Tajikistan Business Economy - The Times Of Central Asia

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Economic Growth

Why Strong Economic Growth in Central Asia Masks Underlying Risks

Central Asian countries are significantly outperforming the global average in GDP growth, largely due to differing economic models across the region. However, rapid expansion does not remove deep structural vulnerabilities. As early as March, data showed that the combined economies of Central Asian countries grew by nearly 7% in 2025 compared to the previous year. The World Bank estimates regional growth at 6.2%, while the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) places it at 6.6%. These calculations include Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; Turkmenistan is excluded due to limited statistical transparency. By comparison, growth rates in advanced economies are much lower. The EDB expects around 1.6% growth in the U.S. and approximately 1.1% in the eurozone in 2026, while China’s economy is projected to expand by about 4.6%. Nevertheless, experts note that the region’s economic outlook remains complicated by high inflation, income inequality, and continued dependence on external factors. Investment activity and domestic demand have been the key drivers of growth, according to the EDB. Kazakhstan recorded its highest growth in 13 years (6.5%), with industry leading the expansion: mining grew by 9.4% and manufacturing by 6.4%. In 2026, the non-resource sector is expected to play a greater role. Kyrgyzstan has led the region in GDP growth for the third consecutive year: GDP grew by 11.1% in 2025 and by 9% in January 2026. In Uzbekistan, GDP increased by 7.7% in 2025 (up from 6.7% a year earlier), supported by investment, trade, services, and construction. Tajikistan’s GDP rose by 8.4% in 2025, matching the previous year’s performance. Growth continues to be driven by expanding industrial production and strong domestic demand. Early 2026 data suggest this momentum is holding. Uzbekistan’s Record In April, the World Bank highlighted Uzbekistan’s resilience to external challenges and strong growth dynamics. According to its updated report, the country’s 2025 GDP growth was revised upward by 1.5 percentage points to 7.7%. The outlook is 6.4% for 2026 and 6.7% for 2027. Key drivers include high global gold prices, investment inflows, expanded lending, and ongoing structural reforms. Rising household incomes have also played an important role, supported by remittances, which increased by 37% last year to reach $18.9 billion. By the end of 2025, Uzbekistan ranked among the fastest-growing economies in developing countries in Europe and Central Asia, alongside Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The region as a whole is experiencing its highest growth rates in 14 years. At the same time, analysts point to persistent structural constraints, including a large public sector and the dominance of state-owned enterprises, which hinder private sector development. External risks, including geopolitical instability and potential disruptions in energy and fertilizer supplies, remain significant. In 2025, Uzbekistan’s GDP exceeded €133 billion, compared to approximately €56 billion nine years earlier. Over the same period, GDP per capita rose from about €1,750 to around €3,220, nearly doubling average income levels. Investment in fixed capital increased by more than 15% year-on-year in 2025, while export value grew by over 33%. Persistently high global gold prices played a major role: export...

China

Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s New Playbook in Central Asia

In the Kyzylorda Region, near the town of Shieli, the silos and conveyor belts of a Chinese-backed plant rise out of the fine brown dust that dominates the landscape. It is the kind of project the Belt and Road was supposed to deliver in Central Asia: heavy industry, fixed capital, and a visible mark on the landscape. But it is also a reminder that China’s role in the region has become narrower, more contested, and less sweeping than the old rhetoric suggested. In photographs, the Gezhouba Cement Plant looks like a self-contained industrial island on the steppe. For nearby villagers, it became something else: a source of jobs and local prestige for some, but also of years of complaints about dust clouds and whether the state was quicker to defend a flagship Chinese-backed project than the people living beside it. Projects like the plant in Shieli also help explain why views of China across Central Asia remain mixed. Beijing is seen as a source of trade, investment, and technology, but that promise is tempered in some places by concerns over transparency, environmental costs, and who really benefits when a project arrives. China has become Central Asia’s dominant trading partner, but investment has not kept pace with the surge in commerce. The gap says a lot about how Beijing now works in the region: with a sharper focus on sectors that matter to its long-term influence. In 2025, trade in goods between China and the five Central Asian states reached $106.3 billion, up 12% year on year. Chinese exports to the region totaled $71.2 billion, while imports from Central Asia reached $35.1 billion. Trade has grown fast enough to reshape the region’s external balance, but long-term investment has been far more selective. Over 2005–2025, the five Central Asian states accounted for about 3% of China’s global overseas investment and construction total. The picture changes once direct investment is separated from trade and construction contracts. China’s FDI stock in the five Central Asian states stood at about $36 billion by mid-2025. Roughly 90% was concentrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The structure of that capital has also changed. Extractive industries still accounted for 46% of the portfolio, but manufacturing and energy together made up more than one third, and greenfield projects rose from 43% to 60%. China has not poured money into Central Asia on the scale once implied by early Belt and Road rhetoric. Instead, it has invested in sectors that strengthen its industrial position. Kazakhstan remains at the center of this relationship. It is China’s biggest commercial partner in Central Asia, and the main destination for Chinese capital in the region. Kazakhstan-China trade reached $43.8 billion in 2024. The country’s portfolio of projects with Chinese participation includes 224 ventures worth about $66.4 billion. Some are still at the planning stage, but the range of projects is telling. Recent developments have included a hydrogen energy technology innovation center in Almaty and a large wind farm with electricity storage. Kazakhstan still sells...

Food Security

Tajikistan, Dependent on Sugar Imports, Contends with Price Surge

Tajikistan’s government has been trying to reduce or at least diversify food imports whose prices are vulnerable to regional or global shocks. But a recent surge in the cost of sugar highlights ongoing challenges for the landlocked country. Tajikistan relies on sugar imports from Russia, Belarus, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and other countries. Last year, it imported about 190,000 tons. Now, as oil prices fluctuate because of conflict in the Middle East, Tajikistan is among many countries, including its neighbors in Central Asia, that are struggling with uncertainty over the international energy trade. The country has faced similar cycles in the past. In 2024, Russia announced a ban on grain and sugar exports to some trading partners to ensure its own food needs as it grappled with sanctions and other economic pressures related to the war in Ukraine. Kazakhstan imposed a similar ban on exports as supply tightened. The result was that the sugar price in Tajikistan jumped by about 25% over the previous year. Those export bans were eventually lifted, and the sugar price stabilized and even dropped in Tajikistan in 2025. Now the country faces another bout of price volatility as concerns mount following U.S. and Israeli air strikes on Iran and Iranian retaliation in the region. U.S. and Iranian negotiators failed to reach an agreement in recent talks, and the International Monetary Fund warns that oil market disruptions could slow global growth and spur inflation. The price of a kilogram of sugar in Tajikistan has increased from 9–11 somoni ($0.80–$1) at the end of March to 12–14 somoni ($1.10–$1.30) this month, according to Asia-Plus, a media group in Tajikistan. It said the wholesale price of a 50-kilogram bag had risen from 380–400 somoni ($34–$36) to more than 500 somoni (more than $45) during the same period. Those are increases of at least 25%, similar to the 2024 jump in cost. The Food and Agriculture Organization, a United Nations agency, said the global sugar price index, which measures the monthly change in cost, was up 7.2% in March, and that the Middle East conflict was contributing to upward pressure on prices. “Nevertheless, the overall increase in world sugar prices was contained by the generally favorable global supply outlook for the 2025/26 season, supported by good harvest progress in India and Thailand,” the agency said.

Economic Growth

ADB Growth Forecast Points to Strong Expansion in Tajikistan

Asian Development Bank (ADB) forecasts that Tajikistan’s economy will maintain strong growth over the next two years, driven primarily by industrial expansion and the services sector. In its latest Asian Development Outlook (April 2026), the bank projects that gross domestic product will grow by 7.3% in 2026 and 6.8% in 2027. This follows an estimated 8.4% expansion in 2025, indicating a slight moderation but continued robust performance. ADB attributes the outlook to improving industrial competitiveness and rising value-added production, which are expected to support long-term economic development and job creation. “Tajikistan’s strong growth opens up opportunities to accelerate job creation,” said Ko Sakamoto, ADB country director for Tajikistan. “By developing competitive, value-adding industries from food processing and textiles to mineral products, the country can translate growth into more and better jobs.” At the same time, inflation is projected to rise to 4.0% in 2026 and 4.5% in 2027. According to ADB, this increase will be driven by stronger consumer lending, remittance inflows, higher public sector wages, supply chain pressures, and adjustments to utility tariffs. The bank noted that the outlook remains subject to revision given the uncertain regional environment. Despite recent gains, ADB cautioned that Tajikistan’s economic structure remains vulnerable. While industrial output has grown, the country continues to depend heavily on a narrow range of products. Exports are dominated by raw materials and low- to mid-level processed goods, with higher value-added manufactured products accounting for less than 10% of total merchandise exports. To address these challenges, the report recommends a broader, ecosystem-based industrial policy. This would involve support for specific sectors, along with improvements in infrastructure, workforce skills, access to finance, and the overall business environment. ADB’s earlier assessments highlight mixed socioeconomic trends. While poverty has declined significantly from 30.9% in 2020 to 19.9% in 2024, inequality and structural constraints continue to pose challenges to long-term development.

Trade

Afghanistan Aims to Increase Trade with Central Asia to $10 Billion

Afghanistan aims to increase trade with Central Asian countries to $10 billion over the next three to four years, Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi said at a meeting in Kabul. According to Muttaqi, Afghanistan’s trade turnover with countries in the region reached approximately $2.7 billion in 2025, marking a significant increase compared to previous years. The statement was made during a consultative dialogue involving representatives from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, focused on regional cooperation, trade, and the development of transit routes. Muttaqi said Afghanistan intends to leverage its geoeconomic position to connect Central Asia with markets in South and West Asia. Among key projects, he highlighted the TAPI gas pipeline, which is currently under construction. Afghan authorities are seeking to expand economic ties despite ongoing international sanctions affecting the banking sector, which continue to constrain investment inflows. At the same time, Russia remains the only country to have officially recognized the Taliban government that came to power in 2021. Several countries, including China, India, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, maintain a diplomatic presence in Kabul. Landlocked Central Asian countries view southern routes through Afghanistan as an alternative to northern corridors via Russia, which have been complicated by sanctions. Afghanistan shares a border of more than 2,300 km with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, and continues to face security challenges, including threats from extremist groups, drug trafficking, and irregular migration. However, Muttaqi said the situation along the borders remains generally stable. Earlier reports indicated that Kazakhstan is exploring the possibility of investing in rare earth metal mining in Afghanistan. The national company Tau-Ken Samruk is conducting laboratory analysis of samples collected in Afghanistan and Rwanda.

Food Security

Iran Conflict Drives Food Price Pressures Across Central Asia

The war around Iran is beginning to push up food price risks in Central Asia as disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz raise fertilizer and fuel costs, while Tehran’s halt to some food exports adds pressure in regional markets. The impact is not manifesting as shortages, but as rising costs across the systems that produce, move, and sell food. The United Nations has warned that the crisis is disrupting one of the world’s most important trade corridors for energy and agricultural supplies. A large share of global fertilizer trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and reduced shipping traffic is tightening supply and pushing up prices. Higher fuel costs are adding a second layer of pressure on farmers and transport networks. Fertilizer and fuel are among agriculture’s highest costs. Even modest increases can compress margins quickly, forcing farmers to cut usage or pass costs on, with pressure moving through to retail prices. Central Asia is particularly exposed to this shift in costs. The region relies on imported fuel and fertilizers, and depends on long, multi-stage transport routes. When costs increase at any point in that chain, they accumulate before goods reach markets. The second layer of pressure comes from Iran itself. On March 3, Tehran imposed a ban on exports of food products as part of wartime economic measures. Reporting in Tajikistan indicates that the move could affect the availability and pricing of goods such as dairy, sugar, fruit, and spices, particularly in wholesale and lower-cost retail markets. Iran is not a dominant supplier, but plays a role in specific markets. Tajikistan is the clearest example. Tajikistan has also expanded its economic relationship with Iran in recent years, supported by cooperation in industry and transport. Iranian goods are widely present in retail supply chains, and trade between the two countries has grown steadily in recent years. That growth is part of a broader trend. Iran’s economic ties with Central Asia have expanded under new trade arrangements and bilateral initiatives. Kazakhstan and Iran have discussed increasing trade turnover to $3 billion, reflecting the rising use of Caspian routes and port infrastructure, which are now under threat. [caption id="attachment_46480" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Aralsk Bazaar. Rising transport and fertilizer costs are beginning to push up food prices across the region. Image: Michael J. Bland[/caption] Transport adds a third layer of pressure. As risks rise across the Middle East, airlines and freight operators are avoiding large swathes of Iranian airspace and surrounding routes, forcing rerouting and raising costs across supply chains. European aviation safety authorities have issued conflict-zone bulletins warning of heightened risks in the region, and carriers have adjusted accordingly. Rerouting increases fuel use, extends journey times, and raises insurance costs. Those increases affect cargo as well as passengers, and over time, higher logistics costs feed into the price of imported goods, including food. On land, the same pattern is visible. As southern routes become less predictable, more freight is shifting toward the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route - the Middle Corridor -...