Trade Routes - The Times Of Central Asia

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UN General Assembly

Central Asia at the UN: Iran Threats and Sanctions Disputes

U.S. President Donald Trump’s threat to “annihilate” Iran brought the vulnerability of Central Asia’s southern trade routes into focus as the UN General Assembly’s general debate opened in New York. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov challenged unilateral sanctions, while diplomacy over Ukraine raised the prospect of a halt to attacks on energy infrastructure. For landlocked Central Asia, these developments carry consequences far beyond the speeches. Iranian ports provide access to overseas markets, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rely heavily on fuel from Russian refineries, and restrictions on international payments can complicate commerce even where transport links remain intact. Iran and Access to the Sea Addressing the General Assembly on September 22, Trump presented a choice between reaching an agreement with Tehran and carrying out his threat to “annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly.” He also predicted that an agreement could follow the U.S. midterm elections, while defending U.S. military action against Iran. [caption id="attachment_56719" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: UN[/caption] That framing leaves Central Asian countries facing costs regardless of their position on Tehran. Iran provides overland connections to ports serving the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Damage to Iranian infrastructure can therefore disrupt trade between Central Asia and countries that are not parties to the conflict. Uzbekistan’s exposure illustrates the distinction. According to its Ministry of Economy and Finance, goods worth $3.9 billion entered Uzbekistan through Iran in 2025. That represented about 9% of total imports, including approximately $1 billion in technological equipment. Uzbek exports transiting Iran were worth another $1.4 billion. Those figures measure transit, not simply purchases from Iranian suppliers. Pressure intended to isolate Tehran can also obstruct Uzbekistan’s access to equipment and customers elsewhere. Kazakhstan has also sought a larger southern outlet. A 27-year agreement provides for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade says the project would expand access to Gulf markets and destinations in Asia and East Africa. The risks differ by port. Bandar Abbas faces the Strait of Hormuz, while Chabahar sits on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait. Both depend on Iranian infrastructure and remain exposed to the wider conflict and sanctions environment. Developing alternative routes does not make these southern connections dispensable. Nor is exposure uniform. Kazakh officials have emphasized the limited existing role of Persian Gulf shipments in the country’s logistics. For Astana, the threat concerns future diversification as well as current trade. For Uzbekistan, the transit figures show a substantial flow already at risk. Tajikistan, meanwhile, has sought 2.55 million tons of Iranian crude oil and fuel following shortages in Russian supplies. Its search for an alternative leaves Dushanbe exposed to two conflicts, with attacks on Russian refineries disrupting its established supplier, and the conflict involving Iran threatening a potential replacement. Japarov Challenges Sanctions In his General Assembly address, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov argued that unilateral sanctions harm smaller developing states and can become instruments of political pressure. “The right to impose sanctions against a particular state should, in our view,...

Middle Corridor

Middle Corridor Must Cut Delays, TITR Chief Tells TCA

The Middle Corridor has spent the past several years attracting freight away from longer or politically sensitive routes between Asia and Europe. Now its operators must make it function as a single, reliable corridor. “Reducing transit time is achieved not through a single solution, but through the consistent modernization of all key links along the route, from ports and terminals to railway infrastructure and digital tools,” Nurgul Zhakupova, Secretary General of the International Association “Trans-Caspian International Transport Route,” told The Times of Central Asia. [caption id="attachment_54935" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Nurgul Zhakupova, Secretary General of TITR. Image courtesy of the subject[/caption] Known internationally as the Middle Corridor, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) connects China with Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, with onward connections through Turkey. Freight traffic has risen sharply since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine increased demand for routes bypassing Russia. According to official figures, container traffic grew by 36% in 2025 to around 77,000 TEUs, although total freight volume slipped to about 4.12 million tons from 4.48 million tons in 2024. The World Bank estimates that freight volumes along the Middle Corridor could triple and transit times could be halved by 2030 if the necessary investments and reforms are made. The European Union and international financial institutions have meanwhile committed to mobilizing €10 billion for sustainable transport connectivity in Central Asia, with the aim of developing a route capable of linking Central Asia and Europe in around 15 days. For Zhakupova, that means tackling bottlenecks across several countries at the same time. Building a faster railway in Kazakhstan achieves little if cargo then waits for a ship on the Caspian, becomes stuck at a border, or encounters another congested section farther west. [caption id="attachment_54945" align="aligncenter" width="1535"] Infographic: TCA[/caption] Infrastructure Races to Catch Up One immediate challenge is expanding infrastructure fast enough to accommodate container traffic and anticipated future freight growth. Kazakhstan launched the second Dostyk-Moyynty railway line and the Almaty bypass in 2025. Construction of the Moyynty-Kyzylzhar line and modernization of other sections are continuing. The Dostyk-Moyynty project alone stretches 836 kilometers and is expected to substantially increase rail capacity on the China-Kazakhstan axis. One of the Middle Corridor’s most difficult bottlenecks is not on land, but on the Caspian Sea. Growing traffic requires more vessels, while falling water levels and adverse weather complicate port and shipping operations. KTZ Express plans to acquire six multipurpose dry cargo container vessels: four are to be built by China’s Jiangsu Haizhongzhou Shipping Industry and two by the Baku Shipyard. Kazmortransflot is building two container vessels in partnership with Abu Dhabi Ports Group, while Azerbaijan is also considering expanding its fleet with ferries and roll-on/roll-off vessels for wheeled cargo. “Additional limiting factors remain the falling level of the Caspian Sea and adverse weather conditions. In this regard, a range of measures is also being implemented at the ports of Aktau, Baku, and Kuryk to minimize the impact of these factors on the stability of transportation,” Zhakupova told TCA. In Kuryk,...

Middle Corridor

Insider’s View: Why Uzbekistan’s Caspian Push Might Be Beneficial for Georgia

Over the past year, Georgia has shifted its focus towards Central Asia, establishing strategic partnerships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The country has long-term plans for the region in several development areas, including trade and transport logistics. However, the current phase of Georgian–Central Asian relations is not solely based on economic pragmatism. It should also be viewed as a means of preserving sovereignty in the face of global challenges that are catalyzing the old-world order to collapse. In this context, strategic connectivity can be defined as a vital component of small states’ long-term stability and security, placing it on a par with defense capabilities. By intensifying political and economic ties with Tbilisi, Tashkent is seeking to reinforce the Western orientation of its foreign policy. This is necessary to successfully balance between the major powers and minimize the risk of becoming overly dependent on neighboring Russia or China, for example. However, this move should not be perceived as a counter to the geopolitical ambitions of non-regional actors in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. It is devoid of political overtones and reflects the parties’ desire to strengthen their sovereignty based on shared economic interests and opportunities. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) is the key driver in this dynamic, and its significance extends far beyond transport connectivity. It is a mutually beneficial initiative whose ultimate goal is to ensure regional stability and sustainable economic growth. Thus, Uzbekistan gains an alternative route to the European Union market — the country’s third-largest trading partner — via the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi on the Black Sea coast. Meanwhile, the Trans-Caspian route provides Georgia with access to the rapidly growing markets of East and South Asia via Uzbekistan and neighboring countries. The new transit corridor concepts promoted by Uzbekistan in the context of the expanding Central Asian partnership deserve special attention. Tashkent and Tbilisi have enormous potential to develop transport cooperation by establishing intercontinental logistics chains: China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey/EU, and India–Pakistan–Afghanistan–Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan–Azerbaijan–Georgia–EU. Both projects involve connecting the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway and the Trans-Afghan Railway Corridor (the Kabul Corridor), which are an absolute priority for Uzbekistan, with the Middle Corridor. This will significantly increase the republic’s exports of transport services by attracting additional transit flows from the South Caucasus, Turkey and Europe, while also expanding the freight base for the aforementioned railway corridors. The issue of jointly promoting new trade routes along the east-west and north-south axes (from Europe to China and India, respectively) through Uzbekistan requires ongoing expert discussion to amplify its relevance. To fully realize its own transit potential, it is insufficient for Uzbekistan to focus solely on the infrastructure development of the Middle Corridor. This is because, even after the launch of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, the country’s ability to attract additional transit cargo flows would remain very limited due to Kazakhstan’s dominance in rail transport between the EU, Central Asia, and China via the Caspian Sea. For Uzbekistan, it is far more important to extend the Middle Corridor to China and India. This would...

Middle Corridor

Aral–Caspian Highway Project Advances Kazakhstan’s Bid for Eurasian Logistics Leadership

Kazakhstan has begun building an 800-kilometer highway that will give freight moving east and west a shorter road connection to the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk. The government says the project could cut nearly 1,000 kilometers and up to three days from journeys between Europe and China, while improving Kazakhstan’s access to European and regional markets. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev launched construction of the Beineu–Saksaulsk highway on August 3, and ordered its completion by 2029. He proposed calling it the Aral–Caspian Highway because it will run from Saksaulsk, near the Aral Sea, west to Beineu and the road network serving Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports. At Saksaulsk, three routes meet. The Kyzylorda road runs southeast to the Western Europe–Western China highway. The Ulgaysyn road continues northwest toward Aktobe. The new highway will run west to Beineu, from where roads lead to Aktau and Kuryk. The result is a more direct connection between southern Kazakhstan, the Aktobe corridor, and the Caspian coast, as outlined in the government’s wider road program. The government is reconstructing and expanding the Kyzylorda–Saksaulsk and Ulgaysyn–Saksaulsk sections alongside the new highway. The three projects cover a combined 1,574 kilometers. The authorities expect annual freight volumes along the routes to rise 2.5-fold to 13.2 million tons and say construction will create more than 10,000 jobs. Tokayev described the change as adding “horizontal connections” to Kazakhstan’s historically “vertical transportation networks.” His stated goal is to transform Kazakhstan into “one of the leading logistics hubs connecting Europe and Asia.” The road will feed into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor. Goods can move west from Kazakhstan across the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye, or east along the same route into Central and East Asia. The corridor gives European companies another path into Central Asian markets and gives Kazakhstan additional options for reaching Europe. The corridor is often presented as a China–Europe land-bridge, but the World Bank’s analysis expects most of its future traffic to be generated within the corridor region. Its modeling projects trade between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and the European Union to rise by 28% by 2030, while intercontinental freight remains below 40% of total volume. The commercial case therefore includes Kazakh exports moving west, European goods moving east, and regional cargo that never travels the full distance between Europe and China. Europe is already supporting parts of the network. The EU’s €30 million Trans-Caspian transport program backs preparatory work for the modernization of the Beineu–Saksaulsk road and improvements at Aktau. In June, Kazakhstan and European partners announced $462 million in transport agreements, including financing for the Aktobe–Ulgaysyn road and cooperation with A.P. Moller-Maersk on container shipping along the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan also enters the competition with infrastructure already in use. It has a direct border with China, established railways carrying freight across the country, and operating Caspian ports. Uzbekistan is advancing the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and other routes, but The Times of Central Asia has previously reported that Kazakhstan retains the stronger position for now because several of...

Russia's War in Ukraine

How the Russia–Ukraine War Is Reshaping Central Asia’s Geopolitical Balance

More than four years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the conflict continues to alter political and economic relations across the former Soviet space. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Uzbek political scientist Mukhtor Nazirov examined Moscow’s evolving regional role, Central Asia’s search for wider external partnerships, and the areas in which Russia remains difficult to replace. “The war changed Russia,” Nazirov said. “It became more closed, more militarized, and its political logic increasingly became military. Central Asian countries suddenly found themselves dealing with a Russia that was no longer the same as it had been before the war.” Before 2022, Russia’s relations with Central Asia rested on long-established political, economic, and security ties. Since the invasion, international isolation and wartime pressures have complicated that relationship. “The war consumed everything,” Nazirov explained. “It influenced not only politics and the economy, but also public thinking, the country’s openness, its ideology, and the overall direction of the state. As Russia changed during the war, its dialogue with Central Asian countries became increasingly difficult.” “Central Asian states gained a moral justification to look for other options,” he said. “Russia is no longer the Russia it used to be.” Russia nevertheless remains deeply embedded in the region’s economy. Infrastructure, logistics networks, export routes, and labor migration still bind Central Asian states to the Russian market. Kazakhstan exports most of its oil through Russia’s Novorossiysk port, while trade from Uzbekistan and other countries continues to rely heavily on northern corridors. Millions of Central Asian citizens also work in Russia. “The economic foundation still exists,” Nazirov told TCA. “Much of Central Asia remains part of an economic structure that was formed during the Soviet period. Infrastructure is shared, and many export routes still pass through Russia.” However, the durability of Moscow’s influence is under closer scrutiny as other powers expand their regional presence. “Political closeness alone is not enough,” Nazirov said. “Any partnership eventually comes down to economics. If Russia wants to remain influential, it must have a strong economic foundation. If it cannot provide that, then others will naturally begin filling the gap.” China and the European Union have expanded their economic engagement as sanctions and wartime demands have constrained Russia. Interest has also grown in the Middle Corridor, or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which offers an alternative to routes through Russia. “The rhetoric surrounding the Middle Corridor became much stronger during the war,” he said. “The project already existed, but the war created momentum.” The EU’s Global Gateway initiative and new connectivity financing have given Central Asian governments additional channels for trade, investment, and transport. “This space is being filled partly by China and partly by the European Union,” he said. “They are proposing alternatives, and naturally Central Asian countries are turning toward those opportunities.” Russia remains the main destination for Central Asian labor migrants, although governments are pursuing employment opportunities in South Korea, Europe, and the Gulf states. “I would not say diversification has already taken place,” Nazirov...

Middle East Crisis

The Fragile U.S.–Iran Truce: What Central Asia Stands to Gain and Lose

The preliminary memorandum signed in mid-June between the United States and Iran, followed by renewed talks between Washington and Tehran, has extended a U.S.–Iran truce and opened a 60-day window for negotiations on a final agreement. The nuclear terms remain unresolved, while Israel’s continued military presence in southern Lebanon, despite U.S. pressure for a withdrawal, underscores how fragile the broader regional de-escalation remains. At the end of this period, the parties may sign a final agreement, return to hostilities, or mutually agree to extend the interim arrangement. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, along with neighboring Azerbaijan, have welcomed efforts to de-escalate the conflict between the United States and Iran. The fighting briefly boosted demand for alternative routes through Central Asia, but prolonged instability would disrupt trade, raise transport and insurance costs, and increase security risks. The question now is what the region could gain if the pause holds. Those effects would vary across the region. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan stand to benefit most directly from safer southern rail access through Iran to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are less directly connected to these corridors and less exposed to oil price swings, would feel the consequences mainly through freight costs, fuel prices, and wider regional trade. For Azerbaijan, a sustained pause would reinforce its role as the Caspian link between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye, while renewed instability would push more freight toward Trans-Caspian alternatives. That interest is not merely theoretical. Tajik-Iranian trade reached $119.6 million in the first quarter of 2026, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are developing access to Iranian maritime infrastructure through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The opportunity, however, is conditional. A truce can reduce military risk, but it does not by itself remove the banking, insurance, and compliance problems that have long complicated trade through Iran. For Central Asian exporters and logistics companies, the question is not only whether routes are physically open, but whether carriers, lenders, insurers, and buyers are prepared to use them during a temporary 60-day window. Analysts interviewed by Deutsche Welle said the framework leaves several important provisions unresolved, making a final agreement uncertain. For Central Asia, the most immediate economic variable is the Strait of Hormuz. Kazakh historian and political analyst Sultan Akimbekov identifies its reopening as the key to easing global supply fears. A durable reopening, combined with the temporary U.S. waiver allowing Iranian oil sales through August 21, could put downward pressure on global energy prices. The effects would vary across Central Asia: weaker prices could strain hydrocarbon revenues, while lower fuel, fertilizer, and freight costs could ease imported inflation in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. For Kazakhstan, lower global oil prices would have significant implications. National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov has said oil generates more than 50% of the country’s export revenues and over 30% of the state budget and National Fund revenues. That would reverse one of the conflict’s few short-term economic benefits for Kazakhstan. Higher crude prices had briefly improved the outlook for export revenues,...