Our People > Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Senior Editor and Contributor

Robert M. Cutler has written and consulted on Central Asian affairs for over 30 years at all levels. He was a founding member of the Central Eurasian Studies Society’s executive board and founding editor of its Perspectives publication. He has written for Asia Times, Foreign Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Euractiv, Radio Free Europe, National Post (Toronto), FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, and many other outlets.

He directs the NATO Association of Canada’s Energy Security Program, where he is also senior fellow, and is a practitioner member at the University of Waterloo’s Institute for Complexity and Innovation. Educated at MIT, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), and the University of Michigan, he was for many years a senior researcher at Carleton University’s Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, and is past chairman of the Montreal Press Club’s Board of Directors.

Articles

Aktau Plane Crash

How the Azerbaijan Airlines Crash Could Shake Relations with Russia

The crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) airplane in Aktau, Kazakhstan, has the potential to significantly effect Azerbaijan's relations with Russia if Moscow mishandles the situation. To date, there has been a lack of transparency and responsiveness on the part of the Kremlin. The implications could include accelerating the deterioration of Moscow's influence in the region. These implications, therefore, concern not only the local countries, but any international actor having strategic interests in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, or otherwise concerned with their future role and place in the evolving post–Cold War international system. The Facts of the Disaster Given the rapid dissemination of information in the 2020s by electronic means, whereby authentic real-time videos made by first responders to the fuselage on the ground were uploaded to social media and available worldwide within minutes, the overall outline and some details of the incident are by now generally well known. The airplane was en route from Baku to Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, when explosions in the air damaged the cabin. Very soon after, but not as a result of these explosions, the pilots completely lost all electronic orientation and navigation capabilities. According to one source close to Azerbaijan's investigation into the crash, preliminary results showed the plane was struck by a Russian Pantsir-S air defense system and its communications were then paralyzed by electronic warfare systems on the approach into Grozny. Ukrainian military drones have repeatedly targeted Russia’s southern regions, triggering Russian air defenses. “No one claims that it was done on purpose,” the source said; but “taking into account the established facts, Baku expects the Russian side to confess to the shooting down of the Azerbaijani aircraft.” After being hit, the plane was refused emergency landing permission at Grozny (2.5 kilometers from where the incident occurred) and at least two other Russian airports in the North Caucasus (Makhachkala, 155 kilometers away, and Mineral’nye Vody, 225 kilometers), before being directed by local air control out over the Caspian Sea. Once there, the pilots made the decision to try to land in Aktau (435 kilometers away). Against all odds, they succeeded in avoiding the need to ditch the aircraft into the sea, which would have undoubtedly killed all on board and also destroyed the craft, making any investigation into what had happened impossible. In the event, according to the Kazakhstani authorities, out of 62 passengers and five crew, 32 survivors were initially rescued. Captain Igor Kshnyakin, Co-pilot (First Officer) Alexander Kalyaninov, and Purser Hokuma Aliyeva died when the front wheel touched down ahead of the back wheels, as a result of which the cockpit was thrown violently away from the ongoing wreck. However, this is what created the conditions for at least some of the passengers to survive, as it split the fuselage in two. The event has garnered international attention, including for the professionalism of the crew. What Has Happened Since At first, Kazakhstan declared its own unilateral competence to investigate the crash, which occurred on...

2 years ago

Middle Powers

How Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Anchor a Strategic Middle-Power Hub in Central Asia

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are driving Central Asia’s global significance. Together, they are turning Central Asia into a strategic middle-power hub. The two countries increasingly act as central nodes in a region key to global supply chains and, inevitably, geopolitical competition. However, they are not merely reactive to changes around them, but are highly dynamic. What does it mean to say that the region is emerging as a strategic middle-power "hub"? The notion of a hub extends beyond the national profiles of the two principals, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, to include the aggregation of collective influence. Central Asia is recognized as a cohesive entity in global forums. Kazakhstan’s energy wealth combines with Uzbekistan’s demographic strength, creating an influential synergy beneficial to the entire region. The interplay between their respective strengths allows them to amplify Central Asia’s voice in international institutions and negotiations collectively. By integrating their regional strategies within global frameworks — such as the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) — Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan enhance the region’s geopolitical relevance. Kazakhstan, for example, has successfully advocated for the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, also called the "Middle Corridor"). This transcontinental trade route is emerging as a lynchpin in Eurasian logistics, connecting China to Europe via the Caspian Sea. Uzbekistan, for its part, has emphasized the integration of transport and energy infrastructure. These initiatives align with the broader vision of a unified Central Asia. The leadership of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has reinforced the region's collective identity as the "C5" group, also including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. This regional bloc has become a diplomatic focal point for major powers like the United States, China, Germany, and Japan. All of them engage with Central Asia through structured consultations within the C5 framework. These meetings have given the region traction in international diplomacy. The elevation of the C5 group reflects the region's new prominence. The United States engages with the C5 on issues ranging from regional security to sustainable development, emphasizing its commitment to a secure and prosperous Central Asia. China’s cooperation under the C5+1 mechanism complements its transcontinental infrastructure initiatives. Germany focuses on sustainable energy and governance, while Japan prioritizes infrastructure and technology transfers. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan together have over two-thirds of the region's gross domestic product and two-thirds of its population. Kazakhstan's vast natural resources undergird its economic influence, while its geographic expanse (as the ninth-largest country in the world) makes it central to major connectivity initiatives. Through President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's nuanced foreign policy, Kazakhstan has adeptly balanced relationships with major powers, ensuring that it remains a key partner for Russia, China, and the European Union. Uzbekistan has surged to prominence through its ambitious domestic reforms and proactive engagement for regional cooperation under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has implemented market liberalization measures attracting foreign investment and reinvigorating its economy. As the most populous country in Central Asia, Uzbekistan is an indispensable actor in regional affairs....

2 years ago

Putin

Russia’s Strategic Posturing and Putin’s November Visit to Kazakhstan

On November 27, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan underscored the complex geopolitical and security challenges facing the region. Hosted by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana, the visit took place amidst heightened tensions following Russia’s deployment of its Oreshnik hypersonic missile in Ukraine on November 21. This escalation has reshaped the regional security environment, compelling Kazakhstan to confront potential spillover effects of the Ukraine conflict. Energy remained a central focus during the visit. Kazakhstan remains heavily reliant on oil exports through the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which passes through southern Russia. This cooperation benefits Kazakhstan economically but, by tying Kazakhstan further into Russian energy networks, it further complicates Astana's efforts to balance relations with Moscow and Western powers. Following periodic closures of the CPC route on various pretexts, Kazakhstan has resolved to diversify its energy export strategy. It has increased shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to enter the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which terminates on Turkey's coast in the eastern Mediterranean. One should not be surprised if ideas about the old Trans-Caspian Oil Pipeline (TCOP) project are taken out of deep storage for reanimation. The TCOP is an undersea link first discussed in the late 2000s between then-Presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Nicolas Sarkozy of France. It was shelved at the time because it did not seem geoeconomically necessary. Since then, relations between Russia and Kazakhstan have been complicated by the periodic CPC closures that, although they are given technical justification, appear politically motivated by Moscow to squeeze Astana. Kazakhstan's short-term solution, to increase oil shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to Baku for insertion into the BTC pipeline, simply cannot attain the volumes necessary to provide a strategic alternative to the CPC. The BTC, at present, would be able to accommodate whatever volumes Kazakhstan would be able to transit to Azerbaijan including via a prospective TCOP, for export to world markets from Ceyhan. One would suppose that bilateral discussions also covered the possible participation of Rosatom in the construction and operation of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant (NPP). However, no mention of this topic was made in public statements. Kazakhstan would prefer to escape the vise-like pressure between Russia and China on this matter. That is why Tokayev has discussed participation by the French firms Orano and EDF with France's President Emmanuel Macron. It has recently been suggested that it would be technically feasible for Kazakhstan to find a group of Western companies capable of executing the project. A Western consortium would have no reason to hesitate to include Kazatomprom in an appropriate role, not excluding capacity-building. The Russia-only and China-only options for the NPP's construction would be less welcoming to such a possibility. Kazakhstan's leadership has become properly sensitive to how energy partnerships are not just economic decisions, but strategic calculations in Central Asia's volatile geopolitical landscape. Indeed, Russia’s use of the Oreshnik missile against Ukraine has created an entirely new security situation. It has raised concerns that...

2 years ago

Energy

Who Will Build Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Power Plant?

There are three generally discussed possibilities for construction of Kazakhstan’s newly approved nuclear power plant (NPP). One is that Russia is sole contractor. Another is that China is sole contractor. Each of these choices has its own rationale yet also geo-economic and geopolitical drawbacks for Kazakhstan. Third, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has publicly stated that he favors an international consortium with participation by companies from China, France, Russia, and South Korea. This option, however, faces logistical challenges, particularly in dividing responsibilities among consortium members and determining the sourcing of critical components. Tokayev has already discussed with France’s President Emmanuel Macron the possible participation of the French companies Orano and EDF in particular. Orano focuses on various aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining, enrichment, and waste management. EDF specializes in design, construction, and operational management. This opens the door to a fourth possibility. Orano, EDF and the British-German firm Urenco together can provide all the NPP construction and management services necessary to realize the project. But Kazatomprom, which focuses on mainly on mining and processing, has not been mentioned in any of these schemes. Such an alternative approach, involving Western companies like Orano, EDF, and Urenco, could ensure comprehensive services with strong Western involvement, possibly including Kazatomprom, thus boosting local capacity and creating a "demonstration project" for broader natural resource collaboration within NATO frameworks. This kind of partnership could help Kazakhstan reduce its dependency on single external actors, thereby enhancing its strategic autonomy. Moreover, by involving Kazatomprom, the project could focus on knowledge transfer and capacity building, fostering local expertise and reducing external dependencies over time. It is reasonable that an offer to take Kazatomprom into a Western consortium and to make capacity building in Kazakhstan, at Kazatomprom and elsewhere, an explicit goal of the project, would be welcome in Astana. Cooperation via NATO platforms could likewise offer Kazakhstan access not only to technical specialists from NATO countries but also to more joint training exercises and workshops, to complement an exchange of knowledge on best practices in nuclear safety and energy resilience. And that would be only a “demonstration project” for the constructive expansion of the energy component of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) into broader natural-resource and rare-earth domains. Indeed, there is no reason even to wait for the NPP project. Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, is a periodic table of the elements, especially rare-earth elements, and their exploration and development has been under way for some time. Building upon the energy-security successes through NATO's PfP, this proposal suggests expanding cooperation with Caspian region Partner countries into the mining sector, specifically for rare-earth elements critical to defense. Extending PfP to include these resources aligns with NATO's and Partners' core security goals, offering broader opportunities to secure the supply chain and enhance collective defense capabilities. This extension also presents a strategic avenue to mitigate risks associated with supply disruptions and geopolitical tensions. Leveraging the extensive experience of partnership in energy security, NATO and its Partner countries could begin with...

2 years ago

COP29

Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan Stand Out at COP29

The 29th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), held in Baku from November 11–22, 2024, has underscored the critical role of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in advancing Caspian Sea regional energy transitions. Both countries leveraged their positions along the Middle Corridor to present ambitious renewable and nuclear energy strategies. Azerbaijan: Renewables and the Middle Corridor Azerbaijan, the host and chair of COP29, has positioned itself as a renewable energy connector between Central Asia and Europe. Its energy strategy reflects a pragmatic approach to transitioning from hydrocarbons, which accounted for 88% of government revenues in 2023, to a diversified portfolio incorporating solar, wind, and hydropower. Azerbaijan has prioritized key renewable energy projects to align with its goal of achieving a 30% renewable share in its electricity mix by 2030. Among these is the operational Garadagh Solar Power Plant, a 230-megawatt (MW) facility developed by the UAE's Masdar, which generates 500 million kilowatt-hours (kWh) annually. Complementing this is the planned Alat Solar Project, a 400-MW solar installation expected to be operational by 2027. These projects aim to bolster domestic electricity supply and expand Azerbaijan’s capacity to export renewable energy. The Caspian Offshore Wind Initiative, backed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), seeks to harness the Caspian Sea’s favorable wind conditions. A 1-gigawatt (GW) wind farm is under preliminary study, with construction anticipated to begin by 2026. This project could transform Azerbaijan into a renewable energy hub for the Middle Corridor, particularly as Europe reduces its dependency on Russian energy. Kazakhstan: Nuclear Ambitions and Renewable Diversification Kazakhstan’s energy strategy focuses on nuclear power and renewables, driven by the need to reduce coal dependency, which still accounts for two thirds of its electricity generation. The government’s approval of its first nuclear power plant, following a nationwide referendum in October 2024, is central to this strategy. The planned nuclear reactor, located near Lake Balkhash, will generate 1.2-GW of electricity, replacing approximately 20% of coal-fired generation. This initiative complements Kazakhstan’s status as the world’s largest uranium producer, supplying over 40% of global demand and generating $3.6 billion in export revenues in 2023. Potential consortium members for the project include South Korea’s KEPCO, France’s Orano and EDF, China’s CNNC, and Russia's Rosatom, although economic-sanctions issues complicate Russia’s involvement in the nuclear sector. Kazakhstan is simultaneously scaling up renewable energy projects, with several key initiatives underway. The Zhanatas Wind Farm, operational since 2022, produces 100-MW of power, and the Shelek Solar Park, a 200-MW solar facility near Almaty, is expected to come online in late 2025. Together, these projects aim to increase renewables to 15% of Kazakhstan’s electricity mix by 2030, quintupling the level from 2023. The Trans-Caspian Electricity Cable Project At the COP29 conference, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, along with Uzbekistan, announced an ambitious trans-Caspian electricity cable project through an underwater transmission system. This infrastructure initiative, estimated to cost $2.5 billion, seeks to establish an electricity corridor linking Central Asia with European markets, representing a significant step in regional energy integration. The project...

2 years ago

Bilateral Relations

Tokayev and Macron Forge New Path for French Investments in Kazakhstan

The Paris summit between Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and France’s President Emmanuel Macron was a significant event in their countries' evolving bilateral relations. The high-level discussions were centered on deepening cooperation across trade, economic investment, cultural, and humanitarian issues. The talks have reaffirmed and broadened existing frameworks, foretokening robust and diversified collaboration. The historical foundation of Kazakh-French relations, particularly in the economic sphere, has long been strong. French multinational corporations, such as TotalEnergies, have played significant roles in Kazakhstan’s major energy projects, including the Kashagan oil field. At the recently concluded summit, President Tokayev held meetings with prominent French business figures, seeking to enhance investment flows and economic partnerships across the renewable energy, infrastructure, and technology sectors. France recognizes Kazakhstan’s strategic significance in Central Asia and seeks to deepen the partnership, which also complements Europe’s generally expanding engagement with the region. The summit builds on a series of annual encounters that sustain the momentum in Kazakhstan–France relations. In November 2023, a year after President Tokayev’s trip to France in November 2022, President Macron made an official visit to Kazakhstan. This visit highlighted the shared interests between the two countries and underscored the importance of their growing cooperation. The meeting not only strengthened political dialogue but also laid the groundwork for further economic, cultural, and technological collaboration, reflecting a commitment to long-term partnership. The regularity of summits between Kazakhstan and France, besides indicating the pragmatic nature of their relationship, speaks to the personal rapport between Tokayev and Macron. The sustained, high-level engagement indicates a mutual appreciation for reliable and constructive diplomacy. The Paris summit continues the momentum and deepens the strategic significance of relations between Kazakhstan and France relations, as the new agreements demonstrate their common intention to leverage shared interests in pursuit of more comprehensive cooperation. At the 2022 meetings, 25 economic agreements were signed amounting to a value of $3 billion, according to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If we include the agreements signed at the 2023 meetings, then the newest agreements bring the overall total to $6.4 billion. Bilateral trade reached $4 billion from January to August this year, representing a 44.7 percent increase compared to the same period in 2023. Kazakhstan’s exports to France for the same period rose by 45.2 percent to $2.7 billion for the first eight months of 2024. These exports were heavily concentrated in crude oil and uranium. Just ahead of Tokayev's visit to Paris, the city hosted the 13th meeting of the Kazakhstan–France Business Council. Twenty-four documents were signed there, worth $2 billion, which spanned the agro-industrial, information-technology, light industry, medicine and mining sectors, not to mention a continuing interest in the energy sector. Kazakhstan’s proactive engagement, including its receptivity to French participation in the NPP consortium is in the line of the country's balanced and pragmatic approach to international partnerships. For France, this partnership deepens its footprint in Central Asia while also promoting the policy goals of broader energy diversification and geopolitical influence. Kazakhstan represents 90 percent of France’s trade with...

2 years ago

Nuclear Energy

Inside Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Power Play

Kazakhstan recently held a referendum in which approximately 71% of voters supported the initiative to construct the country's first nuclear power plant (NPP). This project is part of Kazakhstan's broader strategy to diversify its energy mix, reduce dependence on coal, and address chronic energy shortages that have affected the country for years. As the world's largest uranium producer, Kazakhstan has abundant natural resources that make nuclear power a viable and strategic option. The government views nuclear power as crucial for enhancing energy independence and security, while also contributing to environmental sustainability by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The goal is for nuclear energy to contribute about 5% of the national generation mix by 2035, marking a significant shift towards cleaner energy sources. A strategic opportunity for Kazakhstan The NPP project is expected to be undertaken by an international consortium, the members of which are yet to be selected. Kazakhstan's balanced multi-vector foreign policy encourages the involvement of various potential partners, such as Russia's Rosatom, China's National Nuclear Corporation, South Korea's Hydro & Nuclear Power, and France's EDF. Kazakhstan's strategy for involving an international consortium aims to reduce potential geopolitical risks, particularly concerning Russia's Rosatom. Rosatom is a key player in the nuclear energy sector, but Western sanctions against Russian companies raise concerns about its involvement in Kazakhstan's project. By involving multiple international partners, Kazakhstan aims to prevent overreliance on any single country, such as Russia, and maintain a diversified approach to foreign relations. This approach allows Kazakhstan to leverage advanced technologies from multiple sources, foster innovation, improve efficiency, and reduce risks associated with the NPP's construction and operation. It also ensures that the best practices from leading global enterprises can be integrated into the project, enhancing overall safety and performance. Moreover, the involvement of international partners is likely to facilitate knowledge transfer, enabling Kazakhstan to build domestic expertise in nuclear energy. The estimated cost for the NPP is between $10 and $12 billion, with the expectation that contractors will secure financing. An international consortium could attract investment from multiple sources, including their own countries, thereby reducing Kazakhstan's financial burden for the project, inculcating resilience against uncertainties such as currency fluctuations, and distributing the risks among several stakeholders. As sanctions against Rosatom and broader economic concerns make sole reliance on Russian intolerably risky, attracting investment from multiple international stakeholders will also enable Kazakhstan to spread financial risks, thus enhancing the project's viability. A key strategic opportunity for Kazakhstan is to develop self-sufficiency in uranium enrichment. As the world's largest producer of uranium, Kazakhstan has the potential to enrich its own yellowcake, i.e., impure uranium obtained by processing uranium ore. Developing this capability would reduce Kazakhstan's dependence on Russia for enriched uranium imports and significantly enhance its energy independence. Japan serves as a relevant model for this, as it enriches uranium domestically under international safeguards for civilian nuclear use. Kazakhstan could pursue a similar approach under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision, ensuring compliance with its non-proliferation commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation...

2 years ago

Climate Change

Central Asia’s Increasing Profile in Global Climate Policy

Between 11 and 22 November, the 29th Conference of the Parties (COP29) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will take place in Baku, Azerbaijan. In the run-up to this global event, Central Asian countries have been continuing their integration into the cooperative implementation of the global energy and environmental agenda. Such measures include, but are not limited to, commitments to reducing methane emissions, contributions to green supply chains, and — for Kazakhstan in particular — its nuclear policy based on multi-vector diplomacy. One may anticipate their especially enhanced presence in view of the fact that several them have strategic-partner relations with Azerbaijan, which is cooperating with them also in the implementation of the Trans-Caspian International Trade Corridor (TITR or "Middle Corridor"). The Central Asian states are using their implementation of global energy and environmental priorities as an instrument to integrate further into the international system. Following their participation at COP28 (30 November – 23 December 2023, in Dubai, United Arab Emirates), all five of them signed the Global Methane Pledge to reduce methane emissions by at least 30% by 2030. They have also stepped up their contributions to green supply chains, signalling their ambitions to become more important players in global geoeconomics. At the same time, these initiatives also seek to promote domestic economic diversification. Kazakhstan, in particular, continues to play a central role with its multi-vector approach, notably in the nuclear energy sector, positioning itself at the intersection of sustainability and global energy security. Kazakhstan holds 12% of global uranium reserves. It became the world’s leading producer in 2009 and in 2022 accounted for 43% of global production. In Central Asia, Uzbekistan has a Rosatom-sponsored NPP project under way, as does Kyrgyzstan. Along with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in particular actively engaged in discussions on climate policy at COP28, acknowledging the need to balance their resource-rich economies with global sustainability goals. One of the key outcomes was the region's collective involvement in the Global Methane Pledge. Global environmental policy bodies have assessed that methane emissions are a significant concern for global climate policy. The effect of this assessment will be to load still greater financial burdens on oil and gas companies by making development of hydrocarbon deposits, and the transmission of hydrocarbon resources to market, more expensive. Kazakhstan’s commitment to cutting methane emissions by 30% by 2030 exemplifies this shift, signalling a readiness to reform domestic industries in line with global climate targets. Turkmenistan has the highest methane emissions intensity in the region, but challenges remain in terms of monitoring and implementation. Uzbekistan’s leadership was also highlighted at COP28. The country’s ambitious plans to scale up solar and wind energy by 2030 align with broader regional goals of reducing dependence on hydrocarbons. This is Tashkent's (and the region's) way of enhancing their profile as "good global citizens" as policy decisions by political bodies at the international level increasingly emphasize decarbonization. Uzbekistan has made strides in "green supply chains" by focusing on the renewable energy sector...

2 years ago

Nuclear power

Kazakhstan Referendum Approves First Nuclear Power Plant

More than 71 percent of voters have approved the October 6 referendum for constructing Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant (NPP). Turnout was over 63 percent, easily surpassing the 50-percent barrier for validation. This result closely tracks the results of a telephone survey conducted by the Democracy Institute on September 30 and released by the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies. That survey found 73 percent of those asked to favor construction of a nuclear power plant. It also found that 62 percent of respondents intended to vote, not far from the actual participation rate. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had announced the referendum initiative in a message to the public in September 2023. In that address, he emphasized that Kazakhstan, as the world's largest producer of uranium, should also have its own nuclear-power generation capabilities. Following this announcement, a series of meetings between representatives of various government agencies and the public were organized across all regions of the country. During these meetings, the plans for constructing an NPP were discussed in detail, with an emphasis on the potential benefits of nuclear energy for Kazakhstan’s energy independence. Kazakhstan has held a significant position in the global nuclear-energy market since the late 2000s, accounting for approximately 40 percent of global uranium production. Despite this advantageous position, the country faces severe electricity shortages, which are projected to worsen by 2025, especially in the rapidly growing southern regions. Reliance on aging thermal power plants, many of which are equipped with components that have been in service for over 50 years, has only exacerbated the problem. Frequent energy shortages in multiple regions have left citizens without heat during harsh winter conditions, often with temperatures dropping well below zero. The proposed site for the nuclear power plant is in Ulken, located in the Almaty region. The shortlist of potential builders for the NPP includes companies from China, South Korea, Russia, France, and the United States. The inclusion of companies from multiple countries is aimed at ensuring competitive bidding and securing the best possible technology for the project. Tokayev has indicated a personal preference for an “international consortium made up of global companies equipped with cutting-edge technologies.” Developing an NPP will help the country to achieve energy independence and meet carbon-neutrality goals. Without an NPP, rolling blackouts will be necessary and dependence on electricity imports from Russia will continue. However, the legacy of the Semipalatinsk test site looms large, creating a challenging decision for Kazakh citizens. Kazakhstan's nuclear history spans from Soviet-era testing to present-day energy challenges. The Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, established in 1947, was where the Soviet Union conducted over 468 nuclear tests, leaving long-lasting environmental and health impacts on the local population. The fallout from these tests has burdened the national health-care system for decades, exacerbated by nuclear fallout from Chinese testing at Lop Nor. In response to these consequences, then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev closed the Semipalatinsk site in 1991, and by 1994, Kazakhstan had relinquished its nuclear arsenal and became a non-nuclear state. Nazarbayev’s rise to power...

2 years ago

Middle Corridor

China Officially Joins the Middle Corridor

It was announced during the 8th International Silk Road Expo in Xi’an in September 2024 that China will formally join the Middle Corridor under the guise of participation by the China Railway Container Transport Corporation (CRTC). This move signals a growing reliance on Central Asia’s trade-route infrastructure potential. China's shift to overland routes is part of a broader strategy to diversify away from traditional maritime routes through chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca, which carry geopolitical risk. Kazakhstan's strategic geographic location naturally makes it indispensable to China’s trade, and infrastructure projects currently underway represent a key component of the Middle Corridor’s potential. In July 2024, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev ratified agreements with China aimed at further developing the Middle Corridor, enhancing both road and rail infrastructure. The country has already been upgrading its rail infrastructure, modernizing dry ports like Khorgos on the Chinese border, and expanding transit facilities at the Caspian Sea port of Aktau. The increased flow of goods through Kazakhstan is evident: over 212 container block trains have passed through the country by September 2024, with the number projected to exceed 300 by the year’s end. These build-outs, and particularly Kazakhstan’s modernization of its railways, go hand-in-hand with the recently finished improvements along the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) line, which connects Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia. The expansion of the BTK line's capacity from 1 million to 5 million tons per year has now been completed. As a result of all these efforts, the travel time for goods from China to the Black Sea has been reduced to just 10–12 days, highlighting the efficiency of the corridor. Azerbaijan also plays a crucial role in this economic ecosystem. Baku’s port of Alat serves as a critical transit point for cargo crossing between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan’s collaboration with Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Turkey has led to significant investments in expanding port facilities and upgrading railway systems beyond the crucial BTK link mentioned above. The result is a smoother, more reliable flow of goods from China to Europe. Azerbaijan is winning its bet to become a regional logistics hub. In addition, a Chinese consortium recently secured the contract for the construction of the Anaklia deep-sea port in Georgia, a strategically important site on the eastern edge of the Black Sea. The project was initially awarded to a Georgian-American consortium, but was cancelled in 2020 due to political and legal disputes. Following a new tender process this year, the Chinese consortium emerged as the sole bidder. If supporting infrastructure is adequately developed and the Black Sea’s cargo transit capacity can be significantly enhanced, then the Anaklia port could become a critical node in the Middle Corridor, enhancing its role in Eurasian trade and bolstering regional connectivity. China’s increased reliance on Central Asian, trans-Caspian, and South Caucasus routes is not just about efficiency. It is also a strategic diversification to mitigate the risks posed by geopolitical instability in other regions. Traditional sea routes through maritime choke-points as well as overland routes like...

2 years ago

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