Kyrgyzstan Local Politics - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 473

Dismissals

Kyrgyz President Dismisses Right-Hand Man to “Prevent a Split in Society”

A political earthquake hit Kyrgyzstan on February 10. The tandem of President Sadyr Japarov and security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev was seemingly broken when Japarov dismissed Tashiyev from his post. The reason given for relieving Tashiyev of his position was that it was “in the interests of our state, in order to prevent a split in society, including between government structures,” which hinted that something serious had caused the rift. Old Friends After the brief tumultuous events of October 5-6, 2020, that saw the government of President Sooronbai Jeenbekov ousted in the wake of parliamentary elections plagued by violations, Japarov came to power and appointed Tashiyev to be head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB). The two have remained in those positions and were often referred to as a tandem. Some believe Tashiyev has actually been the one making many of the important state decisions. Their relationship goes back much further, to the days when Kurmanbek Bakiyev was Kyrgyzstan’s president from 2005-2010. In August 2006, Japarov, Tashiyev, and some other politicians from Kyrgyzstan’s southern Osh area cofounded the Idealistic Democratic Political Party of Kyrgyzstan, which later became the foundation for the Ata-Jurt party. Both Japarov and Tashiyev were supporters of President Bakiyev. When Bakiyev was forced to flee the country after the 2010 revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the Ata-Jurt party became the strongest opposition party to the government that emerged after the revolution. Ata-Jurt won the most seats, 28, in the snap October 2010 parliamentary elections, and among the party’s deputies were Japarov, Tashiyev, and another politician named Talant Mamytov. The three Ata-Jurt deputies helped organize anti-government protests, and during one outside the government building in Bishkek in October 2012, Japarov, Tashiyev, and Mamytov jumped the fence and led an armed crowd to the building. All three were convicted in 2013 of trying to overthrow the government. They were sentenced to a mere 18 months in prison, but did not even serve that, with all three being released in July 2013. Japarov helped lead a protest in Kyrgyzstan’s northeastern Issyk-Kul Province in October that year. A local official was captured and briefly held by protesters, and after order was restored, Japarov was charged with hostage-taking. He fled the country and only returned in March 2017. Japarov was immediately arrested and sentenced to 11 ½ years in prison. A crowd released Japarov from prison when unrest started on October 5, 2020. Tashiyev was among those who quickly put forth Japarov to be Kyrgyzstan’s next leader, and by October 15, Japarov was both acting prime minister and acting president. He appointed Tashiyev to be GKNB chief on October 16. Mamytov was elected speaker of parliament on November 4, 2020. The Dismissal Tashiyev was in Germany receiving medical treatment when Japarov dismissed him. On February 11, Tashiyev commented from Germany on his dismissal, calling it unexpected, but said he would heed the president’s decision. “I served our state, people, and president honorably, and I'm proud of it,” Tashiyev said, and expressed his “gratitude...

Revolution

Kyrgyzstan’s Revolutions Since Independence: Three Uprisings That Remade the State

Since gaining independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has experienced three major uprisings that removed presidents and reset the political system. The events in 2005, 2010, and 2020 did not follow one script, but shared familiar triggers: disputed elections, corruption, rising living costs, and a belief that the state had been captured by a narrow circle. Kyrgyzstan began its post-Soviet life with a reputation for relative openness. Askar Akayev initially presented himself as a reform-minded leader, but by the early 2000s, public frustration had grown over perceived corruption and patronage. Political competition increasingly revolved around money, influence networks, and regional loyalties. Weak institutions made leadership transitions risky, and street politics became a recurring instrument of change. The 2005 Tulip Revolution: The Akayev Era Ends The first upheaval occurred in spring 2005, following parliamentary elections widely criticized by international observers. The OSCE/ODIHR final report on the February–March 2005 parliamentary elections documented serious irregularities that undermined confidence in the vote: Protests began in the south and spread to Bishkek. On March 24, 2005, Akayev fled the country as demonstrators seized key government buildings. His resignation was later formalized from abroad. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported on April 4, 2005, that Akayev had signed a resignation agreement intended to stabilize the situation and pave the way for new elections. Kurmanbek Bakiyev emerged as interim leader and later won the July 2005 presidential election. The OSCE/ODIHR assessment of that vote noted improvements compared with the parliamentary elections but highlighted continuing structural weaknesses. The 2010 April Revolution: Bakiyev Overthrown By 2010, public anger was focused on rising utility prices and the concentration of power around Bakiyev’s family. The International Crisis Group’s report Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses detailed how economic grievances and corruption helped spark a violent uprising. On April 7, 2010, clashes between protesters and security forces in Bishkek left dozens dead and injured, with the official death toll later revised to 99. Bakiyev fled the country, and a referendum later that year shifted Kyrgyzstan toward a parliamentary system designed to reduce presidential dominance. The transition produced a more plural political environment, though corruption and instability persisted. In June 2010, interethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan, particularly around Osh, caused significant loss of life and displacement, deepening divisions and reshaping the political climate. The 2020 Upheaval: Election Protests and Rapid Power Shift Kyrgyzstan’s third major uprising followed disputed parliamentary elections on October 4, 2020, when allegations of vote buying triggered mass protests. The Central Election Commission annulled the results, plunging the country into a political crisis. President Sooronbay Jeenbekov resigned on October 15, 2020, with Reuters reporting that “newly sprung from jail,” Sadyr Japarov had consolidated power amid the turmoil. The OSCE/ODIHR assessment of the January 2021 presidential election and constitutional referendum noted that the vote occurred against the backdrop of political upheaval following the annulled parliamentary elections. Japarov won the presidency in January 2021, and a new constitution entered into force in May 2021, strengthening presidential powers and reshaping the political system. Why Revolutions Keep Happening...

Presidential Election

Is Kyrgyzstan About to Have a Snap President Election?

Kyrgyzstan held early parliamentary elections at the end of November 2025 that were moved forward by a year so that they would not overlap with the campaign for the presidential election scheduled for January 2027. On February 9, a group of 75 former officials and notable figures from various spheres of society publicly submitted a letter to the president and speaker of parliament calling on them to “immediately initiate a new election for president.” While there has yet to be any official response, such a proposal is likely to be accepted, leaving anyone who planned on running against incumbent President Sadyr Japarov with little time to organize a campaign. Early Parliamentary Elections In June 2025, amendments were introduced to the electoral system. The split system of using single-mandate districts and party lists to elect parliamentary deputies was changed to only single-mandate districts, and electoral districts were redivided. This sparked discussions that perhaps early parliamentary elections were needed to fill the 90 seats with deputies elected under the newly-approved system. The argument that tilted the debate toward early elections was that parliamentary elections were scheduled for late November 2026 and the presidential election for January 2027. The general opinion was that having the two elections so close together would make voters weary and unable to fully focus on the presidential campaign. Also, if the vote count was delayed in some districts or there were legal challenges, these processes would be ongoing as campaigning for the presidency got underway. The solution was to move parliamentary elections forward by a year. In September 2025, parliament voted to dissolve itself, and November 30 was named as the date for early elections. The Letter The petition addressed to President Japarov and Speaker of Parliament Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu was signed by former deputies, nine former governors, four former prime ministers, several high-ranking members of the military, academics, artists, and even an Olympic Games medal-winner. The letter praised the current administration for establishing stability in Kyrgyzstan, strengthening the country’s armed forces, resolving long-standing border issues with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, successfully battling corruption, and eliminating organized crime in the country. The letter also mentioned remaining problems such as the growing national debt, poverty, and the outflow of “especially young people” unable to find employment and going to other countries to work. A key point in the appeal for an early presidential election was that it would clear up an ambiguity in President Japarov’s term. Japarov came to power in the wake of the October 2020 revolution that was sparked by parliamentary elections riddled with irregularities. He was elected in January 2021 to a six-year term in office, but in April that year, a national referendum approved a new constitution with a five-year presidential term. Therefore, holding the presidential election this year would bring Japarov closer into line with the new constitution. Additionally, the previous constitution, which had a six-year presidential term, also limited a president to one term in office. The new constitution allows for two five-year terms....

Road Safety

Kyrgyzstan Suspends Private Driving Schools in Bid to Improve Road Safety

Kyrgyzstan has temporarily suspended the operations of all private driving schools as part of a sweeping reform aimed at improving driver education and road safety. On January 29, President Sadyr Japarov signed a decree introducing a trial period, effective until August 30, 2026, during which driver training will be conducted exclusively through state-run driving schools. The reform also mandates a significant extension of the training period from the current 2.5 months to 10 months. Authorities say the new measures are designed to reduce traffic accidents and eliminate corruption in the issuance of driver's licenses. As of 2025, Kyrgyzstan had 340 driving schools, including 74 state-run institutions and 266 privately operated ones. Officials cite systemic issues in the private sector, including substandard instruction, widespread corruption, and the illegal sale of licenses. Daiyrbek Orunbekov, Head of the Information Policy Service under the Presidential Administration, addressed public concerns over the extended training period in a Facebook post on January 29. He emphasized that the 10-month program is intended solely to improve driver competence and reduce accidents. “A driver who has acquired sufficient knowledge poses no danger to themselves, passengers, or other road users,” Orunbekov wrote. Under the new model, instruction will include both theoretical and practical training held two to three times per week, with each session lasting two to three hours. Some classes may be offered online. The curriculum will also cover psychological preparation and road ethics. In response to critics who argue that the current 2.5-month course is adequate, Orunbekov said that meaningful learning cannot occur in such a short timeframe. He cited international practices, noting that in many developed countries, driver training takes significantly longer. In Finland, the process can last up to a year and includes a probationary license period; in Germany, it ranges from six to twelve months; in Sweden and Norway, up to a year; and in the United Kingdom, Canada, the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand, it can take up to two years. The reform follows concerning national road safety data. In 2025 alone, Kyrgyzstan recorded 8,456 traffic accidents, resulting in 900 deaths and 12,169 injuries. Over the past decade, more than 75,000 accidents have claimed over 9,000 lives. According to Orunbekov, many current drivers lack even basic knowledge of traffic regulations and, in some cases, cannot recall where they were trained. He described this as a lingering consequence of a flawed and often corrupt driver education system.

Kyrgyz-Uzbek Border

Kyrgyzstan Seeks End to Extra Transit Fees for Its Citizens Crossing Uzbekistan

Kyrgyzstan has formally requested that Uzbekistan eliminate additional fees imposed on Kyrgyz citizens transiting through Uzbek territory, including charges for vehicle insurance and window tinting. The matter was raised during a session of the Jogorku Kenesh (parliament), where Deputy Foreign Minister Almaz Imangaziev confirmed that negotiations with Uzbek authorities are ongoing. According to Imangaziev, the request is currently under internal review in Uzbekistan. “When Kyrgyz citizens transit through Uzbekistan, mainly en route to the southern regions of our country, they are required to purchase car insurance and pay additional fees if their windows are tinted. On our side, no such requirement exists,” said lawmaker Dastan Bekeshev, who called on the Foreign Ministry to advocate for the removal of these rules. Imangaziev affirmed that Bishkek has already submitted a formal request to Tashkent. He added that if Uzbekistan fails to eliminate the fees, Kyrgyzstan may consider imposing reciprocal measures on Uzbek citizens transiting through Kyrgyz territory. The development comes amid broader regional concerns over trade and transit barriers. On January 17, Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khodjaev addressed similar frustrations during a meeting in Tashkent with entrepreneurs, ambassadors, and government officials. He pointed to challenges faced by Uzbek exporters to Tajikistan, citing excessive procedures and additional customs fees that reportedly raise the price of Uzbek goods by approximately 15%, undermining their competitiveness. Khodjaev warned that unless such restrictions are lifted, Uzbekistan may introduce symmetrical measures in response.

Urban Development

Bishkek Unveils New Master Plan for 2050

Kyrgyz authorities have submitted a draft law outlining a new master plan for the development of Bishkek through 2050, now open for public discussion. The document defines long-term priorities for the capital's growth across several sectors, including transport infrastructure, environmental management, economic development, and spatial expansion. Once adopted, the plan will become the principal framework for territorial planning and will be legally binding for decisions related to construction and land use. According to the draft, Bishkek's official population is expected to rise from 1.3 million to 1.9 million by 2050. However, the city is already believed to house approximately 2 million people, with urban development having long exceeded administrative boundaries. As a result, Bishkek is currently facing critical shortages of housing, employment, and transport infrastructure. The plan's authors stress that continued development of the city center alone is no longer viable, as it is already overburdened in terms of both transport and utilities. To address this, the master plan proposes moving away from the current "center-bedroom" model. Instead, employment opportunities should be created within districts and suburbs, supported by improved transport accessibility across all parts of the city. This approach aims to reduce commuting to the center, alleviate traffic congestion, and lessen pressure on the road network. Key infrastructure upgrades include the introduction of an intra-city railway and a high-speed bus system operating along dedicated corridors. A network of transport hubs will also be established, with the goal of reducing residents’ reliance on private vehicles. Developed in 2025 by the Bishkek City Hall in cooperation with the Scientific Research Institute of Prospective Urban Development in St. Petersburg, the plan is now being updated based on public feedback. The most contentious element of the proposal is the renovation program, which calls for the demolition of a substantial number of two, three, and four-storey buildings in central areas and along major roads. Many residents are concerned that state compensation for demolished properties may fall short of market value, a topic that has become one of the most debated during public consultations. Environmental improvements are also a core component. Bishkek frequently ranks among the most polluted cities in the Eurasia region. To address this, the plan includes a “green framework” for the city: expanding river and canal beds, creating green corridors, and enhancing recreational zones.