Afghanistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Healthcare

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan Plan Joint Hospital Project in Mazar-i-Sharif

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan have agreed to build a hospital in the Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif under a public-private partnership, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Health said. The agreement was reached during a visit by an Uzbek delegation led by Health Minister Asilbek Khudayarov to Afghanistan, where talks were held with Afghan Health Minister Mawlawi Noor Jalal, Balkh regional governor Mohammad Yusuf Wafa, and other officials. According to the ministry, the Afghan side highlighted the need to expand cooperation in healthcare, noting that many districts in the country still lack hospitals. Officials also pointed to a rise in cancer cases in recent years and requested Uzbekistan’s support in building a medical facility in Mazar-i-Sharif, training specialists, and simplifying procedures for Afghan patients seeking treatment in Uzbekistan. Wafa expressed appreciation for Uzbekistan’s continued support, particularly during difficult periods such as natural disasters, and emphasized the importance of strengthening humanitarian ties between the two countries. During the visit, the Uzbek delegation also toured healthcare facilities in Balkh province, including a district clinic in Dehdadi and the Abu Ali Ibn Sina Central Hospital in Mazar-i-Sharif, where they met with medical staff and reviewed current conditions. As a result of the talks, the parties agreed to establish a joint working group to develop proposals for supporting Afghanistan’s public healthcare system. Plans were also outlined to organize reciprocal visits by Afghan medical delegations to Uzbekistan. The sides discussed launching training programs that would allow up to 100 Afghan specialists each year to improve their qualifications at Uzbekistan’s specialized medical centers. In addition, the possibility of allocating annual scholarships for up to 50 Afghan students to study at Uzbek medical universities was considered. The Uzbek side also agreed to explore simplifying the issuance of medical visas for Afghan patients and easing procedures for the supply and registration of pharmaceuticals produced in Uzbekistan, which Afghan officials said are in strong demand in the local market. A key outcome of the visit was the agreement to construct a hospital in Mazar-i-Sharif in cooperation with Arman Group. Under the arrangement, the Afghan side will invest in the project, adapt an existing building for medical use, and procure modern equipment, while Uzbekistan will provide qualified medical personnel. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that in March, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan established a joint Business Council aimed at strengthening trade and economic ties, bringing together representatives from both countries’ business communities and institutions. The new healthcare agreement reflects a broader trend toward expanding cooperation between the two neighbors.

Afghanistan

A View from Afghanistan: Silk Seven Plus a New Framework for Regional Integration

In recent years, regional integration has increasingly become a key instrument in countries’ economic and foreign policy strategies. This is particularly relevant for Central Asia, a landlocked region facing structural constraints in accessing global markets. In this context, the Silk Seven Plus (S7+) initiative, recently introduced by the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, has drawn attention. The concept is currently being promoted in Washington. According to its authors, the initiative has received “overwhelming bipartisan support from leading members of the House of Representatives and the Senate.” S7+ is positioned as a multi-stage framework for regional coordination centered on the countries of Central Asia, with plans for gradual expansion, first to Afghanistan and Azerbaijan, and potentially later to Pakistan. The initiative appears to propose a new model of cooperation focused on developing transport connectivity, facilitating trade, and coordinating economic policy among countries in Central and South Asia, as well as neighboring regions. Unlike traditional integration formats, S7+ is designed as a flexible, network-based framework rather than a rigid institutional structure. It functions more as a platform for practical cooperation, including the development of transit routes, the digitization of customs procedures, the reduction of logistics costs, and the expansion of trade and investment flows. This approach allows countries to participate voluntarily and at varying levels of engagement. Within this model, Central Asia is viewed as a key region for the formation of new economic linkages. Strengthening transport connectivity, diversifying trade routes, and reducing dependence on a limited number of corridors could enhance the resilience of regional economies and support deeper integration into global supply chains. Afghanistan holds particular significance within the S7+ framework. Geographically, it lies at the crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, positioning it as a potential transit bridge. The development of routes through Afghanistan could shorten transport distances and improve regional logistics efficiency. In practice, however, this potential faces significant constraints. Key challenges include underdeveloped infrastructure, institutional limitations, and a lack of international recognition. These factors restrict Afghanistan’s ability to fully participate in multilateral initiatives and limit its access to investment and financial resources. At the same time, the flexibility of the S7+ format may create opportunities for Afghanistan’s gradual involvement. Unlike formal organizations, the initiative allows participation on a project-by-project basis without requiring full institutional integration. This aligns with the country’s current model of external engagement, where practical cooperation continues despite the absence of formal recognition. A comparison between S7+ and traditional regional formats highlights key differences. Existing frameworks, such as regional cooperation programs, typically rely on formal agreements and institutional mechanisms. In contrast, S7+ emphasizes flexibility, pragmatism, and the implementation of specific projects, potentially reducing political sensitivities and prioritizing economic interests. In a broader geopolitical context, interpretations of the initiative vary. For some external actors, it may signal the emergence of alternative transport routes and reduced dependence on established corridors. For others, it represents a complementary element within existing economic strategies. In any case, S7+ reflects intensifying competition over the development...

China

Opinion: Expect China to take its 2+2 diplomacy to Central Asia

China does not do military alliances. Its declared posture is one of non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs. Yet Beijing has long understood that commercial ties alone cannot anchor strategic relationships; only security partnerships can. China’s recent experiments with 2+2 security dialogues – bringing together foreign and defense ministers – signal that it is seeking to move beyond an economics-first approach. The most likely next candidates for this format are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all of which share borders with China. For Central Asian governments, a 2+2 with China may hold appeal, particularly as they seek to manage instability spilling over from Afghanistan at a time when Russia’s security role is being strained by its war in Ukraine. After years of hoping that engagement could stabilize Afghanistan, Central Asian states have largely shifted to a policy of containment – seeking to insulate themselves from cross-border militant threats, narcotics flows and refugee movements rather than attempting to reshape Afghanistan’s internal trajectory. For Beijing, the objective would be to consolidate partnerships across the Eurasian heartland – an outcome Washington would prefer to counter. China shares Central Asia’s risk-management approach toward Afghanistan. Like its neighbors, Beijing has little appetite for deep involvement inside the country itself, focusing instead on preventing instability from spilling northward toward Xinjiang or disrupting Belt and Road corridors that run through the region. A 2+2 format offers China a way to institutionalize security coordination without violating its long-standing aversion to formal alliances. Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Defense Minister Dong Jun traveled to Phnom Penh to hold China’s first-ever 2+2 dialogue with Cambodia. Wang told reporters that China is willing to develop the mechanism into a “strategic platform” for enhancing political and defense security cooperation. He described it as a key instrument for cementing mutual assistance and solidarity, and for advancing the construction of a China-Cambodia “community with a shared future.” Wang also said China was prepared to work with Cambodia to build an “Asian security model” based on shared security and on seeking common ground while reserving differences. China’s deepening security engagement with Cambodia comes as the Southeast Asian nation remains locked in a border dispute with Thailand. Although Wang’s itinerary took him next to Bangkok, Beijing chose to hold a 2+2 only with Cambodia – notably the non-U.S. ally in this pairing. China is new to the 2+2 format. Last April, Beijing hosted its first ever 2+2 with a foreign country – with Indonesia. The trajectory suggests further 2+2 engagements ahead, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – the three Central Asian states that border China. In several aspects, Central Asia may be a more conducive environment for this diplomacy than Southeast Asia: there are no maritime disputes, and the countries are not embedded in U.S. alliance structures. Instead, there is a convergence around defensive security priorities – particularly border control and crisis management linked to Afghanistan – making the 2+2 format a natural fit. China under President Xi Jinping has always had an eye...

Afghanistan

Uzbekistan Expands Afghan Rail Capacity to Support Growing Trade

A new 1,000-meter siding track has been completed at Naibabad railway station in Afghanistan, aimed at increasing freight handling capacity and improving the efficiency of rail operations, according to Uzbekistan Railways. The project was implemented by Uzbekistan Railways in cooperation with Sogdiana Trans. The additional track is expected to significantly expand the station’s throughput and accelerate loading and unloading processes, reducing delays and congestion along the route. Afghanistan plays a key role in regional connectivity, linking Central Asia with South Asia through transport corridors that pass through its territory. Naibabad is expected to serve as an important hub for the movement of goods from countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and China to markets in Pakistan and India. The development comes amid a steady increase in cargo volumes between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The Hayraton-Naibabad-Mazar-i-Sharif corridor has become an important route for regional trade, and infrastructure upgrades are seen as essential to maintaining stable freight flows. According to project details, the new siding will enable more efficient processing of freight wagons and help prevent bottlenecks along the line. It is also expected to improve service quality for customers and support the long-term development of Naibabad station. Uzbekistan Railways noted that the project reflects the country’s ongoing efforts to modernize railway infrastructure in Afghanistan and strengthen cross-border logistics links. Cooperation with Sogdiana Trans has further reinforced their position as long-term partners in the development of Afghanistan’s rail sector. The expansion builds on earlier work at the station. In 2024, Uzbekistan Railways reported that the restored Naibabad station officially reopened on August 7, following reconstruction carried out in cooperation with the Termez regional railway hub and Sogdiana Trans. The arrival of the first freight cars marked the resumption of operations. As freight traffic along the corridor continues to grow, Uzbekistan Railways and its partners, in coordination with Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Works, are continuing efforts to modernize infrastructure along the route.

Trade

Afghanistan Aims to Increase Trade with Central Asia to $10 Billion

Afghanistan aims to increase trade with Central Asian countries to $10 billion over the next three to four years, Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi said at a meeting in Kabul. According to Muttaqi, Afghanistan’s trade turnover with countries in the region reached approximately $2.7 billion in 2025, marking a significant increase compared to previous years. The statement was made during a consultative dialogue involving representatives from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, focused on regional cooperation, trade, and the development of transit routes. Muttaqi said Afghanistan intends to leverage its geoeconomic position to connect Central Asia with markets in South and West Asia. Among key projects, he highlighted the TAPI gas pipeline, which is currently under construction. Afghan authorities are seeking to expand economic ties despite ongoing international sanctions affecting the banking sector, which continue to constrain investment inflows. At the same time, Russia remains the only country to have officially recognized the Taliban government that came to power in 2021. Several countries, including China, India, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, maintain a diplomatic presence in Kabul. Landlocked Central Asian countries view southern routes through Afghanistan as an alternative to northern corridors via Russia, which have been complicated by sanctions. Afghanistan shares a border of more than 2,300 km with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, and continues to face security challenges, including threats from extremist groups, drug trafficking, and irregular migration. However, Muttaqi said the situation along the borders remains generally stable. Earlier reports indicated that Kazakhstan is exploring the possibility of investing in rare earth metal mining in Afghanistan. The national company Tau-Ken Samruk is conducting laboratory analysis of samples collected in Afghanistan and Rwanda.

Qosh Tepa canal

Afghanistan Advances Qosh Tepa Canal While Urging Regional Water Cooperation

Uzbekistan just hosted the Tashkent Water Week forum, and the speaker many wanted to hear from was the representative from Afghanistan. Central Asia and Afghanistan are being hit hard by climate change. This region has endured several droughts already this decade, and indications are that this year will bring drought again. Hanging over the forum was Afghanistan’s plan to complete the Qosh-Tepa Canal in 2028, which will draw water from a river that Central Asian countries also use and further complicate the regional water situation. [caption id="attachment_18865" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Qosh Tepa Canal, artist's rendition; image: TCA, Aleksandr Potolitsyn[/caption] Our Fair Share The forum, which actually spanned only two days, March 25-26, brought together some 80 speakers and more than 1,200 delegates from 19 countries. In the past five years, Central Asia has seen noticeably diminished precipitation, melting glaciers, and record high temperatures, making water conservation a priority. The last days of March saw temperatures soar into the 30s Celsius in southern Kazakhstan. In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there were record-high temperatures in February. Rainfall for the last three months of 2025 was also far below normal across Central Asia. When the Taliban government announced in early 2022 that it would build the 285-kilometer-long, 100-meter-wide, 8.5-meter-deep Qosh Tepa to irrigate lands in northern Afghanistan, it added another water concern to Central Asia, particularly the governments in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister of Water and Energy, Mujeeb-ur-Rahman Omar, led the Afghan delegation at the Tashkent Water Week. At the forum, he repeated his government’s position that historically, Afghanistan has taken only very small volumes of water from the Amu-Darya River basin, while its northern neighbors have been using large amounts for irrigation for decades. “We believe in the fair and sustainable development of the region,” Omar said, adding, “We intend to develop (water resources) on a legal basis, in accordance with the legal rights of the countries in the region.“ Omar is correct that under international law, Afghanistan has an equal right to water from the Amu-Darya, one of Central Asia’s two great rivers. The river currently marks the border between Afghanistan to the south, and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a small section of Turkmenistan to the north. There is no separate regional water use agreement between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan. Since none of the Central Asian governments officially recognize the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government, Russia is the only country that does at the moment, there is no possibility of a legal treaty on water use being signed. So, shortly after the construction of the canal is finished in 2028, some 20% of the water in the Amu-Darya, starting from the point just west of the Tajik-Uzbek border, will be diverted into the Qosh Tepa canal. It is already clear that this will mean the end of some downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan that are on the edge of the Kara-Kum Desert and which are already under strain from insufficient water supplies. Turkmenistan did not send a...