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Uzbekistan Economy Export/import Afghanistan Oil & Gas Central Asia Energy

Poor-Quality Gasoline Refused by Taliban Doesn’t Belong to Uzbekistan

The Customs Committee of Uzbekistan denied that gasoline returned by the Taliban due to its poor quality in fact belongs to Uzbekistan, according to a post on the committee's Telegram channel. The Times of Central Asia has reported that the Taliban returned 120,000 liters of gasoline imported via the Hayraton border point to Uzbekistan due to its poor quality. It has been reported that the returned oil products didn't originate in Uzbekistan. On the contrary, 120 tons of gasoline loaded in two tanker trucks were sent to Afghanistan from Russia and moved through the territory of Uzbekistan only in transit mode. On February 7, these tankers left for Afghanistan through the Ayritom station in Surkhandarya, Uzbekistan. These oil products returned by Afghanistan entered Uzbekistan on April 6 through the Ayritom station. Also, the Customs Committee asked certain mass media operating in the country not to distribute unverified, one-sided, unconfirmed information. “At this point, we ask the mass media to study carefully before disseminating such information, taking into account the friendly relations between the two countries,” the Customs Committee report said.

Afghanistan Islamic State Central Asia Terrorism

Islamic State – Khorasan Province: An Element of Geopolitical Rivalry?

In the aftermath of the terrorist attack in Moscow, the media has once again been saturated with discussions about the terrorist group Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP), also known as ISIS-Khorasan and “Wilayat Khorasan.” At this point, most of the coverage has focused on the Afghan wing of Islamic State, and not its other “wilayats,” such as on the Arabian Peninsula, “Wilayat Sinai” (Islamic State – Sinai Province) or “Wilayat Caucasus” (Islamic State – Caucasus Province). The international media covering the ISKP attack in Moscow, including journalists from Russia, widely speculated that the terrorist group is looking at Central Asia as its next base. Such media coverage included a variety of sentiments indicating that Central Asia should be worried. Reports have suggested that the alliance of Central Asian leaders with Moscow makes them look weak in the eyes of ISKP and that the terrorist threat emanating from Central Asia has become a point of weakness for the Putin regime. It has also been suggested that Islamic terrorism in Central Asia remains a real problem for the FSB, and even though the FSB has extensive experience in fighting extremists in the Caucasus, having committed enormous resources to the issue, Central Asia is a blind spot. Alarm bells sounded that regional jihadist groups have become more powerful. Thus, the terrorist attack in Moscow significantly increased media attention on ISKP in the context of Central Asia. Overall, the ISKP theme fits into existing narratives regarding threats to the southern border of the CIS. Sanaullah Ghafari, Emir of ISIS-K; image: rewardsforjustice.net The more likely reality is that in Central Asia, ISKP has been more of a challenge to regional security than an existential threat. In recent years, the region has been broadly successful in dealing with threats from Afghanistan. How real of a threat is the ISKP? A very narrow circle of experts can give a truly objective assessment of ISKP. Information about ISKP membership is contradictory and seemingly based on political considerations. As such, it is difficult to back these up with statistics. The number of fighters reported vary greatly from 2,000 to several tens of thousands. What remains indisputable are two facts: 1. Despite measures declared by the Taliban to eliminate the ISKP, terrorist acts by the group are still recorded throughout Afghanistan, and 2. The group lacks a serious infrastructure in Afghanistan. The activity of ISKP in Afghanistan consists of carrying out targeted, low-level terrorist acts, mainly against local Hazara Shiites. Based on the assessments of the UN Afghanistan monitoring team, the potential of ISKP success looks dubious. In its reports, UN experts point to a decrease in ISKP activity in Afghanistan. Recently, the UN has avoided estimating the size of the group, but previous estimates put it at 1,500-2,200 fighters. At the same time, according to a UN report in January, “ISKP adopted a more inclusive recruitment strategy, including by focusing on attracting disillusioned Taliban and foreign fighters.” Taliban officials, meanwhile, tend to play down the situation....

Uzbekistan Economy Export/import Afghanistan Oil & Gas

Taliban Returns 120,000 Liters of Uzbek Oil Products Over Low-Quality

The National Department of Standards of Afghanistan has reported that it returned two tanker trucks worth of oil products with a volume of 120,000 liters from the port of Hairatan back to Uzbekistan. According to Radio Television of Afghanistan (RTA) English, the reason for this was the low quality of the imported refined products. Furthermore, the National Administration of Standards sent back another 19 oil tankers from Sheikh Abu Nasr Farahi Port to Iran over their low-quality. The standards board once again asked Afghan businessmen to prevent the import of low-quality goods into the country. In January of this year, it was reported that the Taliban returned more than 62 tons of low-quality oil to Uzbekistan through the Hairatan border point. In response to this, Uzbekneftgaz Chairman Bahadir Sidikov said the report was misinterpreted, and that the oil products returned by the Taliban was of high quality. Sidikov stated that the product was returned not because of its low quality, but because its standard isn't available in Afghanistan. "This new product was supposed to enter the Afghan market. Unfortunately, the first batch was sent back. But it’s a process. It will not be easy to enter every market. To prove the quality of this product, we sold 1,000 tons of the same diesel to Estonia last month. They received it as a “premium” and ordered 10,000 tons [more]. Currently, we are producing 10,000 tons of [oil] products. In addition, there are inter-governmental agreements," commented Sidikov at that time.

Kazakhstan Tajikistan Central Asia Terrorism Afghanistan

Flowers Laid at Tajikistan’s Monument to Kazakh Soldiers

On April 11, a wreath-laying ceremony was held at the monument to the Kazakh soldiers who died on April 7, 1995, while guarding the external borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on the Tajik-Afghan border, according to a report from Avesta. Officials taking part in the ceremony included Kazakhstan's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Tajikistan, Valikhon Turekhanov, representatives of the Union of Honorary Internationalists of Tajikistan, veterans of the Border Service, and active military personnel from Tajik armed forces. The participants at the event noted that the Kazakh soldiers had performed their military duty at the cost of their lives, whilst all the while remaining faithful to the military oath. The monument commemorating the bravery of the Kazakh soldiers was opened on December 15, 2007, in the Firdavsi recreation park in Dushanbe. In 2021, the park was renovated and restored with the support of the Embassy of Kazakhstan in Tajikistan, the Ministry of Defense and National Guard of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and other public organizations. On April 7, 1995, the seventh joint company of the Kazakh military was attacked by mujaheddin in a gorge at Pshikharv Mountain on the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border. The militants were defeated in the ensuing battle.

Afghanistan

Taliban and its Neighbors: A Regional Format for Overcoming Challenges in Afghanistan and Beyond

The process of making Afghanistan an independent economic entity that can work constructively within globally accepted economic standards and formats will require addressing pressing security issues as well as strengthening regional partnerships and cooperation. In the long term, this will not only benefit the people of Afghanistan but also its neighbors, as well as the Central Asian republics, who still need to realize their full transit and transport potential to best respond to the world’s changing needs in a new geopolitical environment. While there is currently emphasis on increasing bilateral trade, this in itself will not cure the economic and other problems ailing Afghanistan. Strategic infrastructure projects, in particular, will play a key role in ensuring the long-term economic stability of this country. The Taliban Government is already reaching out to regional neighbors in a new way since it regained power in 2021. Some of the existing regional cooperation structures can be molded to provide a platform for dialogue and collaboration with Afghanistan. Modern realities dictate to the region the need to quickly overcome existing differences in intra-regional relations and create a new model. To this end, the states in the region surrounding Afghanistan should build a system of coordinated and cohesive measures and approaches with security as a key consideration, bringing Afghanistan into the fold to serve mutual interests through regional development. Rapprochement or a de facto relationship with regional states? Recently, the Taliban Government in Afghanistan has been fairly successful in developing cooperation with neighboring countries. It seems that, as opposed to focusing solely on isolation from the West, the current regime has chosen to start actively establishing ties with states in the region, placing the main emphasis of their foreign policy on regional governments who are more interested in pragmatism than ideological prerequisites when it comes to their affairs with Afghanistan. If, for Pakistan and Iran, various forms of cooperation with Afghanistan are historically understandable, then for the Central Asian republics, the Taliban’s openness to broader dialogue, along with the promotion of mutual economic interests, allows for the prospect of transforming the whole region into a fully-fledged, self-sufficient collective unit within the larger global system. To achieve this, Central Asian countries must still overcome narratives of the past, develop common approaches (including through regional formats), and practically see Afghanistan as a genuine partner. In the meantime, states in the region are largely acting intuitively rather than with a calculated strategic depth, or strictly weighing the benefits of building trade relations with Afghanistan’s new authorities. That said, regional players still follow different vectors and act according to their own circumstances despite a common desire to see a stable neighbor in Afghanistan. For Islamabad, for instance, the main trigger in relations with Kabul is the Pakistani Taliban, known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP. Tehran, on the other hand, seeks to protect the Shiite minority in Afghanistan and see their participation in an inclusive government, but at the same time, builds dialogue with the Taliban, including on border security...

Afghanistan

The Priority of Maintaining a United and Stable Afghanistan

The issue of inter-ethnic relations in Afghanistan affects not only the country itself but also its surrounding region. Recent history has placed a heightened importance on the “nation” question in Afghanistan in terms of the country’s political and social stability. Since regaining power in 2021, the de facto Taliban authorities have focused primarily on social policies to respond to the people’s immediate needs as well as on implementing trade and economic cooperation with regional countries to realize the geo-economic potential of the country. To a large degree, they have been successful in these endeavors. The important question now is how the Taliban will work to synthesize various ethnic groups into a society that has a strong identity as a nation while preserving the Pashtun status quo and the legacy of Durrani statehood. Afghanistan in its current state is not ready for a federal structure, and outside actors pushing this now could possibly undermine its stability. On the other hand, the country and the wider region have a long history of diverse ethnic and national groups managing to find a way to coexist and function effectively. As the Afghan people try to overcome humanitarian crises and focus on their economic and social recovery, the Taliban’s strategy will likely continue to be based on the consolidation of ethnic groups around itself and under the umbrella of Islam, supported by measures of assimilation and expansion, as Pashtun rulers did in the country’s history. Understanding the historical role of ethnicity and nationality in Afghanistan So far, no modern regime in Afghanistan has been able to significantly advance the idea of “Afghan nationalism,” reflecting the national unity of the country’s people. Slogans about “one nation” have always been promoted by the capital, but did not necessarily reflect realities on the ground. The latest (2004) republican constitution states in its Article 4 that the Afghan nation consists of “Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis, Pashais, Nuristans, Aimaks, Arabs, Kyrgyz, Qizilbash, Gujars, Brahuis and other tribes,” and that the word “Afghan” applies to every citizen of Afghanistan. This multinational state has so far shown stability in its ethnic groups, but cannot demonstrate their synthesis into a society with a strong self-identification as the Afghan nation, and the term “Afghan” continues to serve as an exonym, a general name for the inhabitants of the country. After regaining power in 2021, the Taliban worked to stop a bloody civil war that had begun in 1978, but faced a set of problems including the big “national question.” Against the backdrop of demands from the international community to ensure an inclusive government, the idea of federalism is once again being brought up in information spheres, which, according to its few supporters, presents the only way to ensure long-term peace in this diverse country. Discussions about federalism in Afghanistan are not new and are largely connected to events in recent history, primarily the civil war that began in 1978 with the “April Revolution.” That said, there has not been enough technical analysis...