• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%

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From Hydropower to Human Capital: Japarov Plans Strategic Visit to Japan

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov is preparing for a visit to Japan that underscores growing strategic ties between the two countries. Kyrgyz officials say they plan to sign energy and infrastructure agreements in Tokyo, including support for a training center for the national electric grid and upgrades at the Kurpsai hydropower plant, according to Trend, citing the Kyrgyz Energy Ministry. The same report notes that grant funding from Japan’s international cooperation programs will back grid training and modernization efforts. The timing reflects Tokyo’s recent step-up in activity vis-à-vis Central Asia. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, in late August 2025, Japan’s foreign minister undertook a multi-country tour that emphasized long-term engagement and connectivity across the region. Japanese officials framed their approach as trust-building, focused on people-to-people links, infrastructure, and practical cooperation. Energy cooperation is expected to feature prominently during the visit. Kyrgyz officials say the Japan-backed training center is moving through final approval, and modernization of the Kurpsai facility is planned with Japanese grant support. Bishkek has also invited Japanese participation in additional hydropower projects, positioning Japan as a technology and financing partner in Kyrgyzstan’s power sector. Labor mobility and skills are another focus. The authorities in Kyrgyzstan have been working with Japanese counterparts to create safe, legal pathways for Kyrgyz workers. In July, Kyrgyz officials met with Japan’s construction human-resources association to align training standards and prepare workers for job opportunities in Japan, and free Japanese-language courses were launched in Bishkek to improve employability for prospective migrants. Education and cultural exchange underpin the relationship. Over three decades, Japan has funded scholarships, exchanges, and language programs that connect Central Asian students to Japanese universities. An overview of these initiatives highlights how education has become a durable pillar of Japan’s regional engagement, building familiarity with Japanese business practices and technology among Kyrgyz graduates. For Bishkek, the visit is about turning ongoing cooperation into signed projects and new resources. Officials point to the grid training center and Kurpsai upgrades as near-term deliverables, while the broader agenda includes workforce programs and academic ties. The message from both sides is continuity: steady, practical steps rather than headline-grabbing announcements. Regionally, Japan’s approach offers Central Asian countries additional partners for finance, training, and technology. For Kyrgyzstan, deeper ties with Tokyo complement existing relationships while helping diversify investment sources and markets. The outcome to watch is whether the visit locks in concrete funding and timelines for priority energy and skills initiatives outlined by the Kyrgyz side.

Kyrgyzstan Says It’s Close to Being Removed from EU Flight Ban

A delegation from Kyrgyzstan’s Civil Aviation Agency will meet European officials in Brussels next month, marking another step in the campaign to end a two-decade ban on Kyrgyz airlines operating in the European Union because of safety concerns.   The October 7 meeting will be followed by a final European audit in December as Kyrgyzstan moves into the last stage of being removed from the EU’s so-called “blacklist” of air carriers, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov said last week during the re-opening of two of the country’s airports, Naryn and Kazarman.   "Thus, we firmly believe that the European skies, which have been closed since 2006, will reopen for Kyrgyzstan,” said Japarov, who predicted that the possible removal of the ban would boost international tourism in the Central Asian country.  Kanat Tologonov, deputy director of Kyrgyzstan’s Civil Aviation Agency, said this week that European officials will decide on whether to lift the air ban on Kyrgyzstan in May 2026, according to the 24.kg news agency. Speaking to a parliamentary committee on budget and fiscal policy, Tologonov said Kyrgyzstan successfully passed 2023-2024 audits of the International Civil Aviation Organization, a U.N. agency that oversees safety and other aspects of air travel.  As Kyrgyzstan’s bid to regain access to EU skies gains momentum, civil aviation chief Daniyar Bostonov met representatives of the International Air Transport Association this week to discuss upgrading air navigation and the digitization of passenger and air cargo transportation.  The EU Air Safety List is a list of air carriers that it says do not fulfil international safety standards and it bars those airlines “from operating to, in and from the EU, including the overflight.” Sixteen carriers from Kyrgyzstan are on the list, out of a total of 169 banned airlines, according to a June update. The EU barred Kyrgyzstan because of inadequate regulation in the aviation sector and failure to comply with international safety standards.  Civil aviation has been developing in some other parts of Central Asia, including Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 

Central Asia Deepens Trade Links with India Amid Growing Economic Ties

Trade between the countries of Central Asia and India is growing, edging closer to the $2 billion mark and signaling a new phase in cooperation across the Eurasian continent. According to data from the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), this surge reflects the expanding economic footprint of both regions. Nikolay Podguzov, Chairman of the EDB, emphasized that Central Asia and India are not only continental neighbors but also markets with significant untapped potential. Of the bank’s seven member states, four — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan — form the heart of Central Asia. Their growing engagement with New Delhi is now setting the tone for broader regional cooperation. Strong Growth as a Foundation The economic fundamentals supporting this trend are healthy. Central Asia has maintained steady growth of around 4.5% annually, while India’s economy continues to expand even faster, at roughly 6% per year. But despite this positive backdrop, there are still logistical hurdles. Trade routes between India and Central Asia must pass through intermediary countries such as Iran, Russia, or Azerbaijan — each adding layers of bureaucracy, customs costs, and delays. Experts argue that overcoming these transit bottlenecks will be crucial if India and Central Asia are to unlock the full potential of their partnership. New initiatives like the International North-South Transport Corridor and discussions on India’s role in developing Chabahar Port in Iran reflect ongoing efforts to make these pathways more efficient. Kazakhstan: The Leading Partner Kazakhstan is India’s largest trading partner in Central Asia, with bilateral trade crossing $1 billion — more than half of the region’s total trade with India. Astana supplies uranium, which is important for India’s civilian nuclear energy program, along with crude oil and steel products. In return, India exports pharmaceuticals, textiles, and consumer goods, with exports valued at around $260 million. The two countries also collaborate in strategic sectors such as energy security and defense. In 2022, India and Kazakhstan conducted joint military drills under the Kazind exercise, which reflects a broadening relationship beyond commerce. Uzbekistan: A Growing Market Trade with Uzbekistan has risen steadily, approaching $500 million in bilateral turnover, while India’s exports to Uzbekistan are valued at around $1.3 billion. Pharmaceuticals, machinery, and agricultural products dominate New Delhi’s exports, while Uzbekistan provides fruits, minerals, and cotton to the Indian market. Uzbekistan and India recently increased engagement through forums like the India-Central Asia Dialogue, where issues of connectivity, counterterrorism, and energy cooperation are regularly discussed. Tajikistan: Small but Strategic Although trade volumes with Tajikistan hover around $100 million, the partnership has strategic importance. Aluminium from Tajikistan’s massive TALCO smelter is a key export, while India provides medicines and consumer goods to Tajikistan. Beyond commerce, Dushanbe is a vital security partner for New Delhi. India operates a military facility in Tajikistan — the Farkhor Air Base, its only such presence abroad. Kyrgyzstan: Modest Trade, Strong Ties Kyrgyzstan’s trade with India is relatively small, at about $50 million, but the relationship is significant in the context of regional institutions like the Eurasian Economic Union...

Opinion: Ex-U.S. Ambassador Warns Washington Has Ceded Information Space in Central Asia

Former U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Daniel Rosenblum, has warned that Washington has “surrendered” its influence in Central Asia’s information sphere, allowing Russia and China to dominate the narrative. His remarks were reported by the Yale Daily News following a lecture at Yale University on September 15. Rosenblum, who served as U.S. ambassador to Uzbekistan from 2019 to 2022 and to Kazakhstan from 2022 to 2025, delivered a speech titled “Battling the Firehose of Falsehood: Confronting Russian Disinformation in Central Asia.” He described how Russian disinformation campaigns frequently portrayed U.S. diplomats as destabilizing actors. In one example from 2023, Russian outlets falsely claimed a NATO base had opened in Kazakhstan. “While it is easy to joke about such an absurd idea,” Rosenblum said, “the intent behind such Russian information operations is deadly serious.” Rosenblum noted that U.S. embassies attempted to counteract these narratives by highlighting tangible achievements, including COVID-19 health initiatives, agricultural partnerships, and academic exchange programs. However, he argued that much of this work has unraveled since 2023, citing the dismissal of over 1,300 State Department personnel, the elimination of USAID programs in the region, and recent cuts to Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “Eight months into the second Trump administration, it seems clear that the information war is over in Central Asia, not because the Russians won. We have simply surrendered,” he said. Rosenblum also emphasized China’s expanding influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, observing that Beijing “was doing a pretty good job of winning friends and influencing people” via infrastructure investment and cultural outreach. In a post-lecture interview, Rosenblum underscored that the challenge is now largely domestic. “The biggest challenge today is ourselves,” he said. “We have to decide as a country, do we want to be engaged in the world or not? If we cut ourselves off from the world, we will ultimately be less secure and less prosperous.” This concern was echoed in earlier analysis for The Times of Central Asia by Arman Amini, a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and an Atlantic Council Millennium Fellow. “Over the past decade, China has steadily expanded its presence in Central Asia, not through military force, but by building roads, trade corridors, and digital infrastructure,” Amini noted. “As the United States scaled back its regional footprint following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, Beijing moved quickly to fill the void. Today, China has positioned itself as the region’s dominant external power, while the U.S. risks being left on the sidelines.” The lecture was attended by approximately 80 people in person and online. It was organized by the Central Asia Initiative of the MacMillan Center, the Edward J. and Dorothy Clarke Memorial Fund, and Asian Crossroads, a student group dedicated to raising awareness of Central Asia.

Russia’s Crackdown Forces Central Asia to Rethink Labor Migration

The most recent World Bank study on labor migration highlighted the immense scale of the issue, describing it as "an ongoing development challenge in Europe and Central Asia, which is currently home to 100 million migrants," roughly one-third of all migrants globally. Historically, Russia has been the primary destination for Central Asia's mobile labor force. However, since March 2024, Moscow’s increasingly restrictive migration policies have forced Central Asian states to confront a dual challenge: managing displaced workers and rethinking the logistics of cross-border labor flows. As of 2023, more than 80% of labor migrants from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were working in Russia. Migration from Uzbekistan was more diversified, with 57% of migrants heading to Russia, 15% to Kazakhstan, and 10% to Ukraine. For millions across the region, labor migration remains a vital economic lifeline. According to the World Bank report, The Journey Ahead: Supporting Successful Migration in Europe and Central Asia, remittances in 2024 accounted for 45% of Tajikistan’s GDP, the highest ratio globally. In Kyrgyzstan, remittances made up 24% of GDP, while in Uzbekistan the figure was 14%. A 2025 update increased the figure for Tajikistan further still, noting that domestic consumption was "supported by large remittance inflows - peaking at 49% of GDP in 2024." Since the start of the war in Ukraine, rhetoric in the Russian media and among some politicians toward Central Asian migrants has increasingly shifted toward overt hostility. Following the March 2024 terrorist attack at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, in which Tajik nationals were named among the suspects, Russia began implementing harsher measures. This included widespread street inspections of Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik citizens, alongside new, more restrictive legal frameworks. While certain steps, such as mandatory biometric data collection, were officially justified by security concerns, other policies have further complicated daily life for foreign nationals. For example, since January 2025, all foreign-owned SIM cards in Russia have been deactivated. Foreign citizens must now register with government agencies to obtain new mobile services, a policy framed as a response to telecom fraud. Another measure, introduced on June 30, requires citizens of visa-free countries to register in the “Gosuslugi RuID” app before entering Russia. They must obtain a digital code to pass border control, effectively instituting a pre-entry surveillance mechanism. Kazakhstan was the first to publicly respond, with Foreign Ministry spokesman Aibek Smadiyarov refusing to rule out reciprocal measures against Russian citizens. “We are studying this issue very carefully. It requires consultations with our government agencies,” Smadiyarov said. Yet, despite these developments, none of the Central Asian countries currently maintains a comprehensive migration strategy equipped to handle these shifting dynamics. In Kazakhstan, the issue came to the fore in 2025 with a noticeable influx of Tajik nationals, the group most affected by Russia’s new rules. At a government meeting in late July, officials noted that Kazakhstan had recorded a positive migration balance for the second consecutive year, as well as a 1.5-fold increase in the number of foreign citizens permanently residing in the country. “The importance...

Central Asians in Putin’s War: Fighting for Ukraine, Forced for Russia

As the war in Ukraine continues to drag on, fighters from across Central Asia have found themselves on both sides of the frontlines. In Kyiv, Kazakh national Zhasulan Duysembin has traded his past life as a sales agent for a rifle, sporting a tattoo of Kazakhstan’s flag on his back as he battles to defend his adopted home. He now fights, he says, to protect his children and believes that “Russia will not stop in Ukraine, it will go further. We must make every effort to ensure that our Kazakhstan does not suffer.” Alan Zhangozha, an ethnic Kazakh who grew up in Kyiv and now serves as a public relations officer in the Ukrainian Army, echoes this sentiment. “Ukraine’s victory will also be a victory for my Motherland,” he told The Diplomat. But as the war drags on, in Kazakhstan, families mourn men like 22-year-old Kiril Nysanbaev - a labor migrant in Russia coerced into signing up for the war who only came home in a coffin. His sister recalls how her brother told her that Russian officers beat and forced him to enlist while he was detained on dubious charges in Chelyabinsk. Nysanbaev was killed in Ukraine’s Donetsk region in March 2024, news that only reached his family three months later. Citizens of all five Central Asian countries have been pulled into the conflict since Russia’s invasion in 2022. Some have volunteered to fight for Ukraine, driven by personal ties or ideals, while others, mostly labor migrants, have been recruited, enticed, or pressured into fighting for Russia. These parallel currents reflect the complex impact of the war on a region that remains officially neutral but was historically deeply entwined with Moscow. While a handful of Central Asians now wear the blue-and-yellow insignia in Ukraine’s defense, far more have ended up in Russia's ranks, often as expendable foot soldiers. From Bishkek to Bucha In November 2022, a Kyrgyz former labor migrant, Almaz Kudabek uulu, announced the creation of the Turan Battalion, a volunteer unit of Turkic-speaking fighters formed to assist Ukraine. “Kyrgyzstan is my homeland; I will always love it. But Ukraine is my home now; I am fighting for Ukraine,” he told reporters. The battalion, joined by volunteers from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and elsewhere, operates as a semi-autonomous unit supported by private donations and allied Ukrainian brigades. Back in Kyrgyzstan, however, the authorities opened a criminal case against Kudabek, punishable by up to eight years in prison, and local media that covered his story faced pressure. Others have supported Ukraine in tangible, humanitarian ways. Early in the war, members of Ukraine’s Kazakh diaspora erected traditional yurts in cities like Bucha and Kyiv as heated shelters dubbed “Yurts of Invincibility.” These spaces provided food, tea, and electricity during blackouts, a gesture of solidarity that irritated Moscow but drew only a muted response from Kazakhstan’s government. Moscow’s Migrant Recruits: Coercion and Casualties Far greater numbers of Central Asians have ended up fighting for Russia, which hosts millions of migrant workers from...