Geopolitics - The Times Of Central Asia

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Oil and Gas

Kazakhstan Gains Weight in China’s Energy System

The newly extended U.S. waiver for Russian oil transit through Kazakhstan and the reported giant onshore hydrocarbon discovery in western Kazakhstan point in different directions, yet they belong in the same analytical frame. One concerns an existing flow that already reaches China through working infrastructure, while the other concerns a possible future source that has not yet reached the stage of commercially proven reserves. Together, they mark a change in Kazakhstan’s position. The country is increasingly important to China both as a corridor and as a possible larger upstream partner. The U.S. waiver now runs until March 19, 2027. Kazakhstan is not a giant direct oil supplier to China in the way that Russia or Saudi Arabia is; China’s import structure is broader. But Kazakh-origin oil shipments, Russian transit oil, and adjacent energy links now constitute a single, more complex relationship. According to official Chinese sources, oil imported from Kazakhstan enters mainly through the China-Kazakhstan crude pipeline. More Than Kazakhstan’s Own Barrels Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP reported that in 2024, the Atasu-Alashankou route carried 1.2 million tons of oil and 9.989 million tons of transit oil, against a design capacity of 20 million tons a year. Official Chinese figures sharpen the point. By the end of 2024, total cumulative throughput on the pipeline had reached 280 million tons, including 19.139 million tons in 2024, while cumulative crude imported from Kazakhstan was lower. Kazakhstan’s significance to China is therefore larger than Kazakhstan’s own volumes would suggest, because the route carries more than Kazakhstan’s own oil. A glance at Europe keeps that proportion straight. Eurostat reports that Kazakhstan supplied 12.7% of the European Union’s petroleum oil imports in 2025. The European External Action Service said that Kazakhstan accounted for 10.9% of EU oil imports in the first quarter of 2024. This made it the bloc’s third-largest supplier in that period, and a more important direct oil supplier to Europe than to China. The significance of Kazakhstan’s geographic proximity to China becomes clearer when one looks beyond crude oil. Kazakhstan is not only a direct oil supplier, but also a transit corridor for multiple China-bound energy flows. The Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline is one of China’s major import routes. At the same time, while Kazakhstan’s own gas exports to China remain limited due to rising domestic demand, gas from Turkmenistan and Russia both pass through its territory. Oil and gas do not form a single operational system, but together they show that China’s energy connection with Kazakhstan extends beyond one commodity and beyond Kazakhstan’s own barrels. The Source Side May Be Growing In this context, the reported discovery on the Zhylyoi carbonate platform makes a difference because it widens the source side of the relationship without changing present flows. According to public statements by KazMunayGas officials, the Karaton, Kazhygali, and Zhylyoi formation has resource potential of 4.7 billion metric tons of hydrocarbons, and the broader Zhylyoi carbonate reservoir may hold as much as 20 billion metric tons of oil equivalent. The field is onshore in...

Middle East Crisis

Central Asia Welcomes Ceasefire, Urges Talks as Energy Risks Persist

Central Asian governments have cautiously welcomed the two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran, describing it as a necessary pause in a conflict that has already begun to affect regional stability, trade, and energy flows. Across the region, official statements struck a consistent balance: support for the truce, alongside calls to translate it quickly into negotiations rather than allow it to become a temporary pause in hostilities. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev described the agreement as a “ceasefire and truce” reached through international mediation, including efforts involving Pakistan’s leadership. According to the presidential press service, Tokayev said that “this agreement became possible due to the goodwill and wisdom of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the senior leadership of Iran, as well as all countries involved in the military conflict.” Tokayev went on to express his hope that the agreement would prove sustainable and contribute to global trade and economic stability. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry described the ceasefire as an “important step toward de-escalating tensions” and stressed that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tashkent called for “all parties to exercise restraint, [and] refrain from actions that could further escalate the situation, warning that further escalation risks widening the conflict and undermining regional stability. The statement reaffirmed Uzbekistan's “unwavering position on the need to resolve conflicts exclusively by peaceful means in strict accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the agreement, expressing hope that the ceasefire would open the way to a comprehensive and long-term peace. Dushanbe emphasized that the conflict has “no military solution and its continuation will only worsen the already difficult situation in the Middle East and cause colossal damage to all countries in the region.” The statement urged all parties to “abandon the use of force” and use political and diplomatic mechanisms in accordance with international law and the UN Charter. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry said it “welcomes the achievement of a ceasefire agreement in the Middle East,” highlighting the role of Pakistan’s mediation efforts in reducing tensions. Bishkek reaffirmed that disputes must be resolved exclusively through political and diplomatic means on the basis of the UN Charter and international law, and expressed its “hope for achieving sustainable and long-term peace in the region.” Turkmenistan had not issued an official public statement on the ceasefire at the time of publication, in line with its longstanding policy of neutrality and cautious approach to external conflicts. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the “announced ceasefire” and praised the efforts of mediators who helped broker the agreement. Baku called on all parties to “engage in productive dialogue aimed at resolving existing problems and strengthening mutual trust” and signaled its readiness to “support initiatives aimed at strengthening lasting peace, security, and cooperation in the region.” The convergence in tone reflects more than diplomatic routine. The conflict has already spilled into Central Asia’s political and humanitarian agenda, prompting coordination on evacuations, aid deliveries, and contingency planning....

Critical Minerals

Opinion: Supply Chains of Power: How Critical Minerals Are Shaping China–U.S. Competition in Central Asia

Central Asia is no longer a distant frontier for global geopolitics. It is developing into a central arena of competition for critical minerals, supply chains, and industrial power, where minerals are no longer simple commodities but have instead become key components of contemporary statecraft. In essence, this transformation highlights a recognition in Washington and other capitals that critical mineral supply chains are fundamental to next-generation energy systems, the development of artificial intelligence (AI), and strategic defense capabilities. Even as the global economy is multipolar, critical mineral supply chains remain highly concentrated and dominated by China. Control of rare earths is increasingly geopolitical, with clear economic, political, and security consequences. The significance of that imbalance is now shaping U.S. foreign policy, Central Asia’s development strategies, and the future of global economics. China’s Strategy: Control the Chain, Not Just the Mine Though many years in the making, China’s critical minerals strategy is still often misunderstood as focused primarily on resource access. However, Beijing’s efforts are far broader and more effective. Not only securing raw materials, the Chinese leadership has also worked to control the entire supply chain—from extraction to processing, refining, and manufacturing. China’s long-term focus and investments began in the 1980s with efforts that culminated in the Made in China 2025 plan for national and overseas manufacturing. In 2023 alone, Chinese firms invested more than $120 billion in overseas mining and processing, targeting key elements used in energy supply chains. Beijing also fed its industrial base by providing over $220 billion for the production of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable infrastructure. As a result, China now controls approximately 60% of lithium processing, more than 70% of cobalt refining, and over 90% of battery material manufacturing. Strategically, China controls roughly 90% of global rare earth refining and associated technologies. Early investments in supplies enabled Beijing to subsequently concentrate funds into refining capacity to feed its industrial sector. This integrated approach has shifted the power dynamic for global supply chains tied to the critical minerals economy. As evidenced by Beijing’s near monopoly on processing, market control is not just associated with geological supplies but with processing capacity. China’s willingness to weaponize access not only to rare earths but also to processing technology demonstrates Beijing’s market muscle. This distinction is critical. Rare earth elements are not inherently scarce, but they are rarely found in concentrated deposits, making them difficult to extract and refine. Over decades, Beijing developed unique refining capabilities and subsidized an industrial base that disincentivized competition and encouraged processing to shift to China. The Vicious Circle Prohibitive investment costs, long development timelines, and market volatility have discouraged Western investment in alternative supply chains. Each stage (mining, processing, refining, manufacturing) is interdependent: miners won’t invest without buyers and offtake agreements, processors and refiners need secure financing and stable mineral supply, and manufacturers need steady inputs. Such interdependence creates an investment standoff and heightens perceptions of risk. By integrating all stages, Beijing exerts influence across global markets, from pricing to production. This has conditioned global markets...

Iran

The Iran War Is Repricing Central Asia’s Connectivity

Europe’s aviation regulator has extended its current conflict-zone bulletin for the Middle East and Persian Gulf through April 10 and continues to advise operators to avoid Iranian and adjacent airspace at all altitudes. Reuters reported soon after that the squeeze on normal flight paths was pushing more traffic into narrower routes, notably over Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The Strait of Hormuz, meanwhile, has not returned to normal commercial use. A limited number of exempted vessels have crossed, but passage remains selective, politicized, and uncertain rather than routine. The question, consequently, is no longer only whether Central Asia has alternatives to single-route dependence but whether those alternatives remain commercially usable, taking into account the increased risk, delay, insurance, fuel burn, and congestion. What has changed is the cost of maintaining reliable connectivity. The Cost of Reliability The Iran conflict imposes higher operating costs on the wider Eurasian air corridor that is now taking displaced traffic. EUROCONTROL estimates that about 1,150 flights a day continue to be affected by re-routing linked to the Middle East crisis. These add roughly 206,000 kilometers of flying and 602 tons of extra fuel burn per day. Maritime trends are similar. In March, war-risk premiums in or near the Gulf had risen more than tenfold in some cases, with hull war premiums moving from about 0.25% of vessel value to as much as 3%. Air-freight rates on some routes rose by as much as 70% as shippers redirected urgent cargo away from disrupted sea lanes and restricted airspace. Higher surcharges and narrower margins for operational error can make routes lose commercial value even if they remain formally open. The wider macroeconomic setting has also made resilience more expensive. Higher oil prices make every detour costlier, raising freight charges, power costs, and production costs across the region’s trading partners. Even where Central Asian cargo does not move through Iranian waters, the same pattern is still present. Asian policymakers were already confronting a combined oil-price and currency shock at a moment when roughly 80% of the oil shipped through Hormuz normally goes to Asia. The World Bank’s March food and nutrition security update notes that around 20% of global oil supplies and about one-third of global fertilizer trade transit the Strait of Hormuz. Urea prices, for example, surged by nearly 46% month on month between February and March 2026. Importers in Central Asia, as well as in Europe and the South Caucasus, remain under pressure from higher household food costs and tighter producer margins. The price of resilience is now showing up in increased costs for farm inputs, food costs, and household budgets. How the Burden Falls Kazakhstan remains the best placed in the region to absorb the shift. The CPC pipeline still carries about 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports; oil income contributes 52% of the state budget. Earlier disruptions had constrained Kazakhstan to reroute 300,000 tons of crude, and the country continues to rely on supplementary outlets such as Ust-Luga, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, and China when its main...

India

India–Central Asia: Connectivity, Security, and Sustainable Partnerships in a Multipolar World

A widening conflict in West Asia is forcing India and Central Asia to reassess trade routes, diplomacy, and regional security, with key projects such as Iran’s Chabahar port now facing growing uncertainty. These risks framed discussions in New Delhi on March 25–26, where experts gathered under the banner of “India–Central Asia: Connectivity, Security, and Sustainable Partnerships in a Multipolar World,” with The Times of Central Asia in attendance. The conference unfolded against the backdrop of two active Eurasian wars—the Russo-Ukrainian and the Israel/U.S.-Iran conflict. Central Asian and Indian participants agreed that the West Asian crisis is widening, putting not only ports and logistics routes but also economies across the globe under serious threat. India's Chabahar link to Afghanistan and Central Asia is now a high-risk, uncertain investment, weakening overall continental strategic thinking across Eurasia, including efforts to consolidate new trans-Caspian trade corridors. If the conflict cripples or destroys Chabahar, years of progress, hard-won partnerships, and millions in strategic investment would be erased. On the sidelines, some participants suggested that India could help cool what's becoming a dangerously global conflict. Unbeknownst to them, India had already held an all-party meeting on March 25 on the West Asia crisis. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar's message: India will not mediate. The revelation surprised some participants—others, not at all. In any event, Central Asian states, in principle, have backed any diplomatic push for peace. With West Asia in turmoil and platitudes in abundance, conference participants emphasized the need to rethink geopolitics, trade, security, and cultural ties beyond stale frameworks at a time of conflict. Four themes defined the Central and South Asian moment: the dangers of bloc politics, even as regional organizations continue to evolve and expand their influence, the ascendancy of national interests over external pressure, and the emergence of a firm refusal to pick sides in the midst of frictions between competing global pressures. Dr. Raj Kumar Sharma, a member of the India Central Asia Foundation, stated: “The conference provided an important platform to move beyond theoretical discussion and toward practical engagement. With Central Asia’s ambassadors to India present, we focused on exploring concrete mechanisms to promote peace through sustained diplomatic efforts. Despite the proximity of the conflict in West Asia to both Central Asia and India, participants expressed confidence that dialogue and restraint – buttressed by trade and investment – will ultimately guide outcomes, with particular concern for civilians and those enduring hardship. Notably, the crisis did not overshadow the conference’s primary agenda or its scholarly contributions. Overall, the gathering can be seen as a constructive step in reinforcing diplomatic initiatives dedicated to peace and stability in a conflict-affected region.” The conference witnessed the release of three significant publications on India–Central Asia relations: India – Kazakhstan Partnership in a Changing Geopolitical Order (eds. Ramakant Dwivedi, Lalit Aggarwal, Kuralay Baizakova), Manas: Kirgiz Vir Gatha Kavya by Ramakant Dwivedi & Hemchandra Pandey and India and Central, East and Southeast Asia: Enhancing the Partnership (eds. Ramakant Dwivedi & Lalit Aggarwal). [caption id="attachment_46364" align="aligncenter" width="1379"]...

EAEU

EAEU Trade Frictions Deepen Despite Shymkent Integration Push

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) met in Shymkent on March 26-27 with a long agenda and a familiar promise: deeper integration, smoother trade, and a more modern common market. Kazakhstan, which holds the bloc’s 2026 chairmanship, used the meeting to push artificial intelligence, digital logistics, industrial cooperation, and the removal of internal barriers. Twelve documents were signed, covering areas including industrial cooperation, transport, and digital integration. “Kazakhstan aims to become a fully-fledged digital country. We have built a modern ecosystem, including Astana Hub and the Alem.ai AI center, and are ready to share experience with EAEU partners on digital regulation and economic transformation,” Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov stated. That sounds ambitious, but it also highlights the bloc’s central weakness. The EAEU has no shortage of plans; it has a shortage of trust between its members, and that matters more. The dynamics extend across the bloc, but are most visible in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The EAEU was built to ensure the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor across Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. But the reality keeps drifting away from the treaty. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship agenda calls for a barrier-free internal market, yet the bloc is entering a new phase of tighter controls, retaliatory measures, and disputes over who really benefits. Shymkent made that contradiction impossible to miss. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov promoted an AI-based system to coordinate cargo flows across the union and speed up transit. He also backed the full electronic handling of veterinary and phytosanitary checks, all of which are practical ideas. Central Asia needs faster, cheaper, and more predictable logistics, but digital tools do not solve a political problem. A system becomes more efficient only if its members want it to be open. When they want leverage instead, technology can only make the controls smarter. [caption id="attachment_46024" align="aligncenter" width="1920"] Image: primeminister.kz[/caption] Kazakhstan’s priorities already show where the friction lies. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev opened his chairmanship by calling for digital transformation, better transport links, and the elimination of internal trade barriers. He also pushed a stronger external profile for the EAEU, with wider links across Asia, the Arab world, and the Global South. That is a serious agenda for a bloc trying to present itself as a Eurasian logistics hub. That push for external expansion comes at a time when internal frictions are becoming harder to manage. It sits uneasily beside everyday trade practice inside the union, where growing trade disputes have become part of the EAEU’s normal life, not an exception to it. The clearest recent example is Russia’s SPOT import-control system, which takes effect for road shipments from EAEU countries on April 1. Importers must submit shipment information two days before trucks reach the border and receive a QR code. Moscow has presented the change as a tax-compliance and anti-fraud measure, with additional financial guarantees expected in later phases of its implementation. In practice, it adds cost, time, and uncertainty before goods even reach the border, the opposite of what a customs union...