Trade Routes - The Times Of Central Asia

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TCA Interviews

Interview: Kazakhstan Pushes Middle Corridor as Global Trade Routes Shift

As war, sanctions, and disruption reshape trade between Europe and Asia, Kazakhstan is trying to turn the Middle Corridor from an alternative route into a more predictable logistics system. The route, formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, links China and Central Asia with the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, Turkey, and Europe, bypassing Russia. For Kazakhstan, the project is both economic and geopolitical. It promises faster access to foreign markets, new transit revenue, and a stronger role for the country as a logistics hub between China and Europe. However, the corridor still faces practical constraints, including port capacity on the Caspian Sea, uneven digital systems, border procedures, tariffs, and coordination between several states and operators. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Alua Korpebayeva, Head of the Project Office for Transport and Logistics under the Presidential Administration of Kazakhstan, about what still needs to change and how Kazakhstan views the corridor’s long-term role. TCA: Why has the Middle Corridor become more urgent for Kazakhstan and Central Asia, and how much have the war in Ukraine and tensions around Iran and the Persian Gulf changed the calculation? Alua Korpebayeva: The government of Kazakhstan has assigned the national railway company, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, a strategic objective of increasing total transit volumes to 55 million tons by 2026, representing a 65% increase compared to last year. This target reflects the scale of the country’s ongoing transport transformation. Achieving this goal is closely tied to the development of the Middle Corridor. The route is especially important because it is becoming a foundation for stable and predictable supply chains in global trade. The Middle Corridor provides Central Asian countries with an opportunity to strengthen connectivity with both Europe and China while increasing the region’s role as an independent transport and logistics hub. Geopolitical factors have undoubtedly increased business interest in alternative routes. For Kazakhstan, however, development of the Middle Corridor is primarily part of a broader effort to expand transport capacity and improve logistical resilience. That is precisely why deeper regional cooperation is so important. Unlocking the corridor’s full potential requires close coordination among all participants, from infrastructure modernization and tariff harmonization to end-to-end digitalization and simplified customs procedures. The World Bank has noted that a fully functioning Middle Corridor could strengthen supply-chain resilience and, if accompanied by investment and efficiency measures, could triple freight volumes and cut transportation times in half by 2030. TCA: Are Kazakhstan and its partners moving toward unified transit rules and tariffs along the corridor? What has already been agreed, and where do gaps remain? Alua Korpebayeva: Work on creating unified transit rules and coordinated tariff policies is ongoing. The current focus is shifting from fragmented national tariffs toward a unified through-route pricing system across the corridor. Within the framework of the Action Plan for Eliminating Bottlenecks along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, signed by the railway administrations of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the parties agreed to establish a single long-term tariff for the route. In practical terms,...

Chinese Investment

Tajikistan’s Rahmon Seeks Deeper Economic Ties During China Visit

More than 700 companies with Chinese capital are operating in Tajikistan, and about 12.5% of the nearly $7 billion in foreign investment that entered the Central Asian country’s economy last year came from China, according to Tajikistan’s presidency. Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon shared the data after arriving in Beijing on Monday to push for even closer economic ties with China, which surpassed Russia last year to become Tajikistan’s largest trading partner. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said Rahmon was making the May 11-14 trip at the invitation of President Xi Jinping, who will then host U.S. President Donald Trump from May 13 to 15 China is expanding economic projects and investment across Central Asia, and the rapid pace of development is evident in numerous initiatives currently underway in Tajikistan. Last month, government and industry officials from the two countries met in Dushanbe to discuss “green minerals,” the materials – abundant in Tajikistan – that are used in clean energy technologies such as solar power and electric vehicle batteries. In February, the first container train from China arrived in Tajikistan’s capital after passing through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on what the Chinese embassy said was a new trade route. “The development of modern transport and economic corridors through Tajikistan linking China and South Asian countries with the Middle East was described as another factor promoting cooperation with neighboring China,” Tajikistan’s presidency said in a summary of Rahmon’s speech in Beijing on Monday. More than 50 agreements were signed between Tajik and Chinese companies during the presidential visit. The deals are projected to attract more than $8 billion in investment to Tajikistan, the presidency said. Despite the escalation in trade ties, some economists warn that Tajikistan is becoming more economically dependent on China and that its trade deficit is deepening that vulnerability. China has also expressed concern about the safety of its Tajikistan-based workers after attacks on Chinese installations from the Afghan side of the border in the last year.

EU Sanctions

EU Sanctions Put Kyrgyzstan’s Transit Trade Under Scrutiny

The European Union has stepped up sanctions pressure on Kyrgyzstan by restricting supplies of sensitive technologies and imposing measures on the country’s financial institutions. The decision, adopted as part of the EU’s 20th sanctions package against Russia, reflects growing concerns in Brussels that the Central Asian republic may be used as a transit hub to circumvent restrictions. The move marks a shift in the EU’s approach, from diplomatic warnings to tighter controls on trade and financial channels in third countries. A key argument for Brussels has been trade data. According to European Commission materials, imports of sensitive goods from the EU to Kyrgyzstan surged by nearly 800% in 2025 compared to pre-war levels. Meanwhile, exports of similar goods from Kyrgyzstan to Russia rose by approximately 1,200%. European officials say this dynamic indicates a systemic pattern of re-exports. As a result, the EU has added Kyrgyzstan to its list of countries posing a “systematic and persistent” risk of sanctions circumvention, a designation previously applied only selectively. The restrictions primarily target dual-use goods. These include metalworking machinery and numerically controlled equipment, as well as a wide range of telecommunications devices, from routers and modems to data, voice, and image transmission equipment. According to the EU, these categories present the highest risk of being used by Russia’s defense-industrial complex. European exporters will face tougher checks to show that sensitive goods are not likely to be re-exported to Russia. This creates an additional administrative barrier and raises risks for businesses. For many companies, the effect is a ‘presumption of guilt’ regime around trade with Kyrgyzstan. The sanctions package also affects the country’s financial system. Keremet Bank and Capital Bank have been included in the restrictions, which are set to take effect in May 2026. Particular attention has been paid to the cryptocurrency sector. The EU has sanctioned TengriCoin, a Bishkek-registered entity linked to the Meer platform, which European regulators say facilitated trading in a stablecoin affiliated with Russia’s Promsvyazbank. This move signals the EU’s expanding sanctions policy into digital financial instruments increasingly used to bypass traditional restrictions. Additional measures affect the transport sector. Several Kyrgyz logistics companies have been restricted from accessing European infrastructure, including ports and transport networks. This is likely to increase shipping costs and complicate foreign trade operations, putting additional pressure on export-oriented businesses. Analysts also warn of a potential shortage of European industrial equipment on the Kyrgyz market. The risk of secondary sanctions may lead EU suppliers to withdraw even from legitimate transactions. The tightening of sanctions comes amid intensified foreign policy engagement by Kyrgyzstan. On the day the package was approved, President Sadyr Japarov reaffirmed a strategic partnership with Vladimir Putin during a visit to Moscow. At the same time, Bishkek is strengthening cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), preparing to host a summit and receive high-level delegations, including Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun. Kyrgyz authorities have previously criticized EU sanctions policy. Japarov has described it as unjustified and as pressure that hampers economic development. Despite a series...

India

India–Central Asia: Connectivity, Security, and Sustainable Partnerships in a Multipolar World

A widening conflict in West Asia is forcing India and Central Asia to reassess trade routes, diplomacy, and regional security, with key projects such as Iran’s Chabahar port now facing growing uncertainty. These risks framed discussions in New Delhi on March 25–26, where experts gathered under the banner of “India–Central Asia: Connectivity, Security, and Sustainable Partnerships in a Multipolar World,” with The Times of Central Asia in attendance. The conference unfolded against the backdrop of two active Eurasian wars—the Russo-Ukrainian and the Israel/U.S.-Iran conflict. Central Asian and Indian participants agreed that the West Asian crisis is widening, putting not only ports and logistics routes but also economies across the globe under serious threat. India's Chabahar link to Afghanistan and Central Asia is now a high-risk, uncertain investment, weakening overall continental strategic thinking across Eurasia, including efforts to consolidate new trans-Caspian trade corridors. If the conflict cripples or destroys Chabahar, years of progress, hard-won partnerships, and millions in strategic investment would be erased. On the sidelines, some participants suggested that India could help cool what's becoming a dangerously global conflict. Unbeknownst to them, India had already held an all-party meeting on March 25 on the West Asia crisis. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar's message: India will not mediate. The revelation surprised some participants—others, not at all. In any event, Central Asian states, in principle, have backed any diplomatic push for peace. With West Asia in turmoil and platitudes in abundance, conference participants emphasized the need to rethink geopolitics, trade, security, and cultural ties beyond stale frameworks at a time of conflict. Four themes defined the Central and South Asian moment: the dangers of bloc politics, even as regional organizations continue to evolve and expand their influence, the ascendancy of national interests over external pressure, and the emergence of a firm refusal to pick sides in the midst of frictions between competing global pressures. Dr. Raj Kumar Sharma, a member of the India Central Asia Foundation, stated: “The conference provided an important platform to move beyond theoretical discussion and toward practical engagement. With Central Asia’s ambassadors to India present, we focused on exploring concrete mechanisms to promote peace through sustained diplomatic efforts. Despite the proximity of the conflict in West Asia to both Central Asia and India, participants expressed confidence that dialogue and restraint – buttressed by trade and investment – will ultimately guide outcomes, with particular concern for civilians and those enduring hardship. Notably, the crisis did not overshadow the conference’s primary agenda or its scholarly contributions. Overall, the gathering can be seen as a constructive step in reinforcing diplomatic initiatives dedicated to peace and stability in a conflict-affected region.” The conference witnessed the release of three significant publications on India–Central Asia relations: India – Kazakhstan Partnership in a Changing Geopolitical Order (eds. Ramakant Dwivedi, Lalit Aggarwal, Kuralay Baizakova), Manas: Kirgiz Vir Gatha Kavya by Ramakant Dwivedi & Hemchandra Pandey and India and Central, East and Southeast Asia: Enhancing the Partnership (eds. Ramakant Dwivedi & Lalit Aggarwal). [caption id="attachment_46364" align="aligncenter" width="1379"]...

Iran

Iran Volatility Tests Central Asia’s Overland Corridors

The current escalation around Iran holds the potential for transforming the long-term geopolitical configuration of Eurasia, including Central Asia. In the short and medium term, aside from the security and safety of its citizens, Central Asia's main concern is economic, because it puts stress on overland rail and trucking routes that cross Iranian territory. Central Asian exporters do not ship through the Gulf, so for now the key issue is whether an Iran-crossing land route remains reliable enough, and financeable enough, to serve as a routine outlet for trade. The Iran transit option differs from trans-Caspian reliance on ports and rail interfaces around the Caspian Sea, transiting to onward rail across the South Caucasus and into Europe. The Iran option offers a continuous land arc from Central Asian railheads and road networks into Iran, then onward to Türkiye and connected European rail networks, with the additional possibility of reaching Iran’s southern ports for Indian Ocean-facing trade. Each route has its own chokepoints, paperwork burdens, and exposure to risk premiums. Rail is efficient for bulk and container flows when schedules and documentation are stable. Trucking provides flexibility, short-notice capacity, and last-mile options, but it is more sensitive to security conditions and border clearance delays. Technical capacity at the Iran–Turkmenistan crossings is key. Recent reports of discussions in Sarakhs describe efforts to expand the use of a specialized rail logistics process whereby entire wheel assemblies are replaced on railcars to transition between different track gauges. There is also a need to address customs constraints at Sarakhs and Incheh Borun. Against that operational background, Kazakhstan has signaled diplomatic attention to Gulf partners and Jordan. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has sent messages of support to leaders of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, followed by a similar message to Jordan, and a phone call with Qatar’s emir. The language emphasized solidarity and diplomacy and, in commercial terms, reads as partner-management. It reassures major investors and energy-market counterparts that Kazakhstan is engaged, attentive, and positioning itself for stability rather than escalation. The trans-Iran rail foundation is over a decade old. On December 3, 2014, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran inaugurated the 928-kilometer Uzen–Bereket–Gorgan railway, characterized by RFE/RL (which gave the length as 935 kilometers) as the shortest railway connecting the three states. The International Union of Railways similarly notes the inauguration of the Gorgan–Inche Boroun link on that date as part of the corridor connecting Iran to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Recent reporting suggests renewed efforts to operationalize the Iran option as a westbound channel. Uzbekistan, in cooperation with Türkiye, launched freight rail services along the Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Türkiye route in 2022. The Organization of Turkic States described a December 2022 event in Tashkent as the first freight train organized from Türkiye to Uzbekistan, which anchors the same basic idea: make westbound rail via Iran more regular and more visible to logistics markets. The point is not that Iran becomes the sole answer, but that Central Asian exporters and transit states have been...

Iran

Central Asia Confronts Iran War Fallout as Trade Routes and Citizens Come Under Pressure

Central Asian governments are racing to protect citizens and keep trade moving as the U.S.–Israel war with Iran widens across the Middle East, disrupting airspace and driving up shipping and energy costs. The effects of the conflict are reaching a region that has spent the past four years trying to diversify trade routes and reduce dependence on maritime chokepoints, now disrupted by rising risk and transport volatility. The threat to its citizens has become immediate for Central Asian governments. On March 1, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry said that it was working on evacuation measures for its nationals in escalation zones and urged citizens to follow official updates from diplomatic missions. It also advised Kazakh citizens in Iran to explore overland exits, including via Azerbaijan, Armenia, Türkiye, and Turkmenistan, given airspace closures and flight suspensions. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry issued safety guidance for citizens in the United Arab Emirates, urging them to avoid crowded areas and adhere to official security directives as tensions in the region escalated. Tajik nationals have already been among those leaving Iran through Azerbaijan’s Astara crossing, with The Times of Central Asia reporting yesterday that five civilians from Tajikistan are among foreigners from numerous countries who have crossed from Iran into Azerbaijan. For Central Asia, the crisis is hitting both its people and its trade routes. The same border crossings used for evacuations sit on corridors that carry freight and connect the region to southern markets. Azerbaijan’s role as a transit hub has grown sharply over the past decade, but in this crisis, it is also a pressure valve for land exits from Iran. As of March 2, more than 300 people have been evacuated from Iran via Azerbaijan. Any tightening at borders or disruptions to rail and road links around the Caspian immediately affect how Central Asian states move both people and cargo. Oil and shipping costs are rising sharply. On March 1, oil prices jumped by around 10%, with analysts warning prices could move toward $100 a barrel if disruption in the Strait of Hormuz worsens. The impact across Central Asia has been uneven. Kazakhstan may see stronger export revenues in the short term due to higher crude prices, but that gain comes with volatility and increased import costs across the region. ING stated that stronger commodity prices could improve the external balance of fuel exporters such as Kazakhstan, while increasing inflation risks for importers. Shipping poses a deeper structural risk. Tanker owners and traders have slowed or suspended transits through the Strait of Hormuz because of security fears and insurance constraints, even without a formal blockade. Higher risk premiums feed directly into freight rates on the routes Central Asian exporters use to reach Europe, the Gulf, and South Asia. When insurers reprice war risk, smaller shippers and landlocked economies absorb the cost first. Iran is central to Central Asia’s trade geography. It serves as a transit state for the southern corridor linking Central Asian rail and port networks to Türkiye, Europe, and the Gulf. Central Asian...