• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10680 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10680 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10680 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10680 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10680 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10680 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10680 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10680 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%

Viewing results 97 - 102 of 792

Cyprus as a Mirror of Turkish Geopolitics: How Ankara Uses Northern Cyprus to Project Influence in Central Asia

Northern Cyprus has become a microcosm of Turkish foreign policy, a space where Ankara combines military presence, the ideology of “Turkic brotherhood,” and economic leverage. For Turkey, this territory is not merely a long-standing geopolitical dispute but a laboratory for a new diplomatic model centered on the vision of a “great Turkic world.” As noted by Stratfor, despite the decisive victory of Republican Turkish Party leader Tufan Erhürman in the October 19, 2025, presidential elections in the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), a candidate who supports renewed negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus and advocates for a federal model, Ankara has shown no intention of revising its entrenched two-state doctrine. Analysts suggest Turkey may apply economic pressure and diplomatic isolation, including suspension of subsidies and credit lines, should Erhürman attempt to implement a federal solution. Concurrently, Turkey is lobbying for the TRNC’s recognition within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), aiming to set a symbolic precedent: if Turkic-speaking nations will not support each other, who will? For Central Asia, this initiative reflects Ankara’s commitment to unifying the Turkic world under its political leadership, extending far beyond cultural solidarity. Political Implications for Central Asia Turkey’s push to incorporate the TRNC into the OTS shifts the organization from a cultural bloc to a geopolitical instrument. Should Northern Cyprus gain observer status, Ankara will likely expect symbolic support from its Turkic partners. This poses a significant dilemma for Central Asian states. Aligning with Turkey could be perceived by Western actors as a breach of international law, while maintaining neutrality might be viewed as a rejection of Turkic unity. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have so far emphasized adherence to international law and sovereignty. At the April 2025 EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, these states jointly reaffirmed UN Security Council resolutions from the early 1980s, which declared the TRNC’s independence and all related separatist actions legally invalid. Kyrgyzstan may face a more delicate challenge due to its deep humanitarian and educational ties with Turkey. Northern Cyprus thus serves as a litmus test for Turkic integration: how closely can nations align without compromising their political autonomy? Economic and Energy Dimensions Cyprus plays a strategic role in Turkey’s energy policy, linking the Caspian region, the Caucasus, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkish control over Northern Cyprus bolsters its influence over maritime logistics, offshore gas development, and export corridors. This holds direct relevance for Central Asia. A stronger Turkish position in the Mediterranean enhances its leverage over energy transit routes from the Caspian to Europe, particularly in relation to the Trans-Caspian pipeline and the Middle Corridor. Over time, Ankara is expected to use energy infrastructure as a tool for political engagement, promoting an “economy of Turkic solidarity”, offering mutual benefits, but often tied to strategic conditions. Security and Military Presence The TRNC functions as a prototype for Turkey’s military protectorate model, a way to retain control while presenting itself as a guarantor of stability. This model is echoed across the Turkic region through Turkey’s expanding military partnerships...

Rare Earth Diplomacy: Critical Minerals Set to Top Agenda at C5+1 Summit

The announcement of an upcoming C5+1 summit in Washington between the United States and the Central Asian republics has taken much of the regional and U.S. political establishment by surprise. A swift visit by U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan was seemingly necessary to coordinate the summit’s agenda. Notably, Kazakhstan appears prepared to play a leading role on one of the summit’s most pressing issues. The summit, scheduled for November 6 in Washington, was first revealed through media channels before being confirmed through official correspondence between Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and U.S. President Donald Trump. Uzbek media later confirmed the meeting, citing sources within the administration of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and this was followed by Kyrgyzstan's President Sadyr Japarov. It is notable that shortly after Tokayev’s correspondence with Trump became public, the Kazakh president held a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Officially, the two discussed Tokayev’s upcoming visit to Moscow. This was their second such call in less than two weeks, the previous taking place on October 14. There is speculation that the Washington summit may have been a key topic of discussion. During meetings in Tashkent with Gor and Landau - Uzbekistan being the first stop on their tour - Mirziyoyev reportedly discussed a broad set of topics. However, the issue of “critical materials,” particularly rare earth metals, stood out. It is increasingly clear that rare earths will be a central focus of Trump’s engagement with Central Asian leaders. [caption id="attachment_38242" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Sergio Gor and Christopher Landau at the Shymbulak ski resort in Almaty; image: Akorda[/caption] Trump has previously drawn attention for high-stakes diplomacy involving rare earth metals, including a controversial deal with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and later discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Anchorage. Most recently, during the first leg of his Asia tour, Trump met with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and concluded a rare earth metals agreement, despite the challenges associated with extracting these materials, which are often found underwater. Against this backdrop, Kazakhstan appears well-positioned to take the lead in terms of rare earth elements. President Tokayev first proposed developing rare earth metal deposits in his September 2023 address, “The Economic Course of Fair Kazakhstan.” In 2024, Kazakh geologists identified 38 promising solid mineral deposits, including the Kuyrektykol site in the Karaganda region, which contains substantial reserves. Tokayev returned to the issue in January 2025, during an extended government meeting, criticizing the cabinet for delays and emphasizing Kazakhstan’s untapped potential in rare earth extraction and processing. In April, during the Central Asia-European Union summit, Tokayev met with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who congratulated him on the discovery of a major deposit in Kazakhstan. The topic also featured at the Central Asia-Italy summit in May, where Tokayev proposed creating a regional research center to consolidate data on rare earth deposits across Central Asia. “The creation of joint ventures, technology transfer, and the localization...

Trump to Host U.S.-Central Asia Summit on November 6

Kazakhstan’s presidency says a Central Asia–United States summit will be held in Washington on November 6. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev sent a letter to U.S. President Donald Trump to thank him for the invitation to participate in the summit on that date in the U.S. capital, Tokayev’s press office said on Sunday. President Tokayev regarded the initiative of the American leader as both timely and important, the office said. “The Head of State also noted that he shares the key principles of President Trump’s domestic and foreign policy, in particular the advocacy of traditional values based on common sense, as well as dedication to safeguarding peace and security.” The summit would mark the tenth anniversary of the C5+1 diplomatic forum, which includes the United States and the five Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Citing unidentified sources in Uzbekistan’s presidential administration, Gazeta, a media outlet in Uzbekistan, confirmed the summit plan, saying Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev was among the Central Asian leaders who had received invitations from Trump to attend the November 6 meeting in Washington. Kyrgyz media have also reported that President Sadyr Japarov will attend the C5+1. According to Azattyq, the invitation was extended to all five Central Asia leaders. The announcement of the summit coincides with a visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan by Sergio Gor, U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau. Trump met Tokayev and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly last month. Multi-billion-dollar business deals were announced in connection with those meetings. The U.S. president is currently on an Asia tour during which he is expected to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping to discuss trade tensions. A summit with Central Asian leaders could potentially help the U.S. counter the influence of Russia and China in that region. In an Oct. 20 letter, a U.S. congressional foreign affairs panel urged Trump to host a summit with Central Asian leaders before the end of the year. It noted U.S. interests such as the development of critical minerals, including tungsten, antimony, lithium, and rare earth elements; the full repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, a Cold War-era law that imposes some restrictions on trade with several countries in Central Asia; and counterterrorism efforts against the regional branch of the Islamic State group.

How U.S. and EU Sanctions Are Rippling Through Central Asia

Russia’s economy has faced renewed pressure following a fresh round of sanctions imposed this past week by both the European Union and the United States. After abruptly canceling a planned meeting with Vladimir Putin in Budapest, President Donald Trump shifted to a more hardline stance, announcing new sanctions. While these sanctions may not cripple Moscow, they are already having secondary effects on Central Asia, particularly on Kazakhstan’s banking and energy sectors. The EU's 19th sanctions package, adopted on October 22, introduces a phased ban on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG). According to Reuters, short-term contracts will be terminated within six months, while long-term contracts are to expire by January 1, 2027. The package also includes a total ban on transactions with Russian oil giants Rosneft and Gazprom Neft, an expanded blacklist of so-called "shadow fleet" vessels, and sanctions against 45 companies in Russia and third countries supplying military-related technologies. Of growing concern in Central Asia is the inclusion of several regional financial institutions in the EU's sanctions list. These include the Kazakh branch of Russia’s VTB Bank, Kyrgyz banks Tolubai and Eurasian Savings Bank, and Tajik banks Dushanbe City Bank, Kommertsbank of Tajikistan, and Spitamen. These restrictions are scheduled to take effect between November and December 2025. Both Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov and the nation's Foreign Ministry have publicly expressed dismay over the sanctions, with Japarov urging Western leaders to stop “politicizing the economy.” In his speech at the UN General Assembly in New York in September, Japarov criticized the impact of unilateral sanctions, while the Foreign Ministry has stated that the country adheres to its international obligations and maintains an open dialogue with the EU to prevent risks associated with possible sanctions circumvention. The ministry has proposed launching an independent, internationally recognized audit and forming a joint “Kyrgyzstan-European Union” technical working group to facilitate data exchange, transaction monitoring, and risk assessments. In Kazakhstan, the National Bank downplayed the impact of sanctions against VTB. Deputy Chairman Yerulan Zhamaubayev noted that the bank had already been under nominal restrictions, and handles few transactions. “VTB does not affect the country’s financial stability, and we do not expect serious risks for the economy,” Zhamaubayev stated. However, the latest U.S. sanctions may prove more consequential for Kazakhstan, particularly amid efforts to strengthen bilateral trade with the United States, including through the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned Russian oil majors Rosneft and Lukoil. The latter has deep economic ties with Kazakhstan. Just days before the announcement, on October 14, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev personally attended the 30th anniversary of Lukoil’s operations in Kazakhstan, awarding CEO Vagit Alekperov the Order of Barys, first class. Oil and gas journalist Oleg Chervinsky reported that the joint venture Kalamkas-Khazar Operating LLP, co-owned by Lukoil and KazMunayGas, is directly affected. “Only the Tengiz and CPC projects, which Lukoil operates with American partners, have been exempted from the sanctions,” Chervinsky noted. A final investment decision for Kalamkas-Khazar was expected in December 2025. Yerkanat Abeni, a member of...

Congressional Panel Urges Trump to Host C5+1 Summit This Year

A U.S. congressional foreign affairs panel is asking U.S. President Donald Trump to host a meeting in Washington, D.C. with leaders from Central Asia by the end of 2025.   The proposal was made in an October 20 letter to Trump by Bill Huizenga, a Michigan Republican who chairs the House’s South and Central Asia Subcommittee, and Sydney Kamlager-Dove of California, the senior Democrat on the subcommittee.  The two representatives said that such a summit would mark the 10th anniversary of the C5+1 diplomatic forum and highlight the importance of Central Asia following Trump’s meetings with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly last month. Multi-billion-dollar business deals were announced in connection with those meetings.  Established in 2015, the C5+1 formula refers to the United States and the five Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. “A Leaders’ Summit with meaningful outcomes will strengthen regional cooperation and maximize the diplomatic potential of the 10th anniversary, setting the tone for strengthened U.S. engagement in the region for the rest of your presidency,” the representatives said in the letter to Trump. They said a meeting would advance U.S. priorities in Central Asia, “including security cooperation, economic ties, soft power, and good governance,” they said.  The letter noted U.S. interests such as the development of critical minerals, including tungsten, antimony, lithium, and rare earth elements; the full repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, a Cold War-era law that imposes some restrictions on trade with several countries in Central Asia; and counterterrorism efforts against the regional branch of the Islamic State group.  “We also hope to see new agreements with the Central Asian countries to bolster people-to-people ties and expand U.S. soft power, such as additional American Peace Corps volunteers and the expansion of educational and cultural exchange programs, while addressing the accreditation issue surrounding U.S.-sponsored journalists and other U.S.-funded news broadcasters.  The Trump administration, however, has taken steps to cut most U.S. foreign aid programs, dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development. USAID had been active in Central Asia. The administration has also cut aid for U.S.-funded domestic and international broadcasters. Analyst Temur Umarov wrote in the Carnegie Politika publication that Central Asia has found it relatively easy to work with the Trump administration.  “Business interests can be used to attract Washington’s attention, and there is no longer any need for demonstrative distancing from Russia or commitment to democratic reforms,” Umarov said.  He said that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have hoped to hold C5+1 anniversary events in their capitals, with top leaders in attendance. If that happens, Trump would be the first sitting U.S. president to visit any of the five Central Asian countries. 

Russia Announces ‘Deportation Regime’ for Migrant Laborers

It has been more than a month since the deadline for migrant laborers working in Russia to complete their registration documents or face expulsion. The anticipated mass deportations have not happened, but Russian State Duma Chairman, Vyacheslav Volodin, indicated on October 13 that could change soon. Volodin warned, “A new migration regime is now in effect… the deportation regime.” The Final Bell Several months ago, Russian officials announced the September 10 deadline for all migrant laborers to legalize their status to work and live in Russia. Russia’s Federal Migration Service created a list in the summer of 2024 of “controlled persons,” those who still did not have all the required documentation to remain in Russia. The list was posted on the service’s website in February 2025. Volodin said those on the list lacked one or more of the following: “documents or certificates required for obtaining migration status or citizenship, registration of a place of stay or residence.” Volodin said the list also included those who failed to complete mandatory procedures such as “annual medical examinations for [their] presence… as well as fingerprinting and photographing” or have failed to show that their “patent, work permits, or employment contract” was renewed. The Duma Chairman said some 35,000 “foreign citizens” had already been expelled between January and August of this year. September 10 arrived, and in the days that followed, there were no reports of Russian law enforcement rounding up migrants and sending them back to their homelands. However, it was clear the Russian government was not bluffing. In his remarks to the Duma, Volodin explained that as of September 1, there were still some 770,000 migrants on the register of controlled persons, and that one-third of them were women and children. If these people have not taken care of their requirements, Volodin said, “They need to leave our country, informing [us] of the date, place, and route of their departure.” The Dwindling Number of Central Asian Migrant Laborers in Russia There are several million foreign workers in Russia, and the largest group is those from Central Asia, though fewer of them work there than was previously the case. The terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall in March 2024 that left more than 140 people dead was blamed on citizens of Tajikistan. It sparked a wave of xenophobia in Russia aimed at Central Asians, and prompted a raft of new laws and regulations for migrant laborers. Uzbekistan’s citizens have long been the largest group of Central Asian migrant laborers working in Russia, numbering between 4 to 6 million, depending on the season, during 2016. Figures vary for how many Uzbek citizens are working in Russia now, but Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency said at the start of October that it was about 1.3 million, noting the figure fluctuates depending on the time of the year, and that during the warmer months of 2025, it was closer to 2 million. During his recent visit to Tajikistan for a CIS summit and a separate meeting with...