Afghanistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Transport Infrastructure

Uzbekistan, Afghanistan Open New Cargo Terminal on Hairatan-Mazar-i-Sharif Railway

A new dry port terminal has opened on the Hairatan-Mazar-i-Sharif railway in northern Afghanistan, marking another step in efforts by Uzbekistan and Afghanistan to expand regional transport infrastructure and increase cargo capacity between Central and South Asia. According to Uzbekistan railways (‘O'zbekiston Temir Yo'llari’), an Uzbek delegation visited Mazar-i-Sharif on May 21, where officials attended the inauguration of Port No. 5, a newly constructed and restored cargo facility on the railway corridor operated by Sogdiana Trans, a subsidiary of Uzbekistan Railways. The terminal received its first freight train during the ceremony, officially launching cargo unloading operations. Uzbek and Afghan representatives said the facility is expected to increase freight volumes and improve logistics efficiency along the Hairatan–Mazar-i-Sharif line, which remains one of Afghanistan’s main rail links to Central Asia. The Hairatan–Mazar-i-Sharif railway, completed in 2010 with financing from the Asian Development Bank, links Afghanistan’s northern trade hub at Hairatan, near the Uzbek border, with Mazar-i-Sharif. The line has become a key corridor for moving fuel, food products, construction materials, and humanitarian cargo. During the visit, Uzbekistan railways Chairman Zufar Narzullayev held talks with Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, Abdul Ghani Baradar. Discussions focused on increasing the carrying capacity of the railway and accelerating infrastructure upgrades. Among the proposals was the construction of an additional 1.65-kilometer branch line near Naibabad station. Officials said the project could reduce wagon waiting times and increase overall railway efficiency. Baradar reportedly welcomed the initiatives and instructed Afghan public works authorities to coordinate technical and construction work with Uzbek counterparts. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Works also stressed the need to expand cargo traffic, stating that Afghan authorities are prepared to receive and unload increasing volumes of freight moving through the corridor. The opening of Port No. 5 is part of a wider Uzbek push to strengthen transport and energy links with Afghanistan, inspired by Tashkent's broader ambitions to improve access to South Asian and Middle Eastern markets. Uzbekistan has repeatedly promoted trans-Afghan transport routes as a way to reduce regional trade bottlenecks and expand Central Asia’s external connectivity. In February 2025, Baradar announced that construction of the proposed Hairatan-Herat railway extension would begin shortly after completion of a feasibility study financed by Uzbekistan. The planned route would extend the existing railway westward through Afghanistan toward Herat, potentially strengthening trade connections between Central Asia and the Middle East. During the same visit in 2025, Baradar said Uzbekistan had agreed to reduce the cost of a power transmission project to Afghanistan by $30 million.

Afghanistan

Opinion: The Southern Dimension of the Middle Corridor – Afghanistan’s Role in Eurasia’s New Logistics Landscape

Afghanistan’s integration into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is extending beyond local logistics and evolving into one of Eurasia’s key geo-economic projects. Amid the global transformation of supply chains, Central Asia has an opportunity to move beyond its role as a transit periphery and become an active participant in shaping new economic corridors, creating a full-fledged “southern dimension” of Eurasian connectivity. Two Routes: Strategic and Operational Two main directions for Afghanistan’s integration into the Eurasian transport system are currently under discussion, each reflecting a distinct development logic: strategic and pragmatic. The “Eastern Branch” (Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar) is traditionally viewed as the primary trans-Afghan route. Its key advantage is direct access to the ports of Karachi and Gwadar, providing the shortest connection between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. At the same time, geography makes the project highly complex. The route passes through the central and eastern regions of Afghanistan, including the Hindu Kush mountain range, where long tunnels and bridges would be required. This would sharply increase construction and maintenance costs, extend implementation timelines, and heighten security and infrastructure risks. According to available estimates, the project could cost around $5 billion and handle 15-20 million tons of cargo annually. However, the lengthy investment cycle and dependence on political stability mean implementation remains a long-term prospect. The “Western Branch” (Turgundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak) represents an alternative logistics corridor based on more favorable geography. Western Afghanistan is characterized by predominantly flat, semi-arid terrain, reducing the need for complex engineering structures and allowing the project to be implemented in phases. This significantly lowers capital costs, shortens construction timelines, and reduces infrastructure risks. The western route’s initial capacity is estimated at 7-10 million tons of cargo annually, making it the more realistic option for medium-term planning. An additional advantage is its geo-economic flexibility. Via Herat, the route could be integrated not only southward through Pakistan, but also westward through Iran, providing access to Persian Gulf ports. This would transform it into a multi-directional corridor capable of serving several logistics flows simultaneously. The Eastern Branch, therefore, remains the strategic option offering the shortest route to the ocean but requiring substantial investment and time. The Western Branch, meanwhile, presents a more pragmatic solution: faster to implement and more flexible from a geo-economic standpoint. The Role of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in the “Western Maneuver” The implementation of the western trans-Afghan corridor depends on close coordination between two key regional players, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which form the northern foundation of the future route by providing access to the Caspian Sea and, beyond it, global markets. Astana and Ashgabat are effectively creating a new geo-economic framework that could transform Central Asia from an isolated region into a strategic crossroads linking the Caspian Sea with the Indian Ocean. In 2026, Kazakhstan moved toward deeper institutionalization of the initiative, making the route through Herat and Kandahar a government priority. Astana’s strategy is multifaceted. In addition to establishing a permanent interdepartmental commission, Kazakhstan is actively seeking to attract international operators such as the Emirati AD...

Afghanistan

Opinion: Hormuz Crisis Pushes Afghanistan Aid Routes Toward Central Asia

The crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is usually viewed through the lens of energy security or military escalation. But it also has another, less visible, humanitarian dimension. A recent article in The Guardian, “Calls for humanitarian corridor through Strait of Hormuz as Iran war hits vital aid,” points to a critical shift: because of the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, along with instability around Hormuz, traditional humanitarian supply routes are beginning to break down. For Afghanistan, this is no longer a theoretical concern but an operational reality. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), cited by The Guardian, the cost of delivering food to Afghanistan has tripled. Cargo that previously moved by sea through Hormuz and onward to Pakistani ports must now travel overland across multiple countries, adding weeks to delivery times. The consequences are felt most acutely by vulnerable populations, particularly children. Predictability is one of the core requirements of any humanitarian system, and that predictability is now disappearing. Some shipments are stranded in regional hubs. Routes are constantly changing. Fuel costs continue to rise. Even modest increases in oil prices significantly raise operational expenses for humanitarian agencies. For Afghanistan, the implications are severe. The country has been in a prolonged food crisis for several years, with millions dependent on external aid. Delays of even one or two weeks can directly affect malnutrition and mortality rates. According to United Nations estimates, around 3.7 million Afghan children are currently suffering from wasting, nearly one million of them from severe wasting, a condition associated with sharply elevated mortality risks. UNICEF estimates that in 2026 alone, 1.304 million children aged 6-59 months will require treatment for acute malnutrition, including severe cases and other high-risk groups. Another 1.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are also suffering from acute malnutrition. Under these conditions, even temporary disruptions in aid deliveries become a direct threat to human life. The situation is being compounded by several overlapping factors. First, instability around the Strait of Hormuz has made maritime routes both more expensive and riskier. Second, the Pakistani corridor, previously the main overland route, has become unreliable, as repeated border closures and restrictions have tied humanitarian deliveries to the fluctuating political and security relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Third, Iran has imposed restrictions on food exports and has itself become part of the conflict zone, undermining its role as both a supplier and transit route for Afghanistan. Together, these developments are creating what can be described as a “triple crisis” for humanitarian logistics into Afghanistan. The previous aid delivery system is effectively ceasing to function. In response, the WFP is restructuring its logistics network. One solution has been increased use of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor: Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea-Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. Although this route is longer and more expensive, it offers predictability and an alternative to disrupted maritime pathways. The key issue is no longer which route is cheapest, but which is reliable. This shift places Central Asia increasingly at the center of...

Deportation

Austria to Use Uzbekistan as Transit Route for Afghan Deportations Under New Agreement

Austria’s Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger and Interior Minister Gerhard Karner are expected to visit Uzbekistan on May 7 to sign a mobility agreement aimed at strengthening cooperation on migration, according to Die Presse. The agreement is intended to improve coordination between the two countries, particularly on deportations and the return of migrants. Austrian officials say it will create a more structured framework for handling individuals required to leave the country. A key provision involves the use of Uzbekistan as a transit route for deportations to Afghanistan. Afghan nationals facing removal from Austria could be escorted through Uzbekistan to Kabul. Until now, deportations to Afghanistan have largely taken place via Istanbul, meaning the new arrangement would open what officials describe as a “second route.” Karner said the deal would establish “the conditions for the consistent implementation of deportations as part of a firm and fair asylum policy.” The agreement also covers the readmission of nationals, third-country citizens, and stateless individuals who entered the European Union through Uzbekistan. In return, the document includes provisions to support legal migration from Uzbekistan to Austria. Despite its growing economy, Uzbekistan is heavily reliant on remittances from abroad, with Uzbek migrants sending home $4.8 billion in Q2 of 2025. Over the past few years, Tashkent has been seeking out alternative destinations than traditional routes dominated by Russia. To that effect, both Uzbekistan and Austria have committed to promoting “safe, orderly, and regular mobility of qualified workers” in line with national legislation. Austrian authorities note that Uzbek professionals already have multiple pathways to access the country’s labor market. The agreement does not provide for the establishment of return centers for rejected asylum seekers, an idea Austria has been pursuing with several EU partners, including Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Denmark. The visit to Uzbekistan is part of a broader regional trip that will also include Kazakhstan, which Austrian officials consider an important partner, particularly in the energy sector. The planned agreement comes amid continued migration pressures linked to Afghanistan’s humanitarian situation. According to the United Nations Development Programme, in 2024 around 85% of Afghanistan’s population was living on less than $1 a day. In June 2025, the World Food Programme reported that approximately 15 million people in the country were facing severe hunger. At the same time, large-scale deportations from neighboring countries have added to the strain. In July last year, Tajikistan launched a campaign to detain and deport Afghan refugees, giving them 15 days to leave the country.

Healthcare

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan Plan Joint Hospital Project in Mazar-i-Sharif

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan have agreed to build a hospital in the Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif under a public-private partnership, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Health said. The agreement was reached during a visit by an Uzbek delegation led by Health Minister Asilbek Khudayarov to Afghanistan, where talks were held with Afghan Health Minister Mawlawi Noor Jalal, Balkh regional governor Mohammad Yusuf Wafa, and other officials. According to the ministry, the Afghan side highlighted the need to expand cooperation in healthcare, noting that many districts in the country still lack hospitals. Officials also pointed to a rise in cancer cases in recent years and requested Uzbekistan’s support in building a medical facility in Mazar-i-Sharif, training specialists, and simplifying procedures for Afghan patients seeking treatment in Uzbekistan. Wafa expressed appreciation for Uzbekistan’s continued support, particularly during difficult periods such as natural disasters, and emphasized the importance of strengthening humanitarian ties between the two countries. During the visit, the Uzbek delegation also toured healthcare facilities in Balkh province, including a district clinic in Dehdadi and the Abu Ali Ibn Sina Central Hospital in Mazar-i-Sharif, where they met with medical staff and reviewed current conditions. As a result of the talks, the parties agreed to establish a joint working group to develop proposals for supporting Afghanistan’s public healthcare system. Plans were also outlined to organize reciprocal visits by Afghan medical delegations to Uzbekistan. The sides discussed launching training programs that would allow up to 100 Afghan specialists each year to improve their qualifications at Uzbekistan’s specialized medical centers. In addition, the possibility of allocating annual scholarships for up to 50 Afghan students to study at Uzbek medical universities was considered. The Uzbek side also agreed to explore simplifying the issuance of medical visas for Afghan patients and easing procedures for the supply and registration of pharmaceuticals produced in Uzbekistan, which Afghan officials said are in strong demand in the local market. A key outcome of the visit was the agreement to construct a hospital in Mazar-i-Sharif in cooperation with Arman Group. Under the arrangement, the Afghan side will invest in the project, adapt an existing building for medical use, and procure modern equipment, while Uzbekistan will provide qualified medical personnel. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that in March, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan established a joint Business Council aimed at strengthening trade and economic ties, bringing together representatives from both countries’ business communities and institutions. The new healthcare agreement reflects a broader trend toward expanding cooperation between the two neighbors.

Afghanistan

A View from Afghanistan: Silk Seven Plus a New Framework for Regional Integration

In recent years, regional integration has increasingly become a key instrument in countries’ economic and foreign policy strategies. This is particularly relevant for Central Asia, a landlocked region facing structural constraints in accessing global markets. In this context, the Silk Seven Plus (S7+) initiative, recently introduced by the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, has drawn attention. The concept is currently being promoted in Washington. According to its authors, the initiative has received “overwhelming bipartisan support from leading members of the House of Representatives and the Senate.” S7+ is positioned as a multi-stage framework for regional coordination centered on the countries of Central Asia, with plans for gradual expansion, first to Afghanistan and Azerbaijan, and potentially later to Pakistan. The initiative appears to propose a new model of cooperation focused on developing transport connectivity, facilitating trade, and coordinating economic policy among countries in Central and South Asia, as well as neighboring regions. Unlike traditional integration formats, S7+ is designed as a flexible, network-based framework rather than a rigid institutional structure. It functions more as a platform for practical cooperation, including the development of transit routes, the digitization of customs procedures, the reduction of logistics costs, and the expansion of trade and investment flows. This approach allows countries to participate voluntarily and at varying levels of engagement. Within this model, Central Asia is viewed as a key region for the formation of new economic linkages. Strengthening transport connectivity, diversifying trade routes, and reducing dependence on a limited number of corridors could enhance the resilience of regional economies and support deeper integration into global supply chains. Afghanistan holds particular significance within the S7+ framework. Geographically, it lies at the crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, positioning it as a potential transit bridge. The development of routes through Afghanistan could shorten transport distances and improve regional logistics efficiency. In practice, however, this potential faces significant constraints. Key challenges include underdeveloped infrastructure, institutional limitations, and a lack of international recognition. These factors restrict Afghanistan’s ability to fully participate in multilateral initiatives and limit its access to investment and financial resources. At the same time, the flexibility of the S7+ format may create opportunities for Afghanistan’s gradual involvement. Unlike formal organizations, the initiative allows participation on a project-by-project basis without requiring full institutional integration. This aligns with the country’s current model of external engagement, where practical cooperation continues despite the absence of formal recognition. A comparison between S7+ and traditional regional formats highlights key differences. Existing frameworks, such as regional cooperation programs, typically rely on formal agreements and institutional mechanisms. In contrast, S7+ emphasizes flexibility, pragmatism, and the implementation of specific projects, potentially reducing political sensitivities and prioritizing economic interests. In a broader geopolitical context, interpretations of the initiative vary. For some external actors, it may signal the emergence of alternative transport routes and reduced dependence on established corridors. For others, it represents a complementary element within existing economic strategies. In any case, S7+ reflects intensifying competition over the development...