• KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
20 September 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 133

Kyrgyz Court Upholds Ex-Security Chief Tashiyev’s Conviction but Changes Charge

On September 10, the Bishkek City Court upheld convictions against former security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev and seven others, but changed the offense from plotting to overthrow the government to interfering with electoral rights. All eight had been convicted in July of plotting the violent overthrow of the government. They received four-year prison sentences, replaced by three years of probation. The change has added to the confusion surrounding the alleged plot. On September 14, Tashiyev’s lawyer asked the Prosecutor General’s Office to investigate the appeal judges’ actions, saying the defense had received no warning of the new charge. The Letter of 75 The saga started in February, when a group of 75 prominent figures in Kyrgyzstan released an open letter calling on President Japarov to call for an early presidential election. The group argued that Japarov was elected in January 2021 under the terms of the previous constitution, which allowed a president one six-year term in office. Several months after Japarov was elected, the country approved a new constitution that gave an individual the right to be elected to two five-year terms as president. Within hours of the letter’s publication, the authorities started rounding up some of the authors of the letter, and President Japarov dismissed his long-time friend Tashiyev as security chief. Japarov said he dismissed Tashiyev to “prevent a split in society,” and for weeks after that, the Kyrgyz president was evasive about the exact reason for sacking a man Japarov continued to call his close friend. In an interview in late April, parliamentary deputy Elvira Surabaldiyeva was the first Kyrgyz official to clarify that Tashiyev was being charged with planning a coup. The trial opened on June 15. Tashiyev’s co-defendants were former Prosecutor General Kurmankul Zulushev, former Parliamentary Speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu, former Deputy Interior Minister Kursan Asanov, former Deputy Prime Minister Aaly Karashev, and politicians Emilbek Uzakbayev, Bekbolot Talgarbekov, and Kurmanbek Dyykanbayev. On July 2, all eight were found guilty of plotting the violent overthrow of the government. The court imposed four-year prison sentences and ordered confiscation of their property, but replaced imprisonment with three years of probation. Most of the defendants and the prosecution appealed the court decision, setting the stage for the court ruling on September 10. Still Guilty, but of Something Different The prosecution sought to have the sentences increased to nine years in prison for all the defendants. The defendants, of course, wanted to be exonerated. On September 10, the Bishkek City Court rendered its verdict. All eight defendants were declared guilty, but not of attempting to overthrow the government. They were guilty of “interfering with exercising voting rights.” The court retained the four-year prison terms but again allowed all eight defendants to serve probation instead. It reduced probation from three years to two and lifted the property confiscation order. Zulushev’s lawyer has said he will appeal to the Supreme Court. Tashiyev’s lawyer has separately asked prosecutors to investigate the appeal judges’ actions, arguing that his client was convicted on a charge the...

Psychologists in Kyrgyzstan Face New Regulation Push

Parents in Kyrgyzstan have been contacting member of parliament Elvira Surabaldieva with a basic question: the person counseling their child online calls themselves a psychologist, but are they actually qualified? There is currently no unified system through which families can check. The authorities now want to establish uniform rules for psychologists for the first time. The bill is being prepared by member of parliament Elvira Surabaldieva. The initiative followed requests from parents and other citizens who wanted to verify the qualifications of people offering psychological services online. According to Surabaldieva, some begin providing consultations after two- or three-month courses, while consultations can cost between 3,000 and 10,000 som ($34-$114) per session. Social media has made it considerably easier to enter the psychological services market. To a potential client, a polished page and thousands of followers can appear as convincing as professional qualifications. There is often no straightforward way to verify a consultant’s education and experience before the first session. Work with children is particularly sensitive. Surabaldieva said parents had approached her specifically because their children were receiving online consultations and they wanted to know whether the practitioners involved were properly qualified. The bill proposes establishing the professional status of psychologists in law. Exactly what education will be required remains under discussion. The working group is considering conventional psychology degrees as well as possible routes for people with qualifications in other fields who subsequently receive additional psychology training. Surabaldieva has argued, however, that completing several short-term courses alone should not be enough to qualify someone as a professional psychologist. The second proposal is a unified registry. Before seeking a consultation, clients would be able to check a specialist’s education, qualifications, and professional experience. But that raises another question: who should decide who is qualified to practice? An interagency working group began a clause-by-clause review of the legislation in Bishkek in early August. One option under discussion would give professional bodies a role in assessing applicants. Surabaldieva supports keeping the registry under state oversight rather than transferring that authority to private professional associations. The proposal would therefore give the state a new role in determining who can present themselves as a qualified psychologist. So far, however, there appears to have been little public discussion of whether tighter requirements could reduce the number of practitioners or increase the cost of consultations. Another point of debate concerns people with years of practical experience whose education may not meet the future requirements. That is particularly important because some state institutions already employ psychologists whose original training was in fields such as education or social work. The working group is considering a transition period of two or three years, giving experienced practitioners time to meet the new standards rather than forcing them to leave the profession immediately. Kyrgyzstan is not alone in facing this problem. A 2025 conference abstract published by European Psychiatry describes inadequate regulation of psychological services in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, which has allowed underqualified practitioners, often with only short-term training, to advertise themselves as...

Kyrgyz Prosecutors Seek Nine-Year Prison Terms for Tashiyev and Seven Others

Kyrgyz prosecutors are asking an appeals court to send former security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev and seven other defendants to prison. A lower court convicted all eight in July of preparing to seize power by force, but allowed them to remain free on probation. The appeal is being heard by the Bishkek City Court, with the hearing taking place behind closed doors. Prosecutors are challenging the sentences handed down by the trial court. The “Letter of 75” case arose from an open letter signed on February 9 by 75 politicians, former officials, and public figures. The authors called for an early presidential election amid a dispute over when President Sadyr Japarov’s current term should end. Five of the signatories were among the eight people later charged with preparing to seize power by force. Before his dismissal, Tashiyev had been one of Kyrgyzstan’s most powerful officials and a central figure in Japarov’s government. Japarov appointed his longtime ally to lead the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) after coming to power in 2020, but dismissed him on February 10, 2026, saying the move was needed to “prevent a split in society” and state institutions. The dismissal ended a five-year governing partnership and was followed by personnel changes across the GKNB and other state bodies. Eight people eventually stood trial, including Tashiyev, former Prosecutor General Kurmankul Zulushev, and former parliamentary speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu. The trial court found all eight guilty and sentenced them to four years in prison with confiscation of property, but exempted them from serving the prison terms and placed them under supervised probation for three years. They were acquitted of the separate charge of abuse of office. The Times of Central Asia previously reported in detail on the verdict and the circumstances surrounding the case. Prosecutors had sought nine-year prison terms at the original trial. According to defense lawyers, they are now asking the appeals court to impose the same terms on all eight defendants. Some of the defendants have also appealed their convictions and are seeking acquittal. During the appeal, the defendants again raised one of the disputed issues in the case: why criminal proceedings targeted only some of the people involved when the open letter had 75 signatories. Five defendants who had signed the letter asked the court to give a legal assessment of the actions of the other 70 signatories. The appeals panel granted the request and agreed that the other signatories could be called for questioning, with the defense responsible for securing their attendance. If prosecutors prevail, the appeal would reverse the main practical outcome of the July trial: all eight defendants were convicted of preparing to seize power by force, but none was sent to prison.

Dombra Dispute and Niqab Bans Fuel Religious Debate in Central Asia

Standing before a court in Aktobe in June, 35-year-old Azat Konys apologized to “the entire Kazakh people” for insulting one of the country’s most cherished cultural symbols. Two months earlier, during a TikTok livestream, he had declared the dombra forbidden under Islam, compared the two-stringed instrument to part of the devil’s anatomy and called clerics from Kazakhstan’s official Islamic authority “dogs of hell.” Konys asked the court not to imprison him. The judge instead sentenced him to three years and six months for inciting religious and national hatred. The controversy began when Konys cited the Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, the dominant legal tradition among Muslims in Kazakhstan, to argue that the dombra and other stringed instruments, including the guitar and balalaika, were haram, meaning forbidden under Islamic law. The remarks caused particular anger because the dombra is more than a musical instrument in Kazakhstan: it has accompanied oral poetry and storytelling for generations and is officially celebrated as a symbol of cultural heritage and national  identity. Police identified Konys after clips from the livestream circulated on social media and detained him in April. The case is an unusually stark example of how online religious disputes are spilling into legal and political life across Central Asia. Arguments that might once have remained within mosques or religious communities are now spreading through social media, forcing governments and official Islamic authorities alike to decide where religious expression ends and attacks on national culture begin. A more recent controversy arose in Kazakhstan’s Turkestan Region, where a 66-year-old guest at a toi, a traditional wedding feast, called for stricter adherence to Islamic law. He urged the organizers to separate men and women and remove music and alcohol from the celebration, while describing musicians as “heralds of Satan.” The video spread rapidly on social media, prompting nationwide debate. The man was detained and placed in a temporary detention facility for incitement of religious and social hatred. In a statement, the Ministry of Internal Affairs said that freedom of expression does not extend to statements that degrade the dignity of others or could provoke religious or social hostility. The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK), the country’s main official Muslim body, later issued its own response. It stated that Islam does not prohibit music in itself and stressed that publicly insulting artists or women is inconsistent with Islamic ethics. Another controversy centered on Nauryz, the spring equinox holiday celebrated throughout Central Asia and across much of the Turkic and Iranian cultural world. In March, a blogger in the Almaty Region described the holiday as “non-Muslim” and argued that it should not be celebrated. Police opened a criminal case against him on suspicion of inciting religious hatred. Kazakhstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office subsequently warned of legal liability for statements attacking Nauryz and other national traditions. The SAMK, meanwhile, publicly celebrated Nauryz as a national holiday promoting social harmony and charitable acts. The debate soon spread beyond social media into politics and the entertainment industry. Producer and television presenter Bayan Alaguzova said...

Bride Kidnapping in Central Asia: Why the Practice Persists Despite Tougher Laws

Bride kidnapping for the purpose of forcing women into marriage remains one of the least visible forms of gender-based violence in Central Asia. Although abduction and coercion into marriage are punishable under criminal law across the region, the offenses are defined differently from country to country. Their true scale is difficult to measure. Many victims never report the crime, while some cases are still viewed as a continuation of tradition rather than a violation of criminal law. Over the past decade, governments across Central Asia have begun revising their approaches to the problem. Kyrgyzstan strengthened criminal penalties following several high-profile cases. Kazakhstan did not close a legal loophole that allowed many perpetrators to avoid prosecution until 2025. Uzbekistan has a specific criminal provision covering the abduction of women for marriage, while Tajikistan does not appear to define bride kidnapping as a separate offense. In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, however, assessing the prevalence of the practice remains particularly difficult because of limited research and incomplete official data. The term “bride kidnapping” has not always referred to the same practice. Anthropologists note that historically it covered a range of marriage customs, from mutually agreed elopements and staged abductions to the violent kidnapping of women. Contemporary researchers stress that the presence or absence of a woman’s free consent is the key distinction between these practices. Comparable customs once existed among a number of Central Asian peoples. One documented motive has been the desire to avoid kalym, the traditional bride price paid by the groom’s family to the bride’s relatives. Economic motives, however, did not alter the nature of the crime when a woman did not consent to the marriage. The issue has been studied most extensively in Kyrgyzstan. A nationally representative survey conducted in 2015–2016 by the National Statistical Committee with support from UN Women, UNFPA, and the International Organization for Migration found that 22.1% of marriages involved some form of bride abduction. Of these, 16.3% were reported as taking place with the woman’s consent, while 5.8% occurred without it. The frequently cited claim that more than one in five Kyrgyz marriages begins with bride kidnapping therefore combines consensual and non-consensual practices. It should not be presented as an estimate of forced abduction. The figures were based on respondents’ accounts and may not capture every form of family or social pressure surrounding consent. Known locally as ala kachuu, or “grab and run,” the non-consensual abduction of a woman for marriage is a criminal offense in Kyrgyzstan. In 2013, the penalty for abducting an adult woman for marriage against her will was increased to between five and seven years in prison. The corresponding sentence when the victim was under 17 was increased to between five and ten years. Tougher penalties, however, have not prevented further tragedies. One of the best-known cases was the 2018 murder of Burulai Turdaaly Kyzy, a 20-year-old medical student. After she was abducted, her family contacted the police. Officers brought both Burulai and her abductor to a police station but left...

Kyrgyzstan Uncovers Suspected Smuggling Tunnel on Uzbek Border

Authorities in Kyrgyzstan have uncovered an underground tunnel on the border with Uzbekistan that is believed to have been built for smuggling goods, 24.kg reported, citing the Batken Regional Department of Internal Affairs. According to the police, officers from the department responsible for combating extremism and illegal migration received information that an underground passage was being constructed to move goods illegally across the border. During an inspection of an abandoned house on Mamazhanov Street in the village of Chechelik, Kadamjay District, investigators discovered a tunnel leading toward neighboring Uzbekistan. According to the regional police department, the tunnel is approximately 12 meters deep and 1.5 meters wide. The authorities have not disclosed its total length or confirmed whether it had already been used. The Batken regional police investigation service is examining the circumstances surrounding the tunnel. The discovery follows several similar cases in Central Asia. In April 2024, Kyrgyz authorities uncovered another underground passage in Jalal-Abad Region along the Uzbek border. Officials said the tunnel had been used to smuggle both people and goods, and police arrested an Uzbek citizen who had allegedly crossed the border through the passage. Kazakhstan has also reported similar discoveries. In December 2024, Kazakh and Uzbek authorities dismantled a smuggling operation involving a 450-meter tunnel in Turkistan Region. Investigators said the passage had been used for around two months to transport between five and seven metric tons of fuel into Uzbekistan each day. In July 2025, Kazakhstan’s Financial Monitoring Agency said the investigation had been completed and the case sent to court.