• KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
15 November 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 2039

Japarov Warns of Ethnic Unrest Ahead of Kyrgyzstan’s Presidential Election

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov warned on November 12 that politicians were discussing ways to provoke violence between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan to disrupt the presidential election. In his Facebook post, he did not identify those allegedly involved or provide evidence for the claim. Two days earlier, Japarov filed an application to seek a second term with Kyrgyzstan’s Central Commission on Elections and Referenda. The election is scheduled for January 27, 2027. The warning comes amid growing restrictions on the opposition and independent media under Japarov, who has consolidated presidential power since taking office in 2021. Ahead of the November 2025 parliamentary elections, security forces arrested ten people, including the leader of the opposition Social Democrats party, in connection with an alleged plot to overthrow the government. Human Rights Watch has also documented prosecutions of journalists on charges that included calling for mass unrest. Against that background, Japarov’s accusations risk casting political opponents as threats to national security. Japarov asked citizens to report provocative statements or actions to local authorities. They could also contact the State Committee for National Security or the Ministry of Internal Affairs through their local offices. He said security forces could stop any unrest within a day or two and pointed to tens of thousands of surveillance cameras nationwide as evidence of the authorities’ ability to detect illegal activity. False rumors could provoke violence even where there was no open dispute between the communities, Japarov warned. He urged residents to resist provocation and asked elders to tell younger generations about the clashes of 1990 and 2010, in which hundreds of people died. In June 2010, violence began in Osh and spread to other parts of southern Kyrgyzstan within days. Human Rights Watch found that false reports of attacks heightened tensions and helped draw people from surrounding villages into the city. At least 426 people died in the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions, according to official figures the group cited in its 2011 report Distorted Justice. Most of those killed were ethnic Uzbeks. The report found strong indications that some members of the security forces had facilitated attacks on Uzbek neighborhoods. Its researchers documented arbitrary detentions and torture during the investigations that followed. They also found that the authorities had violated defendants’ right to a fair trial. Japarov suggested that opponents of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway might try to stoke ethnic tensions after failing to turn the public against cooperation with China. He described the railway as vital to Kyrgyzstan’s economic future. Construction of the railway began in December 2024. The planned route from Kashgar in China to Andijan in Uzbekistan enters Kyrgyzstan at the Torugart Pass. It then runs through Makmal and the city of Manas, formerly Jalal-Abad. Uzbek officials expect the line to shorten shipping times from China to Europe and lower transportation costs. According to the election commission’s preliminary figures, 11 people had applied when nominations closed on November 13. Each must collect at least 30,000 voter signatures by December 8 to qualify for...

Kyrgyzstan Floating Solar Plant Planned Amid Energy Shortages

Kyrgyzstan plans to build a 15 MW floating solar power plant on the reservoir at Hydropower Plant No. 5 (HPP-5), about 10 kilometers northeast of Bishkek, as the country seeks to reduce its dependence on electricity imports. Kyrgyzstan expects to import 4.1 billion kWh of electricity in 2026, about one-fifth of its projected consumption of 19.6 billion kWh. The country relies heavily on hydropower, leaving electricity supplies vulnerable to low reservoir levels. Energy officials have warned that shortages could occur during peak demand this winter. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) describes the proposed plant as Kyrgyzstan’s first utility-scale floating solar power plant. A 100 kW pilot plant has operated on the same reservoir since March 1, 2024. The state-owned Chakan GES OJSC built it with an ADB grant. The larger project is being developed under a cooperation agreement between Chakan GES and the ADB. The bank has proposed $20 million in financing, comprising a $19.55 million concessional loan and a $450,000 grant. The project has not yet received approval, and no construction timetable has been announced. According to the Ministry of Energy, the pilot plant generated 141,100 kWh in 2025. The ministry says installing panels on water saves land, can reduce evaporation, and allows the project to use existing hydropower infrastructure. The ADB expects the HPP-5 project to establish a technical and commercial model that can be used at other reservoirs. The bank estimates that those sites could host floating solar plants with a combined capacity of about 176 MW. Future projects could involve private investors. Kyrgyzstan opened its first large-scale solar power plant in December 2025 in the Kemin district of the Chui region, about 100 kilometers east of Bishkek. The 100 MW plant was built with Chinese investment at a cost of $56 million. The Ministry of Energy estimates that the plant could generate about 210 million kWh a year. If the proposed HPP-5 plant and all 176 MW of additional floating solar capacity were developed, they would have a combined capacity of about 191 MW. Based on the performance of the existing pilot plant and projected generation at Kemin, this could produce roughly 300 million kWh of electricity annually, equivalent to about 1.5% of Kyrgyzstan’s projected electricity consumption in 2026. However, the much larger 1,900 MW solar project being developed by Vietnam’s ROX Energy Global near Lake Issyk-Kul could make a more substantial contribution. Its first 175 MW phase began operating in June 2026, and the Ministry of Energy estimates that the completed plant could generate around 3.3 billion kWh annually, equivalent to nearly 17% of the country's projected 2026 electricity consumption. The remaining phases are expected to come online in 2027 and 2028.

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team looks at the role of clusters in Uzbekistan's farming sector, which is key to understanding what Mirziyoyev's comments about farmers receiving some $1 billion in profits from this year's cotton harvest really means. Special guest: Umida Niyazova, the director and founder of the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights.

CSTO Without Armenia: What Keeps Yerevan From Leaving and What the Summit Means for Central Asia

Armenia has effectively stopped participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) but has not formally withdrawn from the military alliance. At the November 11, 2026, summit in Moscow, Armenia lost its voting rights because of unpaid membership dues, while the CSTO's five other members — Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus — agreed to develop collective aviation forces and mobile air defense units. Kazakh political analyst Maksim Kaznacheyev explained to The Times of Central Asia why Armenia's leadership is reluctant to sever ties with the CSTO and what the new military agreements could mean for Central Asian countries. Why Armenia Has Not Left the CSTO Yerevan froze its participation in the organization in February 2024, accusing its allies of failing to ensure Armenia's security during armed clashes with Azerbaijan. Armenia stopped paying membership dues and sending representatives to CSTO bodies. At the November 11 summit, CSTO members decided that Armenia would lose its voting rights and the ability to nominate candidates for senior positions because of unpaid contributions. CSTO Secretary-General Taalatbek Masadykov said, however, that the organization was not considering expelling Armenia. Kaznacheyev attributes Yerevan's reluctance to sever ties with the CSTO to Armenia's domestic political situation. "If Armenia leaves the CSTO or the EAEU, pro-Western actions could trigger an internal crisis and destabilize the country," Kaznacheyev said. He believes Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is seeking to avoid deepening divisions within Armenia as his government pursues closer ties with the European Union. Yerevan, however, has pursued different policies toward the two organizations. Armenia has suspended its participation in the CSTO but continues to operate within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). On November 5, Pashinyan said the country was not preparing to leave the EAEU. The CSTO has experienced the departure of member states before. Uzbekistan signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992, declined to renew it in 1999, rejoined the CSTO in 2006, and suspended its membership again in 2012. Kaznacheyev believes Armenia's situation is substantially different. "Uzbekistan's experience does not apply to Armenia because Uzbekistan had a unified political elite when it left the CSTO," Kaznacheyev said. He noted that Tashkent also had a bilateral security agreement with Russia, allowing it to maintain military cooperation outside the CSTO. For Kazakhstan, Armenia's dispute with the CSTO does not create an immediate security threat. Kaznacheyev said Astana's restrained position reflects its limited direct interests in Armenia and its growing transport links through Azerbaijan and Georgia toward Turkey. "That is why Kazakhstan maintains a restrained, neutral position," he said. What the New Air Defense Agreements Mean for Central Asia At the Moscow summit, CSTO members agreed to develop the organization's Collective Aviation Forces and approved plans for mobile air defense units to protect joint military formations. Plans call for incorporating combat aviation units alongside transport and special-purpose aircraft. Kaznacheyev believes the agreements could expand Russian military-technical assistance to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. He argues that Russia could help other CSTO members modernize their air forces and air defenses, particularly in Kyrgyzstan...

Bishkek’s Vanishing Spaces Through the Eyes of Artist Sonata Raiymkulova

On Abdymomunov Street in Bishkek, a café serves Qurt Mocha, a drink based on coffee, hot chocolate, and qurt, the local extra-salty Kyrgyz cheese. It’s easy to get addicted to it, and the presentation is aesthetic enough to make a captivating Instagram story. Perhaps it’s still a long way before this will become the next matcha latte, coveted by ‘it girls’ around the world, but certainly not for lack of trying on my part. “I always wanted to try this coffee shop,” artist Sonata Raiymkulova tells me. Elegant and slightly coy, she is certainly an ‘it girl’ of the Central Asian art world herself, “… but I’ll take some green tea instead,” she concludes. While I start feeling like an easily gulled tourist, she sits across from me in the Kölökö coffee shop, lightly tapping on her iPad and showing me her virtual portfolio. The coffee shop has a beautiful garden, with dim lights and a serene nightly atmosphere. I can’t help but notice how this contrasts with the air, which is so heavy with smog that it’s hardly breathable. Like the livability of Kyrgyz cities, issues such as pollution are precisely what Sonata, a former architect with a passion for urbanism, tackles in her work. Her drawings, installations, and performances don’t necessarily look Kyrgyz, or at least not like what foreigners would expect Central Asian art to look like. Not so much qurt in them, so to speak. Rather than attaching herself to some recognizable traditional elements, Sonata tackles the present of her city, Bishkek, where she was born and raised, and where, after her architectural studies, she took up contemporary art. Her Dō – I use the Japanese term as her father steeped her and her brother in Japanese traditions - is collaborative and a little unorthodox. In 2016, she joined Estelik (also known as “monument of memory”), a Bishkek project in which artists, artisans and participants swapped brand-new stools for old, colorful ones and piled their haul into an impromptu massive monument. In 2021, she was one of more than 40 artists from the five Central Asian countries involved in Art Plov CA, a British Council-supported project run from Tashkent. Her studies also took her to Moscow to the HSE Design School, where she graduated. In 2023, she won a Prince Claus Fund Seed Award, one of 100 awarded that year across more than 60 countries. She later told her university she had known about the prize for years but had been too scared to apply, and that winning mostly meant doubting herself less. In February 2024, she had a solo show at DREIVIERTEL in Bern, in collaboration with the Residency.ch programme. She has also had shows in Karlsruhe, Milan, Almaty, and Moscow. This summer she was back in Almaty with Bishkek Gothic, a series made with her brother Marat Raiymkulov for Efes Art Space’s Sayran city route. Raiymkulova's work moves between the personal and the political, exploring the human body as well as Bishkek's changing urban...

Kyrgyzstan’s Junda Oil Refinery Faces Pollution Complaints During $194 Million Upgrade

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov said his government would consider relocating residents of Kara-Balta if living near the Junda oil refinery was harming their health. A resident had asked him to close the Chinese-owned plant or require better pollution controls. At the November 8 meeting in Kara-Balta, about 60 kilometers west of Bishkek, the woman described cases of allergies, hair loss, and high blood pressure that residents associated with the refinery. Japarov defended keeping the plant open, saying Kyrgyzstan needed to develop its industries and produce more of its own fuel. In a November 11 response, Junda said its modernization project was nearing completion. It is installing a vapor recovery system that the company says will capture petroleum vapors during storage and transport and return them to production. It also plans to plant trees on about two hectares of refinery land in spring 2027. Kyrgyzstan is trying to reduce its reliance on Russian gasoline and diesel by refining more crude at home. Junda is the country’s largest refinery, with the capacity to process 800,000 metric tons of crude oil a year. The upgraded plant is expected to produce K4- and K5-grade fuels, which have tighter limits on sulfur content. At full capacity, the company says the plant could meet more than 35% of domestic demand for fuels and lubricants. The refinery began producing fuel in 2014, shut down in early 2020, and resumed operations in 2024. Residents had complained repeatedly about odors and air pollution before the shutdown. The locally registered operator, China Petrol Company Junda, is 99% owned by China’s Central Asia Energy Company. Kara-Balta’s DaDe Service Company holds the remaining 1%. Estimates for the upgrade rose from about USD 160 million in 2024 to USD 167 million in 2025. Kyrgyzstan’s National Investment Agency now puts the investment at USD 193.75 million. The project missed its July 31, 2026, completion deadline. On August 25, the agency and the Chinese investor signed an agreement for the next phase. At an October 9 briefing, an environmental inspector said the work was expected to finish by April 2027. Officials at the briefing also said inspections prompted by residents’ complaints had resulted in two fines and orders to correct violations. After visiting the refinery on November 11, agency head Ravshanbek Sabirov called on the investor to meet its commitments. The agency gave no date for the upgraded plant to enter service. The new fuel standards do not, by themselves, establish whether residents will breathe cleaner air. In September, Kyrgyzstan’s environment ministry published air quality readings for Kara-Balta. Some spring readings for nitrogen dioxide exceeded the daily average limit, while sulfur dioxide remained within the limit in spring and summer. The ministry did not trace the pollution to Junda. The company’s response cited no independent measurements of its emissions or medical studies assessing residents’ symptoms.