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Nuclear power

Mirziyoyev, Putin to Mark Launch of Uzbekistan Nuclear Plant Project

Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev will travel to St. Petersburg on June 4-5 for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and a ceremony marking the launch of Uzbekistan’s first integrated nuclear power plant project. Mirziyoyev is also due to address the 29th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, according to the Uzbek president’s press service. Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov said the two leaders would join the launch ceremony by video link before holding talks at the Konstantinovsky Palace on the evening of June 4. The project has become one of the main energy initiatives in Uzbek-Russian cooperation. According to Russian officials, the planned facility in the Jizzakh region will include two large-capacity power units as well as two smaller units with a capacity of 55 megawatts each. The launch ceremony is expected to involve senior international and industry officials. Ushakov said that Rafael Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Alexey Likhachev, director general of Rosatom, and Azim Akhmedkhadzhaev, head of Uzbekistan’s Uzatom agency, will participate from the construction site. Following remarks by the two presidents and Grossi, Russian and Uzbek nuclear officials are expected to report on technical readiness for the first concrete pouring at the site, formally launching construction work. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that initial concrete works began at the Jizzakh site in March, when Uzatom and Rosatom signed documents moving the project into practical implementation.

EAEU

Putin’s Astana Visit Shows What Russia Still Wants From Kazakhstan

The Eurasian Economic Union summit in Astana gave Vladimir Putin's state visit a wider stage. The summit produced technical documents and familiar language about integration. The bilateral Russia-Kazakhstan package around it was more concrete. It showed what Moscow still wants from Kazakhstan, and what Astana expects in return. The detail lies in infrastructure, where contracts can last for decades. The setting echoed history. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed the treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana on May 29, 2014, with Armenia joining in January 2015, and Kyrgyzstan in August of the same year. In 2026, the bloc returned to Astana for the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and the V Eurasian Economic Forum. The theme of the forum was artificial intelligence, digital regulation, and the EAEU's place in the global technology race. Its website said 14 integration documents were signed on the sidelines, including memoranda, agreements, protocols, and joint action plans. Those documents gave the visit a regional frame. The larger result came on May 28, when Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Putin oversaw a broad set of bilateral agreements. Akorda listed nuclear power, Russian export credit, expanded oil-sector cooperation, a tenge-ruble currency swap, education projects, financial monitoring, transport digitalization, and nuclear safety regulation. That package points to the real agenda: energy, transit, payments, industrial production, and public-facing alliance language. For Moscow, Kazakhstan’s primary value is geographic: it sits between Russia and China, and across routes that connect Central Asia to Europe, the Caspian, and South Asia. Russian crude already crosses Kazakhstan on the Priirtyshsk-Atasu-Alashankou route to China. A KazTransOil contract keeps transit at 10 million tons a year until the end of 2033. The tariff is $15 per ton, excluding VAT. The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline has a design capacity of 20 million tons a year and belongs to Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP, a 50-50 venture between KazTransOil and China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company. Reuters has reported that Russia and Kazakhstan agreed last year to raise that flow by 2.5 million tons, although the extra volume had not started flowing before Putin’s visit. The new agreement on oil-sector cooperation gives the issue a political push. For Moscow, the route strengthens access to China as Western sanctions keep pressure on Russian exports and payments. For Kazakhstan, it brings fees and gives Astana a useful position in Russia-China energy flows. The nuclear agreement, meanwhile, gives Russia a long-term role in Kazakhstan’s shift to nuclear power. Kazakhstan and Russia signed a $16.5 billion agreement for the Balkhash nuclear power plant at Ulken, near Lake Balkhash. The project covers two VVER-1200 III+ reactors. Kazakhstan held a groundbreaking ceremony for the plant in August 2025, with the active construction phase expected to begin in 2027, and the first reactor expected in early 2034. Russia will provide export credit for the first plant, with Rosatom leading the Balkhash project after competition with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), France’s EDF, and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power. But Kazakhstan has not handed the wider program to Moscow....

Energy Security

Putin Visit Puts Nuclear Power and Oil Transit at Center of Russia-Kazakhstan Ties

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan is becoming more than a diplomatic event. It is increasingly being seen as a demonstration of how Russia and Kazakhstan are shaping one of Eurasia’s key energy and logistics axes amid the restructuring of global markets, sanctions pressure, and the continued shift of economic flows toward Asia. Symbolically, ahead of the visit, Putin published a programmatic article in Kazakh media titled “Russia-Kazakhstan: An Alliance at the Heart of Eurasia,” in which he outlined a new framework for bilateral relations. The Russian president focused on nuclear energy, oil and gas cooperation, transport corridors, and Eurasian integration, describing the partnership between the two countries as a factor of stability and development for the wider continent. For Moscow, the current visit carries particular significance. It is Putin’s second state visit to Kazakhstan during a single presidential term. A rare occurrence in international diplomatic practice. Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said the move was intended to emphasize the “unprecedentedly high level of relations between our two countries.” The main outcome of the talks is expected to be the signing of agreements related to the construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant with the participation of Russia’s state nuclear corporation, Rosatom. According to Ushakov, the two sides are expected to finalize “the main parameters for the creation of the nuclear power plant and financing of the project through a Russian state export credit.” For Kazakhstan, the nuclear project is about far more than electricity generation. The country faces growing domestic power demand, aging infrastructure, and the need to ensure long-term energy security. At the same time, the project reflects a broader geopolitical calculation. Nuclear energy has traditionally been one of the most sensitive forms of strategic cooperation. A country building a nuclear power plant enters into a long-term technological partnership involving fuel supplies, engineering maintenance, personnel training, and technical support lasting for decades. Russia’s role in constructing Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant would therefore allow Moscow to preserve a deep technological presence in Central Asia despite its growing international isolation. For Astana, however, cooperation with Russia in the nuclear sector remains a pragmatic choice rather than a purely political one. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer of uranium, yet it still lacks its own nuclear power generation sector. Amid intensifying competition between global power centers, Kazakhstan appears less interested in choosing sides than in strengthening its resilience and turning its geography into a strategic advantage. The same logic is evident in the oil and gas agenda surrounding Putin’s visit. Moscow and Astana are discussing increasing the transit of Russian oil to China through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline from 10 million to 12.5 million tons annually. Ushakov said prospects for the negotiations were “optimistic” and noted that the legal framework for the agreements was already in its final stages. According to KazTransOil, approximately 832,000 tons of Russian oil were transported to China through the route in April alone, while first-quarter transit volumes reached 2.5 million tons. Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russian...

Iran

Kazakhstan Signals Nuclear Diplomacy Role as Iran Uranium Dispute Intensifies

Kazakhstan is seeking a place in the next phase of the Iran nuclear dispute, not as a direct mediator between Washington and Tehran, but as a possible technical partner if talks turn to the handling of enriched uranium. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has said Kazakhstan is ready to assist if international agreements are reached. The offer reflects Astana’s long effort to turn its Soviet nuclear legacy, disarmament record, and nonproliferation infrastructure into diplomatic capital. The dispute has become more urgent as U.S.-Iran talks come under growing strain. According to Iran’s Fars News Agency, Washington has demanded the transfer of approximately 400 kilograms of enriched uranium and major restrictions on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Tehran, in turn, has insisted on sanctions relief, the unfreezing of foreign assets, compensation for wartime damage, and security guarantees. U.S. President Donald Trump has described Iran’s demands as “unacceptable.” He later said he had postponed a possible military strike on Iran following appeals from the leaders of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, citing what he called ongoing “serious negotiations.” Against that backdrop, Tokayev said during a May 11 meeting with Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira that Kazakhstan was ready, “as a gesture of goodwill,” to help resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. He said any such role would depend on relevant international agreements being reached and carried out in practice. According to Akorda, Tokayev also reiterated Kazakhstan’s commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under International Atomic Energy Agency oversight. The statement did not amount to an offer to mediate directly between Washington and Tehran. It was narrower and more practical. Kazakhstan is presenting itself as a state with broad international trust, technical experience, and nuclear infrastructure to support a settlement should the main parties agree on one. Tokayev placed that argument directly into the Iran debate at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April. “The core issue is the proliferation of nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons. This must remain the central subject of negotiations in the context of the situation surrounding Iran,” he said. For Kazakhstan, that distinction is central to the way it presents itself internationally. The country has built much of its post-Soviet foreign policy identity around nuclear nonproliferation. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Kazakhstan’s anti-nuclear stance is not only a diplomatic position, but part of the country’s modern national identity. The Soviet Union conducted 456 nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site between 1949 and 1989, leaving long-term environmental and public health damage in eastern Kazakhstan. After independence, Kazakhstan transferred its inherited nuclear warheads to Russia and joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Kazakhstan has direct technical experience with sensitive nuclear material. In 1994, under Operation Sapphire, roughly 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium were removed from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk and transferred to the United States. TCA previously reported that the operation remains one of the strongest examples of Kazakhstan’s role in practical nonproliferation work. Kazakhstan has been involved...

Nuclear Diplomacy

Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Diplomacy Offers Lessons for Iran Crisis

Ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran have yet to resolve a key issue: what will happen to the enriched uranium currently held by a country engulfed in conflict. Beyond political considerations, there are also significant technical challenges, namely, how such material could be safely removed from Iran if an agreement is reached. Kazakhstan, however, has previously carried out a unique operation of this kind, later documented in detail through U.S. and Kazakh accounts, and has a long track record of constructive engagement in nuclear diplomacy. The Uranium Question The parties to the conflict, the United States, Israel, and Iran, remain deeply divided on core issues. Various countries, including Pakistan, have been involved as mediators. At the same time, the situation is complicated by broader military and economic tensions, including the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian oil exports and Iran’s continuing obstruction of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz dominates headlines, often diverting attention from the central issue: the fate of Iran’s uranium stockpile. Axios reported that U.S. and Iranian negotiators had discussed a possible arrangement involving the release of frozen Iranian funds, with a figure of $20 billion under discussion. One U.S. official described that figure as a U.S. proposal, while U.S. President Donald Trump later denied that any money would change hands. IAEA-linked figures put Iran’s stockpile at about 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, close to weapons-grade levels if further enriched. Trump has expressed confidence that Iran will agree to a deal and that the uranium can be removed. Iranian officials, however, have rejected this claim, stating that they do not intend to transfer enriched uranium to the United States or any other country. Tokayev’s Position On April 17, 2026, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev addressed the issue during a diplomatic forum in Antalya, warning that excessive focus on trade routes and the Strait of Hormuz risks overshadowing the core problem, the nuclear issue. “The essence of the problem lies in the proliferation of nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons. This must be the central topic of negotiations when it comes to the conflict around Iran,” Tokayev said. Experts have since highlighted the complexity of the task facing policymakers: not only negotiating terms but physically removing enriched uranium from Iran. This would involve dealing with potentially damaged facilities, ensuring security, deploying specialist teams, defining transport routes, establishing international oversight, and determining a final destination for the material. Against this backdrop, Tokayev’s remarks carry particular weight. While the United States is reported to be insisting not only on limiting future enrichment but also on transferring existing stockpiles, Iran is seeking to separate the nuclear issue from the broader regional crisis. Tokayev, by contrast, has emphasized that energy and shipping disruptions are symptoms of a deeper conflict, with the nuclear issue at its core. Operation Sapphire Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan inherited the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal, after Russia, the United States, and Ukraine. The country was also...

Nuclear power

Uzbekistan Plans $1 Billion for First Two Small Nuclear Reactors

Uzbekistan is planning to invest nearly $1 billion in the construction of its first two small reactors as part of an integrated nuclear power plant, according to officials speaking at a major industrial exhibition in Tashkent. The estimate was announced by the Deputy Chairman of the country's Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Sukhrob Abdurakhmonov, during the “Innoprom. Central Asia” exhibition, held from April 20 to 22. The event was organized by Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investment, Industry and Trade together with Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade, local media outlet Gazeta.uz reported. Abdurakhmonov said the first phase of the project involves the construction of two small reactors, each with a capacity of 55 megawatts. “Even at the initial stage, the project, valued at approximately $1 billion, will require a large volume of high-quality products,” he said during a panel session. He noted that the scale of the project is expected to push local industries toward higher standards, from electrical equipment manufacturing to construction materials. “We see this as a strong incentive for the modernization of production,” he added. The nuclear plant is planned for the Jizzakh region, where officials expect the development of a broader economic cluster. According to Abdurakhmonov, the project could stimulate growth in related sectors such as services, transport, logistics, and social infrastructure, creating thousands of jobs and new opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses. The announcement follows agreements signed in March between Uzatom and Rosatom on cooperation and further steps in the nuclear power project. Speaking earlier to reporters, Alexey Likhachev said the initiative could also generate significant economic benefits for Russia. He estimated that even a small reactor project in Uzbekistan could bring orders worth up to $22 billion for Russian companies and create around 1,000 jobs.