Tajikistan Business Economy - The Times Of Central Asia

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Intra-regional Trade

Central Asia Trade Rises 25% as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Dominate

Central Asian countries are trading more actively with one another, although the regional market continues to be dominated by its two largest economies, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In January-July 2026, the five countries exported $8.1 billion worth of goods to their neighbors, up 25.4% from a year earlier. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan accounted for more than 80% of those shipments. Smaller bilateral routes have expanded as well. Uzbekistan’s trade with Kyrgyzstan increased by more than half, while trade with Tajikistan rose by 45%. Trade between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rose by a factor of 3.3 after several years of border closure and sharply reduced economic ties. In absolute terms, trade between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remains the region’s largest bilateral flow. The figures were published by Uzbekistan’s Center for Economic Research and Reforms (CERR). Kazakhstan remains the region’s largest exporter. Over the seven-month period, it shipped $4.5 billion worth of goods to its neighbors, accounting for 55.9% of total intra-regional exports. Uzbekistan exported $2 billion, representing another 24.7%. Kazakhstan’s Central Asian neighbors still account for a relatively small share of the country’s overall foreign trade. In January-July, its total foreign trade turnover amounted to $87.75 billion. Central Asia accounted for around 6.7% of Kazakhstan’s total trade and 8.9% of its exports. By contrast, Kyrgyzstan’s trade volumes are much smaller, but neighboring markets are considerably more important to the country’s exporters, absorbing almost one-third of its exports. During the same period, Kyrgyzstan exported $523 million worth of goods to its neighbors and imported nearly $1.5 billion. Tajikistan buys considerably more from its neighbors than it sells to them. Its imports from Central Asia increased by 35% to $1.2 billion, while exports rose 6.2% to $209 million. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan account for around 94% of Tajikistan’s trade with the region. Figures reported by Turkmenistan’s trading partners show that the country exported $844 million worth of goods to neighboring countries. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan remain its main regional markets. The Eurasian Development Bank estimated that trade among Central Asian countries reached $12.3 billion in 2025, nearly double the 2020 level. Kazakhstan accounted for 54% of regional exports, as The Times of Central Asia previously reported. New transport and energy links are developing alongside intra-regional trade. In February, the World Bank approved an $846 million guarantee to mobilize $1.41 billion in commercial financing for a railway project in Kazakhstan. The project includes construction of the 201-mile Mointy-Kyzylzhar railway line on Kazakhstan’s section of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor. The new line is expected to shorten the route by 149 kilometers and relieve congestion on heavily used sections of the corridor. Central Asian countries are seeking closer integration of their power systems. In January, the World Bank approved the 10-year Regional Electricity Market Interconnectivity and Trade Program, with indicative financing of more than $1 billion, to establish Central Asia’s first regional electricity market. Cross-border electricity trade currently amounts to only around 3% of the region’s total electricity demand. In an earlier CERR analysis, researcher Ruslan Abaturov argued...

Russian Fuel Exports

Russian Diesel Returns, but Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Remain Exposed

Russia sharply increased diesel supplies to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in August after a summer slump in Russian fuel exports strained both countries’ markets and pushed prices higher. But the August rebound underscored a weakness already exposed over the summer: disruptions at Russian refineries can quickly ripple through fuel markets across both countries. In August, Kyrgyzstan received more than 72,000 tons of Russian diesel, up from just 4,400 tons in July. Supplies to Tajikistan rose from 16,000 tons to more than 56,000 tons, around 3.5 times the July level. Overall, Russia exported more than 370,000 tons of diesel to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Mongolia in August, more than double the July volume. Kazakhstan received around 28,000 tons after no deliveries in July, while Mongolia imported about 215,000 tons. Russia's diesel production recovered to around 170,000 tons per day in August, but Moscow maintained restrictions on exports to protect its domestic market, with exceptions for countries covered by intergovernmental agreements. The summer disruption showed that such arrangements do not insulate Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from falling production at Russian refineries. Kyrgyzstan Starts to Diversify Kyrgyzstan consumes around 1.6 million tons of petroleum products a year and receives the overwhelming majority of its imports from Russia. The summer disruption pushed Bishkek to look for additional sources. The authorities discussed purchases from Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Belarusian deliveries began arriving in July, while China also sent an initial batch of fuel. In August, Kyrgyz officials opened talks with China’s Sinopec over further supplies. Another option is to refine more crude oil domestically. In August, 35,000 tons of crude were shipped through Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan for processing at local refineries. The new route gives Bishkek another way to source feedstock while reducing its dependence on finished gasoline and diesel from Russian refineries. The 72,000 tons of Russian diesel delivered in August largely offset July’s collapse rather than establishing a new level of supply. Tajikistan's Options Tajikistan is even more dependent. In the first half of 2026, the country imported 599,500 tons of petroleum products worth $494.7 million. Russia accounted for 91.1% of those supplies. Diesel imports totaled 300,200 tons. The reduction in supplies became visible on the streets of Dushanbe over the summer. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others limited purchases to 20 liters per vehicle. By late July, prices at some stations had reached 17–18 somoni (about $1.90) per liter. As of August 31, the average price was around 16.5 somoni, compared with approximately 11 somoni in early June. Dushanbe responded by increasing purchases from neighboring countries. In July, imports of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan roughly tripled to 34,000 tons. But average monthly imports of these fuels from all suppliers in the first half of the year were around 97,000 tons. Neighboring suppliers can cover part of the shortfall, but for now they cannot quickly replace Russian volumes. In July, the presidents of Tajikistan and Kazakhstan discussed increasing supplies of Kazakh petroleum...

Central Asia-South Korea Summit 2026

From Critical Minerals to Connectivity: South Korea’s Stakes in Central Asia

On September 16, Seoul hosted the first Korea–Central Asia Summit, bringing President Lee Jae Myung together with the heads of all five Central Asian states. The meeting elevated a dialogue that has run at a ministerial level since 2007 to the level of heads of state. The leaders adopted a Seoul Declaration setting the terms for future engagement and agreed to hold summits every two years. On September 14, trade and industry ministers from South Korea and the five Central Asian states met in Seoul for the first C5+Korea Industry Ministers’ Meeting. They signed a joint statement launching a standing platform for industrial cooperation. Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investment, Industry and Trade used the occasion to push for a shift away from raw-material trade toward joint production and localization. Behind the diplomatic choreography sits a practical problem: the minerals both sides keep discussing cannot move without a route to carry them. A Minerals Agenda with Separate Tracks South Korea relies heavily on imported minerals for its manufacturing industries. Seoul has been developing separate plans with each country. With Tajikistan, discussions have focused on gold and silver, alongside antimony. With Kyrgyzstan, Seoul has been discussing antimony and tungsten. Cooperation with Uzbekistan covers minerals and digital manufacturing. With Kazakhstan, a central issue is moving beyond raw exports toward processing inside the country, as The Times of Central Asia reported ahead of the summit. South Korean firms are pursuing supply diversification independently. POSCO International and LX International have been expanding overseas mineral investments, including graphite and nickel projects, amid Chinese export restrictions. The Transport Connection Consider the Bolashak chrome mine in Kazakhstan, which Eurasian Resources Group launched in late 2024. The company plans to ramp it up to a design capacity of 7.5 million metric tons of chrome ore a year. Production on that scale makes reliable transport an essential part of the commercial equation. An Atlantic Council analysis identifies limited processing capacity and underdeveloped westward routes as obstacles to U.S. mineral partnerships with Central Asia. It presents the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor as a route to Western markets that avoids Russian and Iranian territory. That argument needs a distinction when applied to Korea. The corridor runs westward toward Europe; it is not a prerequisite for minerals to reach South Korea. Its relevance is the wider choice of buyers it could offer Central Asian producers, including potential Korean-backed processing ventures serving those markets. That corridor is being built out. The Aktau container hub has a planned capacity of 240,000 twenty-foot equivalent units. The World Bank-backed Mointy–Kyzylzhar railway is meant to remove a 149-kilometer detour and accommodate 30 train pairs a day, against roughly ten on the existing constrained route. Traffic is already rising: 125 container trains crossed Kazakhstan on the Trans-Caspian route in the first quarter of 2026, up 34.4% year-on-year. Japan has also become involved, pledging in August 2025 to help modernize customs operations at the port of Aktau. The Seoul Declaration also backs Korean participation in transport infrastructure, including modernization and digitalization. In...

Construction

Tajikistan Plans to Build Central Asia’s Tallest Building

Construction has begun in Tajikistan on what authorities say will be the tallest building in Central Asia, part of a massive development involving international design and engineering firms that is expected to alter Dushanbe’s skyline. The planned 77-floor Dushanbe Tower will be in a complex in the Shohmansur district of the capital that includes five high-rise towers and office, entertainment, and residential areas, according to Tajikistan’s presidential office. It said more than 2,000 local construction workers will be involved in the Dushanbe Mall project, which is slated for completion within five years. “In general, this will be the tallest structure in the region,” the presidency said. While the official statement used the term “structure,” it’s possible that the Dushanbe Tower would not be taller than several other structures, including telecommunications towers, in the region. However, it would be the tallest conventional building if its height projections are borne out. The presidency said the height of the Dushanbe Tower will be 340 meters. Amir Holding, a Dushanbe-based real estate development group leading the Dushanbe Mall project, notes a height of 359 meters on its website. RMJM, a global network of architects and other professionals that was founded in Scotland, says it is designing the skyscraper and that it will be 400 meters high. Completed in 2022, the 311-meter Abu Dhabi Plaza in Astana, Kazakhstan, is currently the tallest building in Central Asia. TAS International Group, a construction company within Amir Holding, is involved in the project. In a statement, the parent company described the development as “a landmark urban intervention addressing the city's shortage of high-quality residential, commercial, hospitality and retail infrastructure,” but did not disclose the project’s cost. “Positioned within a rapidly growing market, it responds to increasing demand for premium real estate and establishes the foundation for Dushanbe's first central business district,” the developer said. The project includes a lake and extensive green space, according to designers. The Dushanbe Tower will be “immersed” in the park, offering “a new blueprint for sustainable urbanism in Central Asia,” according to RMJM. It said the goal is to make “greenery an integral, authentic part of the urban experience.” Companies from Uzbekistan are also contributing to the Dushanbe Mall project, showing that “Central Asian countries are working together not only in politics and trade, but also on major construction and infrastructure projects,” said MTRK, Uzbekistan’s state broadcaster. The Shohmansur district, where the project is being built, is in the Gissar Valley. Dushanbe is in an earthquake-prone region, and a LinkedIn recruitment post for an engineer on the Dushanbe Tower project says the job involves advanced analysis of seismic loads in what it describes as a “9-ball zone.” Dushanbe already has a shopping center called Dushanbe Mall or City Plaza, which opened in 2016 and is not connected to the new project. President Emomali Rahmon and his son, Dushanbe Mayor Rustam Emomali, laid the foundation stone for the new project on September 3.

Antimony

U.S. Eyes Tajikistan Antimony as China Dominates Processing

The United States is showing growing interest in Tajikistan’s antimony – a metal important to the defense industry, electronics, and batteries. The country accounted for about 20% of global production in 2025, ranking third after China and Russia. For Washington, Tajik deposits could become one of the alternative sources of supply amid tighter Chinese controls on antimony exports. That interest received political confirmation on September 1. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon met in Bishkek with U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asian Affairs Sergio Gor and Senator Steve Daines, a member of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Among the subjects discussed, the two sides specifically highlighted investment in rare and strategically important minerals. Critical minerals have taken on a prominent role in U.S. policy toward Central Asia in 2026. Washington is looking for new sources of strategic raw materials as it seeks to reduce dependence on Chinese supplies. In Kazakhstan, U.S.-based Cove Capital, together with state-owned Tau-Ken Samruk, is already preparing to develop the large Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty tungsten deposits. For Tajikistan, antimony could play a similar role. According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the country produced about 22,000 tons of antimony in 2025, out of global production of approximately 110,000 tons. China produced about 40,000 tons, while Russia produced 32,000 tons. Antimony is used in batteries, flame-retardant materials, semiconductors, infrared optics, and military applications. Its strategic importance has increased since China introduced export controls on antimony products in 2024. Playing Catch-Up to China Tajikistan’s main antimony production is concentrated in Ayni District in the north of the country. Its two principal centers – Dzhizhikrut and Konchoch – also illustrate the respective positions of American and Chinese capital in the sector. Washington would not be starting from scratch. The Dzhizhikrut antimony-mercury deposit is operated by Anzob, which has been wholly owned by U.S.-based Comsup Commodities Inc. since 2006. At Konchoch, China has the stronger position. The group of deposits is being developed by TALCO Gold, which is 50% owned by the state-owned Tajik Aluminium Company and 50% by China’s Tibet Huayu Mining. The Chinese investor entered the project in 2017, paying $90 million for its stake. Konchoch comprises several deposits containing gold, silver, antimony, mercury, and other minerals. Tajik authorities estimate that the deposit contains more than 23 million tons of ore, about 50 tons of gold, and more than 265,000 tons of antimony. The key advantage of the Chinese-backed project is processing. In July 2026, TALCO Gold commissioned a plant with capacity to produce up to 5,000 tons of metallic antimony a year. Previously, the company had primarily produced concentrates. The Chinese investor now participates in the chain from ore extraction to metal production. For the United States, this makes the challenge more complicated: access to a deposit alone does not provide an independent source of finished antimony products. More broadly, an OECD review published in 2026 says foreign investment in Tajikistan’s mining sector comes mainly from China, making U.S.-owned Comsup one of...

Energy Security

Tajikistan Seeks 2.55 Million Tons of Iranian Oil and Fuel as Russian Supplies Falter

Tajikistan has asked Iran to supply 2.55 million metric tons of crude oil and petroleum products as Dushanbe looks for alternatives to increasingly unreliable Russian fuel supplies. The request includes 2 million tons of crude oil, 300,000 tons of diesel, 150,000 tons of gasoline, and 100,000 tons of aviation fuel, according to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport. The ministry said the volume would require about 51,000 railway tank cars. The proposal was discussed in Tehran on August 15 during talks between Tajik Transport Minister Azim Ibrohim and Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh. It is not yet a purchase agreement, and Tajikistan has not announced a delivery timetable, price, or supplier. The timing, however, places the proposed trade directly inside a worsening sanctions environment. On August 20, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened economic consequences for countries providing support to Iran, promising “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not announced specific new measures linked to that statement. Significant purchases and transport of Iranian petroleum already carry U.S. sanctions exposure. Executive Order 13846 authorizes sanctions against people and financial institutions involved in significant transactions for the purchase, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum from Iran. A temporary U.S. authorization covering Iranian crude and petroleum products, issued in June, was revoked on July 7, with its wind-down period ending on July 17. Russia’s Fuel Crunch Reaches Tajikistan Dushanbe’s request to Iran is driven by a more immediate problem: dependence on Russian fuel. In 2025, Tajikistan imported about 1.7 million tons of fuel and lubricants, more than 1.2 million tons of which came from Russia. Tajik officials said in July that Russia supplied 84% of imported petroleum products. That dependence has become more difficult to manage as Ukrainian drone attacks have reduced Russian refinery output and forced Moscow to protect its domestic market. Russian fuel shortages began spilling into Central Asia in early summer. Tajikistan’s fuel imports fell sharply in July, pushing Dushanbe to seek additional supplies from China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Iran. Russia still accounted for 72.3% of fuel supplied to Tajikistan in the first half of the year, while talks with Kazakhstan had reached presidential level by the end of July. The pressure was already visible in Dushanbe. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others imposed sales limits. On July 10, Energy and Water Resources Minister Daler Juma said Tajikistan had roughly two months of petroleum reserves and was seeking alternative suppliers. The scale of the request is striking. At 2.55 million tons, it exceeds Tajikistan’s total fuel and lubricant imports in 2025, although 2 million tons of the proposed volume is crude oil rather than finished fuel. The Ministry of Transport has asked Iran to help organize dedicated tanker trains and create a “green corridor” giving Tajik fuel cargoes priority on the Iranian rail network. Further transit arrangements would still be needed because Tajikistan and Iran do not share a border. The Refinery Question The large crude component also highlights...