Our People > Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Senior Editor and Contributor

Robert M. Cutler has written and consulted on Central Asian affairs for over 30 years at all levels. He was a founding member of the Central Eurasian Studies Society’s executive board and founding editor of its Perspectives publication. He has written for Asia Times, Foreign Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Euractiv, Radio Free Europe, National Post (Toronto), FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, and many other outlets.

He directs the NATO Association of Canada’s Energy Security Program, where he is also senior fellow, and is a practitioner member at the University of Waterloo’s Institute for Complexity and Innovation. Educated at MIT, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), and the University of Michigan, he was for many years a senior researcher at Carleton University’s Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, and is past chairman of the Montreal Press Club’s Board of Directors.

Articles

Abraham Accords

Abraham Accords Frame Kazakhstan–Israel Cooperation to Deliver Tokayev’s Reforms

Kazakhstan’s decision to enter the Abraham Accords is a diplomacy-first move by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Its aims include: 1) converting symbolic capital into policy traction in Washington, 2) arriving at workable co-financing with Gulf partners, and 3) preserving equilibrium with Moscow and Beijing. The step does not alter recognition; the two countries have had diplomatic relations for a third of a century, institutionalized through embassies. Cooperation has been steady, if modest. Entering the Abraham Accords now gives these relations a framework that U.S. agencies, funds, and implementers already use. The timing intersects the C5+1 turn from set-piece dialogues to transactions, with new deals announced alongside the Accords move. What the framework unlocks is execution. It compresses attention cycles inside U.S. bureaucracies, normalizes trilateral packaging with Gulf financiers, and clears diligence pathways for banks and development finance institutions. Those effects matter where Israeli capabilities dovetail with Tokayev’s priorities. The premise of Tokayev’s move is straightforward: diplomacy should shorten the distance between declared policy and the implementation of projects that work. Tokayev’s Diplomatic Architecture and the Bilateral Relationship Kazakhstan recognized Israel in 1992 and opened embassies soon after, setting a cautious but uninterrupted channel for official contact. The institutional scaffolding is visible in public sources. Trade volumes have been modest but steady, with 2024 bilateral turnover reported by Kazakhstan’s statistics at roughly $236 million, a figure that is broadly consistent with third-party trackers such as Trading Economics and OEC profiles. Practical frictions have eased as Air Astana initiated direct air links between Almaty and Tel Aviv in 2023. The Accords move aligns that long, incremental relationship with a framework that is transparent to Washington and to Gulf financiers. Reporting on the Washington week underscores the shift from set-piece dialogues to transactions, as the Accords announcement was paired with commerce headlines. Joining the Abraham Accords reorganizes and reframes practical bilateral activities. By placing existing ties under a known diplomatic wrapper, Astana becomes easier to route inside U.S. agencies and funds, and easier to match with Gulf co-financing for projects that fall in line with Tokayev’s domestic reforms and economic development program. The practical test becomes whether the new wrapper accelerates cooperation, where Israel’s comparative advantages can help Kazakhstan meet the goals of that program. Examples of this are precision irrigation and basin telemetry to optimize steppe agriculture, audit-plus-retrofit toolkits that cut grid and industrial losses without new generation, reinforcing the 2060 neutrality track, and civil-service-embedded cyber training with secure data exchange that lifts administrative credibility. The Accords thus function as additive diplomacy, widening Kazakhstan’s access to recognizable cooperation pathways without demanding a shift in alignments. In Washington, the move plugs into an existing rubric that officials already use for interagency routing and external partnerships. Regionally, it complements the C5+1’s turn toward transaction-focused engagement. Domestically, it moves Tokayev’s reform agenda forward. Internationally, it demonstrates continued leadership. The diplomatic wrapper works because Kazakhstan can route cooperation through recognized counterparties and rules. Samruk-Kazyna and core state-owned enterprises (SOEs) represent accountable anchors consistent with OECD-provided guidance on...

11 months ago

U.S.-Central Asia Summit

Washington Shifts C5+1 From Diplomacy to Deals

On November 6, 2025, Washington hosted the C5+1 summit, bringing U.S. President Donald Trump together with the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The tone shifted from broad diplomacy to deliverable transactions, with officials emphasizing cooperation on critical raw materials. The timing signified a broader shift in supply chains away from China and Russia, and the discussion moved from general diplomacy to transactions that can be tracked and delivered. The private-sector track also accelerated. The B5+1 (“B” for “business”) platform is meant to carry follow-through on minerals, processing, logistics, and services. It complements state-to-state commitments by putting contract-ready work streams and policy dialogue in the same frame. Verification is simple: match U.S. and host-government readouts with company filings and ministry communiqués issued after the summit. Subsequent notices should specify instruments, values, financing, timelines, and the units responsible. What Was Signed Versus What Was Signaled The summit mixed firm orders with preliminary commitments. Uzbekistan Airways converted eight options for the Boeing 787-9 (covered by FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet T00021SE) into a firm order, bringing its total to twenty-two Dreamliners. That flows into the manufacturer’s backlog and starts financing and ground-side preparation. Tajikistan’s Somon Air announced up to four 787-9s and ten 737 MAX; that signals intent, with binding contracts and financing to follow. Engine families for the 787-9 are Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 TEN and GE Genx-1B, setting maintenance and training paths. Air Astana said it had selected up to fifteen 787-9s. Slot allocation and financing are next, along with sale-and-leaseback or operating-lease decisions. A parallel commercial package aimed to show that U.S.–Central Asia ties can move on a near-term clock, framed publicly through the Department of Commerce’s announced “C5+1 Deal Zone,” earmarked at “over $25 billion.” Rare earths and related inputs sat at the center of the talks. Aviation and other signings were presented as tangible outcomes. The substance rests with the underlying company agreements and national approvals, although the packaging usefully aggregates a single narrative for public consumption. Minerals were cast as the strategic core, even though many projects remain in the early stages. Public readouts emphasized supply-chain resilience and competition with China and Russia. For shipments into the European Union, the bottleneck remains the processing limits set by the EU Critical Raw Materials Act. Customs classification uses the Harmonized System (HS), a universal tariff code maintained by the World Customs Organization (WCO): tungsten falls under HS 8101, while rare-earth metals and their compounds are under HS 2805 and HS 2846. Bankability likewise depends on recognized industry disclosure rules for reporting mineral resources, which require standardized geology, sampling, and reserve estimates before serious financing proceeds. Wire services likewise underscored rare earths and closer cooperation along the value chain. Country Outcomes Kazakhstan. The most tangible non-aviation item was a tungsten venture at Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty, with an indicated project scope of around $1.1 billion. A Letter of Interest (LOI) from the U.S. Export–Import Bank (EXIM) suggests a figure near $900 million on a 70/30 structure with...

11 months ago

U.S.-Central Asia Summit

Opinion: A Trump Visit to Central Asia Would Deliver Results and Anchor a Corridor Strategy

On November 6, Washington will host the C5+1 leaders’ summit, marking the format’s 10th anniversary and signaling a rare alignment of political attention and regional appetite for concrete outcomes. The date is confirmed by regional and U.S.-focused reporting, with Kazakhstan’s presidency and multiple outlets noting heads-of-state attendance in the U.S. capital. This timing is decisive. Russia’s bandwidth is constrained by the war in Ukraine, China’s trade weight in Central Asia has grown, and European demand for secure inputs and routes has intensified. All these developments together create a window where a visible United States presence can meaningfully alter the deal flow. A visit sequenced off the November C5+1 will attach U.S. political attention to minerals, corridors, and standards that regional governments already prioritize, confirming the conversion of the summit's symbolism into leverage. Washington already has the instruments but has lacked a synchronized presence. Development finance, export credit, and C5+1 working groups exist, yet announcements have too often outpaced commissioning. A targeted tour could unveil named offtakes, corridor slot guarantees, and training compacts. This would move from the dialogue to bankable packages if paired with financing envelopes, posted schedules, and third-party verification. Deals, dates, and delivery would make operational signals clear to partners and competitors alike. Strategic Rationale and Operating Concept The United States has three clear goals. These are to diversify critical minerals away from single-point dependency on China, de-risk trans-Eurasian routes that connect Asian manufacturing to European demand, and reinforce the sovereignty of the states in the region without pressuring them to choose sides in great-power competition over other issues. These imperatives already guide the national-security strategies of Central Asian governments, which implement them according to multi-vector doctrines. A presidential visit that treats minerals, corridors, and standards as a single package would show that Washington is prepared to move forward on the same problem set that the region has defined for itself. The ways to do that are through finance-first diplomacy and an end-to-end corridor approach, including the Caspian crossing. Finance-first diplomacy pairs every political announcement with insurance, offtake letters, and term sheets (short non-binding summaries of key commercial and legal terms for a proposed deal). These signal the intention to convert declarations into commissioning. An end-to-end corridor approach accepts the physical reality that Central Asian outputs move west through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and across the South Caucasus, with Azerbaijan functioning as the hinge that makes Europe reachable at scale. Each element of the “minerals–corridors–standards” triad reinforces the others when the whole is pursued as a single program. Reliable customs and traceability raise corridor credibility, which raises project bankability, which in turn attracts the private capital required for mineral processing. The instrumentalities for this already exist. The C5+1 framework can be tasked to track deliverables; the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) can cover risk and long-term debt; aid and technical programs of the Department of State and Commerce can align standards, procurement integrity, and traceable supply chains; U.S. universities and labs can...

11 months ago

U.S.-Central Asia Summit

C5+1 at 10: Washington Seeks Concrete Outcomes With Central Asia

A leaders’ summit between Central Asia and the United States is scheduled for 6 November in Washington, D.C. Kazakhstan’s presidency has said the meeting will take place on that date, and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has confirmed his attendance. Others have confirmed as well. The meeting would bring the heads of state of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to Washington for only the second leaders’ level C5+1 meeting, after the first took place on the margins of the UN General Assembly in September 2023. The timing is notable as 2025 marks the C5+1’s tenth year. Since 2015, the C5+1 format, linking the five Central Asian states with the United States, has steadily become Washington’s primary channel for strategic diplomacy in the region. With Russia constrained by the war in Ukraine and China expanding Belt and Road finance and logistics, the U.S. is building a durable presence through programmatic work, published procedures, and predictable commitments. Public calls in the United States to mark the tenth year with a Washington meeting have focused on concrete results. Stakeholders such as U.S. and Central Asian ministries, regulators, banks, carriers, and investors now expect clear schedules for practical work on corridor performance, compliance guidance under evolving sanctions, critical minerals cooperation, grid reliability, aviation access, and investment risk-sharing. The success of the summit depends on more than words that have characterized prior summits. One metric of success could be the consummation of a final joint communiqué including 90-day and 180-day check-backs with a designated lead and co-lead for each item - identified by name, title, and agency - and a requirement to publish brief progress notes. The summit was preceded by a visit of U.S. officials to the region: on October 25, U.S. Special Representative for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau arrived in Tashkent, met senior officials and U.S. companies, continued to Samarkand, and then to Almaty. The trip was not publicly scheduled; initial confirmation came via embassy Telegram posts. Discussions reportedly covered rare-earth processing and other sensitive cooperation areas, signaling agenda-setting ahead of November 6. How Washington Can Regularize Intensified C5+1 Coordination This meeting would normalize leaders’ level C5+1 engagement after the first such gathering in September 2023. That shift matters. Since 2015, the format has moved from occasional ministerials to a steadier dialogue built around defined themes, even when leaders have met on the sidelines of larger events. With Washington now hosting, observers will compare outcomes to the 2023 joint-statement themes - security, economic resilience, sustainable development, climate, and sovereignty - and to readouts that set a precedent for presidential-level participation. In this sense, the Washington summit represents not only a procedural step but a test of whether the United States can institutionalize its Eurasia policy with a more proactive diplomacy. An annual leaders’ cycle, spring ministerials, and quarterly sherpa meetings pre-scheduled through Q4 2026 would signal a commitment to deepen the process. In Washington, there is bipartisan pressure to show continuity and delivery...

11 months ago

critical raw materials

U.S. Backs Private Bid for Kazakhstan’s Tungsten

The United States is facilitating a private American bid by Cove Kaz Capital Group LLC for Kazakhstan’s Upper Kairakty and North Katpar tungsten deposits, in competition with state-backed Chinese bidders. Tungsten is not a rare earth element, but it is a critical raw material. In particular, it underpins armor-piercing ammunition, penetrators, and high-temperature tooling used across aerospace and industrial manufacturing. Reporting indicates direct engagement by senior U.S. officials and active coordination with Kazakhstan’s sovereign-wealth ecosystem. The metal’s significance elevates the commercial negotiation into a strategic policy. The policy driver is diversification away from China’s dominance along the mine-to-powder supply chains. China accounts for well over four-fifths of global tungsten production and processing, and tightened export controls in 2025 have upset pricing and availability. The U.S. has established a procurement deadline of 2027 to avoid sourcing from China or Russia for covered defense uses. All this adds urgency to securing non-Chinese volumes. Kazakhstan’s revived tungsten sector includes a newly opened processing plant, with destinations not yet announced for the concentrate to be produced. The country thus offers a practical non-Chinese source of tungsten. Strategic Stakes and Principal Actors The American role would be one of facilitation and financing, rather than ownership. The administration has supported talks linking Cove Kaz to Kazakhstan’s Samruk-Kazyna and relevant mining entities. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick is mentioned as a key interlocutor. Potential financial tools include the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank. Insurance (EXIM), guarantees, or direct loans from these institutions would offset pricing and risk advantages historically offered by Chinese bidders. The U.S. government’s approach is to enable a private operator to compete without placing federal equity as an asset. Kazakhstan’s Samruk-Kazyna and its mining arm Tau-Ken Samruk coordinate with the national exploration company Qazgeology. Kazakhstan has pursued a wider critical-minerals investment agenda, signaling its openness to joint ventures and privatization pathways under a special legal regime that provides a familiar legal and compliance framework for Western partners. That structure streamlines licensing and dispute resolution and has already been used for joint ventures in other critical minerals projects. China remains the current market leader, dominating tungsten mining, ammonium paratungstate (APT) conversion, and downstream powders and carbides. Beijing’s 2025 export controls cover tungsten, tightening an already narrow global market and raising the policy value of non-Chinese options. Reports of Chinese interest in Vietnam’s Nui Phao tungsten complex underscore that non-Chinese sources face active competition, framing Kazakhstan’s appeal to Western buyers. The Assets and Kazakhstan’s Capacity Rebuild Kazakhstan suspended tungsten production after the 1990s but has moved over the past several years to re-establish a mine-to-processing base, with corporate and ministerial communications emphasizing the strategic nature of these deposits for long-term development. Upper Kairakty (also rendered as Verkhneye or Upper Kayrakty) and North Katpar sit in the Karaganda Region and feature repeatedly in Samruk-linked materials as the top tungsten prospects. Upper Kairakty is by itself the world’s largest tungsten deposit, and represents over two-thirds of the total tungsten reserves across the ex-Soviet territories. One...

11 months ago

Railways

Central Asia’s Rail Corridors: U.S. and Chinese Partnerships in Perspective

Kazakhstan’s railways are modernizing with a U.S. supplier, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are advancing a new trans‑mountain link with China. On September 22, 2025, Wabtec and KTZ announced a multi‑year locomotive and services package worth about $4.2 billion, described by the company as its “largest” agreement. In parallel, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan formalized a joint company to build the long-planned CKU railway, with China holding a 51% stake. Central Asia’s rail networks are thus being reshaped by two major partnerships - one with the United States and one with China. Rather than a zero-sum rivalry, these projects show how regional governments are pursuing different infrastructure strategies to expand connectivity. Kazakhstan and Wabtec: Modernizing an Existing Network In September 2025, Kazakhstan’s railway operator KTZ signed a $4.2 billion agreement with U.S.-based Wabtec for 300 Evolution Series ES44ACi locomotives. The diesel-electric engines are tailored for Kazakhstan’s 1,520 mm gauge network and harsh climate, replacing aging Soviet-era stock. Wabtec finalized full ownership of the Astana locomotive plant in late 2023; production and services for 1,520-mm stock are now fully under Wabtec’s Kazakhstan subsidiary. Local manufacturing and long-term service contracts are expected to expand domestic engineering capacity. The locomotives’ digital diagnostic systems should improve fuel efficiency and maintenance intervals. According to the official Wabtec press release, the agreement “strengthens KTZ’s role as a critical and reliable hub for the Middle Corridor,” while KTZ CEO Talgat Aldybergenov said it “confirms our commitment to advanced technologies in the transport sector”. Rail accounts for about 64% of Kazakhstan’s freight turnover (2024), so locomotive performance directly affects Middle Corridor throughput. Financing details have not been disclosed, but the purchase appears to be domestically funded through KTZ and state support. For Astana, the order fits its multi-vector foreign-policy approach: Kazakhstan continues its partnerships with France’s Alstom, China’s CRRC, and Russia, maintaining balance across suppliers. While the locomotives are diesel, Kazakhstan is also electrifying key lines with European partners. Diesels provide an immediate boost without new catenary investment, and Wabtec claims lower emissions than previous models. Over time, expanded electrification could complement this upgrade. Overall, the Wabtec partnership represents incremental modernization. This is an interoperability-based approach that strengthens existing routes rather than building new corridors from scratch. [caption id="attachment_37655" align="aligncenter" width="950"] Image: trains.com - One of Kazakhstan’s modern Evolution Series diesel locomotives (model TE33A) produced through a partnership with U.S. firm Wabtec. Kazakhstan’s railways carry about 64% of the country’s freight, making such upgrades crucial for trade connectivity.[/caption] The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) Railway: Building a New Corridor After nearly three decades of discussion, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan launched construction of the CKU railway in late 2024. The 523 km line will run from Kashgar (Xinjiang) through the Kyrgyz mountain ranges to Andijan, Uzbekistan. It will provide a second direct China–Central Asia connection, bypassing reliance on Kazakhstan’s network. The CKU is designed with dual gauges: standard (1,435 mm) in China and broad (1,520 mm) in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, with a dry-port transshipment hub in Makmal, Kyrgyzstan. This compromise allows integration with existing Central...

12 months ago

Rare Earth Elements

Kazakhstan’s Emerging Role in Global Rare-Earth Supply Chains

October 10 was one of the most consequential days for global trade policy and one of the most volatile for world markets since the U.S.–China tariff conflict first reignited. After China announced tighter export controls on rare earths, U.S. President Donald J. Trump first posted on Truth Social that “there seems to be no reason” anymore for him to meet with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in two weeks' time. Several hours later, the official White House account on X posted a message from Trump that he had learned that "effective November 1st, 2025, [China will] impose large-scale Export Controls [sic] on virtually every product they make, and some not even made by them." He then followed with the declaration that the U.S. will impose a 100% tariff on Chinese imports starting November 1, "or sooner," and launch export controls on critical software. As Washington and Beijing escalate their economic confrontation, the scramble for stable rare-earth supply chains has broadened beyond East Asia. Attention is shifting to Central Asia, where mineral potential and trade corridors align with the broader effort to reduce dependence on China. Kazakhstan has drawn particular attention, not as a single solution, but as a state seeking to leverage its Soviet-era industrial base and access to the Caspian to help meet emerging supply chain needs. Although Kazakhstan has made the most progress in translating its mineral reserves into a functioning mining industry, it remains part of a broader regional effort to diversify away from a single external partner, most notably China. Other Central Asian states are testing their own capabilities to meet global supply chain demands, though most remain constrained by infrastructure, financing, or lack of processing capability. Kazakhstan’s Position in the Emerging Supply Realignment On reserves, Kazakhstan’s rare-earth potential is rooted as much in continuity as it is in discovery. Decades of geological mapping under Soviet administration established its mineral profile, and recent joint surveys by Kazgeology and private firms have both confirmed and expanded those earlier findings. New delineated deposits in the east and center of the country, including the Zhana Kazakhstan site in Karagandy, have reinforced its status as a prospective non-Chinese source of critical materials, with verified concentrations of neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium, and samarium. If current resource estimates are validated, the Zhana Kazakhstan deposit could rank among the largest rare-earth reserves in the world. These elements are essential inputs for high-efficiency magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, and advanced defense systems. The U.S. Department of Defense classifies these rare earths as “critical defense materials,” a designation that underscores their strategic relevance rather than any immediate shift in supply. Both the Pentagon and the Defense Logistics Agency have begun increasing stockpiles and exploring alternative processing sources, but for now, the question in Kazakhstan is not geological endowment, which is established, but the terms under which that endowment can be brought to market. On processing capacity, Kazakhstan’s experience in large-scale mining of uranium, copper, and other critical minerals has...

12 months ago

United Nations

Kazakhstan Recasts Its Foreign Policy at the United Nations

Several days ago I argued here that Kazakhstan’s diplomacy had begun to try to move from survival-mode balancing into a more entrepreneurial phase, testing its accumulated diplomatic capital on the world stage. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s September 24, 2025, speech to the United Nations General Assembly confirms this. It was a statement of intent, marking a departure from decades of careful multivectorism toward a doctrine of initiative and responsibility. The speech sought to anchor a claim that Kazakhstan is not only balancing among vectors but weaving them into a systemic position of leverage to support active participation in the agenda-setting of global affairs. The multivector line, crafted under Nazarbayev, kept Moscow, Beijing, and Western capitals equidistant during a period when Kazakhstan’s priority was survival and gradual integration. The price of that prudence was that the distinct voice that Astana was trying to cultivate could not be heard. The country appeared more like a venue for great-power competition rather than an autonomous actor in favor of its own interests. On the UNGA stage, Tokayev did not abandon the old formula outright. Instead, he pressed it into service as a platform for what he called “bridge building,” but which looks in practice like a bid to shape the rules of the international order, instead of merely accommodating them. Railways, Corridors, and Diplomacy in Motion Tokayev declared to the Assembly: “Kazakhstan today carries eighty percent of all overland freight between Asia and Europe. By 2029, we will build five thousand kilometers of new railway to strengthen the Middle Corridor.” These words accompanied the announcement, only a few days before, of a multibillion-dollar deal with the American company Wabtec for the purchase of three hundred locomotives over ten years. Timed with his UN appearance itself, the announcement highlighted Tokayev's view of infrastructure as diplomacy. In systems terms, railways are not discrete projects but nodes in a meso-level build-out capable of reconfiguring macro-level flows. By embedding a commercial contract into the theater of UNGA, Tokayev gave it a transformational headline. The “Middle Corridor” now functions in two registers. In one, it is freight tonnage, Caspian ferry capacity, Azerbaijan–Georgia transit. In the other, it is a political instrument. Only weeks before UNGA, Astana hosted talks that facilitated the U.S.-backed Armenia–Azerbaijan declaration. By enabling that dialogue, Kazakhstan projected itself into the South Caucasus as an intermediary claiming credibility with both sides. Hosting the South Caucasus dialogue projected Astana's view of itself as a systems-level creator of interdependence at the infrastructural level. From there, the loop feeds back to the structuration of political behavior. Economically, Kazakhstan remains the only Central Asian state with diversified sources of foreign direct investment (FDI). The Netherlands and the United States together still outpace China and Russia in cumulative FDI. Uzbekistan, despite rising visibility, remains structurally dependent on its two large neighbors. By contrast, Astana uses diversification to demonstrate optionality. The locomotive deal is one example; the C5+1 dialogues with Washington are yet another. Reforming the Global Order Tokayev spoke about a “crisis of...

1 year ago

UN General Assembly

Tokayev at the UN Underscores Kazakhstan’s New Diplomacy

Kazakhstan’s international visibility is reaching a peak this late summer and early autumn of 2025. In August, UN Secretary-General António Guterres visited Astana, praising the country’s role as a stabilizing influence in Central Asia and a supporter of multilateral institutions. In a few days, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev will address the UN General Assembly in New York, presenting Kazakhstan as a reliable partner in peacekeeping, sustainable development, and nonproliferation. This upcoming UN speech marks a departure from past appearances, signaling Astana’s intent not only to balance powers but also to set global agendas. Together, these events signify the country’s ascent as a state no longer defined solely by the art of survival between great powers, but one that now seeks to set agendas, convene adversaries, and project norms beyond its borders. This dual UN moment illustrates the broader transformation of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy over the past year: the shift from multi-vector balancing, an inheritance of the Nazarbayev era, toward a more assertive mode of multi-actor entrepreneurship. Framed through the UN stage, Kazakhstan’s diplomacy now aspires to translate regional initiatives into a global narrative. Rather than oscillating between Moscow, Beijing, Brussels, and Washington, Astana has begun to use its accumulated diplomatic capital to initiate, mediate, and institutionalize regional and global frameworks. From Balance to Initiative For three decades after independence, Kazakhstan’s “multi-vector” foreign policy served as a model of survival in a region shaped by the clash of external rivalries. The doctrine emphasized equidistance between Russia, China, and the West, with an overlay of pragmatic economic engagement. In practice, this often meant leveraging one relationship to offset pressure from another while securing steady inflows of trade and investment. Today, however, the war in Ukraine, the erosion of European security, and the sharper contest between Beijing and Washington have undermined the viability of simple balancing. In response, Tokayev’s government has shifted its approach, seeking to overlay a more agenda-setting dynamic on multi-vectorism by positioning Kazakhstan as a regional hub for diplomacy and connectivity. At the UN, this shift might be presented as Kazakhstan’s evolution from passive survival to a more proactive approach to international diplomacy. Astana’s task is to transform such declarations into a durable strategy. Central Asia and the South Caucasus The clearest evidence of Kazakhstan’s new role comes from Central Asia itself. Relations with Uzbekistan, once characterized by rivalry, have been recast as a cornerstone of functional regionalism. Over the past twelve months, Astana and Tashkent have concluded demarcation agreements, expanded electricity grid interconnections, and coordinated positions on water resource management. The consultative meetings of Central Asian leaders, which Kazakhstan has championed, now serve as regularized platforms for joint initiatives, from infrastructure to practical economic integration, with attempts to reduce Russian and Chinese influence. At the UN, this shift may be framed as Kazakhstan’s evolution from mere survival to actively pioneering new approaches in international diplomacy. For Kazakhstan, the partnership with Uzbekistan provides buffering against external pressure and multiplies regional influence. Astana has also made use of the UN Regional Centre...

1 year ago

Gas Exports

The Power of Siberia 2 Project and Central Asia’s Gas Bargaining Power

The proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PoS-2) pipeline from Russia to China has re-entered the headlines on the strength of a new memorandum between Gazprom and CNPC. Russia calls the memorandum “legally binding,” but China has avoided the phrase, because the only thing that is legally binding is an agreement to negotiate. The memorandum affirms a design capacity up to 50 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y), a route via Mongolia, and a total trunk length of roughly 2,600 kilometers (km) on the Russian side before crossing Mongolian territory. Feasibility work has highlighted a 1,420-millimeter (56-inch) pipe diameter, and an indicative cost cited in some trade reporting near $13–14 billion. The political signaling is strong, but pricing terms remain unresolved. For Central Asia, the significance is immediate: even without a final sales contract, the expectation of future Russian volumes tightens China’s negotiating posture with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, the three states already connected to China by the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline (CAGP). Central Asia's Gas Supplies to China China’s westbound import corridor from Central Asia consists today of three parallel pipelines that together provide a nominal capacity of 55 bcm/y (Lines “A” and “B” at 15 bcm/y each, and Line “C” at 25 bcm/y). Construction of the first two lines began in 2008, with operations starting in 2009–2010; Line C entered service in 2014. Line D, planned at 30 bcm/y through Uzbekistan–Tajikistan–Kyrgyzstan to China, has been delayed for years; if completed, it would raise corridor capacity toward 85 bcm/y. Turkmenistan is the anchor supplier. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) estimates its deliveries to China at 32.9 bcm in 2022 (roughly 81% of the country’s gas exports that year), with long-term sales structured on formulas linked to the price of oil. Interfax reports that in the second quarter of 2025, the price for Turkmenistan’s gas fell below $290 per thousand cubic meters (mcm). This figure is consistent with oil-price linkage rather than hub-indexed European benchmarks. Recent industry and regional reporting puts Turkmenistan’s deliveries averaging approximately 35 bcm/y in the mid-2020s. Kazakhstan had committed to supply up to 10 bcm/y, but domestic constraints have kept actual flows lower. S&P Global cites 4.4 bcm in 2022 and 5.86 bcm in 2023, with winter interruptions to protect domestic consumers; of the 29.8 bcm of commercial gas produced in 2023, 19.4 bcm was consumed at home. Uzbekistan’s volumes have been more variable as Tashkent balances domestic demand, imports, and swap operations. Jamestown noted a fall in Uzbek gas export value to China from $1.07 billion in 2022 to $563.5 million in 2023, before a rebound in 2024 and 2025 according to Chinese customs-based press summaries. PoS-2’s Route, Mongolian Gatekeeping, and Central Asian Implications The geography of the route matters for Central Asia. On the Russian side, public summaries describe a corridor from Yamal via Urengoy through Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk, then across Buryatia toward Kyakhta near the Mongolian border. In Mongolia, official communications stress underground installation across the steppes and local economic benefits, but final...

1 year ago

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