Tajikistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Afghan Refugees

Tajikistan Officially Confirms Deportation of Afghan Refugees

Tajikistan’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB) has publicly commented for the first time on the deportation of Afghan citizens from the country, citing alleged violations of national law and crimes that the authorities said had sparked public outrage. The statement followed an appeal by Afghan citizen Muhammad Hakim Tursun, who criticized the deportation of his compatriots. In its response, published through the state news agency Khovar, the security service claimed that some Afghan citizens living in Tajikistan had “grossly violated the requirements of the law” despite being provided with conditions for residence, work, and education. To justify the deportations, the agency cited crime statistics that it said involved Afghan citizens and foreign nationals, without clearly explaining the time period covered or how many cases were linked specifically to Afghan refugees in Tajikistan’s Sughd region. According to the GKNB, the authorities recorded 670 cases of illegal drug trafficking, 32 cases involving membership in terrorist organizations, 15 cases of sexual violence against minors, and 594 instances of forged documents being used to obtain refugee status. The security service also reported 45 cases involving the organization of gambling and entertainment establishments and 25 cases related to ties with what it described as “destructive organizations” and attempts to destabilize the situation in the country. Particular attention in the statement was devoted to a high-profile murder case in Khujand. According to the agency, on the evening of April 30, Afghan citizen Rahmoni Muhammadumar allegedly killed local resident Aziza Vokhidova, who, according to authorities, “attempted to defend her honor and dignity.” Earlier, Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry reported the detention of the suspect. In a video released by authorities, the suspect allegedly confessed to the crime, saying he acted because of “strong sexual attraction” and stabbed the woman multiple times. Following the killing, residents of the Dehmoy jamoat in Jabbor Rasulov district told journalists that their Afghan neighbors had suddenly disappeared. According to witnesses, unidentified individuals transported approximately 200 to 250 refugees away in vehicles on May 4, many of whom had reportedly lived there for years. Until the publication of the GKNB statement, the authorities had not officially confirmed the mass deportation of Afghans. Officials had instead limited themselves to reminding foreigners of the need to comply with migration laws. Tajikistan has previously faced criticism over the forced return of Afghan refugees. In December 2024, UNHCR urged the authorities to halt deportations after at least 41 Afghan citizens, including 37 refugees, were returned without due process. The agency warned that forced returns to Afghanistan could violate international law and place returnees at risk. The security service stressed that more than 10,000 Afghan families who obey Tajik laws continue to reside in the country. The statement also said Tajikistan has served as a “second homeland” for several generations of Afghan citizens over the past 35 years and claimed that the state treats them “impartially.” Nevertheless, the agency emphasized that security concerns remain its top priority.

UFO Files

Pentagon UFO Files Include 1994 Tajik Air Report Over Kazakhstan

On May 8, the Pentagon released the first batch of U.S. Department of War files on unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP), including a State Department cable describing a 1994 sighting by Tajik Air pilots over Kazakhstan. The new archive, called the Presidential Unsealing and Reporting System for UAP Encounters, was created in response to a directive from U.S. president Donald Trump. It covers unresolved cases where the government cannot make a definitive determination from available data, with further releases expected “every few weeks.” The department uses the current term UAP as well as the older term unidentified flying object (UFO). The release includes a three-page unclassified State Department cable from the U.S. embassy in Dushanbe. Dated January 31, 1994, it is titled “Tajik Air Pilots Report Unidentified Flying Object” and carries a State Department “Released in Full” stamp dated February 25, 2026. The same cable had previously appeared in CUFON’s archive of State Department UFO records, released in 2000 in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. According to the cable, Tajik Air chief pilot Ed Rhodes, identified as a United States citizen, and two American pilot colleagues reported that they had encountered a UFO on January 27, 1994, while flying at 41,000 feet in a Boeing 747SP. The location was given as latitude 45 north and longitude 55 east, over Kazakhstan. The pilots described the object as an intensely bright light approaching from the east at high speed and at an altitude far above their aircraft. They said they watched it for about 40 minutes as it moved in circles, corkscrews, and 90-degree turns. Rhodes reportedly took several photographs with a pocket Olympus camera and said copies would be sent to the embassy and to the Tajikistan desk at the State Department if they came out. No such photographs appear in the released cable. The crew could not identify the object’s shape because it was dark. They described its light as resembling a “bow wave,” and later said the aircraft flew beneath contrails left by the object after sunrise. Rhodes estimated those contrails to be at about 100,000 feet. The embassy suggested that the object might have been a meteor entering and skipping off the Earth’s atmosphere. Rhodes and the other pilots rejected that explanation, saying their years flying passenger aircraft for Pan Am had given them extensive experience with meteors and space junk. Based on the object’s reported speed and maneuverability, Rhodes expressed the view, which the cable says his crew seemed to support, that it was “extraterrestrial and under intelligent control.” The U.S. government recorded what the pilots said, but the cable does not confirm what they saw, as demonstrated in the file’s cautionary note: “We have no opinion and report the above for what it may be worth.” The release adds an official U.S. record to a regional history in which unexplained aerial reports have surfaced in Soviet research programs and, more recently, in media and online claims. During the Soviet period, reports of anomalous...

Victory Day

No Tanks on Red Square as Moscow’s Victory Day Pull Fades in Central Asia

Russia’s Victory Day parade on May 9 is set to be more restrained this year, with tanks, armored vehicles, and missile systems absent from Red Square for the first time in nearly two decades. The Russian Defense Ministry cited the “current operational situation,” while the Kremlin blamed what it called Ukrainian “terrorist activity.” Russia also reported drone attacks aimed at Moscow in the days before the ceremony, and security around President Vladimir Putin has been tightened. The reduced scale of the parade carries a resonance beyond Russia. Victory Day remains one of the most emotionally charged dates in the post-Soviet calendar, including in Central Asia, where families still remember relatives who fought, died, or labored during World War II. But across the region, the holiday has increasingly been placed inside national calendars rather than left as part of Russia’s political script. The contrast with last year is sharp. In 2025, Moscow marked the 80th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat with its largest Victory Day parade since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Chinese troops marched on Red Square, Xi Jinping sat beside Putin, and foreign leaders attended from across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet space. Tanks, rocket launchers, missile systems, drones, and other military hardware rolled through the square. This year’s guest list is more limited. The Kremlin’s initial list of foreign delegations included leaders and senior figures from Belarus, Laos, Malaysia, Slovakia, the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska. Attendance has also been hard to read. Earlier reports said Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov were expected in Moscow, while the Kremlin’s initial published list of foreign guests did not include any Central Asian presidents. On May 8, however, Kazakh and Uzbek media reported that Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev were traveling to Moscow for Victory Day events. The late confirmations complicate the picture, but they do not restore the full regional show of unity seen in the last two years, when all five Central Asian presidents were present at the Moscow parade. It does suggest, however, that Moscow’s political ownership of the date is less automatic than it once was. Victory Day, which commemorates the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in what Russia calls the Great Patriotic War, has long been one of the main rituals of modern Russian power. It draws large television audiences, fills public space with military symbolism, and presents the Kremlin as the guardian of a sacred national memory. The holiday speaks of sacrifice and family loss, but also of nationalism and state control over history. Putin has used that language repeatedly. On May 9, 2024, after appearing on Red Square in snowfall, he said Russia was going through a “difficult, milestone period,” and warned: “We will not allow anyone to threaten us. Our strategic forces are always in combat readiness.” In 2025, he used the 80th anniversary parade to link Soviet wartime memory to Russia’s current war, saying...

Geopolitics

European Summit in Yerevan Sends a Signal to Central Asia

The 8th European Political Community summit in Yerevan highlighted deepening geopolitical fault lines while signaling that some post-Soviet countries, notably Azerbaijan and Armenia, are gradually shifting their geopolitical orientation away from Moscow. It is a realignment that Central Asian states are watching with increasing interest. On May 4, attention across post-Soviet space, from Russia and Belarus to Central Asia and the South Caucasus, turned toward Yerevan. Armenia, still a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Eurasian Economic Union and formally tied to the Collective Security Treaty Organization despite freezing its participation, hosted Europe’s political leadership. Among those attending were French President Emmanuel Macron, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President António Costa, and prime ministers including Donald Tusk, Keir Starmer, and Petteri Orpo. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev participated via video link. No Central Asian leaders attended the summit. Even so, the gathering carried a message for the region. Armenia hosted Europe’s political leadership while remaining tied to Moscow-led structures, including the CIS and the Eurasian Economic Union. For Central Asian governments pursuing their own multi-vector policies, the summit showed how a post-Soviet state can widen its diplomatic options without a clean break from Russia. The parallel is not exact, but it is visible. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan remain in the Eurasian Economic Union, while Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan remain in the CSTO. All five Central Asian states maintain working ties with Moscow, while expanding contacts with the EU, Turkey, China, and the Gulf, part of a wider effort to diversify foreign policy options through closer engagement with Europe and other outside powers. Turkey was represented by Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, the highest-level Turkish official to visit Armenia since then-President Abdullah Gül in 2008. Turkey and Azerbaijan largely positioned themselves as counterweights to the dominant European framing, marking one of the summit’s key geopolitical divides. Aliyev adopted a confrontational tone, announcing a suspension of relations with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. “Instead of addressing fundamental problems of some member states, such as xenophobia, Islamophobia, antisemitism, migration, competitiveness, and homelessness, the European Parliament targets Azerbaijan, spreading slander and lies,” Aliyev said. “And the reason is that Azerbaijan restored its territorial integrity and sovereignty, put an end to separatism, and brought war criminals to justice.” In response, António Costa sought to soften tensions, emphasizing the summit’s historical significance as the first of its kind held in the South Caucasus and highlighting Aliyev’s participation as a symbol of peace efforts in the region. Cevdet Yilmaz focused on bilateral diplomacy, meeting Romanian President Nicușor Dan to discuss trade, regional issues, and global challenges. He also held talks with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, the summit’s host. The two sides signed a memorandum of understanding on the joint restoration of the historic Ani Bridge, located on the border between the two countries and dating back to the 11th century. Yilmaz suggested that Armenia would benefit from closer alignment with Turkey...

TCA Interviews

UNEP Interview: From Space, Central Asia’s Methane Challenge Comes Into Focus

Satellites are changing the way the world sees methane. What was once an invisible leak from a well, flare, pipeline, landfill, or coal mine can now be detected from space, traced to a specific site, and sent to governments and companies for action. A new analysis by the United Nations Environment Programme’s International Methane Emissions Observatory puts that system to the test. Its Methane Alert and Response System, known as MARS, uses 35 satellite instruments to identify major human-caused methane “super-emitters” and notify those responsible. UNEP says the system has already enabled 41 mitigation cases in 11 countries, covering sources estimated to have released 1.2 million tonnes of methane. For Central Asia, the findings are especially relevant. UNEP’s new data includes a rolling list of the world’s 50 largest satellite-detected methane sources, covering oil and gas, coal, and waste, and shows where rapid action may be possible. Several of those sources are linked to Turkmenistan’s oil and gas sector, placing the region firmly inside a global debate over methane transparency, climate responsibility, and whether satellite alerts can lead to action on the ground. Of the 50 sources featured in the latest UNEP/IMEO snapshot, China has the largest number, while Turkmenistan stands out sharply for Central Asia, with the second-largest individual source and four of the top ten. Methane is shorter-lived than carbon dioxide, but far more powerful in the near term. That makes cutting large leaks one of the fastest ways to slow global warming. The harder question, as UNEP’s latest data makes clear, is no longer only where the leaks are, but who responds when they are found. On April 30, UNEP/IMEO presented the new MARS findings, highlighting the growing role of satellite-based monitoring in identifying major methane sources and pressing governments and companies to act. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Meghan Demeter, MARS Programme Manager, International Methane Emissions Observatory, UNEP. TCA: What does the new MARS data reveal about Central Asia specifically that may surprise readers? Demeter: The latest MARS data products depict the region as one with growing engagement and significant mitigation potential. Responses to MARS notifications are increasing, supported in particular by designated national focal points who play a key role in coordinating follow-up with operators. Based on the published 2025 data alone, the response rate across Central Asia currently stands at 22%. Managing a high volume of alerts requires more effort to achieve very high response rates compared to countries that receive only a handful of notifications. Encouragingly, the region has already recorded nearly 20 mitigation cases, underscoring the strong potential for emissions reductions when large methane sources are identified and addressed. TCA: Why does Central Asia matter in the global methane debate, even if it is not the world’s largest methane-emitting region? Demeter: Across Central Asia, looking at the 2025 data alone, UNEP’s International Methane Emissions Observatory, through the Methane Alert and Response System (MARS), detected and notified 298 emission sources from the oil and gas sector. While satellites detect only a fraction of global methane emissions, satellites are highly effective at identifying so-called “super-emitters,” methane emission events so large they can be detected from space. These represent opportunities where action can deliver the greatest and fastest climate wins, while also catalyzing broader change. Regarding the “top 50” list of emission events, 11 of these sources are located in Central Asia, all from...

Regional Ecological Summit

Opinion: The Regional Ecological Summit and the Making of a Central Asian Voice

On 22–24 April, Astana hosted the Regional Ecological Summit—a gathering of governments, international organizations, financial institutions, and civil society that marked a new level of ambition in Central Asia’s environmental diplomacy. Fifty-eight sessions were held across three days at a moment when Central Asia’s ecological agenda is becoming inseparable from its political and economic future. The opening ceremony was attended by the presidents of all five Central Asian states. The summit adopted the Astana Declaration on Ecological Solidarity in Central Asia and brought renewed attention to the need to reform the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). Taken together, these developments signal more than procedural diplomacy. They point to growing political momentum. The region has never lacked shared history or channels of communication. Russian remains a practical language of intergovernmental exchange, and borders, economies, rivers, energy systems, and labor markets have tied these countries together long before contemporary climate diplomacy gave this interdependence a new vocabulary. For decades, much external analysis of Central Asia expected this interdependence to produce confrontation, particularly around water and energy. Those risks remain real. Yet the Astana summit showed a more complex trajectory. Climate change, biodiversity loss, water insecurity, land degradation, and food security are not separate national problems neatly contained within borders. Addressing them is becoming one of the fields through which regional coherence is being built. The significance of the Summit lies less in ceremonial language than in the consolidation of multiple ecological agendas into a visible diplomatic architecture. Through its panels and high-level discussions, the Summit placed Central Asia’s natural heritage not at the margins of development but at its center. Ecosystems, rivers, glaciers, mountains, and landscapes are not only environmental assets. They are conditions for prosperity, stability, and resilience. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of IFAS reopened the question of whether the Fund, long criticized for its limitations, can be reworked rather than left as a symbol of failed regional environmental governance. Kazakhstan’s proposal for an International Water Organization should be read in the same frame: it is not merely a technical proposal about water governance but an attempt to move a Central Asian concern into the language of global institutional reform. Kyrgyzstan’s mountain agenda and Tajikistan’s glacier diplomacy also belong to this broader pattern. They are not just isolated national branding exercises. Together with Uzbekistan’s increasingly active regional posture, they form a wider mosaic: each country brings a distinct ecological priority, but these priorities are becoming legible as parts of one regional perspective, and its voice carries more weight when presented as such. This is particularly important in the current geopolitical moment. As larger powers turn inward, compete over corridors, or speak about Central Asia through the old grammar of influence, the region is attempting to define itself not as terrain for another “Great Game" but as a pole of its own. This does not mean distance from external partners. On the contrary, the United Nations was a strategic partner of the Summit, and many formats involved major international organizations, European...