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Turkey Deportation Consent

In Türkiye, Uzbek Man Faces Deportation After Photographing Woman Without Consent

An Uzbek man who photographed a Turkish woman in the Istanbul metro without her permission is in the process of being deported. Uzbekistan’s consulate in Istanbul said on Thursday that the man was arrested on April 13 after taking “unauthorized” photos of the woman, who then reported the alleged violation of her privacy to law enforcement authorities. The man’s work permit was revoked and he is being subjected to “forced deportation measures,” said the consulate, which intervened in order to prevent a criminal investigation. “According to Turkish law, photographing or videotaping another person, especially women, without their consent is strictly prohibited and may result in criminal prosecution,” the consulate said. It urged Uzbek citizens to follow local laws and said photographing or recording video of “strangers without their permission or causing them discomfort may result in serious action being taken against you.” Article 134 of Türkiye´s penal code provides for a punishment of up to several years in prison for violating the privacy of another person, including by disseminating images and sounds related to the personal life of the affected individual. ER&GUN&ER, an Istanbul-based law firm, says the country has “robust” laws to address privacy violations in the digital environment. It refers to a 2011 sex tape case and a 2016 political party data breach as high-profile cases involving such violations. “Taking pictures itself is not illegal in Turkey, but there are specific regulations that must be observed,” says Manolya Travel Agency, which is based in Istanbul. “While taking pictures, it is crucial to respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from capturing images of people without their explicit permission. This rule applies regardless of whether the person in the camera frame is a Turkish citizen or a foreign tourist.”

Middle Powers TITR Transport and Logistics Middle Corridor Turkey

How Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Are Rewiring the Middle Corridor

Kazakhstan's acceleration of its strategic alignment with Azerbaijan signals more than bilateral convergence. It reflects a deeper structural reconfiguration of Eurasian connectivity, a reconfiguration that is not additive but integrative. As documented in multiple announcements and institutional moves across March 2025, their cooperation has crossed the threshold from parallel development to systemic coordination. This evolving dynamic illustrates the emergence of a regionally endogenous axis that, without proclaiming itself as such, is shaping the wider functional geometry of Eurasia. At the material core of this shift is the Middle Corridor — the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) — linking China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus. While long viewed as a technical alternative to the Northern and Southern corridors, the Middle Corridor is now exhibiting the dynamics of what in systems theory would be called self-amplifying dynamic feedback loops. (The technical term is “autopoiesis,” literally “self-creation” of “self-production.”) In particular, institutional feedback, infrastructure reinforcement, and regulatory adaptation are all feeding into one another in ways characteristic of an autonomously emergent macroregional logic. Kazakhstan’s announcement in December 2024 of the financing of a new terminal at Alat port in Azerbaijan, on which construction began in 2025, illustrates this logic in material form. Simultaneously, Kazakhstan is upgrading its Aktau port, backed by Chinese capital from Lianyungang, to triple its container throughput by 2028. This situation exemplifies the transformation of quantity into quality. Specifically, the upgrades are instantiating a network strategy that values not only volumes but also redundancy, flexibility, and strategic optionality. The new fiber-optic cable agreement signed in March 2025 further reinforces this convergence. A 380-kilometer undersea connection between Sumqayit and Aktau — part of the broader Digital Silk Road — will reduce latency between the two countries from hours to milliseconds. In system-theoretic terms, this is not merely a technical augmentation. It converts the corridor from a physical transit route into a distributed digital platform capable of supporting real-time adaptive coordination. This shift from “throughput” to “synchronization” is foundational. It also deepens the infrastructure-energy-information triad that has become characteristic of new macroregional systems. Kazakhstan’s expanded use of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, projected to carry 1.7 million tons of its oil in 2025, is not simply diversification. It is the strategic concretization of Azerbaijan’s role as a downstream node for Central Asian hydrocarbons. This is occurring alongside green transition signaling, including a modest floating solar project at Lake Boyukshor and a trilateral renewable energy agreement between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. The repurposing of hydrocarbon corridors for hybrid energy flows is not substitution but overlay, in effect a dual-pathway system. Meanwhile, capital commitment is reinforcing the commercial aspect. A $300 million joint investment fund announced by the two countries has already designated the construction of an intermodal terminal at Alat as its inaugural project. Additional integration comes from the UAE-backed $50 million grain terminal at Kuryk, which will further diversify the system's carrying capacity by drawing agro-logistics into the corridor's functionality. In my recent article on the...

Turkey Azerbaijan Regional Cooperation Ukraine War

What Does Turkey’s “Return” to Europe Mean for Central Asia?

Turkey’s ties with Europe are undergoing a reinvigoration. This phenomenon is foregrounded by recent high-level diplomatic engagements and burgeoning military and economic linkages, which may at first glance appear as a realignment within the Euro-Atlantic system. It holds deeper implications, however, and most consequentially for Central Asia. Turkey is re-entering the European strategic imagination, this time not as a supplicant but as a self-assured middle power. Europe's altered international environment, by changing its external posture, will provide the Central Asian states with additional geopolitical resources in a world marked by shifting alignments and competing centers of power. To grasp the systems-level implications of this shift, one must first dispense with the linear narrative of bilateralism that has long framed Turkey-Europe or Turkey-Central Asia relations in isolation. Instead, Turkey’s position as a hub of multi-vectorial networks — anchored in NATO, increasingly interlocked with EU markets, yet culturally and politically entwined with Turkic Central Asia — makes it a proactive agent whose movement in one sphere triggers systemic perturbations across others. Thus, when Turkey edges closer to Europe, it also subtly reconfigures the vector of Central Asia’s international relations. The second Trump administration is continuing the transition in Europe’s security architecture that was inaugurated during the first. With longstanding assumptions about American commitment to the Atlantic alliance shaken, Europe finds itself unmoored. In this new context, Turkey’s military interventions — its incursions in northern and now central Syria, its containment of Russian advances in Ukraine, and its supply of military drones to Azerbaijan — demonstrate a degree of strategic autonomy that is rare among NATO members. Europe has noticed. The readjustment of its view of Turkey is evident through invitations to summits with key EU players, overtures from German and Polish leaders, and discussions around deepening the customs union. Turkey is no longer peripheral country knocking at the EU’s door; shifts in the international system have made it an increasingly indispensable node in the continent’s security and energy architectures. This European courtship of Turkey has ramifications well beyond Brussels or Berlin, or even Ankara. For the Central Asian states, afflicted by asymmetric dependencies on Russia, Turkey’s geopolitical normalization with Europe presents a "demonstration effect". That is, it puts the spotlight on a regional actor that is using soft power affinities and hard power capabilities to parlay its peripheral status into centrality. Turkey’s return to Europe showcases a successful strategy of multidirectional engagement. Such "strategic hedging" obviates obedience to any single bloc, instead leveraging the overall system's recursive entanglements for national-interest advantage. The Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership is illustrative. Turkey’s provision of military assistance used during the Second Karabakh War in 2020, notably the Bayraktar TB2 drones, enabled Azerbaijan to shift the regional balance. Russia is no longer the hegemonic power in the South Caucasus and must compete in a condition where it is diplomatically and militarily weakened by its war against Ukraine. Baku stands to benefit from its multisectoral economic cooperation with Ankara, which goes far beyond military assistance. Specifically, Azerbaijan's partnership with Turkey...

Natural gas Bilateral Trade Bilateral Relations Iran Turkey

Strategic Cooperation Between Turkey and Turkmenistan Gains Momentum

Turkey and Turkmenistan have accelerated their cooperation in recent years, advancing economic, energy, and diplomatic initiatives that underscore their shared cultural and strategic interests. Their deepening of bilateral ties reflects and expresses both broader regional dynamics and shifts in global energy geopolitics. As The Times of Central Asia reports, the two countries signed a natural gas supply agreement in February 2025 that reinforces Turkey’s ambitions as a regional energy hub while providing Turkmenistan with a new export avenue. Turkmenistan will begin supplying 1.3 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of natural gas to Turkey on March 1 through a swap agreement. Turkmenistan will send gas to Iran for consumption in the northeast of the country, in return for which Iran will transfer an equivalent amount to Turkey. Various press commentaries and diplomatic declarations touting the “export of Turkmen gas to Turkey” are therefore to be regarded skeptically as political grandstanding, even if such an assessment may be supported from a technical standpoint of how the industry calculates flows. Trade and investment relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan have recently seen steady growth, underpinned by Turkish business engagement in Turkmenistan’s infrastructure and construction sectors. Over 600 Turkish companies are active in Turkmenistan, and Turkish direct investment has surpassed $500 million. Turkish contractors have executed projects worth over $50 billion in Turkmenistan since its independence. In this context, the eighth meeting of the bilateral Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation took place in Ankara on February 25. Following the meeting, a large-scale protocol was signed, including 87 points and covering cooperation over a wide range of issues - areas such as trade and investment, energy, transport and logistics, scientific cooperation, agriculture, and healthcare. The bilateral trade turnover between the two countries reached $2.2 billion in 2024, and Turkey aims to more than double this level to $5 billion. However, reaching that target hinges on further liberalization of Turkmenistan’s economic policies and the expansion of investment-friendly regulations, both of which could be challenging. The two sides also discussed how to integrate Turkmenistan into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, “Middle Corridor”) as well as possible cooperation in the field of transport and logistics toward that end. Ankara has successfully positioned itself as a strategic economic partner, but Ashgabat’s tightly controlled economy presents structural barriers that may slow the desired growth. Ankara’s engagement with Ashgabat thus reflects its broader efforts to enhance connectivity across Central Asia. Turkey’s push to integrate Turkmenistan into the TITR aligns with its own ambition to position itself as a logistical bridge between Asia and Europe, complementing its Middle Corridor strategy, which seeks to create an alternative trade route bypassing Russia. However, Turkmenistan’s rigid economic model and cautious foreign policy limit the pace of integration. Practical challenges include regulatory misalignment, infrastructure bottlenecks, and geopolitical sensitivities. Turkey’s Vice-President, Cevdet Yilmaz, affirmed his country’s intention that Turkmen gas and electricity should reach European markets through Turkey. Turkish state-owned companies such as TPAO and BOTAŞ will also seek to develop hydrocarbon fields in Turkmenistan and...

Geopolitics Organization of Turkic States EAEU Multi-vector Foreign Policy Russia Turkey CSTO

Turkey’s Turkic Gambit: Balancing Influence in Post-Soviet States

Despite its superpower ambitions, which have diminished somewhat since February 24, 2022, Moscow views Turkey’s growing geopolitical influence with increasing concern. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which includes several Central Asian republics, is perceived by the Kremlin as a rival to its regional blocs, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, for Central Asian nations, the OTS is not a political or military alliance but rather a framework for economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. The extent of Turkey’s influence remains limited within these parameters. A Historical Perspective Russia continues to interpret geopolitical dynamics through the lens of century-old concepts, particularly Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turkism, both of which emerged as nationalist movements against the Russian and Ottoman empires. Pan-Turkism gained traction in the Ottoman Empire but lost momentum following its adoption and subsequent rejection by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideology was later revived during the Cold War, when Turkey’s NATO membership positioned it as a force for destabilizing Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Turkic regions within Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Despite Turkish efforts, Pan-Turkic sentiment found limited success, influencing only Azerbaijan, which aligned closely with Turkey after losing the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijan formalized this relationship in the early 1990s with the doctrine of “Two Countries, One Nation.” Baku only began to see concrete benefits from its alliance with Ankara after winning the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The Organization of Turkic States: Reality vs. Rhetoric Although the first summit of Turkic states was held in 1992, the OTS’s precursor, the Turkic Council, was only founded in 2009. The agreement, signed in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, initially included Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining in 2018, and officially became a member in 2019, whilst Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2022), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (2023) hold observer state status. Turkmenistan has frequently been rumored to be considering full membership. Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia have often clashed with the ambitions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan delayed its membership in the Turkic Council until 2019 due to strained relations with Ankara which dated back to the mid-1990s. Turkey, the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics, expected to leverage its Cold War victory over the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region. While Kazakhstan initially welcomed Turkish economic expansion and Pan-Turkic rhetoric, it became increasingly skeptical in the 2000s. Uzbekistan, however, was cautious from the outset and largely resisted Turkish influence. Kazakhstan’s shift in perspective coincided with Ankara’s increased push for deeper Turkic integration. Turkish-backed initiatives in Kazakhstan revealed clear expectations that Ankara would lead such a union, prompting Astana to resist. Kazakhstan, which balances ties with the West, China, and Russia, rejected the notion of falling under Turkish leadership. The Kazakh government neutralized Pan-Turkic voices by integrating key advocates into political positions, redirecting their efforts toward promoting Kazakh nationalism instead. Turkey’s Role in the...

Natural gas Iran Turkey

Turkmenistan to Start Natural Gas Shipments to Turkey

Long-discussed shipments of Turkmen natural gas to Turkey could be just weeks away. Several options have been discussed for bringing gas to Turkey, but news since February 10 indicates Turkmenistan and Turkey chose a swap agreement involving Iran. Turkmenistan’s state information agency TDH reported the head of the country’s Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov spoke with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian by phone. During that call, Berdimuhamedov “announced the agreement with (Turkey’s) BOTAS company on the transit of Turkmen natural gas through Iran to the Republic of Turkey..." Since there is no pipeline connecting Turkmenistan to Turkey, the agreement involves a swap deal whereby Turkmenistan ships its gas to Iran and Iran makes a like amount of its gas available to Turkey. However, on February 11, Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar posted on X (formerly Twitter) confirming an agreement between BOTAS and Turkmengaz. Bayraktar said “… gas flow is planned to start on March 1, 2025.” There were no details about the volume of gas to be delivered, but Turkish officials have previously been mentioning an initial volume of some 2 billion cubic meters (bcm). Turkish officials have been pushing for this deal for more than two years, with the ultimate aim of turning Turkey into a gas hub to shipments to Europe. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev traveled to Turkmenistan in December 2022 to meet with Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov (the son of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov). Erdogan and Aliyev were hoping for an agreement on construction of a pipeline to carry Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan and from there to Turkey. Those talks were inconclusive, but did lead to a series of other meetings of officials of the three countries to discuss alternative means to ship Turkmen gas to Turkey. The swap arrangement involving Iran was one of the possibilities raised during these meetings. However, Turkey is still clinging to the plan for construction of a pipeline that would eventually boost Turkmen gas supplies to Turkey up to 15 bcm. Turkish Ambassador to Ashgabat Ahmet Demirok said in September 2024 that his country was looking to purchase 300 bcm of Turkmen gas over the next 20 years. The agreement is good news for Turkmenistan, but it also shows again how dependent Turkmenistan is becoming on Iran for gas exports. When Turkmenistan became independent in late 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the only gas pipelines in Turkmenistan led north to Russia. Turkmenistan was exporting gas to Russia for most of the years after independence, but in 2024 the latest agreement between the two countries expired and both countries indicated they would not renew Turkmen gas exports. The first post-Soviet pipeline built in Turkmenistan connected to Iran. That pipeline started operations at the end of 1997. Another pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran was launched in 2010. The two pipelines have a combined capacity to carry some 20 bcm, but a pricing dispute between Turkmenistan and Iran in late 2016 led Turkmenistan to...