• KZT/USD = 0.00209
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00209
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 44

Patient Capital, Fast Deals: Japan and South Korea Take Different Paths into Central Asia

Japan and South Korea have reached the same strategic conclusion: Central Asia matters to their economic security. Yet they are pursuing that goal through markedly different playbooks. In December 2025, Tokyo hosted the first leaders' summit of the "Central Asia plus Japan" Dialogue, 21 years after the format was launched. All five Central Asian presidents attended. Japan set a target of three trillion yen in business projects across the region over five years - roughly $19 billion at the time - while placing critical-mineral supply chains among the summit's priority areas. The bilateral announcements were equally significant. Uzbekistan presented a proposed project portfolio worth more than $12 billion and called for a joint investment platform to advance it. Kazakhstan and Japan announced a package of public- and private-sector agreements worth $3.7 billion. These included a long-term uranium contract and an offtake agreement under which Kazakhstan's Eurasian Resources Group would supply gallium to Mitsubishi Corporation RTM Japan. The timing was no accident. By May 2026, Chinese shipments to Japan of dysprosium and terbium remained close to zero, while exports of finished rare earth magnets to Japan fell 35% from the previous month. These materials are essential to high-performance magnets. For Tokyo, diversifying critical mineral supply is no longer a distant policy objective; it is an immediate industrial requirement. South Korea has been moving toward the same destination by a different route. During then-President Yoon Suk Yeol's state visit to Kazakhstan in 2024, the two countries signed a critical minerals memorandum allowing Korean companies to participate in the exploration and development of lithium, chromium, uranium, and rare earths. Seoul is now preparing to host the first Korea-Central Asia summit on September 16-17, 2026, elevating years of bilateral and multilateral engagement to the leaders' level. [caption id="attachment_52351" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: Japan Cabinet Public Affairs Office[/caption] Why Central Asia Counts Both Japan and South Korea are resource-poor manufacturing powers whose leading industries depend on secure supplies of imported minerals. South Korea imports more than 95% of the critical minerals it consumes. Japan received its own warning in 2010, when Chinese rare earth shipments were disrupted during a territorial dispute, and the pressure has returned in a sharper form in 2026. Central Asia cannot replace China in the short term, but it offers Tokyo and Seoul a credible route toward diversification. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan combine substantial mineral potential with governments eager to attract investment, technology, and new export markets. Kazakhstan is already a major producer of uranium and chromium, and has significant copper, titanium, and rare earth prospects. In April 2025, Kazakhstan announced the possible discovery of a rare earth deposit containing more than 20 million metric tons of resources. If further exploration confirms that estimate, the country could possess one of the world's largest rare earth resource bases. However, the distinction between a resource estimate and a usable supply chain is crucial. A discovery is not a producing mine, and a mine is not a processing industry. Exploration, environmental approvals, infrastructure, separation, refining, and...

Uzbekistan and Belarus Establish Strategic Partnership in Minsk

Uzbekistan and Belarus have established a strategic partnership following President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's official visit to Minsk, where the two governments signed a broad package of economic, labor, scientific, and cultural agreements. According to the Uzbek presidential press service, Mirziyoyev visited Minsk on July 8-9 at the invitation of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. He was welcomed with an official ceremony at the Palace of Independence before the two leaders held both one-on-one and expanded talks with their delegations. The visit marked a notable milestone in a relationship that has expanded steadily in recent years. Diplomatic relations between Uzbekistan and Belarus were established on January 21, 1993, but Uzbekistan opened its first embassy in Minsk only in March 2018. Before that, the Uzbek Embassy in Russia also covered Belarus. The relationship is developing while Belarus remains under extensive European Union sanctions over human rights abuses and its support for Russia's war against Ukraine. Speaking after the talks, Mirziyoyev said the visit had become “a historic event in the development of Uzbek-Belarusian relations.” He said the newly signed declaration “marks the beginning of a new chapter in strengthening interstate cooperation” and demonstrates both countries’ commitment to long-term partnership. The leaders highlighted the rapid growth in economic ties. According to the Uzbek side, bilateral trade has nearly tripled over the past five years and approached $1 billion by the end of 2025, while trade during the first months of 2026 rose by another 30%. Official figures differ according to methodology. The Uzbek side said bilateral trade approached $1 billion in 2025, while Belarusian trade figures put goods trade at almost $855 million and services at $207.9 million. Belarusian state news agency BelTA also said around 230 enterprises with Belarusian capital are registered in Uzbekistan and that Belarus had a positive trade balance of more than $517 million. Both presidents said the target of $2 billion in annual trade is achievable by 2030. To support that goal, the two governments adopted a 2026-2030 action plan covering trade, economic, social, and humanitarian cooperation. The plan includes measures to expand collaboration in agriculture, mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals, electrical engineering, microelectronics, textiles, furniture production, and other manufacturing sectors. One of the most significant areas discussed was nuclear energy. The Uzbek presidential press service said the parties agreed to draw on Belarusian experience in the construction of Uzbekistan’s first nuclear power plant and related infrastructure. Belarus operates the Russian-financed Ostrovets plant, whose two VVER-1200 units were built by Atomstroyexport. Uzbekistan’s own project is being developed with Russia’s Rosatom and is planned to combine two VVER-1000 reactors with two smaller RITM-200N units. Political analyst Mukhtor Nazirov said the declaration represented a qualitative change and could create opportunities for investment, technology transfer, and industrial cooperation. He described nuclear cooperation as “one of the most important components of the strategic partnership,” arguing that it required a particularly high level of trust. Labor migration also emerged as a major theme. During the talks, Lukashenko invited Uzbek citizens, especially families, to move to Belarus to...

Uzbekistan and Georgia Sign Strategic Partnership Declaration

Uzbekistan and Georgia have signed a declaration establishing strategic partnership relations, adding a new dimension to a relationship led by trade and Eurasian transit routes. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze held talks on July 3 in Tbilisi during Mirziyoyev's state visit. The sides also exchanged agreements and memorandums on customs, digitalization, education, agriculture, tourism, environmental protection, labor migration, healthcare, and nuclear and radiation safety. The visit was the first by an Uzbek president to Georgia in 23 years. Mirziyoyev held talks with Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili on July 2 and with Kobakhidze the following day. Before the signing, Georgian Foreign Minister Maka Botchorishvili told 1TV that the visit was a "historic opportunity to elevate relations" and tied the agenda to the Middle Corridor. One concrete diplomatic step is Tashkent's decision to open an embassy in Georgia. Uzbekistan currently has no embassy in Georgia and covers the country through its diplomatic mission in Baku, despite diplomatic relations having been established in August 1994. The Uzbek president's office said bilateral trade reached $270 million in 2025 and has passed $100 million since the start of 2026. The governments plan a dedicated roadmap to raise trade to $1 billion in the coming years and reduce the trade imbalance. Following the talks, the Uzbek side said both governments had agreed on "concrete steps to significantly increase trade and deepen industrial cooperation in key sectors." The focus on Georgian ports gives the deal a clear regional dimension. Mirziyoyev and Kobakhidze discussed wider use of Poti and Batumi for Uzbek cargo and backed a logistics hub in Georgia, with an industrial zone and a showroom for Uzbek products. A business forum held before the signing drew about 300 participants, including Georgian businesses from logistics, pharmaceuticals, finance, IT, tourism, and agribusiness. Georgia already serves as a South Caucasus outlet for Central Asian freight moving toward the Black Sea and Turkey. Uzbekistan is seeking more western routes as it develops rail links toward China, Afghanistan, and the Caspian Sea. The Times of Central Asia recently reported that Kyrgyzstan and Georgia discussed linking the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway to Georgian port infrastructure. Mirziyoyev made the same connection in Tbilisi, proposing that the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway corridor be integrated with the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway now under development. That proposal would put Georgia firmly inside Uzbekistan's export planning. Uzbek foreign trade cargo moving along the Middle Corridor has doubled over the past five years to reach 1.2 million tons by the end of 2025. Industrial cooperation is also moving beyond general pledges. The sides signed a cooperation program through 2027 and discussed projects in agriculture, electrical engineering, energy, pharmaceuticals, food processing, construction materials, digital services, and tourism. The leaders also proposed a joint investment fund to support new projects. People-to-people links have grown with direct flights. Tashkent now has air links with both Tbilisi and Batumi, with direct flights operating 13 times per week. More than 21,500 Uzbek tourists visited Georgia in 2025, while Georgian tourist arrivals in Uzbekistan reached 6,800...

Mirziyoyev and Mishustin Reaffirm Strategic Alliance as Russia Says Uzbekistan Projects Top $50 Billion

TASHKENT, June 17, 2026 — President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev received Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Mikhail Mishustin in Tashkent on June 16, as the Russian premier arrived to take part in the Fifth Tashkent International Investment Forum (TIIF). In their meeting, the two leaders reviewed progress on implementing agreements reached at the highest level within the framework of Uzbek-Russian relations and their strategic partnership. Mirziyoyev and Mishustin backed deeper private-sector ties, regional cooperation in oil, gas, mining and agriculture, and expanded cultural and educational exchanges, points also raised in Mishustin's separate meetings with Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov and Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of the presidential administration. They expressed satisfaction at a 20% rise in bilateral trade turnover since the start of the year, and noted that major joint projects in energy, metallurgy and other priority sectors are continuing. [caption id="attachment_50632" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Saida Mirziyoyeva, Head of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and Mikhail Mishustin, PM of the Russian Federation. Image: RF website[/caption] Those parallel meetings underscored that the relationship now extends well into the cultural and academic sphere alongside the commercial one. Aripov congratulated Mishustin and “all our Russian friends on Russia Day. I wish the multi-ethnic people of Russia peace, stability, and continued prosperity,” he said. Aripov went on to note that two-way trade has more than tripled over the past decade to surpass $13 billion, with the combined portfolio of joint projects now standing near $47 billion. Mirziyoyeva, in turn, highlighted recent cultural exchanges held around the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, including a Mariinsky Theatre premiere of the opera “Tamerlane” and exhibitions at the Hermitage and the Fabergé Museum, while officials on both sides pointed to the large number of Russian university branches operating in Uzbekistan as evidence of deepening educational ties. Of key significance in the Uzbek-Russian relationship is the construction of Uzbekistan's first integrated nuclear power station, which will be built to a Russian design. Putin and Mirziyoyev marked the launch by video link during the St. Petersburg forum, as concrete was poured at the project site. Russian engineers are also involved in the construction of the country's largest hydropower plants. A joint center for managing drilling operations has been created, and a major project is underway to upgrade the Central Asia-Centre gas pipeline and expand its capacity. [caption id="attachment_50634" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: President.uz[/caption] Mishustin’s TIIF Address Speaking at the TIIF opening ceremony on June 17, Mishustin set the bilateral relationship against the backdrop of a strained global economy. “The global economy is undergoing a profound transformation these days amid growing turbulence and escalating trade wars, the wide application of protectionist measures and unfair competition. Of course, all this means that we, our countries, must work on systemic objectives. The way we address them will define whether we succeed in fostering steady economic development for our countries and improving the quality of life for our people,” he said. Mishustin told the forum that “Russia is among...

Opinion: UK’s C6 Engagement and the Opportunity for British Geostrategic Renewal

Along with Nicholas Spykman, Sir Halford Mackinder is one of the most pre-eminent thinkers in the field of geopolitics. Whilst today geopolitics is a term used interchangeably with “world affairs,” “international relations,” and “foreign policy,” Spykman and Mackinder used the phrase to describe the narrow academic study of how geography influences international relations and the conduct of states. In the 1904 paper, The Geographical Pivot of History, Mackinder theorized that the key to controlling the balance of power in the world rested in a “heartland” of Eurasia, comprising Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Mackinder described the heartland region as the “pivot region” for regional and global hegemony. The word “pivot” has recently been popularized in international relations, with examples including President Obama’s pivot to the Pacific and Britain’s Indo-Pacific pivot in the 2021 Integrated Review. In 1997, former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski built on Mackinder’s ideas in his work, The Grand Chessboard. Brzezinski defined a geopolitical pivot as being “determined by their geography, which in some cases gives them a special role either in defining access to important areas or in denying resources to a significant player. In some cases, a geopolitical pivot may act as a defensive shield for a vital state or even a region.” To Mackinder and Brzezinski, Central Asia was a crucial geostrategic pivot. Central Asia - comprising the five states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, collectively termed the C5 - is located between China, Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan. Thus, the near abroad of the region is defined by conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Iran and Israel/U.S., and between Taliban-run Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pragmatic engagement is a necessity for the C5 but has not stopped them from pursuing greater diversification in security and economic arrangements, and they remain committed to U.S.-led diplomatic initiatives. Faced with a regionally assertive superpower in China, risks created by Russia’s war in Ukraine, theocratic Iran, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, Central Asia has continued to show its desire to build and deepen its economic and security partnerships from beyond traditional powers – such as China and Russia – to states in the Gulf, the Caucasus, Western Europe, and elsewhere. The United Kingdom has emerged as a new and important partner. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised concerns in the Central Asian states about its regional revisionism, territorial ambitions, and Putin’s reconstruction of the Soviet Union. In 2014, Putin credited Nursultan Nazarbayev with having “created a state in a territory that had never had a state before,” adding that “the Kazakhs never had any statehood.” The remarks sparked anger in Kazakhstan and fed concern about Moscow’s view of post-Soviet sovereignty. Finally, Putin said that it would be best for Kazakhstan to “remain in the greater Russian world.” In The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski predicted that “Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians.” Central Asia has been a...

Britain Expands Central Asia Ties as Kazakhstan Ratifies Strategic Partnership Deal

Last week, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed a law ratifying a strategic partnership and cooperation agreement with the United Kingdom. With that move, Central Asia’s largest economy added Britain to its growing list of strategic partners, reinforcing Astana’s long-standing multi-vector foreign policy. For London, meanwhile, the agreement marked another milestone in what some analysts have framed as a renewed contest for influence in Central Asia, an area where Britain has sought to strengthen its position over the past five years. Kazakhstan already counts Russia, China, the United States, several European Union states including Italy, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, as well as Turkey, Azerbaijan and its Central Asian neighbors among its strategic partners. Britain has now joined that group as it seeks to revive its historical influence in the region. That broader contest is often described through the language of a “New Great Game,” a phrase that draws on an older imperial rivalry. The term “Great Game” emerged in the 19th century to describe the geopolitical rivalry between the British and Russian Empires across Central and South Asia. The phrase was popularized by British officer, spy, and diplomat Arthur Conolly, who compared the complex web of political intrigues to a vast strategic board game stretching across half a continent. Since 2022, observers say London has intensified its engagement in this geopolitical competition, aimed partly at limiting Russian and Chinese dominance in Central Asia. At stake are key sectors such as critical minerals, including rare earths, as well as logistics corridors, particularly the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor. In December 2023, the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee published a report titled Countries at the Crossroads: UK Engagement in Central Asia. The report criticized what it described as ineffective engagement by British ministers with the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. One of the report’s central recommendations was that London should more actively counter Russian influence in the region. In recent years, British embassies across Central Asia have established offices linked to the UK’s international development structures, expanding engagement with local civil society groups. Through the British Council, London has also expanded its soft power initiatives, financing programs such as Creative Central Asia and Creative Spark. More than 60 universities have joined these programs, with participation exceeding 65,000 people. Britain also continues to operate the Chevening scholarship program, under which young political and public sector figures from Central Asia study in the UK before often returning to influential positions in their home countries. For Kazakhstan’s ambitious younger generation, Britain’s appeal may also be reinforced by symbolic success stories. On May 8, the same day Tokayev signed the strategic partnership into law, Kazakhstan-born Sanjar Abishev was elected to Westminster City Council, representing London’s prestigious St James’s district. Abishev’s election drew attention in Kazakhstan as a symbolic example of the country’s growing diaspora presence in Britain. Little is publicly known about Abishev, though one detail stands out: he entered politics only in 2022 after previously running a...