Uzbekistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Military Defense

Uzbekistan’s Reported Chinese Jet Deal in a Changing Arms Market

China’s J-10CE could become Uzbekistan’s first new combat fighter in decades that was designed neither in Russia nor the Soviet Union. This summer, defense publications and analysts reported that Tashkent had allegedly already received the first aircraft and could eventually acquire 24 jets. Neither Uzbekistan nor China has confirmed the deal. If the reports prove accurate, the purchase would mark a notable shift for a region whose armed forces still rely heavily on Soviet- and Russian-made equipment. For decades, Russia was the natural source of new weapons, spare parts and maintenance. Its position is no longer unchallenged. China can offer combat aircraft and air-defense systems, Turkey has established itself in the drone market, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are developing their own defense industries. Whether or not the reports prove accurate, they point to two broader trends: Central Asian countries are increasingly looking beyond Russia for newer military technology, while some are also trying to produce more equipment at home. Shadow Purchase In July, reports emerged of the alleged delivery of four J-10CEs to Uzbekistan. The aircraft is the export version of the Chinese J-10C multirole fighter manufactured by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. Its export variant has already been purchased by Pakistan. Subsequent reports spoke of a possible contract for 24 aircraft and of Uzbek pilots undergoing training in China. Uzbek news outlet Kun.uz attempted to verify the claims and contacted the country’s Ministry of Defense. The ministry responded that it had no information it could provide on the matter. Chinese authorities and manufacturers have also made no public announcement of a sale. Nevertheless, throughout the summer, reports of Uzbekistan purchasing J-10CEs have refused to die down. Russian Weapons Remain the Backbone of Existing Arsenals Uzbekistan inherited a combat aircraft fleet from the Soviet Union built primarily around MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters. These aircraft were developed in the Soviet era, and after the collapse of the USSR, Russia remained the main source of compatible spare parts, weapons, repairs, and upgrades. The reports about the J-10CE challenge this established model. A new fighter comes with a different weapons, maintenance and training ecosystem. Over time, this creates dependence on a new supplier. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, Russian exports of major arms in 2021–2025 were 64% lower than during the previous five-year period. Russia’s share of global arms exports fell from 21% to 6.8%, leaving it the world’s third-largest supplier after the United States and France. Those figures do not mean that China has replaced Russia as Central Asia’s dominant arms supplier. Russia retains a strong position, above all because of the equipment Central Asian militaries already operate. Kazakhstan is perhaps the clearest example. According to SIPRI data for 2021–2025, Russia accounted for 83% of Kazakhstan’s imports of major arms. Spain accounted for 7.9% and France for 3.6%. Kazakhstan operates Russian Su-30SM fighters, as well as helicopters, armored vehicles and air-defense systems. Any abrupt change in procurement policy would raise questions over the compatibility of ammunition, communications systems, maintenance, and the training of crews...

Border Security

Badakhshan Fighting Raises Risks for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

In Nusay district, Badakhshan province (northeast Afghanistan), fighting began around August 11 between Taliban forces and followers of Juma Khan Fateh, a local Taliban commander of ethnic Tajik origin who had resisted efforts to disarm his network. The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project (ACLED) identifies the immediate trigger as an attempt to remove military equipment and vehicles from areas under Fateh’s control, amid longer-running tensions over disarmament, local authority, and control of gold mining. Similar disputes over gold mines have repeatedly produced clashes between local commanders and Taliban forces since 2021. Fateh surrendered on August 17 after nearly a week of fighting. By August 22, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said his case was being prepared for trial. Post-surrender reporting also indicated weapons seizures and disarmament activity around Fateh-linked sites and associates, although the scale of the reported seizures and disarmament remained incompletely verified. The Fateh episode came amid a broader increase in armed instability in Badakhshan during 2026. ACLED recorded 22 anti-Taliban armed-opposition events in the province from January through July, compared with four from June through December 2025. In July, one opposition group temporarily seized the Yaftal-e Sufla district headquarters, while the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) reportedly fought Taliban forces in Zebak. The Yaftal-e Sufla and Zebak operations were separate from the Fateh confrontation, and there is no credible evidence of coordination with Fateh’s network. Fateh’s surrender ended the immediate confrontation, while separate armed-opposition activity in Badakhshan continued. The fighting has already had a direct cross-border consequence for Tajikistan. Nusay lies opposite Tajikistan’s Darvoz district. On August 13, gunfire from the Afghan side crossed into Darvoz, killing a 21-year-old woman inside her home and damaging residential property. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest, saying the fighting had violated the country’s airspace and demanding respect for the state border and measures to prevent a recurrence. The Afghan Foreign Ministry acknowledged the death and expressed regret while blaming “disruptive and opportunistic elements.” The one confirmed limited incident does not show that the conflict has extended into Tajikistan on a sustained basis, but it makes the cross-border dimension more than hypothetical. Tajikistan shares a 1,374-kilometer frontier with Afghanistan, much of it facing Afghan Badakhshan. Dushanbe had already treated this border as a persistent security problem. In late November 2025, two attacks launched from Afghanistan’s territory killed five Chinese nationals and wounded five others in Tajikistan, which then instituted tighter border measures, while the Taliban pledged to cooperate on security and investigations. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is also implementing a program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan frontier with weapons, equipment, and other border-protection means. Its 2026–27 implementation phase antedates the present fighting. A 2026 Security Council monitoring report said Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was active mainly in northern Afghanistan, particularly Badakhshan, and was developing cells capable of projecting a regional threat, with Central Asia remaining a key focus. It also reported concern in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the role of their nationals in the organization and the possible...

Bilateral Cooperation

Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan Target $1 Billion in Trade as Investment and Transit Links Expand

Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have set a target of increasing bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2030, as economic ties expand from a relatively low base into vehicle manufacturing, oil and gas, investment, and transport across the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s state visit to Uzbekistan on August 23–24 added new projects to that list. The two presidents signed a Treaty on Eternal Friendship and a program aimed at increasing bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2030. Political relations, meanwhile, have been moving faster than economic ties. In 2023, the two countries established the Supreme Interstate Council, and a year later they signed a Treaty on Allied Relations. The latest trip was Aliyev’s third state visit to Uzbekistan in five years and his seventh visit overall. Aliyev said ahead of his trip to Tashkent that bilateral trade more than tripled in 2025 to reach $795 million. Uzbekistan’s Center for Economic Research and Reforms, however, reported a much lower total of $307.3 million for the same year. Neither side has explained the discrepancy, which may reflect different definitions of trade. Sustaining growth toward the $1 billion target will require broader trade and more joint production, including goods aimed at markets beyond the two countries. From Trade to Investment The Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan Investment Company is intended to help turn some of these plans into operating businesses. Established in 2023 with $500 million in capital, the company finances projects in both countries. Some areas of cooperation have already reached the production stage. Azerbaijan’s Azermash CP works with Uzbek manufacturers to produce Chevrolet and Isuzu vehicles in Azerbaijan. By July, more than 10,700 Chevrolet vehicles and 275 Isuzu buses had been produced. More than 130 commercial entities with Uzbek investment are registered in Azerbaijan. During the latest visit, the two sides opened a gypsum plant. They also laid foundations for five SOCAR filling stations and a silver-ore enrichment plant. For Baku, the interest in Uzbekistan is understandable. With a population of more than 38 million, Uzbekistan is Central Asia’s most populous country. The Uzbek economy is growing rapidly, while the authorities are opening more sectors to private and foreign capital. For Azerbaijani companies, this offers access to a market considerably larger than their own as well as a foothold in Central Asia. For Tashkent, Azerbaijan offers investment and expertise in the oil and gas sector. SOCAR, the Azerbaijani state oil company, has been operating in Uzbekistan for years. A joint venture between Uzbekistan’s O‘ZLITINEFTGAZ and the Azerbaijani company’s research institute has been operating since 2016. Cooperation is now gradually moving from engineering services toward much larger exploration and potential production projects. The main project is on the Ustyurt Plateau in western Uzbekistan. BP joined the project in May 2026 with a 40% stake, while SOCAR, which is the operator, and Uzbekneftegaz each hold 30%. Total investment could reach around $2 billion if commercially viable reserves are found and the project proceeds to development. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the project envisages extensive seismic...

Opinion

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan Show What Diplomacy Can Deliver as Vast Rail Project with China Advances

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev met on July 30 on the shores of Kyrgyzstan’s Lake Issyk-Kul, in Cholpon Ata, to sign the Treaty on Allied Relations. It was much more than business as usual. In their press conference, the leaders largely set aside the diplomatic boilerplate and expressions of mutual approbation that usually attend such summits. Instead, the meeting focused on putting a decisive end to mutual Kyrgyz-Uzbek grievances and rivalry, opting for dialogue over confrontation, stability over tension, and partnership over the quest for primacy in their bilateral relationship. Without ceding any of their sovereignty, they stressed that teamwork and shared responsibility—not the pursuit of great-power patronage or one-upmanship—are the surest way to advance common interests. Japarov, like Mirziyoyev, made clear that strategic-level collaboration always trumps short-term transactional gains. One of the biggest takeaways from the Japarov–Mirziyoyev summit was the confident demeanor and optimism with which they spoke about the future of Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations. Veering from his scripted notes and speaking in Russian to the press, Mirziyoyev said: “What an atmosphere we have today [here in Kyrgyzstan]. Look at what we're doing today— we're making history. This alliance — all of this will remain in history forever and ever.” Friendship, mutual respect, and hard work will produce “dynamic development” and “steady economic growth,” leading to “the well-being of peoples.” Business Development and Ahead of Schedule Once dismissed as an engineer's pipedream or a financier's nightmare, Japarov and Mirziyoyev said they’re staying the course on building strategic connectivity, energy, and water infrastructure, singling out the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and the Kambarata-1 Hydropower Plant (HPP), projects that some considered unrealistic. The leaders made it plain that this railway will deliver huge benefits. As Mirziyoyev put it: "We will work together non-stop to develop trade and logistics infrastructure along this railway route." Beyond offering transit times faster than the northern routes, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway will boost tourism and bring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan hundreds of millions of dollars in transit revenue. Most importantly, it will unlock untapped economic resources, fueling new jobs, businesses, and logistics hubs along the corridor. After the Japarov-Mirziyoyev meetings, The Times of Central Asia spoke with Akramjon Nematov, First Deputy Director of Uzbekistan's Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies. Having been on site, he noted that the numbers and progress on the ground speak louder than any words or communiqués: "Construction is active at 83 of 107 planned sites on the Kyrgyz line, with over 10,000 workers and 7,000 units of heavy machinery deployed. Crews are drilling 26 tunnels through the Tian Shan, with over 13.5 kilometers of the main tunnel already cut, while 38 of 50 bridges are underway. The pace is staggering. I've watched this railway move Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations from friction to cooperation – and I measure progress not in words, but in cubic meters of earth moved." China has committed to supplying most of the capital and engineering capacity. The project carries a total capitalization of roughly $4.7 billion, structured as a $2.3...

Jewelry

Bukharan Jewelry: How an Uzbek Jeweler Is Preserving a Traditional Craft

In 2024, Uzbek jeweler Zokir Negmatov published a handbook of Bukharan jewelry making. Traditional Bukharan jewelry making left little technical documentation. Instead, its skills were transmitted largely through observation. "In jewelry making, much knowledge has traditionally been passed directly from master to apprentice," he explains. "For me it was important to preserve the tradition for future generations." A man in his mid-forties, Negmatov was born and trained in Bukhara and has nearly three decades of experience as a jeweler. His native city has been a center of gold and silver work for well over a millennium, and craftsmanship helped shape the city itself: as many as two hundred crafts are believed to have flourished here, with each neighborhood, or mahalla, tied to a particular one. At the center of the old town stands Toqi Zargaron, the Jewelers' Dome, a covered bazaar built in 1569–70 that once housed thirty-six jewelers' workshops and shops, where gold, precious stones, and coral were traded. It still stands, the largest of the surviving domes, and now sells spices and souvenirs. Across Uzbekistan, silver was the dominant metal, but Bukhara's jewelers were unusual in their preference for gold. The city lies in the Zarafshan oasis, named after the river whose Persian name means 'spreader of gold' and refers to gold-bearing sands in its upper reaches. By the nineteenth century, Bukhara ranked with Khiva, Samarkand, Karshi, and Kokand among Central Asia's principal jewelry centers, each with a recognizable style. A jeweler was a zargar, a Persian word that survives in the name of the dome. The trade was organized, with hierarchies, patron saints, and its own written texts: the risola, a pamphlet setting out the legend of how the craft's patron founded it and the prayers required of a craftsman. What those texts did not contain were the technical aspects of the craft: how to do the work. That knowledge was carried largely through the usta-shogird relationship. Usta, from the Persian ustad, means master and functions as a title; a man is addressed as Usta before his name. The shogird attaches himself to one master for years, works for little at the outset, and learns by being present at the bench. Negmatov's handbook is a different kind of text. Where the risola preserved the craft's spiritual charter, his book sets down the methodology. It arrives at a moment when Bukhara and the traditions of Uzbekistan are drawing interest not only from tourists but also from the broader world of art and culture. [caption id="attachment_54454" align="aligncenter" width="932"] Image courtesy of Zokir Negmatov[/caption] Family Traditions Zokir Negmatov grew up in a family where culture and tradition were central. His father was an educator. His mother, Gauhar Negmatova, was a master of zardozi, the gold embroidery for which Bukhara is equally known, creating figurative patterns and traditional ornament by hand in gold thread. "There were no professional jewelers in my family, but craftsmanship and traditional art were always highly valued," recounts Negmatov. "From childhood, I was surrounded by traditional ornament...

Language Policy

Uzbekistan’s Alphabet Reform Revives a 33-Year-Old Debate

Uzbekistan began switching from Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet in 1993 and initially planned to complete the transition by 2000. Nearly 33 years later, both scripts are still widely used, and the country is preparing to revise its Latin alphabet again. On July 7, the lower house of Uzbekistan’s parliament approved a bill introducing a new version of the alphabet, with 28 letters and one apostrophe instead of the current 26 letters and three letter combinations, and sent it to the Senate. Literary scholar Dilbar Khaydarova told The Times of Central Asia that a reform originally intended to take seven years has stretched across a generation. She attributes the delay mainly to an inconsistent transition, with schools moving faster than publishers and much of the government. “After 30 or 31 years, these small corrections have prompted another reform,” she said. A Reform That Stretched Across Decades Uzbekistan adopted the law introducing a Latin-based alphabet in 1993. Schools were to use the new script first, while adults were expected to have opportunities to study it at workplaces and institutions. The transition was initially due to be completed by 2000. In 1995, the deadline was extended to 2005 and later postponed to 2010. The original alphabet was revised in 1995, when sh and ch were adopted and ng was listed separately. That revision also introduced the forms o‘ and g‘, establishing an alphabet of 26 letters and three letter combinations. Two Alphabets for One Country Schools switched to Latin, while Cyrillic remained common in government and the publishing industry. The media also continued using the script for years, and the Soviet-educated generation remained active in public institutions after 1993. As a result, children learned to write in Latin but continued to encounter Cyrillic in publications and official documents. The same script remained in use when they entered the workplace. “Even if we became literate in Latin, we also developed the ability to read and write in Cyrillic,” Khaydarova said. “Because the situation required it.” She describes this as the coexistence of “two policies or practices that did not correspond to each other.” This mismatch, she believes, largely explains why the transition has lasted for decades. That pattern persists, with some major publications using Latin while others continue publishing in Cyrillic. Khaydarova says the difference does not necessarily reflect opposition to the reform because publishers must consider their audiences’ habits. The Cost of the New Alphabet Implementing the revised alphabet will involve costs beyond school textbooks. Since 1993, Uzbekistan has accumulated a vast body of material in both Cyrillic and the current version of Latin. For publishers, this raises questions about whether existing publications should be converted to the revised script and who will pay for the work. “If they lose a significant share of their audience, there will be serious financial risks in the future,” Khaydarova said. Khaydarova believes the state will have to bear some of the cost by supporting publishers that convert existing materials to the revised script. “The more sources of...