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UN General Assembly

Central Asia at the UN: Iran Threats and Sanctions Disputes

U.S. President Donald Trump’s threat to “annihilate” Iran brought the vulnerability of Central Asia’s southern trade routes into focus as the UN General Assembly’s general debate opened in New York. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov challenged unilateral sanctions, while diplomacy over Ukraine raised the prospect of a halt to attacks on energy infrastructure. For landlocked Central Asia, these developments carry consequences far beyond the speeches. Iranian ports provide access to overseas markets, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rely heavily on fuel from Russian refineries, and restrictions on international payments can complicate commerce even where transport links remain intact. Iran and Access to the Sea Addressing the General Assembly on September 22, Trump presented a choice between reaching an agreement with Tehran and carrying out his threat to “annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly.” He also predicted that an agreement could follow the U.S. midterm elections, while defending U.S. military action against Iran. [caption id="attachment_56719" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: UN[/caption] That framing leaves Central Asian countries facing costs regardless of their position on Tehran. Iran provides overland connections to ports serving the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Damage to Iranian infrastructure can therefore disrupt trade between Central Asia and countries that are not parties to the conflict. Uzbekistan’s exposure illustrates the distinction. According to its Ministry of Economy and Finance, goods worth $3.9 billion entered Uzbekistan through Iran in 2025. That represented about 9% of total imports, including approximately $1 billion in technological equipment. Uzbek exports transiting Iran were worth another $1.4 billion. Those figures measure transit, not simply purchases from Iranian suppliers. Pressure intended to isolate Tehran can also obstruct Uzbekistan’s access to equipment and customers elsewhere. Kazakhstan has also sought a larger southern outlet. A 27-year agreement provides for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade says the project would expand access to Gulf markets and destinations in Asia and East Africa. The risks differ by port. Bandar Abbas faces the Strait of Hormuz, while Chabahar sits on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait. Both depend on Iranian infrastructure and remain exposed to the wider conflict and sanctions environment. Developing alternative routes does not make these southern connections dispensable. Nor is exposure uniform. Kazakh officials have emphasized the limited existing role of Persian Gulf shipments in the country’s logistics. For Astana, the threat concerns future diversification as well as current trade. For Uzbekistan, the transit figures show a substantial flow already at risk. Tajikistan, meanwhile, has sought 2.55 million tons of Iranian crude oil and fuel following shortages in Russian supplies. Its search for an alternative leaves Dushanbe exposed to two conflicts, with attacks on Russian refineries disrupting its established supplier, and the conflict involving Iran threatening a potential replacement. Japarov Challenges Sanctions In his General Assembly address, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov argued that unilateral sanctions harm smaller developing states and can become instruments of political pressure. “The right to impose sanctions against a particular state should, in our view,...

Cold War

Opinion: Weaponizing Faith – The Cold War Roots of Central Asia’s Security Dilemma

Central Asia’s contemporary security dilemma is partly rooted in Cold War strategies that transformed Muslim identity into a factor of geopolitical competition. Washington viewed Soviet Central Asia’s Muslim populations as a potential pressure point against Moscow. The Soviet Union itself mobilized Central Asian Muslim personnel during its intervention in Afghanistan. These policies did not alone create later radical movements, but they contributed to a regional environment where existing grievances, ideological narratives, and transnational networks could be redirected and intensified. The origins of Washington’s interest in Soviet Muslim populations as a strategic factor emerged during the final years of the Cold War. In 1977, the Nationalities Working Group, an interagency task force within the National Security Council, was established to examine vulnerabilities among the Soviet Union’s non-Russian nationalities. Declassified U.S. records show that American officials studied ethnic, cultural, and religious identities as possible sources of pressure against Moscow. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, this approach became part of Washington’s broader effort to weaken Soviet influence. Through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the United States provided assistance to Afghan resistance organizations, while Saudi Arabia contributed significant financial support. Pakistan’s military government under General Zia-ul-Haq favored Islamist factions among Afghan resistance groups, helping connect military assistance with religious mobilization against Soviet forces. During his visit to the Khyber Pass in early February 1980, U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski addressed Afghan resistance fighters, declaring: "That land over there is yours. You will go back to it one day because your cause is right and God is on your side." The remarks reflected how the anti-Soviet struggle was framed not only in geopolitical terms but also through religious language and symbolism. [caption id="attachment_56711" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Soviet T-62 tank leaving Afghanistan; image: U.S. Department of Defense.[/caption] The Afghan conflict was also fought through education and information campaigns. Between 1986 and 1992, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funded an approximately $50 million educational program through the University of Nebraska–Omaha’s Center for Afghanistan Studies for Afghan refugees and schools. Research has shown that some textbooks incorporated violent imagery, references to weapons and combat, and themes glorifying holy war and the duty of martyrdom. Produced for wartime Afghanistan, these materials reflected, and arguably helped sustain, a militarized ideological environment. Islamic religious life in Central Asia had its own deeper roots. Despite Soviet restrictions, religious learning survived through underground hujra networks and unofficial scholarship. Figures such as Muhammadjon Hindustoniy-Rustamov, born in the Fergana Valley and later one of Soviet Central Asia’s most influential unofficial Islamic scholars, shaped generations of students even as Afghanistan became an arena of international rivalry during the 1980s. Moscow also used Central Asian Muslim identity for strategic purposes. The 154th Separate Spetsnaz Detachment, known as the “Muslim Battalion,” was composed largely of Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen soldiers from the Soviet Turkestan Military District. The unit participated in Operation Storm-333 in December 1979, the Soviet operation that killed Afghan President Hafizullah Amin and installed Babrak Karmal. The selection of Central Asian...

Russian Fuel Exports

Russian Diesel Returns, but Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Remain Exposed

Russia sharply increased diesel supplies to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in August after a summer slump in Russian fuel exports strained both countries’ markets and pushed prices higher. But the August rebound underscored a weakness already exposed over the summer: disruptions at Russian refineries can quickly ripple through fuel markets across both countries. In August, Kyrgyzstan received more than 72,000 tons of Russian diesel, up from just 4,400 tons in July. Supplies to Tajikistan rose from 16,000 tons to more than 56,000 tons, around 3.5 times the July level. Overall, Russia exported more than 370,000 tons of diesel to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Mongolia in August, more than double the July volume. Kazakhstan received around 28,000 tons after no deliveries in July, while Mongolia imported about 215,000 tons. Russia's diesel production recovered to around 170,000 tons per day in August, but Moscow maintained restrictions on exports to protect its domestic market, with exceptions for countries covered by intergovernmental agreements. The summer disruption showed that such arrangements do not insulate Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from falling production at Russian refineries. Kyrgyzstan Starts to Diversify Kyrgyzstan consumes around 1.6 million tons of petroleum products a year and receives the overwhelming majority of its imports from Russia. The summer disruption pushed Bishkek to look for additional sources. The authorities discussed purchases from Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Belarusian deliveries began arriving in July, while China also sent an initial batch of fuel. In August, Kyrgyz officials opened talks with China’s Sinopec over further supplies. Another option is to refine more crude oil domestically. In August, 35,000 tons of crude were shipped through Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan for processing at local refineries. The new route gives Bishkek another way to source feedstock while reducing its dependence on finished gasoline and diesel from Russian refineries. The 72,000 tons of Russian diesel delivered in August largely offset July’s collapse rather than establishing a new level of supply. Tajikistan's Options Tajikistan is even more dependent. In the first half of 2026, the country imported 599,500 tons of petroleum products worth $494.7 million. Russia accounted for 91.1% of those supplies. Diesel imports totaled 300,200 tons. The reduction in supplies became visible on the streets of Dushanbe over the summer. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others limited purchases to 20 liters per vehicle. By late July, prices at some stations had reached 17–18 somoni (about $1.90) per liter. As of August 31, the average price was around 16.5 somoni, compared with approximately 11 somoni in early June. Dushanbe responded by increasing purchases from neighboring countries. In July, imports of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan roughly tripled to 34,000 tons. But average monthly imports of these fuels from all suppliers in the first half of the year were around 97,000 tons. Neighboring suppliers can cover part of the shortfall, but for now they cannot quickly replace Russian volumes. In July, the presidents of Tajikistan and Kazakhstan discussed increasing supplies of Kazakh petroleum...

UN General Assembly

Central Asia at the UN: Saida Mirziyoyeva to Represent Uzbekistan

Saida Mirziyoyeva, the head of Uzbekistan’s Presidential Administration and daughter of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, is expected to deliver the country’s address at the UN General Assembly’s general debate in New York. Her appearance comes as Central Asian delegations seek support for regional development and prepare for a larger role in UN diplomacy. On September 22, Gazeta reported that Mirziyoyeva would represent Uzbekistan in the debate. Her father delivered the country’s address last year. The report did not specify the proposals she would present. Mirziyoyeva met UN Secretary-General António Guterres on September 21. Her public account described discussions on cooperation with the UN, but provided no detailed negotiating agenda. The assignment follows her appointment as administration chief in June 2025, when the president restored a post abolished two years earlier. She had previously served as his assistant. This month, Mirziyoyev also appointed her to head the planned Tashkent International Financial Centre, which aims to attract private capital through tax incentives and a legal framework drawing on English common law principles. Mirziyoyeva’s UN appearance adds a major diplomatic assignment to her domestic responsibilities. She has addressed UN events before, including a water conference in 2023. Delivering Uzbekistan’s national statement in the General Assembly would give her a broader platform to present government policy. What is On the Agenda The general debate runs from September 22 to 26 and resumes on September 28. It is the centerpiece of the General Assembly’s high-level week, when world leaders address the UN and hold bilateral talks on the sidelines. The gathering is based at UN headquarters in New York, with additional events around the city. This year’s theme is “Restoring trust, managing transformation: A United Nations that delivers for all.” Practical discussions include reforming the organization and financing development. The European Council’s published priorities call for a more effective, cost-efficient UN and stronger international peace and security mechanisms. The week also brings diplomacy over the war in Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelenskiy is due to meet U.S. President Donald Trump in New York to press for a halt to attacks on energy infrastructure, Reuters reported. Those talks take place amid continuing strikes on power facilities and refineries. The week’s program includes separate meetings on climate action and a just transition on September 23, according to Kazakhstan Today. Pandemic prevention and preparedness will be discussed on September 25. Central Asia in New York The region’s countries are attending at different political levels. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov is in New York after visiting Utah. His announced program combines participation in the UN gathering with meetings with national leaders and U.S. businesses. On September 21, Japarov met financial services group StoneX. The meeting produced memoranda involving Kyrgyzstan’s Finance Ministry and Eldik Bank, following discussions about precious metals trading and access to international financial services. Kyrgyzstan is also preparing for its 2027–2028 Security Council term. In a recent interview with The Times of Central Asia, Shumkarbek Adilbek uulu, director of the National Institute for Strategic Initiatives, described efforts to secure financing for...

Opposition

Tajikistan’s Islamic Opposition Changes Leader After 20 Years

The Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan (formerly the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan) has elected a new chairman after longtime leader Muhiddin Kabiri decided to step down. The IRP has been one of the most influential groups in Tajikistan since the country became independent in late 1991. The organization subsequently became the principal target of a sustained government crackdown, which culminated in its activities being banned in Tajikistan and pressure being applied to members who fled the country. The New Leader Members of the IRP’s Supreme Presidium met in Vilnius, Lithuania, on September 19 to choose from three candidates: Abubakr Nuri, Abdukodir Shehov, and Islomiddin Saidov. Sixty-four percent of members voted for Saidov, the group's first deputy chairman. In late August 2026, the IRPT changed its name to simply the Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan. Saidov, who made that announcement, explained to the Tajik opposition’s Azda TV that the removal of the word “Party” and the change of the organization’s symbols were part of internal reforms. The leadership change appears to be another part of those reforms, although Kabiri said he had wanted to step down as the group’s leader for some time. Edward Lemon, president of the Washington-based Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, has followed events in Tajikistan for some two decades. He has lived in the country and speaks Tajik. He met Saidov and describes him as a moderate, much like Kabiri. Saidov is from Nurobod in the Rasht Valley, and, according to Lemon, is a cleric “who takes a firm stance on issues of authoritarianism and Islamic rights.” Saidov takes over Tajikistan’s largest opposition group, but one that has been embattled for years and forced to conduct its work far from the borders of Tajikistan. There Since the Start The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) was formed in the final years when Tajikistan was a Soviet republic, after Mihail Gorbachev’s perestroika policy was implemented. Following independence in 1991, the IRPT spearheaded the opposition to the government that eventually took over and was led by Rahmon Nabiyev, a former leader of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic who was ousted in Gorbachev’s anti-corruption campaign in the mid-1980s. When civil war broke out in the spring of 1992, the IRPT joined forces with the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and the Pamiri organization La’li Badakhshan to fight government forces. The IRPT was the backbone of this unlikely alliance. When the Tajik Peace Accord ended the war in June 1997, then-IRPT leader Said Abdullo Nuri signed on behalf of the opposition. The peace deal legalized all three opposition groups, making the IRPT the first, and to date only, Islamic party to be registered in any Central Asian country since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The agreement also stipulated that the opposition would receive 30% of positions in the government, from local to ministerial posts. Marginalized and Ousted The arrangement lasted only a few years before Emomali Rahmon, who had come to power during the civil war, gradually began removing former opposition...

Nuclear Waste

Central Asia Makes Progress on Uranium Cleanup, but Major Risks Remain

Radioactive waste lies beside the river in Mailuu-Suu, a former uranium town in Kyrgyzstan’s picturesque mountain landscape. Engineers preparing to secure it found a problem inside one of its dams. Additional drilling revealed tailings within the dam structure itself. Two subsequent studies concluded that waste from two connected ponds would have to be moved to a safer location. The discovery changed the cleanup design and increased its cost, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s revised master plan. Material that planners had intended to secure in place could no longer safely remain there. Once known as Mailbox 200, the town was founded in 1946 for a secret Soviet uranium program. Its workforce included Germans treated as politically suspect and former Red Army soldiers punished for surrendering during World War II. Uranium mining and processing at Mailuu-Suu ended in the late 1960s, leaving waste buried along the river. Cleanup is expected to continue until 2032. Even then, the authorities will need to maintain the restored sites and check that contamination remains contained. Mailuu-Suu illustrates why Central Asia’s uranium cleanup has stretched across decades. The waste sits in places where rivers and unstable slopes can carry it beyond the original industrial sites. Making those places safer requires extensive engineering, followed by public oversight that must outlast the contractors. [caption id="attachment_56370" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Archival photograph of Mailuu-Suu’s old mill and uranium tailings; image: Peter Waggit/IAEA[/caption] The International Atomic Energy Agency’s latest assessment, published in January 2026, records substantial progress. Four out of seven priority sites have been remediated since the original regional plan was adopted in 2017. But Mailuu-Suu remains one of the largest and most complex projects, with work expected to extend beyond the updated regional plan’s 2030 horizon. Across the region, former uranium operations left radioactive residue after mining and processing ended. The IAEA describes facilities abandoned without adequate plans for safe closure. National governments inherited responsibility for sites where no private owner remained to pay for the work. The geography compounds the situation. The IAEA’s original planning framework identifies tailings ponds near major rivers in seismically active areas. Flooding or a landslide can undermine containment and lead to contaminated materials traveling downstream. The location of a deposit therefore helps determine the urgency and design of its cleanup. At Mailuu-Suu, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) announced a €23 million grant in 2023. The original design included soil covers two meters thick to reduce water entering the waste and prevent access to it. The project concerned more than two million cubic meters of tailings along the river and its tributaries. Following the devastating 2023 earthquake in Turkey and Syria, Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Construction required further checks on the dams’ stability. Drilling revealed tailings inside the dam at pond seven. Subsequent studies found that the waste in ponds five and seven could not safely remain in place. The IAEA plan warns that a strong earthquake could cause the dam to collapse, allowing water-saturated waste to liquefy and enter the river....