Kyrgyzstan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Migrant Resettlement

Kyrgyzstan Rejects European Migrant Resettlement Proposals

Kyrgyzstan has repeatedly rejected proposals from several European countries to accept migrants from Afghanistan and African countries, Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev said on October 13. In exchange, those countries had offered employment opportunities for Kyrgyzstan’s skilled workers. He said Bishkek would not negotiate on those terms. Kulubaev did not specify which countries had made the proposals or how many migrants Kyrgyzstan had been asked to accept. No European government has publicly confirmed such an offer. On October 1, the Council of the European Union adopted new rules for returning foreign nationals who have no legal right to remain in its member states. The rules allow countries to establish migrant return centers outside the bloc under agreements with third countries. Such arrangements must comply with international human rights protections, including the prohibition on sending people to countries where they face persecution or ill-treatment. Similar arrangements have been discussed elsewhere in Central Asia. On May 7, Austria and Uzbekistan signed an agreement to cooperate on deportations during a visit by Austria’s foreign and interior ministers to Tashkent. The deal also provided for greater cooperation on legal employment opportunities for skilled workers from Uzbekistan. Unlike the proposals described by Kulubaev, the Austrian arrangement envisaged Uzbekistan as a potential transit route for Afghan nationals being returned from Austria, rather than a place of resettlement. Kyrgyzstan is reassessing its own approach to labor migration. According to Kulubaev, growing numbers of its citizens are choosing Turkey and the United States as destinations for work. South Korea and Japan are also interested in recruiting workers from Kyrgyzstan, particularly staff to care for elderly patients in hospitals. Bishkek has reduced the organized placement of its citizens in long-term jobs abroad while continuing to facilitate seasonal employment. Kulubaev said Kyrgyzstan also faces labor shortages at home. Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Labor, Social Security, and Migration said 736,600 citizens had worked abroad so far in 2026, compared with 798,400 during the whole of 2025. Russia remains the main destination, with more than 472,000 citizens of Kyrgyzstan living there in March. Approximately 70,000 were working in Kazakhstan, 60,000 in the U.S., 35,000 in Turkey, and 20,000 in Germany.

Innovation Rankings

Central Asia in the Global Innovation Rankings: Supercomputers, Engineers, and the Economics of Government Ambitions

In the Global Innovation Index (GII), published on September 29 by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Kazakhstan climbed eight places to rank 73rd among 139 economies. Uzbekistan ranked 77th and Kyrgyzstan 92nd. Tajikistan placed 112th, while Turkmenistan was not included in the study. The overall rankings, however, conceal some interesting details. Uzbekistan ranks second worldwide in the share of graduates in science and engineering. Kyrgyzstan ranks second in labor productivity growth, while Tajikistan leads in utility model applications relative to the size of its economy. Utility models are a simpler form of patent protection, usually for smaller inventions. Such strong results in individual indicators stand in contrast to the countries' relatively modest overall rankings. Part of the explanation lies in the study's methodology. WIPO evaluates education and scientific capacity alongside infrastructure and investment. It also considers business activity and research output. A country may train large numbers of engineers or register technical innovations while lagging in research output and investment, with limited commercial activity. For Central Asia, the rankings also offer a way to compare economic performance with the scale of governments' technological ambitions. Kazakhstan: Supercomputers in Search of Customers In recent years, Kazakhstan has assembled an impressive portfolio of digital projects. The Alem.Cloud and Al-Farabium supercomputers, along with the Data Center Valley project in Ekibastuz, are intended to improve the country's computing infrastructure. The Alem.ai artificial intelligence (AI) center and the KazLLM and AlemLLM large language models are designed to develop its AI capabilities. Training opportunities are also expanding through AI-Sana and Tomorrow School, with TUMO Astana offering education in AI and other digital fields. However, the wider use of AI remains relatively modest. The Digital Qazaqstan strategy through 2029 cites figures for the second half of 2025 showing that generative AI adoption in Kazakhstan stood at 13.7%, compared with a global average of 16.3%. Kazakhstan ranked 24th in the United Nations (UN) E-Government Development Index in its 2024 survey but 73rd in the 2026 GII. Kazakhstan's digitalization model has long centered on government services. The country's high position in the UN study reflects this focus. Commercial technologies present a more complicated picture: here, the government must rely on research teams, private developers, investors, and customers willing to pay for their services. The arrival of supercomputers expands the country's technical capabilities. How extensively they will be used outside government projects remains to be seen. Uzbekistan: Engineering Education and IT Services Exports The country has long focused on workforce development for the IT industry. An export-oriented digital services sector is growing around IT Park. Foreign companies are operating in the country, while training programs in programming and AI are expanding. Tashkent intends to support its workforce development policies with domestic computing infrastructure. Under the AI development strategy adopted in 2024, Uzbekistan plans $50 million in AI infrastructure spending and the training of one million specialists. AI laboratories are also planned at 15 universities. A smaller supercomputer is already operating, and preparations are underway to acquire a more powerful system....

Agricultural Trade

Kyrgyzstan Proposes Apple and Potato Import Ban to Protect Domestic Farmers

Kyrgyzstan is considering temporary bans on apple and potato imports to prevent foreign produce from driving down prices during the domestic harvest season. The proposed apple import ban would remain in place until February 1, 2027, while potato imports would be restricted until March 1. The Ministry of Agriculture expects Kyrgyz farmers to harvest 179,400 metric tons of apples this year. Meanwhile, the country imported 6,400 tons between January and August, more than twice the amount imported during all of 2025. The main suppliers were Poland (3,600 tons), China (1,700 tons), and Uzbekistan (859 tons). Kyrgyz apple exports, by contrast, fell by 13.3% over the same eight-month period to 10,800 tons. The ministry is concerned that rising imports and declining exports could make it harder for local growers to sell their harvest without accepting lower wholesale prices. For potatoes, the government expects domestic production to cover the country's needs. The projected harvest is 1.25 million tons, compared with annual domestic consumption of approximately 800,000 tons. The ministry proposes restricting imports until spring to give farmers time to sell their crops. The proposals raise questions about Kyrgyzstan's obligations within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which guarantees the free movement of goods between member states. According to a published examination of the draft legislation, the apple ban would also cover imports from other EAEU countries, while the potato proposal does not specify whether these would be included. Under Article 29 of the EAEU Treaty, member states can restrict trade in certain circumstances, including to protect public health or national security. In September, Kazakhstan also introduced a ban on apple imports. The ban, which runs until December 31, extends to apples from other EAEU countries and specifically cites Article 29 of the Union's treaty. As recently as March, Kyrgyzstan's Ministry of Agriculture said there were no grounds for restricting potato imports from China, citing, among other factors, the country's international trade obligations.

Regional Cooperation

Opinion: Central Asia’s Minilateral Diplomacy and the Limits of Cooperation

In the contemporary, largely fragmented world order, the concept of minilateralism has become increasingly relevant. As less powerful, smaller states are struggling with often ineffective multilateral diplomatic frameworks, cooperation on a smaller scale has been gaining momentum in international relations. Central Asian countries, although with an intrinsic set of strengths and resources, still lack the power to individually address some of their own issues and advocate more proactively for their interests, especially in global forums dominated by major powers and entities. Geopolitical weaknesses of each Central Asian country lie in insufficiently developed domestic economic and military power to compete with much stronger neighbors such as Russia or China. Furthermore, unfavorable geography, where Central Asia, as a landlocked region, has limited access to global trade chains, also dilutes its geopolitical strength. In addition, the transboundary nature of critical resources, especially concerning water flows and supply, often causes tensions among states of Central Asia. In such discouraging circumstances, minilateralism promises more realistic solutions that can place Central Asia on a more equal footing with external partners and enable the region to play a more significant role in regional and, to some extent, international politics. That is why the consultative meetings of the five Central Asian countries (C5), now expanded to include Azerbaijan as C6, and C5+1 dialogues with external partners have become important platforms for Central Asia’s diplomatic standing. Minilateralism and Central Asia Minilateralism represents an international relations concept that implies cooperation of a smaller group of countries (usually three to nine members) in order to resolve shared problems or pursue mutual objectives. While bilateralism remains the main form of cooperation in international politics and multilateralism is necessary for tackling global issues, minilateralism has emerged as a more appropriate response for addressing specific regional issues in a more flexible and efficient manner. One of the main features of minilateralism is prioritizing shared interests over values or ideological principles, which allows collaborating states to focus more on solving issues and avoid being burdened by ideological discrepancies. Take, for example, the Abraham Accords that managed to gather countries with very different ideological views, especially Israel and the United Arab Emirates, but still produced tangible results of cooperation. Another advantage of minilateralism is a quicker response to crises, as well as opportunities, with less of the bureaucratic hassle that often follows multilateral diplomacy. For Central Asia, working together provides a stronger platform for negotiating better outcomes, especially in the economic area. While the current major geopolitical tensions, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Iran war, continue to shake the international order, the Central Asian countries have become more aware of their opportunities, especially in terms of transit routes and natural resource demand. Central Asia has definitely caught the attention of major powers, and its geographical position along alternative transportation routes, as well as its considerable wealth of natural resources, including hydrocarbons and critical materials, opens doors for the region to gain more influence and power. However, for all of these opportunities to materialize, Central...

Middle Corridor

Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan Ties Could Reorient Central Asian Integration

The five Central Asian presidents met with Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev in Avaza on October 8 for the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s participation brings a principal outlet for Central Asian trade into the six governments’ economic deliberations. Within their consultative format, the states can coordinate industrial projects with the transport services through which regional producers reach foreign markets. If Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan connect cross-Caspian transport more closely to industrial cooperation, the corridor could become an organizing axis for regional integration. The Case for Trans-Caspian Integration Closer Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan cooperation would make cross-Caspian transport more dependable if trains reach Kazakhstani ports in time for Caspian sailings and cargo arriving at Azerbaijani terminals connects with onward services through Georgia. A 2023 assessment by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), also called the World Bank, identified trade among Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Europe as a driver of corridor demand, giving regional exporters a place alongside China–Europe transit traffic. Onward connections from the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway now under construction could run through Turkmenistan and across the Caspian to Azerbaijan, providing an alternative to routes through Iran. Conflict involving Iran strengthens Azerbaijan’s position as the more dependable western outlet for Europe-bound exports. Greater predictability could offset the cost of a Caspian crossing by reducing the stocks firms must hold against delays and the losses caused by interrupted deliveries. Extending the operating coordination developed with Kazakhstan to these southern connections could make Azerbaijan commercially preferable for Central Asian exporters serving European markets. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan occupy the principal positions in this prospective reorientation. Together, they represent approximately one-third of the six countries’ population but account for more than three-fifths of their nominal GDP. Yet bilateral merchandise trade amounted to only $470.7 million in 2025. Their combined economic weight is thus disproportionate to the commerce presently linking them. The infrastructure and institutions connecting industrial investment to markets across the Caspian could give the two countries a basis for organizing wider regional integration, provided firms sustain commercial relationships through those connections. The Bilateral Basis for Regional Integration Export commitments depend on the cost and timing of the complete transport service. At Avaza, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev attached “particular importance” to developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. His Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, advocated joint investment, manufacturing, and entry into foreign markets. For firms undertaking joint production, the commercial viability of Aliyev’s proposal would depend on transport coordinated from departure to delivery. Kazakhstan is developing the Middle Corridor along with the eastern branch of the International North–South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Iran through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. At Avaza, Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov supported the development of North–South corridors in addition to East–West routes. Tokayev also highlighted the continuing importance to Kazakhstan of the North–South route in cooperation with Russia. Kazakhstan’s multi-vector approach thus extends to transport infrastructure: the Middle Corridor strengthens westward access without displacing the commercial connections maintained...

Safety Measures

Kyrgyzstan Road Safety Plan Proposed After 900 Traffic Deaths in 2025

Kyrgyzstan recorded 8,456 road accidents in 2025, leaving 900 people dead and 12,169 injured. Compared with the previous year, the number of accidents rose by 18.8%, while fatalities increased by 21.1%. In response, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has drafted a road safety program for 2027–2030 and opened it for public discussion on October 10. It identifies speeding, driving into oncoming traffic, drunk driving, and violations of rules at intersections and pedestrian crossings as major causes of accidents. Speeding alone resulted in 298 deaths last year. The ministry is proposing the installation of barriers, improving street lighting, creating safer pedestrian crossings, and expanding the network of bicycle lanes. Near schools, the plans include reducing speed limits to 30 km/h, additional traffic lights, and building sidewalks. The program also calls for expanding the network of automated traffic enforcement cameras and introducing digital traffic management systems, as well as developing new rules for using drones to detect traffic violations. Police already use drones for this purpose, but the ministry wants to formalize and expand their use. Separate changes would affect electric scooters and mopeds. In Bishkek, scooters frequently share sidewalks with pedestrians. The ministry proposes designating separate lanes or space along the edges of roads for these vehicles and separating their movement from pedestrians. The program also proposes gradually replacing rental electric scooters with bicycles. Kyrgyzstan is also overhauling its driver training system. Authorities have suspended the operations of private driving schools and transferred training to state institutions, while extending the duration of courses from two and a half months to ten months. The restrictions, introduced in January 2026, have been extended until December 31 as part of a trial program. Officials said the decision was intended to eliminate corruption in the issuance of driver's licenses and improve training standards. In its country profile, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated Kyrgyzstan's road traffic mortality rate at 13.3 deaths per 100,000 people in 2021, compared with 13.9 in Tajikistan, 12.2 in Kazakhstan, 9.3 in Uzbekistan, and 8.0 in Turkmenistan. In the European Union, meanwhile, the rate was 4.5.