• KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
24 October 2026

Viewing results 19 - 24 of 918

Opinion: Central Asia’s Minilateral Diplomacy and the Limits of Cooperation

In the contemporary, largely fragmented world order, the concept of minilateralism has become increasingly relevant. As less powerful, smaller states are struggling with often ineffective multilateral diplomatic frameworks, cooperation on a smaller scale has been gaining momentum in international relations. Central Asian countries, although with an intrinsic set of strengths and resources, still lack the power to individually address some of their own issues and advocate more proactively for their interests, especially in global forums dominated by major powers and entities. Geopolitical weaknesses of each Central Asian country lie in insufficiently developed domestic economic and military power to compete with much stronger neighbors such as Russia or China. Furthermore, unfavorable geography, where Central Asia, as a landlocked region, has limited access to global trade chains, also dilutes its geopolitical strength. In addition, the transboundary nature of critical resources, especially concerning water flows and supply, often causes tensions among states of Central Asia. In such discouraging circumstances, minilateralism promises more realistic solutions that can place Central Asia on a more equal footing with external partners and enable the region to play a more significant role in regional and, to some extent, international politics. That is why the consultative meetings of the five Central Asian countries (C5), now expanded to include Azerbaijan as C6, and C5+1 dialogues with external partners have become important platforms for Central Asia’s diplomatic standing. Minilateralism and Central Asia Minilateralism represents an international relations concept that implies cooperation of a smaller group of countries (usually three to nine members) in order to resolve shared problems or pursue mutual objectives. While bilateralism remains the main form of cooperation in international politics and multilateralism is necessary for tackling global issues, minilateralism has emerged as a more appropriate response for addressing specific regional issues in a more flexible and efficient manner. One of the main features of minilateralism is prioritizing shared interests over values or ideological principles, which allows collaborating states to focus more on solving issues and avoid being burdened by ideological discrepancies. Take, for example, the Abraham Accords that managed to gather countries with very different ideological views, especially Israel and the United Arab Emirates, but still produced tangible results of cooperation. Another advantage of minilateralism is a quicker response to crises, as well as opportunities, with less of the bureaucratic hassle that often follows multilateral diplomacy. For Central Asia, working together provides a stronger platform for negotiating better outcomes, especially in the economic area. While the current major geopolitical tensions, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Iran war, continue to shake the international order, the Central Asian countries have become more aware of their opportunities, especially in terms of transit routes and natural resource demand. Central Asia has definitely caught the attention of major powers, and its geographical position along alternative transportation routes, as well as its considerable wealth of natural resources, including hydrocarbons and critical materials, opens doors for the region to gain more influence and power. However, for all of these opportunities to materialize, Central...

Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan Ties Could Reorient Central Asian Integration

The five Central Asian presidents met with Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev in Avaza on October 8 for the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s participation brings a principal outlet for Central Asian trade into the six governments’ economic deliberations. Within their consultative format, the states can coordinate industrial projects with the transport services through which regional producers reach foreign markets. If Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan connect cross-Caspian transport more closely to industrial cooperation, the corridor could become an organizing axis for regional integration. The Case for Trans-Caspian Integration Closer Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan cooperation would make cross-Caspian transport more dependable if trains reach Kazakhstani ports in time for Caspian sailings and cargo arriving at Azerbaijani terminals connects with onward services through Georgia. A 2023 assessment by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), also called the World Bank, identified trade among Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Europe as a driver of corridor demand, giving regional exporters a place alongside China–Europe transit traffic. Onward connections from the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway now under construction could run through Turkmenistan and across the Caspian to Azerbaijan, providing an alternative to routes through Iran. Conflict involving Iran strengthens Azerbaijan’s position as the more dependable western outlet for Europe-bound exports. Greater predictability could offset the cost of a Caspian crossing by reducing the stocks firms must hold against delays and the losses caused by interrupted deliveries. Extending the operating coordination developed with Kazakhstan to these southern connections could make Azerbaijan commercially preferable for Central Asian exporters serving European markets. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan occupy the principal positions in this prospective reorientation. Together, they represent approximately one-third of the six countries’ population but account for more than three-fifths of their nominal GDP. Yet bilateral merchandise trade amounted to only $470.7 million in 2025. Their combined economic weight is thus disproportionate to the commerce presently linking them. The infrastructure and institutions connecting industrial investment to markets across the Caspian could give the two countries a basis for organizing wider regional integration, provided firms sustain commercial relationships through those connections. The Bilateral Basis for Regional Integration Export commitments depend on the cost and timing of the complete transport service. At Avaza, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev attached “particular importance” to developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. His Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, advocated joint investment, manufacturing, and entry into foreign markets. For firms undertaking joint production, the commercial viability of Aliyev’s proposal would depend on transport coordinated from departure to delivery. Kazakhstan is developing the Middle Corridor along with the eastern branch of the International North–South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Iran through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. At Avaza, Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov supported the development of North–South corridors in addition to East–West routes. Tokayev also highlighted the continuing importance to Kazakhstan of the North–South route in cooperation with Russia. Kazakhstan’s multi-vector approach thus extends to transport infrastructure: the Middle Corridor strengthens westward access without displacing the commercial connections maintained...

Japanese Firm Backs Uzbekistan’s Nuclear-Powered Data Center Project

Uzbekistan's first nuclear power plant, now under construction in the Jizzakh region, is primarily a Russian project. Rosatom is supplying the reactors, and Atomstroyexport, part of its engineering division, is the main contractor. But at the first summit of the Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue in Tokyo in December 2025, a Japanese company agreed to cooperate on a related project: a 50-megawatt data center that could become the first in the world powered entirely by a small modular nuclear reactor. What Russia Is Building The plant in the Forish district will combine two large VVER-1000 reactors with two smaller RITM-200N reactors, for a total capacity of just over 2.1 gigawatts. Uzbekistan's nuclear energy agency, Uzatom, has estimated the maximum contract value at $9.5 billion. Initial concrete work began in March 2026, while the first concrete for the small reactor's foundation was poured in June. The first small reactor is expected to start up in 2029, while the two larger reactors are scheduled for 2033 and 2035. Japan's Role? On December 20, 2025, at the summit, Uzatom signed a memorandum of understanding with Muroosystems Corporation. This Tokyo-based company, founded in 2006, specializes in information technology infrastructure and renewable energy. It expanded into nuclear engineering through its acquisition of a German company, NUKEM Technologies Engineering Services (NUKEM), in 2024. Through NUKEM, Muroosystems plans to provide nuclear safety assessments and engineering services, alongside technical consulting that includes owner's engineer support. These services are intended to support the project in line with international best practices and International Atomic Energy Agency requirements. The cooperation agreement also covers the proposed nuclear-powered data center, involving Uzbekistan's Ministry of Digital Technologies. There is an interesting history behind NUKEM's involvement. The German company was previously owned indirectly by Atomstroyexport and remains based in Germany, although it has been Japanese-owned since September 2024. The Data Center Itself The project involves a data center with an estimated power demand of 50 megawatts. According to DatacenterDynamics, it is expected to receive its normal electricity supply through a direct line from one of the Russian-made RITM-200N reactors, each capable of generating 55 megawatts, rather than from the national grid. Public announcements do not specify how backup power would be provided during reactor maintenance or shutdowns. Combining a Reactor With a Data Center The rationale, outlined by NUKEM, is straightforward. The data center would receive a stable, round-the-clock power supply. In return, the nuclear power plant would gain a steady customer whose high demand could be met through a direct connection, potentially improving the use of its generating capacity. The project also fits into Uzbekistan's efforts to develop artificial intelligence (AI) and digital infrastructure. In September 2026, the country opened new AI-capable data centers in Bukhara and Kokand, while state telecommunications operator Uztelecom announced an agreement to distribute Amazon's satellite internet services. A Pattern, Not an Isolated Case Muroosystems' involvement in Central Asia is not limited to Uzbekistan. The Japanese company has also signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Nuclear Center of...

Drone Strikes on Russian Data Centers Disrupt Yandex Services Across Central Asia

Drone attacks on three Yandex data centers in Russia disrupted taxi, delivery, and other digital services in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. At the same time, the company said that Kazakh users’ personal data continued to be stored within Kazakhstan. The outages revealed how heavily Central Asia’s digital economy depends on computing infrastructure beyond its borders. Between October 8 and 11, drones attacked three Yandex data centers in Russia. The first facility hit was in Sasovo, in the Ryazan region, where two supercomputers used for artificial intelligence development were located. The center shut down completely. A subsequent strike hit a data center in Kaluga, disabling some of its equipment. On October 11, another attack forced a facility in Vladimir to shut down. Yandex confirmed the damage and said no employees were injured. Company specialists began redistributing computing workloads among the remaining operational sites, but it is not yet known when the damaged equipment will be fully restored. According to Reuters, the strikes on Russian data centers were part of an expansion of attacks on economic and technological infrastructure during Russia’s war against Ukraine. The consequences quickly spread beyond Russia. On October 11, users in Kazakhstan encountered problems ordering taxis, meals, and groceries through Yandex Go, Yandex Eats, and Yandex Lavka. The disruptions also affected scooter rentals and other applications. Drivers and couriers could not receive orders, while restaurants and stores temporarily lost access to some of their customers. Yandex Qazaqstan confirmed the technical problems. By evening, taxi booking was available again, although some functions continued to operate with restrictions. The company explained that when servers fail, computing tasks are transferred to other resources, but switching workloads takes time. Similar disruptions occurred in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Users reported errors when booking rides and ordering deliveries, as well as problems displaying fares. In Kyrgyzstan, Yandex’s local division acknowledged the problems and confirmed that damage to infrastructure in one country could disrupt applications in another. For Central Asia, this is more than a temporary inconvenience. Digital platforms have become part of the urban economy, supporting the work of drivers, couriers, restaurants, stores, and delivery services. When an application stops accepting orders, some market participants effectively lose access to customers. However, reliable estimates of financial losses in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are not yet available. It is unclear how many orders were lost or whether partners will be compensated for their losses. The outages also affected Yandex’s financial services. Dmitry Pirogov, head of the company’s fintech division, said on October 11 that users were temporarily unable to check their balances, pay for purchases, or transfer money through Yandex Pay. According to him, account information is stored in multiple copies, and checks found no loss of records. However, data preservation did not ensure uninterrupted access to financial transactions. This distinction proved particularly important for Kazakhstan. Following the widespread outages, questions arose about why damage to servers in Russia affected applications in Kazakhstan despite local legal requirements to store personal data within the country. Yandex Qazaqstan said...

Avaza Summit Highlights East–West and North–South Trade Routes

On October 8, the presidents of five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan gathered in Avaza, on Turkmenistan's Caspian coast, to discuss closer economic and political cooperation. Hosted by Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, the annual Consultative Meeting included Azerbaijan as a full participant for the first time, extending the forum across the Caspian to the South Caucasus. The six leaders adopted a joint statement recognizing East–West and North–South transport corridors as priorities for regional development. The summit highlighted the region's growing importance in Eurasian trade and international supply chains. Beyond expanding transport networks, the leaders proposed closer industrial cooperation and cross-border investment, seeking to capitalize on their geographic advantages while preserving flexibility in their international economic relationships. Transport Corridors in Multiple Directions Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov said, "I believe it is now important to intensify negotiations and practical steps toward establishing transport and logistics connectivity along the East–West and North–South routes." He added, "The Central Asia–Caspian Sea–South Caucasus–Europe corridor should play a key role here." He also emphasized that cooperation among Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as Caspian states could help integrate the wider Central Asian region and other countries into these transport networks. Turkmenistan remained prepared to make its Caspian infrastructure available for mutually beneficial projects. Its port at Turkmenbashi and rail connections toward Iran give it a practical role in both East–West and North–South trade. The Turkmen president's emphasis on North–South connectivity also reflects ongoing transport cooperation with Russia. In May 2026, Turkmenistan reported that Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran were working on an agreement to improve freight movement along the corridor's eastern branch. Turkmen officials also outlined preferential railway tariffs and container services linking Turkmenbashi with Russia's Olya port. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev also highlighted growing demand for the Middle Corridor, while emphasizing the continued importance of the North–South route. "For Kazakhstan, the North–South route in cooperation with Russia remains particularly relevant," Tokayev said. The statement is consistent with Kazakhstan's longstanding multivector foreign policy, which seeks to maintain established trade connections while expanding access to alternative transport routes. Kazakhstan, Central Asia's largest economy, occupies a strategic position at the intersection of major East–West and North–South transport routes. For the region’s landlocked economies, a wider choice of reliable routes can improve access to markets and reduce dependence on individual transit connections. Expanding the Middle Corridor Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized investments on both shores of the Caspian, noting that transit cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor increased by more than 10% in 2025 and by almost 20% during the first eight months of 2026. Azerbaijan has invested in ports, railways, highways and other infrastructure to facilitate trade between Central Asia and international markets. It also serves as a transit route for Kazakh and Turkmen oil exports, giving the country a growing role in connecting Central Asian producers with markets to the west. Tokayev proposed exploring the integration of the Middle Corridor with the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a planned transport link through Armenia connecting mainland Azerbaijan...

Central Asia Agrees New Water Limits, but National Quotas Remain Unclear

Water has repeatedly caused friction between Central Asian governments. Uncoordinated releases have flooded communities downstream, while disputes over access have contributed to deadly fighting along contested borders. On October 7, the region's countries agreed on water withdrawals from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya for fall and winter 2026–2027, though published results do not reveal how much water each country will receive. The agreements were reached at the 95th meeting of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) in Avaza, on Turkmenistan's Caspian coast near Turkmenbashi. Participants agreed on national water withdrawal limits and projected reservoir operating schedules, but the figures remain in unpublished annexes to the meeting protocol. Regional cooperation has grown in recent years. In June, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan agreed on water releases and electricity supplies for the 2026 irrigation season, continuing efforts to coordinate reservoir operations across borders. Despite this progress, longstanding tensions remain. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan need water in the winter to generate electricity, while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan need it in the summer for irrigation. Bishkek has revived proposals for its neighbors to share the costs of maintaining reservoirs, while Afghanistan's Qosh Tepa Canal could put further pressure on the Amu Darya. Countries are also trying to resolve discrepancies in river-flow measurements. [caption id="attachment_58085" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Officials from Central Asian countries attend talks on cross-border cooperation and sustainable development in the Amu Darya basin in Turkmenistan. Image: State News Agency of Turkmenistan[/caption] From Flooded Villages to Border Clashes The competing demands of electricity generation and agriculture are particularly evident in the Syr Darya basin. Kyrgyzstan's Toktogul Reservoir sits on the Naryn River, the Syr Darya's main tributary. In winter, Kyrgyzstan releases water to generate electricity, months before downstream farmers need it for irrigation. When these releases exceed the capacity of reservoirs and canals, the excess water can cause flooding. In February 2004, residents of Kazakhstan's Kyzylorda region experienced the consequences of uncoordinated water releases. The Syr Darya overflowed its banks, forcing the evacuation of at least 200 families. Ice had already restricted the river's flow, worsening the flooding. According to NASA, Kyrgyzstan was releasing more water from its hydropower system than the agreements allowed, with the excess flow entering the Shardara Reservoir. Uzbekistan agreed to divert some of the water into the Arnasay lake system, but it was not possible to divert the entire volume needed. As a result, the river flooded areas farther downstream. In the Amu Darya basin, disagreements developed differently. In 2012, then-Uzbek President Islam Karimov warned that disputes over water resources could lead to war. The source of tension was the construction of the Rogun Hydropower Plant in Tajikistan. Tashkent feared that a large dam on the Vakhsh River, a tributary of the Amu Darya, would allow Dushanbe to influence the volume of water reaching Uzbekistan's agricultural regions. The confrontation was accompanied by interruptions in gas supplies to Tajikistan, transport restrictions, and mutual accusations. Dushanbe linked Tashkent's actions to pressure over the Rogun project, although the Uzbek side disputed that...