adoption. The strategy has produced visible activity, but whether it can develop into a sustainable AI economy remains an open question. Over the past five years, the government has expanded IT Park and its incentives, simplified rules for employing foreign specialists, and introduced tax breaks for resident companies. As digital service exports have grown, artificial intelligence has increasingly been positioned as the sector's next stage. According to IT Park, its resident companies were exporting services to more than 90 countries after the first seven months of 2025. North America accounted for 45% of exports, while the Asia-Pacific region and the Commonwealth of Independent States accounted for 26%, and the European Union and the United Kingdom for 24%. The figures show the sector's geographical reach. That export base gives Uzbekistan a plausible route into AI. Local companies can use existing engineering and outsourcing capacity to develop products for foreign clients, while private companies and software exports hold a prominent role in the government's commercial strategy. Uzbekistan has not yet built a fully fledged AI economy. Under targets set by an October 2025 presidential decree, at least 100 AI projects are to be implemented by the end of 2026, AI laboratories are to open at 15 universities, and more than $1 billion in foreign investment is to be attracted for AI infrastructure by 2030. These targets show the scale of the government's ambitions. Success will depend less on the number of approved programs than on whether they produce commercially viable AI products for international markets. Microsoft's Global AI Diffusion in Q1 2026 report estimated that 7.2% of Uzbekistan's working-age population used a generative AI product during the first quarter, compared with a global average of 17.8%. Uzbekistan was nevertheless among several Central Asian countries recording rapid growth from a relatively low base. Government policy is now shifting from creating favorable conditions toward supporting commercially oriented companies. In 2026, Uzbekistan launched the President AI Award, a national program combining startup acceleration with performance-based investment. Financing is linked to measurable business results and companies' ability to bring products to market. The government is also building a venture funding structure for technology startups. IT Park Ventures, established with the support of the Ministry of Digital Technologies, invests in technology startups, with artificial intelligence, fintech, DeepTech, and education technology among its priority sectors. The fund also helps portfolio companies enter international markets and connect with foreign investors. One Uzbek AI company active in this ecosystem is Repli AI. In March 2026, the startup secured $375,000 in cloud credits from Microsoft and Google to further develop its AI-powered sales and customer service platform. These were service credits rather than...

Aviation

Uzbekistan Turns to Georgia and Iraq as Jet Fuel Demand Rises 27%

Uzbekistan says it has arranged aviation fuel imports from Georgia, Iraq, and other countries as changes in regional air traffic drive up demand. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's office said on August 3 that demand for aviation fuel will reach an estimated 375,000 metric tons from July through December, 27% higher than in the same period in 2025. The government linked the increase to more flights through Central Asia and a rise in services to Uzbekistan, according to an official statement. “Most of this demand will be met by domestic oil refineries,” the president’s office said, adding that alternative import channels, including supplies from Georgia and Iraq, had been established in response to export restrictions imposed by certain partner countries. The statement did not identify the countries imposing the restrictions. It also gave no details about suppliers, import volumes, prices, delivery routes, or whether shipments from Georgia and Iraq have begun. Batumi Oil Terminal resumed handling European-produced aviation fuel in July, while Georgia’s Kulevi refinery does not plan to begin producing aviation kerosene until 2027. Uzbekistan has not said whether the supplies listed as coming from Georgia are produced there or re-exported through the country. State-owned Uzbekneftegaz aims to produce 310,000 tons of aviation fuel in 2026. This is only the company’s production target, not Uzbekistan’s total domestic output. The government has not said how much of the country’s aviation fuel demand will be met by Uzbekneftegaz, other domestic producers, or imports. Uzbekistan's airports handled 64,831 flights during the first half of 2026, up 8% from a year earlier. Passenger traffic rose 16% to more than 8.15 million, according to Uzbekistan Airports data. International services accounted for 47,371 flights and nearly 6.7 million passengers, with Tashkent International Airport handling 40,283 flights, up 7%, while passenger traffic increased 17% to 5.36 million. Tourism is also adding to passenger demand. Uzbekistan recorded 6,565,410 foreign visits for tourism purposes in January-June, up 24.9% from a year earlier, according to the National Statistics Committee. The increase forms part of a wider regional travel boom. However, almost three-quarters of those came from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, which together accounted for 4.9 million arrivals. The total therefore includes substantial land-border traffic and cannot be read solely as an air-passenger figure. Geopolitical disruption is another factor driving demand. The war involving Iran has constricted a main Europe-Asia aviation corridor and forced airlines away from high-risk airspace. Some services are now using a northern arc through the Caucasus and Central Asia, increasing the value of the region’s airspace. Pressure from the north predates the Iran conflict. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many Western carriers have avoided Russian airspace. Uzbekistan Airways began routing Europe services around Russia and Belarus in January 2025. Its Tashkent-Munich route grew by 307 kilometers, adding 30 to 40 minutes to the journey time. Uzbekistan already had a growing air transit base. Uzaeronavigation served 188,000 flights in 2023, including 143,000 by foreign airlines. More than 74,000 flights were handled in Uzbek airspace during January-April...