Our People > Tamila Olzhbaekova

Tamila Olzhbaekova

Journalist

Tamila Olzhabekova is a journalist, award-winning illustrator, and a volunteer, curator and event organizer in the DOSTAR diaspora of Kazakhstan organization.
Prior to working for The Times of Central Asia, she has written for Peter Tv, First Line, Five Corners, Sport.Kz, and numerous other publications. A campaigner for interethnic harmony and the protection of stray animals, she studied at St. Petersburg State University.

Articles

Cultural Heritage

The Art of the Witty Reply: How Uzbek Askiya Works

Imagine two people standing before an audience. One throws out a joke. The other has only a few seconds to grasp the meaning, pick up the wordplay, and fire back – preferably with something even sharper. The first responds again. Hesitate, miss the implication, or simply fail to make the audience laugh, and the round is lost. That is how askiya works – a traditional Uzbek contest of wit in which the conversation cannot be scripted in advance. In 2014, UNESCO inscribed askiya on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. But the genre lives on beyond festivals and recordings of old masters. Today, schoolchildren compete in askiya, young performers learn from their elders, and short performances circulate on social media. The Joke Is Only the Beginning Askiya usually involves two or more participants. They choose a common theme, one begins, and the others respond by seizing on words, double meanings, and unexpected associations in the previous speaker’s line. There is no time to step away and think of a better answer. A good askiyachi – an askiya performer – needs a keen sense of language, quick reactions, and the ability to instantly recognize where someone else’s thought can be taken. Almost anything can provide material: everyday situations, human habits, relationships, and events familiar to the audience. Humor also makes it possible to address subjects that are not always easy to laugh about in ordinary conversation. Askiya can poke fun at human weaknesses and comment on events around it, but it does so through verbal play rather than moralizing. UNESCO notes that the tradition is particularly closely associated with the Fergana Valley and the Tashkent region. Historically, most practitioners have been men. How Do You Teach Improvisation? The hardest part is passing the skill on to the next generation. A famous comedian’s joke can be memorized. In askiya, that is not enough. A performer has to hear the other person’s line, spot the trap hidden inside it, and find a way out before the audience loses interest. Traditionally, performers learned directly from a master. In Uzbekistan, this principle is known as ustoz-shogird – “master and apprentice.” It is used across many traditional arts, from music to crafts. The system is still at work in the Fergana Valley, one of the main centers of askiya. At a recent regional competition marking the 116th anniversary of Uzbek actor and comedian Soyib Khodjayev, the askiya club from School No. 57 in the city of Karasu took second place. The school of mastery named after Abdulkhay Makhsum Kazakov from Kurgantepa district won first place, while a team from Jalakuduk district finished third. Askiya was judged separately from other comic performances and theatrical miniatures. The distinction matters: a sketch can be rehearsed; a verbal duel cannot. Special schools of mastery also operate in districts of the Fergana region. Young performers train with experienced artists, preserving the traditional method of learning directly from a master. But a paradox remains: how do you teach...

8 hours ago

Contemporary Art

From Bukhara to Venice: How Uzbekistan Is Building a Contemporary Art Scene

Uzbekistan has long known how to attract foreign visitors with its past – Samarkand, Bukhara, the Silk Road, and Islamic architecture. Now the country is trying to interest the world in what it is creating today. In just a few years, Uzbekistan has launched the Bukhara Biennial and established a national pavilion at the Venice Biennale. On September 6, the country’s first permanent center for contemporary art opened in Tashkent. The Centre for Contemporary Arts Tashkent (CCA Tashkent) occupies a 1912 industrial building that once served as a diesel station and tram depot. French architecture firm Studio KO preserved its industrial character while incorporating local materials and craft techniques. Sheikha Al Mayassa bint Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, chairperson of Qatar Museums, attended the opening. Three days earlier, Qatar Museums and the Uzbekistan Art and Culture Development Foundation launched a five-year collaboration covering exhibitions and artist residencies, professional development for museum specialists, and work with Islamic heritage. For the young Tashkent center, this offers a route into established international museum networks. Over the past two decades, Qatar has built one of the Middle East’s most prominent museum networks. The connection with Doha could give Tashkent access to artists, curators, and museum networks developed over years. [caption id="attachment_55705" align="aligncenter" width="819"] Image: ccat.uz[/caption] The Foundation Behind the Push One organization stands behind several of Uzbekistan’s major contemporary art projects: the Uzbekistan Art and Culture Development Foundation (ACDF). It organizes the Bukhara Biennial, oversees the new center in Tashkent, and presents the country’s national pavilion at the Venice Biennale. The foundation was established in 2017 and now operates within the Presidential Administration. It is headed by Gayane Umerova, who also leads the administration’s Department of Creative Economy and Tourism. The foundation’s projects have also received support from Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of the Presidential Administration. That context helps explain where the funding and scale come from. Contemporary art in Uzbekistan is developing with direct state support, while exhibitions and biennials have become part of a broader effort to reshape the country’s cultural image abroad. Bukhara provided the first major test. In 2025, the ancient city hosted its first contemporary art biennial, Recipes for Broken Hearts. Works were installed among madrasas, mosques, and other buildings in Bukhara’s historic center, a UNESCO World Heritage Site. According to the organizers, the biennial drew more than 1.8 million visitors over its run. It was an unusual experiment for the region: contemporary art was not separated from the architecture that has drawn tourists to Bukhara for decades, but placed directly inside it. Tashkent is trying something different. Here, artists now have a permanent space where they can not only exhibit but also work. [caption id="attachment_55708" align="alignnone" width="1024"] ccat.uz[/caption] From Uzbek Ceramics to Kimsooja The center’s inaugural exhibition is called Hikmah – “Wisdom.” Curated by the center’s chief curator, Sara Raza, it explores craft, memory, material, and knowledge passed between generations. Among the participating artists is Shokhrukh Rakhimov, who grew up in a family of Uzbek ceramicists. His work continues that tradition...

1 day ago

Foreign Investment

Tashkent’s Rise Reshapes Central Asia’s Business Landscape

Tashkent is changing faster than it can adjust to its own growth. The city is already pressing against the limits of its existing airport; a vast new city designed for up to two million people is being built alongside it, and a separate financial jurisdiction drawing on English common law is being created. Uzbekistan is opening up further to foreign investment, and nearly two-thirds of the country’s foreign-invested enterprises are already concentrated in the capital. But being the leading business city in your own country and becoming a regional hub are not the same thing. Tashkent already has strong competitors in Central Asia. Given that competition, it is more useful to examine why companies are choosing Tashkent now and what the city still lacks than to declare it the region’s new business capital. As of July 1, 2026, Uzbekistan had 20,502 operating enterprises with foreign investment. Their number had increased about 1.4 times over five years. China accounted for the largest number, with 6,060 companies, followed by Russia with 3,454, Turkey with 2,293, and Kazakhstan with 1,307. As of June 1, 12,480 of the 19,921 enterprises with foreign investment then operating in Uzbekistan were located in Tashkent. That was almost 63%. Why Tashkent? Part of the answer is obvious: the institutions and services businesses rely on are concentrated there, from government and finance to professional services, technology firms, and skilled workers. That creates a network effect: companies come because partners, clients, and suppliers are already there. But the capital had roughly the same administrative advantages ten years ago without attracting business on anything like the current scale. What changed first was Uzbekistan’s economy itself. After 2016, the country began moving away from its previous closed economic model. One of the first major steps was currency liberalization in 2017. Changes followed in trade, taxation, privatization, and the treatment of foreign investors. The state still plays an enormous role in the economy, but it has become considerably easier for foreign private businesses to operate. Uzbekistan’s GDP grew by 7.7% in 2025. The IMF expects growth of about 6.8% in 2026, while pointing to a longstanding problem: the state’s large footprint in the economy, including major state-owned enterprises and banks, continues to constrain competition and private-sector development. The combination of rapid growth and a gradually more open economy has benefited Tashkent more than any other city in the country. Uzbekistan also has an advantage that cannot be created by government decree. With a population of about 38.5 million, it is Central Asia’s most populous country and has a large domestic consumer base. It is also the region’s only country that borders all four other Central Asian republics. For an international company, Tashkent can serve both as an office for the Uzbek market and as a gateway to neighboring countries. Now, Tashkent is entering territory long occupied by others. For decades, Almaty has concentrated banks, international representative offices, private companies, and professional talent. In 2018, the Astana International Financial Centre began operations, with a...

3 weeks ago

Camel Farming

Camel Farming Expands Across Central Asia as Climate Pressures Mount

Camels are gaining renewed economic importance in Central Asia as farmers seek new markets for their milk and governments look for livestock better suited to increasingly dry conditions. In Kazakhstan, camel numbers are rising and producers are developing markets for shubat, a fermented camel milk drink, and powdered camel milk. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, has begun working with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to develop camel husbandry in arid areas. Kazakhstan has more than 322,000 camels, according to government figures for 2026, an increase of 2.4% from the previous year. Most are raised in the vast arid lands in the west and south of the country. Camels are also an important part of Turkmenistan’s livestock sector. The herd numbered about 345,000 animals in 2020. Bactrian camels have traditionally dominated Kazakhstan’s camel herd. They can withstand sharp fluctuations between extreme heat and severe cold. Over the past two decades, Kazakhstan has also seen an increase in one-humped Arvana camels, a breed of Turkmen origin known for high milk productivity. In Turkmenistan, the Arvana is the mainstay of the industry. These camels can produce milk even when grazing on sparse desert pastures, feeding on salt-tolerant vegetation and bitter wormwood that are of little use to many other types of livestock. Milk Brings in the Money Milk offers camel farmers a product that can be sold throughout the year and increasingly processed into higher-value goods. A female Kazakh Bactrian camel can produce up to about 1,750 liters of milk annually, although yields vary considerably between breeds and farming systems. The main product on the domestic market is shubat, but larger producers have also begun processing camel milk for markets far beyond the communities where it is produced. One of the most prominent examples is Daulet-Beket LLP in the Almaty region. When a camel-milk processing plant opened there in 2021, the farm had around 5,000 camels and was producing up to five tons of shubat a day. The plant was designed to produce as much as 30 tons of powdered camel milk a month, with products being shipped to Russia and China. Smaller farms show how strong local demand can also sustain the industry. The Suleymanov family in the Almaty region started with two camels. By the time they were profiled in 2021, their herd had grown to around 70 animals. Sixteen were being milked each day, producing 52 to 53 liters. The family said customers frequently bought their shubat before it even reached Almaty. Camel Farming in Turkmenistan Turkmen state media has also highlighted privately run camel farms. A 2024 report said farmer Serdarkuli Berdyliev in Ahal province kept 320 camels, including 140 females. Average milk yields were around six liters a day. Information about private agriculture in Turkmenistan largely comes through tightly controlled state media. Camel milk production continues to feature in official coverage alongside the country’s long-established herding traditions. Camel wool remains a marketable product, although its market is much smaller than that for milk. In Turkmenistan, it...

3 weeks ago

Psychology

Psychologists in Kyrgyzstan Face New Regulation Push

Parents in Kyrgyzstan have been contacting member of parliament Elvira Surabaldieva with a basic question: the person counseling their child online calls themselves a psychologist, but are they actually qualified? There is currently no unified system through which families can check. The authorities now want to establish uniform rules for psychologists for the first time. The bill is being prepared by member of parliament Elvira Surabaldieva. The initiative followed requests from parents and other citizens who wanted to verify the qualifications of people offering psychological services online. According to Surabaldieva, some begin providing consultations after two- or three-month courses, while consultations can cost between 3,000 and 10,000 som ($34-$114) per session. Social media has made it considerably easier to enter the psychological services market. To a potential client, a polished page and thousands of followers can appear as convincing as professional qualifications. There is often no straightforward way to verify a consultant’s education and experience before the first session. Work with children is particularly sensitive. Surabaldieva said parents had approached her specifically because their children were receiving online consultations and they wanted to know whether the practitioners involved were properly qualified. The bill proposes establishing the professional status of psychologists in law. Exactly what education will be required remains under discussion. The working group is considering conventional psychology degrees as well as possible routes for people with qualifications in other fields who subsequently receive additional psychology training. Surabaldieva has argued, however, that completing several short-term courses alone should not be enough to qualify someone as a professional psychologist. The second proposal is a unified registry. Before seeking a consultation, clients would be able to check a specialist’s education, qualifications, and professional experience. But that raises another question: who should decide who is qualified to practice? An interagency working group began a clause-by-clause review of the legislation in Bishkek in early August. One option under discussion would give professional bodies a role in assessing applicants. Surabaldieva supports keeping the registry under state oversight rather than transferring that authority to private professional associations. The proposal would therefore give the state a new role in determining who can present themselves as a qualified psychologist. So far, however, there appears to have been little public discussion of whether tighter requirements could reduce the number of practitioners or increase the cost of consultations. Another point of debate concerns people with years of practical experience whose education may not meet the future requirements. That is particularly important because some state institutions already employ psychologists whose original training was in fields such as education or social work. The working group is considering a transition period of two or three years, giving experienced practitioners time to meet the new standards rather than forcing them to leave the profession immediately. Kyrgyzstan is not alone in facing this problem. A 2025 conference abstract published by European Psychiatry describes inadequate regulation of psychological services in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, which has allowed underqualified practitioners, often with only short-term training, to advertise themselves as...

4 weeks ago

Bloggers’ Rights

Uzbekistan’s New Bloggers’ Council Has No Confirmed Leader

Uzbekistan’s Union of Journalists says it plans to help bloggers when officials refuse to provide information or when they face pressure over their work. The proposal follows several prosecutions of bloggers known for reporting on alleged local corruption or criticizing public officials. The initiative immediately encountered a leadership problem: one day after the Creative Council of Bloggers was announced, the blogger expected to lead it said he had declined the position. The Union of Journalists announced the council on August 7, saying the decision reflected the growing role of bloggers in Uzbekistan. According to the union, bloggers increasingly compete with traditional media for audiences and influence public debate. The council is expected to advise bloggers on legal issues, including cases in which officials obstruct access to information or third parties apply pressure. It also plans training in media law and ethics, along with digital security and media literacy. Shukhratjon Oripov, acting chairman of the Union of Journalists, said bloggers had become independent participants in the country’s information landscape. The council’s leadership remains unclear. Journalist and blogger Eldar Asanov was initially named for the post. On August 8, however, Asanov said he had received the offer but declined it. He said he had proposed that the Union of Journalists establish a bloggers’ club instead. Gazeta.uz subsequently corrected its original report. Among the bloggers prosecuted in recent years are Otabek Sattoriy and Olimjon Khaidarov, both of whom had reported allegations of local corruption. Sattoriy, founder of the YouTube channel Xalq Fikri, or People’s Opinion, covered social and economic problems in the Surkhandarya region. Shortly before his arrest, he was reporting on farmers whose land had allegedly been seized by a senior local official and transferred to a company owned by businessman and senator Murtazo Rakhmatov. On May 10, 2021, Sattoriy was convicted on four counts of extortion and one count of slander and sentenced to six and a half years in prison. On February 5, 2024, after about three years behind bars, a court released him and replaced the remainder of his sentence with correctional labor, with 20% of his earnings to be withheld for the state. On December 1, 2023, a court in the Ferghana region sentenced blogger Olimjon Khaidarov to eight years in prison on a large-scale extortion charge and speech-related charges of slander and insult. Khaidarov, who had nearly 30,000 YouTube followers, was known locally for reporting allegations of corruption and criticizing local authorities. One slander charge concerned a claim by the mayor of Kokand that a post about the off-the-books sale of parking spaces had defamed him. Police alleged that Khaidarov had demanded $10,000 from the head of Kokand’s Istiklal bazaar in exchange for withholding negative coverage and said he was detained while receiving the final $2,500. Khaidarov denied wrongdoing and said he had been set up in retaliation for his reporting. Human Rights Watch described his conviction as the latest in a series of criminal cases against bloggers and journalists in Uzbekistan. In Reporters Without Borders’ (RSF)...

4 weeks ago

Internet Restrictions

Internet Restrictions in Central Asia: How the Five Countries Differ

There is no single Central Asian internet. Crossing a border can turn a freely accessible website into one that is blocked or reachable only through a virtual private network (VPN). The contrast is starkest in Turkmenistan, where years of censorship have created a black market for access to the open internet. Freedom House’s 2025 Freedom on the Net assessment covers three of the five Central Asian countries. Kyrgyzstan scored 47 out of 100 and retained its Partly Free status. Kazakhstan scored 37, while Uzbekistan scored 29; both were classified as Not Free. Turkmenistan has the most restrictive system in the region. The largest measurement study of its internet censorship to date tested 15.5 million domains and found that more than 122,000 were blocked. Researchers also identified filtering rules that inadvertently made more than 5.4 million additional domains inaccessible. Bypassing these restrictions has developed into a market of its own. In July 2025, VPN keys were being sold for around $50 a month, while access through a connection exempt from government filters cost up to $2,000. Turkmen officials were also alleged to have been involved in selling such access. Such claims are difficult to verify independently inside one of the world’s most closed countries. Even so, the market illustrates the effect of years of blocking: for some residents, a working VPN can provide access to large parts of the internet that would otherwise remain unavailable. The situation in Kazakhstan is different. The internet is far more accessible than in Turkmenistan, although the authorities also use technical controls. A study published by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) found evidence that at least 17 news websites and 73 sites for circumvention tools were blocked between June 1, 2023, and June 1, 2024. The affected sites included independent media and major VPN services. Researchers also found evidence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) man-in-the-middle attacks, in which a third party intercepts an encrypted connection between a user and a website. This can allow the third party to read or alter the data passing through the connection. Similar technology prompted an international dispute in 2019, when internet service providers in Kazakhstan instructed users to install a government-issued security certificate capable of intercepting encrypted web traffic. Major browser developers responded by blocking the certificate or preventing their software from trusting it. Kazakhstan does not, however, operate a closed network. OONI found that some circumvention tools remained accessible, unlike in Turkmenistan, where stable access to the open internet can itself be difficult. Kyrgyzstan’s online environment has traditionally been more open than those of its Central Asian neighbors, though restrictions have increased in recent years. Freedom House kept the country in the Partly Free category in 2025, lowering its score from 48 to 47. It cited the detention of journalists and activists, as well as pressure on online media. Government control has also extended to internet infrastructure. In July 2025, President Sadyr Japarov signed a decree giving state-owned operator ElCat a temporary monopoly on international internet traffic. The decree set the one-year trial...

4 weeks ago

ComicCon Astana

Comic Con Astana 2026 Draws Game of Thrones and One Piece Stars

Comic Con Astana returned to Kazakhstan’s capital from August 6 to 9, with stars from Game of Thrones and Netflix’s One Piece among the headline guests. The event followed a record year in 2025, when the festival attracted more than 75,000 visitors, including over 10,000 from abroad. Held at Barys Arena and the Alau Ice Palace, the fifth edition of the festival drew fans of film, television, games, comics, and anime for autograph sessions, actor meetings, cosplay competitions, and gaming. [video width="360" height="640" mp4="https://timesca.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/7641361931360792851.mp4"][/video] Among the biggest names at this year’s festival was Danish actor Nikolaj Coster-Waldau, who played Jaime Lannister throughout all eight seasons of HBO’s Game of Thrones. The series has a history at Comic Con Astana. Pilou Asbæk, who played Euron Greyjoy, was the main international guest at the inaugural event in 2019, when demand for information briefly crashed the festival website. Other international guests in 2026 included Iñaki Godoy and Taz Skylar from Netflix’s One Piece. South Korean K-pop group Kandis also appeared after gaining recognition among Kazakh audiences through Silk Way Star. The group attracted further attention by performing Orda’s Kesh Meni in Korean and took the Comic Con stage on August 9. Cosplay was another major part of the program, with KZT 20 million, around $40,000, offered in prize money for the international competition. Guests included German duo Kamui Cosplay, known for their elaborate costumes and props. Comic-Con began in San Diego in 1970 as a gathering of around 300 comic book and science-fiction fans. It has since developed into a major international pop-culture convention, inspiring events around the world, including Astana’s edition. Comic Con arrived in Kazakhstan in 2019, but the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted its early development. After a four-year hiatus, the festival returned in 2023. Attendance passed 50,000 the following year, when Danish actor Mads Mikkelsen was the main international guest. The festival’s growth has also brought an economic return for the capital. Astana authorities estimated its impact in 2025 at around KZT 3.5 billion, approximately $6.5 million, including spending by visitors outside the event itself. Comic Con is one of a growing number of international events being held in Astana. In the first half of 2025, the city hosted more than 25 such events involving over 120,000 participants from 40 countries. During the same period, Astana received 735,700 tourists, including 177,100 from abroad, according to the city’s Department of Investment and Entrepreneurship Development. For international visitors, Comic Con also presents a side of Kazakhstan far removed from the country’s more familiar association with Silk Road history. Its focus is contemporary pop culture and the global fan communities surrounding it. Final attendance figures for Comic Con Astana 2026 had not been released at the time of publication.

1 month ago

Bride Kidnapping

Bride Kidnapping in Central Asia: Why the Practice Persists Despite Tougher Laws

Bride kidnapping for the purpose of forcing women into marriage remains one of the least visible forms of gender-based violence in Central Asia. Although abduction and coercion into marriage are punishable under criminal law across the region, the offenses are defined differently from country to country. Their true scale is difficult to measure. Many victims never report the crime, while some cases are still viewed as a continuation of tradition rather than a violation of criminal law. Over the past decade, governments across Central Asia have begun revising their approaches to the problem. Kyrgyzstan strengthened criminal penalties following several high-profile cases. Kazakhstan did not close a legal loophole that allowed many perpetrators to avoid prosecution until 2025. Uzbekistan has a specific criminal provision covering the abduction of women for marriage, while Tajikistan does not appear to define bride kidnapping as a separate offense. In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, however, assessing the prevalence of the practice remains particularly difficult because of limited research and incomplete official data. The term “bride kidnapping” has not always referred to the same practice. Anthropologists note that historically it covered a range of marriage customs, from mutually agreed elopements and staged abductions to the violent kidnapping of women. Contemporary researchers stress that the presence or absence of a woman’s free consent is the key distinction between these practices. Comparable customs once existed among a number of Central Asian peoples. One documented motive has been the desire to avoid kalym, the traditional bride price paid by the groom’s family to the bride’s relatives. Economic motives, however, did not alter the nature of the crime when a woman did not consent to the marriage. The issue has been studied most extensively in Kyrgyzstan. A nationally representative survey conducted in 2015–2016 by the National Statistical Committee with support from UN Women, UNFPA, and the International Organization for Migration found that 22.1% of marriages involved some form of bride abduction. Of these, 16.3% were reported as taking place with the woman’s consent, while 5.8% occurred without it. The frequently cited claim that more than one in five Kyrgyz marriages begins with bride kidnapping therefore combines consensual and non-consensual practices. It should not be presented as an estimate of forced abduction. The figures were based on respondents’ accounts and may not capture every form of family or social pressure surrounding consent. Known locally as ala kachuu, or “grab and run,” the non-consensual abduction of a woman for marriage is a criminal offense in Kyrgyzstan. In 2013, the penalty for abducting an adult woman for marriage against her will was increased to between five and seven years in prison. The corresponding sentence when the victim was under 17 was increased to between five and ten years. Tougher penalties, however, have not prevented further tragedies. One of the best-known cases was the 2018 murder of Burulai Turdaaly Kyzy, a 20-year-old medical student. After she was abducted, her family contacted the police. Officers brought both Burulai and her abductor to a police station but left...

1 month ago

Neutrality

Turkmenistan’s Neutrality: Diplomatic Space, Economic Limits

Permanent neutrality has shaped Turkmenistan’s foreign policy for more than three decades. It has given Ashgabat a distinct diplomatic identity and helped it maintain relations with competing regional powers. Its economic benefits, however, have been more limited. On December 12, 1995, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution without a vote that recognized and supported Turkmenistan’s declared permanent neutrality. The Assembly adopted a further resolution in 2015 and reaffirmed its support for a third time on March 21, 2025. The UN reinforced a policy declared by Ashgabat. It did not create the status or guarantee Turkmenistan influence beyond its borders. The strongest evidence of neutrality’s diplomatic value came during the civil war in Tajikistan. Turkmenistan hosted UN-sponsored inter-Tajik peace talks in Ashgabat during the 1990s. The negotiations contributed to the process that produced the 1997 peace agreement. Hosting those talks did not make Turkmenistan the principal mediator. The UN and regional governments played larger roles. Ashgabat nevertheless provided a venue considered acceptable by the opposing sides. Turkmenistan has followed a similar policy toward Afghanistan. It has maintained contacts with successive authorities in Kabul while supplying electricity and pursuing transport and energy projects across the border. Since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, Ashgabat has continued its economic engagement without making its relationship dependent on formal political alignment. Neutrality helps Turkmenistan keep diplomatic channels open, but it is not the only explanation for this policy. The two countries share a long border, and Afghanistan is central to several planned export and transit routes. Energy provides a clearer measure of what neutrality can and cannot deliver. Turkmenistan has sought buyers in Russia, China, Iran, Türkiye, South Asia, and Europe. Its ability to reach those markets has depended mainly on pipelines, financing, and relations with transit countries. China became Turkmenistan’s main gas customer after the Central Asia-China pipeline opened in 2009. By 2026, Turkmenistan was exporting around 30 billion cubic meters of gas to China each year. A new agreement signed in April 2026 to expand the Galkynysh gas field could support another 10 billion cubic meters of annual production, further deepening the energy relationship with Beijing. Turkmenistan’s experience with other buyers has been less stable. Russia’s Gazprom stopped purchasing Turkmen gas in 2016 before resuming much smaller imports in 2019. Supplies to Iran ended in 2017 during a dispute over unpaid bills. Ashgabat secured a modest new outlet in March 2025, when Turkmen gas began flowing to Türkiye under a swap arrangement through Iran. The one-year agreement covered about 1.3 billion cubic meters, with officials discussing possible annual supplies of up to 2 billion cubic meters. The Türkiye deal showed that Ashgabat could find new customers, but the volume remained small beside exports to China. The route also depended on Iranian infrastructure. Turkmenistan’s larger diversification projects remain incomplete. Construction has advanced on the Afghan section of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline, known as TAPI. Turkmen officials expect the first Afghan section to reach Herat by the end of 2026, but plans for extending...

1 month ago

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