Trade Routes - The Times Of Central Asia

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India

India–Central Asia: Connectivity, Security, and Sustainable Partnerships in a Multipolar World

A widening conflict in West Asia is forcing India and Central Asia to reassess trade routes, diplomacy, and regional security, with key projects such as Iran’s Chabahar port now facing growing uncertainty. These risks framed discussions in New Delhi on March 25–26, where experts gathered under the banner of “India–Central Asia: Connectivity, Security, and Sustainable Partnerships in a Multipolar World,” with The Times of Central Asia in attendance. The conference unfolded against the backdrop of two active Eurasian wars—the Russo-Ukrainian and the Israel/U.S.-Iran conflict. Central Asian and Indian participants agreed that the West Asian crisis is widening, putting not only ports and logistics routes but also economies across the globe under serious threat. India's Chabahar link to Afghanistan and Central Asia is now a high-risk, uncertain investment, weakening overall continental strategic thinking across Eurasia, including efforts to consolidate new trans-Caspian trade corridors. If the conflict cripples or destroys Chabahar, years of progress, hard-won partnerships, and millions in strategic investment would be erased. On the sidelines, some participants suggested that India could help cool what's becoming a dangerously global conflict. Unbeknownst to them, India had already held an all-party meeting on March 25 on the West Asia crisis. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar's message: India will not mediate. The revelation surprised some participants—others, not at all. In any event, Central Asian states, in principle, have backed any diplomatic push for peace. With West Asia in turmoil and platitudes in abundance, conference participants emphasized the need to rethink geopolitics, trade, security, and cultural ties beyond stale frameworks at a time of conflict. Four themes defined the Central and South Asian moment: the dangers of bloc politics, even as regional organizations continue to evolve and expand their influence, the ascendancy of national interests over external pressure, and the emergence of a firm refusal to pick sides in the midst of frictions between competing global pressures. Dr. Raj Kumar Sharma, a member of the India Central Asia Foundation, stated: “The conference provided an important platform to move beyond theoretical discussion and toward practical engagement. With Central Asia’s ambassadors to India present, we focused on exploring concrete mechanisms to promote peace through sustained diplomatic efforts. Despite the proximity of the conflict in West Asia to both Central Asia and India, participants expressed confidence that dialogue and restraint – buttressed by trade and investment – will ultimately guide outcomes, with particular concern for civilians and those enduring hardship. Notably, the crisis did not overshadow the conference’s primary agenda or its scholarly contributions. Overall, the gathering can be seen as a constructive step in reinforcing diplomatic initiatives dedicated to peace and stability in a conflict-affected region.” The conference witnessed the release of three significant publications on India–Central Asia relations: India – Kazakhstan Partnership in a Changing Geopolitical Order (eds. Ramakant Dwivedi, Lalit Aggarwal, Kuralay Baizakova), Manas: Kirgiz Vir Gatha Kavya by Ramakant Dwivedi & Hemchandra Pandey and India and Central, East and Southeast Asia: Enhancing the Partnership (eds. Ramakant Dwivedi & Lalit Aggarwal). [caption id="attachment_46364" align="aligncenter" width="1379"]...

Iran

Iran Volatility Tests Central Asia’s Overland Corridors

The current escalation around Iran holds the potential for transforming the long-term geopolitical configuration of Eurasia, including Central Asia. In the short and medium term, aside from the security and safety of its citizens, Central Asia's main concern is economic, because it puts stress on overland rail and trucking routes that cross Iranian territory. Central Asian exporters do not ship through the Gulf, so for now the key issue is whether an Iran-crossing land route remains reliable enough, and financeable enough, to serve as a routine outlet for trade. The Iran transit option differs from trans-Caspian reliance on ports and rail interfaces around the Caspian Sea, transiting to onward rail across the South Caucasus and into Europe. The Iran option offers a continuous land arc from Central Asian railheads and road networks into Iran, then onward to Türkiye and connected European rail networks, with the additional possibility of reaching Iran’s southern ports for Indian Ocean-facing trade. Each route has its own chokepoints, paperwork burdens, and exposure to risk premiums. Rail is efficient for bulk and container flows when schedules and documentation are stable. Trucking provides flexibility, short-notice capacity, and last-mile options, but it is more sensitive to security conditions and border clearance delays. Technical capacity at the Iran–Turkmenistan crossings is key. Recent reports of discussions in Sarakhs describe efforts to expand the use of a specialized rail logistics process whereby entire wheel assemblies are replaced on railcars to transition between different track gauges. There is also a need to address customs constraints at Sarakhs and Incheh Borun. Against that operational background, Kazakhstan has signaled diplomatic attention to Gulf partners and Jordan. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has sent messages of support to leaders of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, followed by a similar message to Jordan, and a phone call with Qatar’s emir. The language emphasized solidarity and diplomacy and, in commercial terms, reads as partner-management. It reassures major investors and energy-market counterparts that Kazakhstan is engaged, attentive, and positioning itself for stability rather than escalation. The trans-Iran rail foundation is over a decade old. On December 3, 2014, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran inaugurated the 928-kilometer Uzen–Bereket–Gorgan railway, characterized by RFE/RL (which gave the length as 935 kilometers) as the shortest railway connecting the three states. The International Union of Railways similarly notes the inauguration of the Gorgan–Inche Boroun link on that date as part of the corridor connecting Iran to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Recent reporting suggests renewed efforts to operationalize the Iran option as a westbound channel. Uzbekistan, in cooperation with Türkiye, launched freight rail services along the Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Türkiye route in 2022. The Organization of Turkic States described a December 2022 event in Tashkent as the first freight train organized from Türkiye to Uzbekistan, which anchors the same basic idea: make westbound rail via Iran more regular and more visible to logistics markets. The point is not that Iran becomes the sole answer, but that Central Asian exporters and transit states have been...

Iran

Central Asia Confronts Iran War Fallout as Trade Routes and Citizens Come Under Pressure

Central Asian governments are racing to protect citizens and keep trade moving as the U.S.–Israel war with Iran widens across the Middle East, disrupting airspace and driving up shipping and energy costs. The effects of the conflict are reaching a region that has spent the past four years trying to diversify trade routes and reduce dependence on maritime chokepoints, now disrupted by rising risk and transport volatility. The threat to its citizens has become immediate for Central Asian governments. On March 1, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry said that it was working on evacuation measures for its nationals in escalation zones and urged citizens to follow official updates from diplomatic missions. It also advised Kazakh citizens in Iran to explore overland exits, including via Azerbaijan, Armenia, Türkiye, and Turkmenistan, given airspace closures and flight suspensions. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry issued safety guidance for citizens in the United Arab Emirates, urging them to avoid crowded areas and adhere to official security directives as tensions in the region escalated. Tajik nationals have already been among those leaving Iran through Azerbaijan’s Astara crossing, with The Times of Central Asia reporting yesterday that five civilians from Tajikistan are among foreigners from numerous countries who have crossed from Iran into Azerbaijan. For Central Asia, the crisis is hitting both its people and its trade routes. The same border crossings used for evacuations sit on corridors that carry freight and connect the region to southern markets. Azerbaijan’s role as a transit hub has grown sharply over the past decade, but in this crisis, it is also a pressure valve for land exits from Iran. As of March 2, more than 300 people have been evacuated from Iran via Azerbaijan. Any tightening at borders or disruptions to rail and road links around the Caspian immediately affect how Central Asian states move both people and cargo. Oil and shipping costs are rising sharply. On March 1, oil prices jumped by around 10%, with analysts warning prices could move toward $100 a barrel if disruption in the Strait of Hormuz worsens. The impact across Central Asia has been uneven. Kazakhstan may see stronger export revenues in the short term due to higher crude prices, but that gain comes with volatility and increased import costs across the region. ING stated that stronger commodity prices could improve the external balance of fuel exporters such as Kazakhstan, while increasing inflation risks for importers. Shipping poses a deeper structural risk. Tanker owners and traders have slowed or suspended transits through the Strait of Hormuz because of security fears and insurance constraints, even without a formal blockade. Higher risk premiums feed directly into freight rates on the routes Central Asian exporters use to reach Europe, the Gulf, and South Asia. When insurers reprice war risk, smaller shippers and landlocked economies absorb the cost first. Iran is central to Central Asia’s trade geography. It serves as a transit state for the southern corridor linking Central Asian rail and port networks to Türkiye, Europe, and the Gulf. Central Asian...

trans-Afghan railway

Icy Relations Between Pakistan and Afghanistan Threaten Central Asian Trade Plans

On November 25, the Afghan authorities accused Pakistan of a new round of airstrikes in eastern Afghanistan. The bombing killed nine children and a woman, injuring several others. The attacks are the latest escalation in rapidly worsening tensions between Islamabad and the Taliban-led government in Kabul, with key border crossings currently closed, and Afghan refugees being expelled from Pakistan. At the heart of the crisis is Pakistan’s claim that Kabul is providing support to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban, or TPP), a militant group seeking to topple Pakistan’s government and impose its strict interpretation of Islamic law. The fallout may ripple beyond bilateral relations, with significant consequences for Central Asian trade, particularly the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan plan for a Trans-Afghan railway. The planned 647-kilometer line is set to connect the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif with Peshawar in Pakistan. When combined with existing infrastructure, this will mean that trains can travel from southern Uzbekistan all the way to the Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi, granting landlocked Uzbekistan and Afghanistan a long-sought gateway to the Indian Ocean. But mounting instability, along with Islamabad’s willingness to shut borders as leverage, may now place the project in serious jeopardy. “The moment a state weaponizes geography, every financier in Tashkent, Moscow, or Beijing prices in risk, delays commitments, and quietly explores alternative alignments,” Anant Mishra, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales, told The Times of Central Asia. So, what are the prospects for salvaging the Trans-Afghan railway? How can Pakistan and Afghanistan de-escalate? And what does this turmoil mean for Central Asia’s wider economic ambitions? A sudden frost On July 17, Uzbekistan’s Transport Minister Ilkhom Makhkamov, Pakistan’s Railway Minister Muhammad Hanif Abbasi, and Afghanistan’s acting Public Works Minister Mohammad Esa Thani signed an agreement to conduct a feasibility study for the proposed railway. Many hoped the railway would presage a new era of fraternal relations between Central and South Asia. “Civil society, the intelligentsia, media, and business community of Pakistan have been loudly calling for intimate trade relations with the Central Asian Republics,” Khadim Hussain, Research Director at the Centre for Regional Policy and Dialogue (CRPD), Islamabad, told TCA. For Uzbekistan, which has aggressively pursued diversification of trade routes to reduce reliance on transit through Iran and Kazakhstan, the project promised a cheaper, faster corridor to global markets. According to Nargiza Umarova, Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, the trans-Afghan is one of two high-priority transport projects, along with the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway – work on which began in April 2025. But the ink had barely dried on the July accord when tensions between Afghanistan’s Taliban government and Islamabad began escalating, throwing the ambitious railway into doubt. [caption id="attachment_40211" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Uzbek passenger and freight trains parked in Andijan; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] In early October, Pakistan launched an airstrike in Kabul targeting the leader of the...

Geopolitics

Central Asia’s Road to the Southern Seas: A Search for Stability

India has confirmed that it received a six-month sanctions waiver from the United States for its involvement in developing Iran’s Chabahar port. According to The Times of India, the decision followed intensive diplomacy by New Delhi, which convinced Washington that Chabahar provides India’s only practical overland access to Central Asia that avoids Pakistan. Through Chabahar, India is building a land-based counterpart to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, creating an alternative axis linking the Indian Ocean with Eurasia while bypassing Islamabad and Beijing. The exemption, valid until April 2026, gives India room to negotiate with Washington. For Central Asia, the episode reflects a broader challenge: choosing viable routes to the southern seas. Current debates about “Afghan transit” focus largely on the Trans-Afghan Railway and the so-called Kabul corridor connecting northern Afghanistan with Pakistan’s ports. Yet Afghanistan’s transport network is forming along multiple lines. Alongside the eastern route, a western corridor from Herat to Kandahar and Spin Boldak is also developing, offering access both to Pakistan and to Chabahar. The integration of western Afghanistan’s infrastructure with Iran’s transport network makes this corridor more reliable under today’s political and security conditions. It aligns with projects pursued by Iran, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan and positions Herat as a major hub. It is also close to the North–South Transport Corridor, the Lapis Lazuli and Middle Corridors, and the Caspian and Persian Gulf regions. The planned Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat line fits the logic of the Five Nations Railway Corridor, potentially giving Tajikistan and Uzbekistan access to Chabahar and, if stability improves, to Pakistan’s ports as well. By contrast, the eastern route will remain constrained by the unstable Afghan–Pakistani border and the volatile relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Afghanistan’s own priorities also differ from outside assumptions: the Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak line primarily serves as an internal transport spine linking the west and south. For Kabul, the route to Gwadar is more a political gesture than a practical goal. Some analysts note that developing the western corridor also helps rebalance the country’s economic geography toward its more diverse western regions. These dynamics strengthen the western route’s appeal. The Taliban leadership has even urged Afghan businesses to reduce reliance on Pakistani ports, signaling a structural shift in trade orientation. Both Chabahar and Gwadar face political risks. Pakistan’s transit routes pass through areas affected by insurgency, including Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as the broader narcotics routes of the Golden Crescent. The greatest uncertainty remains the fluctuating relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Gwadar, while technologically superior, is undermined by chronic instability. Chabahar’s capacity is more modest, but its integration with Iran’s road and rail network provides reliability. The United States adds another layer of complexity. The waiver suggests Washington is balancing its Iran sanctions regime with its strategic partnership with India. The United States is not directly involved in regional infrastructure but retains enough influence to shift the balance between the western and eastern routes. Under certain conditions, Gwadar may appear less problematic for Washington than Chabahar. At the same time, selective sanctions exemptions...

Digitalization

Digital Geopolitics and AI Strategy in Central Asia

Central Asia, long known as a crossroads of global trade routes, is once again emerging as a stage for strategic competition. This time, the old caravan routes have been replaced by digital highways. The new contest is over technologies and data flows. For countries in the region, especially Kazakhstan, choosing a digitalization model and an AI development strategy is no longer just a technical matter. It is a fundamental decision tied to national security and long-term competitiveness. Equally important is the “digital ideology” behind these choices, something clearly illustrated today by two giants of the Global South: China and India, each with over a billion people and very different approaches to digital growth. The Dragon's Shadow: China's Systematic Expansion in Central Asia China’s ongoing real estate crisis, rising debt, and slowing domestic demand have pushed Beijing to look outward for growth. One major tool is the Digital Silk Road, announced in 2015 as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. This long-term program aims to export Chinese digital technologies. For Central Asian states, it brings an appealing “one-stop shop” of turnkey solutions: everything from 5G mobile and 10G-PON fixed networks to smart city systems (Huawei, ZTE), surveillance platforms (Hikvision), and fintech tools (Ant Group, Tencent). The benefits come with risks. A heavy reliance on one supplier creates the danger of vendor lock-in. When an entire digital ecosystem is tied to a single foreign provider, questions of security and long-term debt become inevitable. Kazakhstan has shown flexibility by experimenting with mixed models rather than relying exclusively on Chinese systems. Competing Models: China's "Walled Garden" and India's "Digital Public Infrastructure" China: The model is centralized, built on state corporations and giant platforms. It delivers speed and scale of growth, but at the cost of strict control and regulation. The Chinese government has tightened its grip on big tech companies (Alibaba and Tencent), imposed stricter rules on the collection and use of personal data under the Personal Information Protection Law (2021), and limited the fintech divisions of major firms to prevent systemic risks. India: The state has developed India Stack, a package of open digital platforms (Aadhaar, UPI, DigiLocker) that serve as the rails for thousands of startups and services. This gave India global leadership in digital payments and created a model of open digitalization. Central Asia is already partially repeating this experience (Kazakhstan’s eGov.kz, Kaspi.kz, and the digital tenge), though without the depth and openness that made the Indian approach unique. Today, Central Asia is forming a pragmatic hybrid: Chinese hardware for rapid infrastructure, Indian logic in public services (GovTech, eGov.kz), and European regulatory standards under the GDPR (in force since 2018), which serves as a global benchmark of trust in data. This “three-axis” hybrid allows a balance between speed of implementation and regulatory control. Europe's Alternative: Global Gateway and the Digital Silk Way Europe seeks to strengthen its position in Central Asia and the South Caucasus by offering an alternative to Chinese expansion. Its key tool is the EU Global Gateway...