Tajikistan Business Economy - The Times Of Central Asia

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Central Asia-South Korea Summit 2026

From Critical Minerals to Connectivity: South Korea’s Stakes in Central Asia

On September 16, Seoul hosted the first Korea–Central Asia Summit, bringing President Lee Jae Myung together with the heads of all five Central Asian states. The meeting elevated a dialogue that has run at a ministerial level since 2007 to the level of heads of state. The leaders adopted a Seoul Declaration setting the terms for future engagement and agreed to hold summits every two years. On September 14, trade and industry ministers from South Korea and the five Central Asian states met in Seoul for the first C5+Korea Industry Ministers’ Meeting. They signed a joint statement launching a standing platform for industrial cooperation. Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investment, Industry and Trade used the occasion to push for a shift away from raw-material trade toward joint production and localization. Behind the diplomatic choreography sits a practical problem: the minerals both sides keep discussing cannot move without a route to carry them. A Minerals Agenda with Separate Tracks South Korea relies heavily on imported minerals for its manufacturing industries. Seoul has been developing separate plans with each country. With Tajikistan, discussions have focused on gold and silver, alongside antimony. With Kyrgyzstan, Seoul has been discussing antimony and tungsten. Cooperation with Uzbekistan covers minerals and digital manufacturing. With Kazakhstan, a central issue is moving beyond raw exports toward processing inside the country, as The Times of Central Asia reported ahead of the summit. South Korean firms are pursuing supply diversification independently. POSCO International and LX International have been expanding overseas mineral investments, including graphite and nickel projects, amid Chinese export restrictions. The Transport Connection Consider the Bolashak chrome mine in Kazakhstan, which Eurasian Resources Group launched in late 2024. The company plans to ramp it up to a design capacity of 7.5 million metric tons of chrome ore a year. Production on that scale makes reliable transport an essential part of the commercial equation. An Atlantic Council analysis identifies limited processing capacity and underdeveloped westward routes as obstacles to U.S. mineral partnerships with Central Asia. It presents the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor as a route to Western markets that avoids Russian and Iranian territory. That argument needs a distinction when applied to Korea. The corridor runs westward toward Europe; it is not a prerequisite for minerals to reach South Korea. Its relevance is the wider choice of buyers it could offer Central Asian producers, including potential Korean-backed processing ventures serving those markets. That corridor is being built out. The Aktau container hub has a planned capacity of 240,000 twenty-foot equivalent units. The World Bank-backed Mointy–Kyzylzhar railway is meant to remove a 149-kilometer detour and accommodate 30 train pairs a day, against roughly ten on the existing constrained route. Traffic is already rising: 125 container trains crossed Kazakhstan on the Trans-Caspian route in the first quarter of 2026, up 34.4% year-on-year. Japan has also become involved, pledging in August 2025 to help modernize customs operations at the port of Aktau. The Seoul Declaration also backs Korean participation in transport infrastructure, including modernization and digitalization. In...

Construction

Tajikistan Plans to Build Central Asia’s Tallest Building

Construction has begun in Tajikistan on what authorities say will be the tallest building in Central Asia, part of a massive development involving international design and engineering firms that is expected to alter Dushanbe’s skyline. The planned 77-floor Dushanbe Tower will be in a complex in the Shohmansur district of the capital that includes five high-rise towers and office, entertainment, and residential areas, according to Tajikistan’s presidential office. It said more than 2,000 local construction workers will be involved in the Dushanbe Mall project, which is slated for completion within five years. “In general, this will be the tallest structure in the region,” the presidency said. While the official statement used the term “structure,” it’s possible that the Dushanbe Tower would not be taller than several other structures, including telecommunications towers, in the region. However, it would be the tallest conventional building if its height projections are borne out. The presidency said the height of the Dushanbe Tower will be 340 meters. Amir Holding, a Dushanbe-based real estate development group leading the Dushanbe Mall project, notes a height of 359 meters on its website. RMJM, a global network of architects and other professionals that was founded in Scotland, says it is designing the skyscraper and that it will be 400 meters high. Completed in 2022, the 311-meter Abu Dhabi Plaza in Astana, Kazakhstan, is currently the tallest building in Central Asia. TAS International Group, a construction company within Amir Holding, is involved in the project. In a statement, the parent company described the development as “a landmark urban intervention addressing the city's shortage of high-quality residential, commercial, hospitality and retail infrastructure,” but did not disclose the project’s cost. “Positioned within a rapidly growing market, it responds to increasing demand for premium real estate and establishes the foundation for Dushanbe's first central business district,” the developer said. The project includes a lake and extensive green space, according to designers. The Dushanbe Tower will be “immersed” in the park, offering “a new blueprint for sustainable urbanism in Central Asia,” according to RMJM. It said the goal is to make “greenery an integral, authentic part of the urban experience.” Companies from Uzbekistan are also contributing to the Dushanbe Mall project, showing that “Central Asian countries are working together not only in politics and trade, but also on major construction and infrastructure projects,” said MTRK, Uzbekistan’s state broadcaster. The Shohmansur district, where the project is being built, is in the Gissar Valley. Dushanbe is in an earthquake-prone region, and a LinkedIn recruitment post for an engineer on the Dushanbe Tower project says the job involves advanced analysis of seismic loads in what it describes as a “9-ball zone.” Dushanbe already has a shopping center called Dushanbe Mall or City Plaza, which opened in 2016 and is not connected to the new project. President Emomali Rahmon and his son, Dushanbe Mayor Rustam Emomali, laid the foundation stone for the new project on September 3.

Antimony

U.S. Eyes Tajikistan Antimony as China Dominates Processing

The United States is showing growing interest in Tajikistan’s antimony – a metal important to the defense industry, electronics, and batteries. The country accounted for about 20% of global production in 2025, ranking third after China and Russia. For Washington, Tajik deposits could become one of the alternative sources of supply amid tighter Chinese controls on antimony exports. That interest received political confirmation on September 1. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon met in Bishkek with U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asian Affairs Sergio Gor and Senator Steve Daines, a member of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Among the subjects discussed, the two sides specifically highlighted investment in rare and strategically important minerals. Critical minerals have taken on a prominent role in U.S. policy toward Central Asia in 2026. Washington is looking for new sources of strategic raw materials as it seeks to reduce dependence on Chinese supplies. In Kazakhstan, U.S.-based Cove Capital, together with state-owned Tau-Ken Samruk, is already preparing to develop the large Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty tungsten deposits. For Tajikistan, antimony could play a similar role. According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the country produced about 22,000 tons of antimony in 2025, out of global production of approximately 110,000 tons. China produced about 40,000 tons, while Russia produced 32,000 tons. Antimony is used in batteries, flame-retardant materials, semiconductors, infrared optics, and military applications. Its strategic importance has increased since China introduced export controls on antimony products in 2024. Playing Catch-Up to China Tajikistan’s main antimony production is concentrated in Ayni District in the north of the country. Its two principal centers – Dzhizhikrut and Konchoch – also illustrate the respective positions of American and Chinese capital in the sector. Washington would not be starting from scratch. The Dzhizhikrut antimony-mercury deposit is operated by Anzob, which has been wholly owned by U.S.-based Comsup Commodities Inc. since 2006. At Konchoch, China has the stronger position. The group of deposits is being developed by TALCO Gold, which is 50% owned by the state-owned Tajik Aluminium Company and 50% by China’s Tibet Huayu Mining. The Chinese investor entered the project in 2017, paying $90 million for its stake. Konchoch comprises several deposits containing gold, silver, antimony, mercury, and other minerals. Tajik authorities estimate that the deposit contains more than 23 million tons of ore, about 50 tons of gold, and more than 265,000 tons of antimony. The key advantage of the Chinese-backed project is processing. In July 2026, TALCO Gold commissioned a plant with capacity to produce up to 5,000 tons of metallic antimony a year. Previously, the company had primarily produced concentrates. The Chinese investor now participates in the chain from ore extraction to metal production. For the United States, this makes the challenge more complicated: access to a deposit alone does not provide an independent source of finished antimony products. More broadly, an OECD review published in 2026 says foreign investment in Tajikistan’s mining sector comes mainly from China, making U.S.-owned Comsup one of...

Energy Security

Tajikistan Seeks 2.55 Million Tons of Iranian Oil and Fuel as Russian Supplies Falter

Tajikistan has asked Iran to supply 2.55 million metric tons of crude oil and petroleum products as Dushanbe looks for alternatives to increasingly unreliable Russian fuel supplies. The request includes 2 million tons of crude oil, 300,000 tons of diesel, 150,000 tons of gasoline, and 100,000 tons of aviation fuel, according to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport. The ministry said the volume would require about 51,000 railway tank cars. The proposal was discussed in Tehran on August 15 during talks between Tajik Transport Minister Azim Ibrohim and Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh. It is not yet a purchase agreement, and Tajikistan has not announced a delivery timetable, price, or supplier. The timing, however, places the proposed trade directly inside a worsening sanctions environment. On August 20, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened economic consequences for countries providing support to Iran, promising “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not announced specific new measures linked to that statement. Significant purchases and transport of Iranian petroleum already carry U.S. sanctions exposure. Executive Order 13846 authorizes sanctions against people and financial institutions involved in significant transactions for the purchase, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum from Iran. A temporary U.S. authorization covering Iranian crude and petroleum products, issued in June, was revoked on July 7, with its wind-down period ending on July 17. Russia’s Fuel Crunch Reaches Tajikistan Dushanbe’s request to Iran is driven by a more immediate problem: dependence on Russian fuel. In 2025, Tajikistan imported about 1.7 million tons of fuel and lubricants, more than 1.2 million tons of which came from Russia. Tajik officials said in July that Russia supplied 84% of imported petroleum products. That dependence has become more difficult to manage as Ukrainian drone attacks have reduced Russian refinery output and forced Moscow to protect its domestic market. Russian fuel shortages began spilling into Central Asia in early summer. Tajikistan’s fuel imports fell sharply in July, pushing Dushanbe to seek additional supplies from China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Iran. Russia still accounted for 72.3% of fuel supplied to Tajikistan in the first half of the year, while talks with Kazakhstan had reached presidential level by the end of July. The pressure was already visible in Dushanbe. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others imposed sales limits. On July 10, Energy and Water Resources Minister Daler Juma said Tajikistan had roughly two months of petroleum reserves and was seeking alternative suppliers. The scale of the request is striking. At 2.55 million tons, it exceeds Tajikistan’s total fuel and lubricant imports in 2025, although 2 million tons of the proposed volume is crude oil rather than finished fuel. The Ministry of Transport has asked Iran to help organize dedicated tanker trains and create a “green corridor” giving Tajik fuel cargoes priority on the Iranian rail network. Further transit arrangements would still be needed because Tajikistan and Iran do not share a border. The Refinery Question The large crude component also highlights...

Tourism

Tajikistan Creates Tourism Fund as Visitor Numbers Rise

Tajikistan has created a dedicated fund to reinvest money collected from tourists and travel companies in the country’s tourism industry. The move comes amid rising visitor numbers, with nearly 890,000 foreign tourists visiting the country in the first half of 2026, up 16.7% from a year earlier. The tourist fee predates the fund, which the government formally established by a resolution adopted on July 1. The fund will be used to improve tourism infrastructure and service standards. The money will be kept in a separate account at the Ministry of Finance’s Central Treasury, while the Tourism Development Committee is required to report to the government every six months on how the funds are used. Tourism permit fees and fines for nonpayment will provide additional revenue. The fund will also receive 5% of the value of outbound tour packages sold to citizens of Tajikistan, channeling money from trips abroad into tourism development at home. For foreign travelers, the fee depends on the type of accommodation and is based on Tajikistan’s “calculation indicator,” a government-set benchmark used for official charges. In 2026, one calculation indicator is set at 78 somoni, or about $8.40. Under the current rates, the fee is 0.2 of the indicator per day at hotels and similar accommodation, and 0.15 at guesthouses and hostels. That works out to 15.6 somoni a day in the first category and 11.7 somoni in the second, roughly $1.70 and $1.30 respectively. The charge is small relative to the overall cost of a trip to destinations such as the Pamirs. The government resolution does not state how much revenue the fund is expected to collect. Uzbekistan was the largest source market, accounting for more than half of the total, or 510,400 tourists. Russia accounted for 175,800 and Kyrgyzstan for 89,000. Another 23,100 came from Kazakhstan and 22,700 from China. The committee expects Tajikistan to receive more than 2 million foreign tourists in 2026. Russia remains one of the country’s main source markets. Russian tour operators report growing demand for the Pamir Highway and the Wakhan Corridor. The Fann Mountains and combined trips through Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are also popular. Operators cite expensive airfares and insufficient tourist infrastructure as obstacles familiar to independent travelers. Tajikistan has difficulty competing with Uzbekistan for travelers drawn primarily by the architecture of its Silk Road cities. Its appeal lies elsewhere, particularly in trekking and road trips through the mountains. Some infrastructure problems have eased in recent years as electronic visas and eSIM services have become available and more hotels and restaurants are operating. Tourist information centers have opened, and sections of the Pamir Highway are being repaired. Service quality outside Dushanbe and Khujand, however, remains uneven. There are also security concerns for travelers heading toward the Afghan border. Some of the country’s most spectacular routes pass through the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. After attacks from Afghan territory killed Chinese citizens in late 2025, Dushanbe increased security in border areas. The fund’s effectiveness will depend on how much it raises and...

Digital Finance

Opinion: Tajikistan’s Digital Finance Boom Faces Its Next Challenge – Keeping Money Digital

Tajikistan’s e-wallet numbers are striking. As of June 30, 2026, 28 credit financial institutions reported 19.8 million electronic wallets, up 25.9% from a year earlier. In the first half of 2026, e-wallets were used for 14.6 million non-cash transactions worth 3.6 billion somoni. But those figures should not be read as if 19.8 million people are actively using wallets. The National Bank of Tajikistan’s published aggregate data do not state how many wallets belong to unique users or how many are active. Nor do they show how usage is distributed among them. Without that denominator, the headline figure tells us much less about actual use. Tajikistan has clearly expanded digital access. It now needs a clearer picture of usage and stronger reasons for people and businesses to keep money inside the digital system. I call this the shift from digital access to digital retention. The headline number is 19.8 million wallets out of an official population of 10.721 million as of January 1, 2026. The more useful number would be how many are meaningfully active. Do Not Confuse Registration With Usage A registered wallet is an access point, not proof of financial behavior. One person may hold several wallets, and some may sit dormant. Usage may also be concentrated among a smaller group of frequent users. Without active-wallet and unique-user data, none of those possibilities should be assumed as fact. What we can say is that non-cash activity is growing. The National Bank reports that cashless payments for goods and services made with electronic payment instruments reached 41% in the first half of 2026, 13 percentage points higher than a year earlier. It also reports 9,425 POS terminals at trade and service points and 33,620 QR codes. That 41% figure covers electronic payment instruments, including bank cards and e-wallets. It is not an e-wallet usage rate. To understand how wallets are actually being used, Tajikistan needs a clearer view of active wallets, transaction frequency, and what happens to money after it enters a digital account. Trust Is Part of the Infrastructure For many people, the move from cash to bank cards was already a significant behavioral change. They learned to trust money represented by a balance on a screen rather than notes in a hand. Wallets, QR payments and app-based financial services require another layer of trust. Users need to know where their money is and whether a payment went through. They also need a clear route when something goes wrong. Fees should be easy to understand. This is why simplicity is part of financial trust, not merely user experience. Tajikistan’s Financial Literacy Program for 2026–2030 makes the same connection at a policy level. It links financial literacy and consumer protection with public confidence as digital financial services expand. A good digital-finance service should be usable by ordinary people without making money feel harder to understand. Users should not need fintech expertise to trust the product. Merchants Need a Reason Not to Cash Out Consumers are only one part of...