Trade Routes - The Times Of Central Asia

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Trade Routes

Iranian Foreign Minister to Visit Turkmenistan, Seeking Closer Ties

Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi is leading a diplomatic and economic delegation on a visit to Turkmenistan this week, according to Iranian state media. Araghchi will travel to Ashgabat on Monday for talks with Turkmen officials on “areas of mutual interest,” reported the Islamic Republic News Agency, or IRNA. The report didn’t specify the areas, but Iran has been working to develop its relationships in Central Asia as it faces pressure because of conflict in the Middle East, Western sanctions, and disruption to its trade routes. On October 26, Araghchi and Turkmen counterpart Rashid Meredov spoke by phone about “continuing diplomatic consultations and political efforts to de-escalate tensions and establish lasting stability and security in the region,” Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said. Turkmenistan has a policy of permanent neutrality under which it commits to staying out of military alliances, promoting peaceful relations and not getting involved in other countries’ affairs. In July, it issued an unusually sharp statement after an attack on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea that the Iranian government blamed on Ukraine. The Turkmen government described the attack as unacceptable. The Caspian Sea is critical to Turkmenistan’s efforts to expand its role as a transit point on the Middle Corridor, a trade network linking China and Central Asia to Europe via rail and maritime links. The country’s main port is Turkmenbashi. Iran has a long border with Turkmenistan and is also a Caspian Sea littoral state, with its northern port of Amirabad. The sea is an alternative route for some of Iran’s regional trade, including with Russia to the north. Iran also offers Central Asia a southern route for goods to reach the Persian Gulf and beyond, though that route has been disrupted by blockades, restrictions and attacks in the Strait of Hormuz. In another area of collaboration, Iran imports electricity from Turkmenistan to offset shortages in northern Iranian provinces, and the two countries recently discussed expanding and extending the arrangement. They have also worked together on energy swap deals under which Iran would provide natural gas to other countries, including Azerbaijan and Iraq, and receive similar amounts of gas from Turkmenistan in return.

OTS summit

OTS Summit in Ankara: Türkiye Looks to Strengthen Its Position as Central Asia Competes for Transit Routes

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev arrived in Ankara on October 28, the day he delivered his annual State of the Nation Address, in which he announced plans to expand transport routes between China and Europe. On October 30, he will attend the 13th summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Turkey is preparing to take over the organization's chairmanship from Azerbaijan, and Central Asian countries are seeking to accelerate freight transportation across the Caspian Sea. Behind the shared rhetoric of Turkic unity lie specific economic interests. Kazakhstan is building railways and expanding its capacity to handle transit cargo from China. Azerbaijan is developing Caspian ports and transport infrastructure in the South Caucasus. Turkey wants to attract more freight moving between China and Europe through Central Asia, increasing its role as a transit hub. A unified route looks much simpler on a political map than it does in the daily operations of transport companies. Between China and Europe, cargo crosses several borders, is transferred from trains to ships and back, undergoes customs clearance, and is subject to tariffs set by different operators. Interest in alternative Eurasian transport routes has grown since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but the competition extends beyond freight. Ankara is looking to strengthen its political presence in Central Asia, where Russia and China retain considerable influence. Summit events begin on October 29 with a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, chaired by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. The nation’s presidents will meet on the following day. Participants are expected to adopt the Ankara Declaration, discuss investment, energy, digitalization, security, and appoint a new OTS secretary-general. Tokayev and Kazakhstan's Route to Europe Tokayev's visit to Turkey follows directly after his State of the Nation Address, much of which focused on infrastructure, including plans to open the 272-kilometer Bakhty–Ayagoz railway in 2027. The line is expected to add 20 million metric tons of annual freight capacity between Kazakhstan and China. Tokayev also discussed construction of the Aral–Caspian highway. The project would establish a new transport connection between western and central Kazakhstan. According to government estimates, it could shorten certain freight routes between China and Europe by approximately 1,000 kilometers and reduce delivery times by up to three days. Both projects are part of a broader effort to increase Kazakhstan's revenue from international logistics. The country currently earns a substantial share of its transit revenue directly from freight transportation. Developing warehouses, terminals, processing facilities, and distribution centers could generate additional income. Turkey occupies an important position in this network. An overland branch of the Middle Corridor passes through its territory en route to European markets; the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway connects Azerbaijan to Turkey's rail network through Georgia. On the sidelines of the Ankara summit, Turkish business associations plan to discuss border crossing operations, transportation costs, and the development of the Middle Corridor. Transport geography, however, does not fit neatly within the OTS's political boundaries. Georgia, through which the railway connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey passes, is not a member...

Regional Security

Central Asia’s Afghan Engagement Faces Persistent Security Risks

Central Asian countries are expanding their trade with Kabul despite concerns about armed groups operating from Afghanistan. Russia has renewed warnings about militants seeking to infiltrate the region and is advocating cooperation with the Taliban authorities to contain them. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are interested in trade, energy, and transport projects connecting the region with South Asia. Tajikistan has traditionally taken a more critical position toward the Taliban and places particular emphasis on securing its lengthy border with Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Russia and China are seeking guarantees from the Afghan authorities against the activities of armed organizations that threaten their security. Speaking on October 16 at a joint conference of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said extremist organizations maintained a significant presence in Afghan provinces bordering Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. According to Lavrov, militants intend to use Afghan territory to expand their activities into Central Asia and Russia. Lavrov identified Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State terrorist organization, also known as ISIS-K, as the main threat, citing Russian security agencies. The group opposes the Taliban, carries out attacks in Afghanistan, and has struck beyond its borders. The name Khorasan refers to a historical region encompassing parts of present-day Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia. ISIS-K’s reach extends beyond Afghanistan’s border regions through propaganda, recruitment, and cross-border networks. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, people from Central Asia have been implicated in ISIS-K activities beyond the region itself, including within migrant communities. Lavrov claimed that militants in northern Afghanistan included ethnic Uyghurs, alongside fighters from Central Asia and the North Caucasus. His reference to Uyghurs echoes Beijing’s security concerns over Xinjiang, where China has used counterterrorism policies to justify sweeping repression. A 2022 UN assessment found that arbitrary detention and restrictions on the rights of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim groups could constitute crimes against humanity. The TASS report provided no evidence supporting his claims about the fighters’ origins. Lavrov also called for joint action against weapons and drug trafficking through Central Asia. The Taliban as a Security Partner Lavrov urged engagement with the Taliban authorities, who returned to power during the U.S. military withdrawal in August 2021. Russia formally recognized their government in July 2025. Moscow argues that the Taliban’s control of Afghan territory makes them responsible for security within the country, and is seeking international support for Kabul’s efforts to improve regional security. While relying on the Taliban to contain armed groups, Moscow is simultaneously questioning their ability to do so. ISIS-K has attacked Taliban officials, giving Kabul a direct reason to confront the organization. That conflict, however, offers no assurance that the Taliban will act against other armed groups operating in Afghanistan. China also favors working with Kabul on security, with concerns extending to the safety of Chinese nationals and regional trade routes. Two attacks launched from Afghan territory killed five Chinese nationals...

CKU Railway

Opinion: China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Opens New Options Beyond Europe

The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is often presented as a new route to Europe, but its first benefits are likely to be felt closer to home. It could give Central Asian shippers more choice and governments more room to negotiate transport costs, even where sanctions restrict access to European markets. Excavation of the 209.6-meter Kosh-Dobo North No. 2 tunnel was completed on August 5. Work is also underway on other tunnels along Kyrgyzstan’s mountainous section of the railway. CKU is advancing as falling Caspian water levels make the Middle Corridor more expensive to maintain. That could increase demand for alternative routes, although each comes with its own costs and restrictions. Kyrgyz officials have high expectations. Deputy Prime Minister Edil Baisalov told TCA that “this railroad will virtually transform Kyrgyzstan.” Fulfilling that ambition will require the country to earn more than transit fees. Much depends on Makmal, where a transshipment station and possible logistics center are planned. The Torugart-Makmal section will use the Chinese standard gauge of 1,435 mm, while the Makmal-Jalal-Abad section will use the 1,520 mm gauge common across the post-Soviet rail system. Changing gauge adds time and expense as cargo moves between trains. The planned station will handle transfers between the two systems, as well as cargo sorting and train assembly, operations which could support local logistics businesses, provided there is enough traffic. Warehousing and customs services would give Kyrgyzstan a chance to earn more from that traffic. Whether Makmal develops into a wider logistics hub will depend on the services available and their cost to shippers. The mountainous terrain makes the line expensive and slow to build. It also limits the options for competing routes through the Tien Shan. That may strengthen Kyrgyzstan’s negotiating position, but only if the railway offers a reliable service at competitive rates. The trans-Caspian Middle Corridor avoids Russia and Iran, making it more attractive to European companies concerned about sanctions. Yet, as TCA has reported, falling Caspian water levels are raising the cost of the route through Aktau and Kuryk. Low sea levels around Aktau and Kuryk reduce loading efficiency and increase transport costs. Kazakhstan has dredged Kuryk and launched deeper work at Aktau, aiming for a 7.7-meter depth in the operational part of the port. The Caspian route remains workable, but maintaining it requires continuing investment. If those costs rise, shippers will have more reason to compare alternatives. There are also delays to address. In a recent TCA interview, the TITR secretary general stressed the need to speed up the route and ease Caspian bottlenecks as freight volumes grow. A southern route could avoid Caspian transshipment. From Uzbekistan, cargo can move through Turkmenistan and Iran to Turkey. Uzbek, Iranian, and Turkish officials have already discussed linking this corridor with the CKU railway. Some freight already travels south on existing lines. In September, a 55-container block train was dispatched from Kazakhstan’s Altynkol station after crossing from China. Its announced route ran through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to Iran via the Sarakhs border station. It carried...

UN General Assembly

Central Asia at the UN: Iran Threats and Sanctions Disputes

U.S. President Donald Trump’s threat to “annihilate” Iran brought the vulnerability of Central Asia’s southern trade routes into focus as the UN General Assembly’s general debate opened in New York. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov challenged unilateral sanctions, while diplomacy over Ukraine raised the prospect of a halt to attacks on energy infrastructure. For landlocked Central Asia, these developments carry consequences far beyond the speeches. Iranian ports provide access to overseas markets, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rely heavily on fuel from Russian refineries, and restrictions on international payments can complicate commerce even where transport links remain intact. Iran and Access to the Sea Addressing the General Assembly on September 22, Trump presented a choice between reaching an agreement with Tehran and carrying out his threat to “annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly.” He also predicted that an agreement could follow the U.S. midterm elections, while defending U.S. military action against Iran. [caption id="attachment_56719" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: UN[/caption] That framing leaves Central Asian countries facing costs regardless of their position on Tehran. Iran provides overland connections to ports serving the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Damage to Iranian infrastructure can therefore disrupt trade between Central Asia and countries that are not parties to the conflict. Uzbekistan’s exposure illustrates the distinction. According to its Ministry of Economy and Finance, goods worth $3.9 billion entered Uzbekistan through Iran in 2025. That represented about 9% of total imports, including approximately $1 billion in technological equipment. Uzbek exports transiting Iran were worth another $1.4 billion. Those figures measure transit, not simply purchases from Iranian suppliers. Pressure intended to isolate Tehran can also obstruct Uzbekistan’s access to equipment and customers elsewhere. Kazakhstan has also sought a larger southern outlet. A 27-year agreement provides for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade says the project would expand access to Gulf markets and destinations in Asia and East Africa. The risks differ by port. Bandar Abbas faces the Strait of Hormuz, while Chabahar sits on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait. Both depend on Iranian infrastructure and remain exposed to the wider conflict and sanctions environment. Developing alternative routes does not make these southern connections dispensable. Nor is exposure uniform. Kazakh officials have emphasized the limited existing role of Persian Gulf shipments in the country’s logistics. For Astana, the threat concerns future diversification as well as current trade. For Uzbekistan, the transit figures show a substantial flow already at risk. Tajikistan, meanwhile, has sought 2.55 million tons of Iranian crude oil and fuel following shortages in Russian supplies. Its search for an alternative leaves Dushanbe exposed to two conflicts, with attacks on Russian refineries disrupting its established supplier, and the conflict involving Iran threatening a potential replacement. Japarov Challenges Sanctions In his General Assembly address, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov argued that unilateral sanctions harm smaller developing states and can become instruments of political pressure. “The right to impose sanctions against a particular state should, in our view,...

Middle Corridor

Middle Corridor Must Cut Delays, TITR Chief Tells TCA

The Middle Corridor has spent the past several years attracting freight away from longer or politically sensitive routes between Asia and Europe. Now its operators must make it function as a single, reliable corridor. “Reducing transit time is achieved not through a single solution, but through the consistent modernization of all key links along the route, from ports and terminals to railway infrastructure and digital tools,” Nurgul Zhakupova, Secretary General of the International Association “Trans-Caspian International Transport Route,” told The Times of Central Asia. [caption id="attachment_54935" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Nurgul Zhakupova, Secretary General of TITR. Image courtesy of the subject[/caption] Known internationally as the Middle Corridor, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) connects China with Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, with onward connections through Turkey. Freight traffic has risen sharply since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine increased demand for routes bypassing Russia. According to official figures, container traffic grew by 36% in 2025 to around 77,000 TEUs, although total freight volume slipped to about 4.12 million tons from 4.48 million tons in 2024. The World Bank estimates that freight volumes along the Middle Corridor could triple and transit times could be halved by 2030 if the necessary investments and reforms are made. The European Union and international financial institutions have meanwhile committed to mobilizing €10 billion for sustainable transport connectivity in Central Asia, with the aim of developing a route capable of linking Central Asia and Europe in around 15 days. For Zhakupova, that means tackling bottlenecks across several countries at the same time. Building a faster railway in Kazakhstan achieves little if cargo then waits for a ship on the Caspian, becomes stuck at a border, or encounters another congested section farther west. [caption id="attachment_54945" align="aligncenter" width="1535"] Infographic: TCA[/caption] Infrastructure Races to Catch Up One immediate challenge is expanding infrastructure fast enough to accommodate container traffic and anticipated future freight growth. Kazakhstan launched the second Dostyk-Moyynty railway line and the Almaty bypass in 2025. Construction of the Moyynty-Kyzylzhar line and modernization of other sections are continuing. The Dostyk-Moyynty project alone stretches 836 kilometers and is expected to substantially increase rail capacity on the China-Kazakhstan axis. One of the Middle Corridor’s most difficult bottlenecks is not on land, but on the Caspian Sea. Growing traffic requires more vessels, while falling water levels and adverse weather complicate port and shipping operations. KTZ Express plans to acquire six multipurpose dry cargo container vessels: four are to be built by China’s Jiangsu Haizhongzhou Shipping Industry and two by the Baku Shipyard. Kazmortransflot is building two container vessels in partnership with Abu Dhabi Ports Group, while Azerbaijan is also considering expanding its fleet with ferries and roll-on/roll-off vessels for wheeled cargo. “Additional limiting factors remain the falling level of the Caspian Sea and adverse weather conditions. In this regard, a range of measures is also being implemented at the ports of Aktau, Baku, and Kuryk to minimize the impact of these factors on the stability of transportation,” Zhakupova told TCA. In Kuryk,...