Kazakhstan Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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Organization of Turkic States

Opinion: Turkey’s Third Vector: How the Turkic States Are Expanding Central Asia’s Room for Maneuver

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s May 13-14 state visit to Kazakhstan and the May 15 informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States in Turkistan should not be read as isolated diplomatic events. Together, they point to a larger shift in Central Asia’s geopolitical architecture. During Erdoğan’s visit to Astana, Kazakhstan and Turkey signed the Declaration on Eternal Friendship and Expanded Strategic Partnership, along with agreements covering trade, transport, energy, education, investment, defense cooperation, oil and gas, and financial-sector collaboration. The two sides also reaffirmed their goal of raising bilateral trade to $15 billion. Erdoğan was awarded the newly established Khoja Ahmed Yassawi Order, a symbolic gesture tied to the summit being hosted in Turkistan, the city most closely associated with Yassawi’s legacy. A day later, Turkistan hosted the informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States under the theme “Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development.” The timing matters. Central Asia is no longer operating inside a simple Russia-China framework. Russia remains deeply embedded in the region through security history, infrastructure, language, labor migration, and energy networks. China remains the region’s main infrastructure and trade heavyweight. The West is increasingly focused on sanctions, critical minerals, connectivity, and the Middle Corridor. But Turkey is becoming something different: not a replacement for Russia or China, but a useful third vector. Its influence is built on identity, logistics, defense technology, education, digital cooperation, and institutional networking through the Turkic States framework, rather than overwhelming capital or military dominance. Turkey as a Corridor Power Turkey cannot match China’s investment scale in Central Asia. It also cannot match Russia’s historical security depth. Ankara does not need to replace either power to matter. Its comparative advantage is different. Turkey connects Central Asia westward, to the South Caucasus, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and Europe. It also offers a language of partnership that is culturally familiar and politically less threatening than great-power patronage. Tokayev captured this dimension during the joint statements in Astana, describing Turkey as a “golden bridge” connecting Europe and Asia. The framing is telling: not a partner of equal weight, but a connector, exactly the function of a corridor power. A corridor power does not dominate a region directly. It expands the routes, partnerships, platforms, and strategic options available to states that do not want to be trapped between larger powers. That is why the Erdoğan-Tokayev meeting and the Turkistan summit matter. The issue goes beyond bilateral trade. It is the gradual construction of a Turkic corridor linking identity, transport, defense, digital governance, and markets. The OTS as Identity Infrastructure The Organization of Turkic States is often dismissed as symbolic: summits, speeches, flags, cultural rhetoric, and references to shared history. That reading is incomplete. Identity is not just emotion. In international politics, identity can become infrastructure. Shared language, educational networks, media links, cultural affinity, and repeated institutional contact reduce the cost of trust-building. They make it easier to sign agreements, build transport projects, expand student exchanges, coordinate business forums, and create political habits of consultation. The...

CA5+UK

Opinion: UK’s C6 Engagement and the Opportunity for British Geostrategic Renewal

Along with Nicholas Spykman, Sir Halford Mackinder is one of the most pre-eminent thinkers in the field of geopolitics. Whilst today geopolitics is a term used interchangeably with “world affairs,” “international relations,” and “foreign policy,” Spykman and Mackinder used the phrase to describe the narrow academic study of how geography influences international relations and the conduct of states. In the 1904 paper, The Geographical Pivot of History, Mackinder theorized that the key to controlling the balance of power in the world rested in a “heartland” of Eurasia, comprising Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Mackinder described the heartland region as the “pivot region” for regional and global hegemony. The word “pivot” has recently been popularized in international relations, with examples including President Obama’s pivot to the Pacific and Britain’s Indo-Pacific pivot in the 2021 Integrated Review. In 1997, former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski built on Mackinder’s ideas in his work, The Grand Chessboard. Brzezinski defined a geopolitical pivot as being “determined by their geography, which in some cases gives them a special role either in defining access to important areas or in denying resources to a significant player. In some cases, a geopolitical pivot may act as a defensive shield for a vital state or even a region.” To Mackinder and Brzezinski, Central Asia was a crucial geostrategic pivot. Central Asia - comprising the five states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, collectively termed the C5 - is located between China, Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan. Thus, the near abroad of the region is defined by conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Iran and Israel/U.S., and between Taliban-run Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pragmatic engagement is a necessity for the C5 but has not stopped them from pursuing greater diversification in security and economic arrangements, and they remain committed to U.S.-led diplomatic initiatives. Faced with a regionally assertive superpower in China, risks created by Russia’s war in Ukraine, theocratic Iran, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, Central Asia has continued to show its desire to build and deepen its economic and security partnerships from beyond traditional powers – such as China and Russia – to states in the Gulf, the Caucasus, Western Europe, and elsewhere. The United Kingdom has emerged as a new and important partner. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised concerns in the Central Asian states about its regional revisionism, territorial ambitions, and Putin’s reconstruction of the Soviet Union. In 2014, Putin credited Nursultan Nazarbayev with having “created a state in a territory that had never had a state before,” adding that “the Kazakhs never had any statehood.” The remarks sparked anger in Kazakhstan and fed concern about Moscow’s view of post-Soviet sovereignty. Finally, Putin said that it would be best for Kazakhstan to “remain in the greater Russian world.” In The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski predicted that “Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians.” Central Asia has been a...

Afghanistan

Opinion: The Southern Dimension of the Middle Corridor – Afghanistan’s Role in Eurasia’s New Logistics Landscape

Afghanistan’s integration into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is extending beyond local logistics and evolving into one of Eurasia’s key geo-economic projects. Amid the global transformation of supply chains, Central Asia has an opportunity to move beyond its role as a transit periphery and become an active participant in shaping new economic corridors, creating a full-fledged “southern dimension” of Eurasian connectivity. Two Routes: Strategic and Operational Two main directions for Afghanistan’s integration into the Eurasian transport system are currently under discussion, each reflecting a distinct development logic: strategic and pragmatic. The “Eastern Branch” (Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar) is traditionally viewed as the primary trans-Afghan route. Its key advantage is direct access to the ports of Karachi and Gwadar, providing the shortest connection between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. At the same time, geography makes the project highly complex. The route passes through the central and eastern regions of Afghanistan, including the Hindu Kush mountain range, where long tunnels and bridges would be required. This would sharply increase construction and maintenance costs, extend implementation timelines, and heighten security and infrastructure risks. According to available estimates, the project could cost around $5 billion and handle 15-20 million tons of cargo annually. However, the lengthy investment cycle and dependence on political stability mean implementation remains a long-term prospect. The “Western Branch” (Turgundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak) represents an alternative logistics corridor based on more favorable geography. Western Afghanistan is characterized by predominantly flat, semi-arid terrain, reducing the need for complex engineering structures and allowing the project to be implemented in phases. This significantly lowers capital costs, shortens construction timelines, and reduces infrastructure risks. The western route’s initial capacity is estimated at 7-10 million tons of cargo annually, making it the more realistic option for medium-term planning. An additional advantage is its geo-economic flexibility. Via Herat, the route could be integrated not only southward through Pakistan, but also westward through Iran, providing access to Persian Gulf ports. This would transform it into a multi-directional corridor capable of serving several logistics flows simultaneously. The Eastern Branch, therefore, remains the strategic option offering the shortest route to the ocean but requiring substantial investment and time. The Western Branch, meanwhile, presents a more pragmatic solution: faster to implement and more flexible from a geo-economic standpoint. The Role of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in the “Western Maneuver” The implementation of the western trans-Afghan corridor depends on close coordination between two key regional players, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which form the northern foundation of the future route by providing access to the Caspian Sea and, beyond it, global markets. Astana and Ashgabat are effectively creating a new geo-economic framework that could transform Central Asia from an isolated region into a strategic crossroads linking the Caspian Sea with the Indian Ocean. In 2026, Kazakhstan moved toward deeper institutionalization of the initiative, making the route through Herat and Kandahar a government priority. Astana’s strategy is multifaceted. In addition to establishing a permanent interdepartmental commission, Kazakhstan is actively seeking to attract international operators such as the Emirati AD...

Oil Prices

Opinion: Kazakhstan, Oil, the Iran War and Dutch Disease

In 1977, The Economist coined a new term for the (potential) negative consequences of a short-term boom in natural resources: “Dutch disease.” The phenomenon got its name from an analysis of the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands following the 1960s natural gas discoveries at Groningen, in the northeastern Netherlands. The theory was that a surge in the price of a natural resource like oil or gas would likely cause currency appreciation, making imports cheaper and other sectors, like manufacturing, less competitive. Whether the recent spike in oil prices will contribute to Dutch disease in oil-rich Kazakhstan will likely depend on the length of the Iran war’s effect on oil prices (which could last well beyond the end of the conflict itself) and the government’s stewardship of Kazakhstan’s economy. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev deserves credit for the government’s efforts to diversify the national economy. Investing in the nation’s manufacturing base, especially SMEs, educating the Kazakh workforce, and improving healthcare are all helping broaden the Kazakh economy and reduce the country’s dependence on oil. But oil is the main driver of Kazakhstan’s wealth, and while other sectors are increasing their share of Kazakhstan’s economy, oil and the wider extractive sector remain central to public finances, accounting for over 40% of government revenues. So, let’s do a deep dive on Kazakhstan’s oil. Most of Kazakhstan’s oil comes from the west of the country, including the Tengiz field near the Caspian Sea and the offshore Kashagan field in the northern Caspian. The Tengiz oil field is one of the deepest and largest oil fields in the world, while Kashagan, an offshore deposit, ranks as one of the largest global oil discoveries since the 1960s. Kazakhstan’s main export blend, CPC Blend, is a light, sweet crude, a desirable oil type that’s easy to refine into gasoline and diesel. Because the Iran war and restrictions around the Strait of Hormuz have disrupted tanker traffic and raised fears of supply shortages, global oil prices have climbed. And while high oil prices are generally a net positive for Kazakhstan, the current price - Brent crude was trading above $100 per barrel in mid-May 2026 - could present problems. In the short term, high oil prices tend to boost government revenues and budget surpluses. They can increase inflows to Kazakhstan’s National Fund, depending on production, tax receipts, transfers, and government withdrawal policy, and provide resources for government spending on infrastructure and social programs. They can also stimulate demand in related sectors, boosting Kazakhstan’s oil-related industries. And since oil exports typically make up more than half of the nation’s export revenues, high oil prices generally lead to a rise in Kazakhstan’s GDP. So far, so good. But high oil prices also carry risks. For one thing, they can strengthen the tenge and add to domestic demand, especially if higher revenues feed into faster government spending. Which is where Dutch disease comes in. As the stronger currency makes non-oil exports less competitive, capital and labor shift toward the energy...

Geopolitics

Opinion: The U.S. Still Doesn’t Know Where Central Asia Belongs

Washington cannot decide where Central Asia belongs. Is it part of Europe? Asia? The Middle East? The confusion is on full display in how the House of Representatives has reassigned the region across subcommittees in rapid succession. In the 116th Congress, which convened in 2019, Central Asia fell under the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment. Two years later, in the 117th Congress, it was moved to the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation. That arrangement barely settled before the 118th Congress shifted it again—this time to the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Now, in the 119th Congress, it has been relocated to the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia. On the banks of the Potomac, Central Asia has taken on a nomadic life of its own—constantly on the move, never quite settling in one place. At the State Department, Central Asia is grouped under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs alongside Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. At the Pentagon, by contrast, the Middle East team oversees relations with Central Asia, alongside countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. These mismatches are not just clumsy; they are strategically dangerous. By misplacing Central Asia, Washington is misreading the geography of China’s rise. It is time for Washington to stop the bureaucratic musical chairs and place Central Asia within a coherent grand strategy. Far from being an afterthought, the region is one of the most consequential pieces of the geopolitical puzzle facing the United States: how to respond to China’s strategy. This is because Central Asia sits at the heart of China’s decades-long effort to move its critical lifelines away from the Indo-Pacific and onto the Eurasian landmass. Over the past 15 years, China has quietly reoriented its energy routes, reducing reliance on maritime pathways vulnerable to U.S. naval dominance—particularly chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—and expanded overland imports across Eurasia. Today, China imports significant volumes of natural gas via pipelines from Turkmenistan and Russia, as well as crude oil from Kazakhstan. These continental routes are largely insulated from maritime interdiction, giving Beijing strategic resilience. Central Asia should be understood through this lens. For China, the region is not peripheral—it is essential. The pipelines, railways and trade corridors that underpin China’s resilience all pass through Xinjiang and Central Asia. In this sense, Central Asia is not merely adjacent to China; it is embedded in China’s vision of the future. This is why Washington’s practice of grouping Central Asia with South Asia misses the mark. The two regions operate under fundamentally different strategic logics. South Asia is centered on the Indian subcontinent, shaped by maritime dynamics and the India‑Pakistan rivalry. Central Asia, by contrast, is a continental crossroads—defined by overland connectivity, energy flows and great‑power competition across Eurasia. India, meanwhile, is geographically constrained—lacking direct land access to Central Asia due to territory administered by Pakistan and separated from China by the Himalayas—leaving it...

Middle Corridor

Opinion: A New Southern Gate – How the EU-Armenia Summit Unlocks a Critical Branch for the Middle Corridor

For the first time in its history, the European Union held a full summit with Armenia. The meeting, which took place in Yerevan on 4–5 May 2026, was not merely a diplomatic milestone for Armenia. It also sent a signal to governments thousands of kilometers away in Central Asia that the trade route linking Asia to Europe through the South Caucasus is becoming more real, and more politically backed, than ever before. The centerpiece of the summit saw the signing of a “Connectivity Partnership” between Brussels and Yerevan. The European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, described Armenia as "uniquely positioned" to connect Europe with the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Under the EU's Global Gateway program, investments in Armenia are expected to reach €2.5 billion. A further €3 billion is earmarked specifically for the Middle Corridor – the trade route that runs from China across Central Asia, over the Caspian Sea, through the South Caucasus, and into Europe. “We will support your integration into key transport networks like the Trans-Caspian Corridor. It is a route that is also of strategic importance for Europe, given the growing flows of trade between our two regions,” von der Leyen stated. A Route That Is Already Moving Fast The Middle Corridor, formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), has grown at a pace that few predicted. Cargo volumes rose 70 percent in the first nine months of 2024 alone, reaching 3.4 million tons. By the end of that year, the total had climbed to 4.1 million tons – up from just 350,000 tons in 2021. The World Bank projects that the route could handle up to 11 million tonnes a year by 2030. It's important to maintain some perspective. These numbers are small fry when compared to the billions of tons of trade that moves between Europe and Asia by sea. However, the Middle Corridor does offer important diversification, particularly given the spillover effects of wars in the Middle East and piracy in the Red Sea. [caption id="attachment_48602" align="aligncenter" width="1274"] Image: Trans Caspian International Transport Route and it’s southern part, China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway project. Source: middlecorridor.com[/caption] Where Uzbekistan Stands For Uzbekistan, the Middle Corridor is both an opportunity and a work in progress. In January 2025, President Mirziyoyev signed a decree to upgrade road and rail connectivity, and in September 2024, Tashkent co-founded the Eurasian Transport Route Association alongside Austria, Azerbaijan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkey. In December 2024, Uzbekistan sent its first block train all the way to Brazil – through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and the Georgian port of Poti – proving the route is operationally viable. But costs remain a challenge. Shipping a 40-foot container via the Middle Corridor currently costs between $3,500 and $4,500, compared to $2,800–$3,200 on the Northern Corridor through Russia. Europe, meanwhile, accounts for only around 3 percent of Uzbekistan's exports and 13 percent of its imports — a share that Tashkent wants to grow significantly. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway — a $8 billion, 573-kilometre project whose...