Tajikistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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SCO Summit

Kyrgyzstan Hosts SCO Summit as Bloc Marks 25 Years

Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's ten member states are due in Bishkek on September 1 for the final summit of Kyrgyzstan's 2025-2026 chairmanship. The meeting is expected to produce a Bishkek Declaration marking the SCO's 25th anniversary, alongside thematic statements and other decisions. For Kyrgyzstan, the gathering is more than a turn in the organization's rotating chairmanship. As many as 21 heads of state are expected in the country during the week, according to presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov. The summit coincides with Kyrgyzstan's Independence Day and the August 31 opening of the World Nomad Games. The member-state session will bring together Belarus, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with President Sadyr Japarov as host. Chinese President Xi Jinping will also make a state visit, giving the summit a substantial bilateral program alongside the formal meetings. Kyrgyzstan's Diplomatic Week The summit comes less than three months after Kyrgyzstan was elected to the UN Security Council for 2027-2028, its first term on the body. Hosting the SCO gives Japarov an opportunity to reinforce that diplomatic profile before the Security Council term begins in January. The SCO's foreign ministers reiterated in July that Central Asia is the organization's core and backed a larger role for it in the region's security and economic development. Their statement also praised Kyrgyzstan's chairmanship and confirmed that the Council of Heads of State and SCO Plus meetings would take place in Bishkek on August 31 and September 1. What Cholpon Ata Already Settled At their July 24 meeting in Cholpon Ata, SCO foreign ministers approved the draft declaration and accompanying documents as a basis for the summit. The language is therefore largely negotiated before the leaders arrive, although the final package can still change. The ministerial statement gives a clearer indication of the political agenda, supporting a multipolar world order and rejecting unilateral sanctions. It also calls for more intra-SCO trade. Terrorism, separatism, extremism, drug trafficking, and transnational organized crime remain its stated security priorities. The statement says the SCO is entering a period of institutional reform, including changes to its legal framework and cooperation procedures. A Development Bank Still Taking Shape Economic cooperation will occupy a significant part of the summit. In Tianjin last year, interested member states reached political consensus to establish an SCO Development Bank. The institution is not yet operational. At the fourth consultation meeting in Shenzhen in June, delegates discussed its key elements and the next stage of negotiations. A timetable or capital commitments announced in Bishkek would move the proposal beyond its current design stage. The bank could eventually provide another source of finance for infrastructure, but its structure and membership remain unsettled. Currency diversification will also remain part of the discussion. The 2024 Astana Declaration called for gradual growth in the use of national currencies for settlements among interested members. Sanctions on Russia and Iran have increased the political importance of that effort, although the SCO has not created a common payment system. SCO Plus, but Not...

SCO Summit

Xi Jinping Heads to Bishkek as Kyrgyzstan Prepares to Host 21 Heads of State

Chinese President Xi Jinping will attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek and make a state visit to Kyrgyzstan, Beijing has confirmed. The trip, which also includes a state visit to Egypt, will run from August 30 to September 3. The formal meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State is scheduled for September 1. As many as 21 heads of state are expected in Kyrgyzstan during the week, according to presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov. Xi had long been expected to be among the leaders traveling to the Kyrgyz capital, but the formal confirmation turns attention from the guest list to the business that may be conducted around the main session. For Kyrgyzstan, the most consequential part of the visit may come in Xi's talks with President Sadyr Japarov rather than in the summit hall. The Times of Central Asia will be reporting from Bishkek as the delegations arrive, and from the opening ceremony of the World Nomad Games on August 31. Several visiting heads of state are expected to attend the ceremony, which will bring summit diplomacy and Kyrgyzstan’s biggest cultural showcase together on the eve of the SCO meeting. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has already confirmed that he will be there. The spectacle will be considerable, but the substance is likely to emerge in the bilateral meetings, signed agreements, and final documents released around the September 1 summit. The State Visit and the Railway The state visit format gives Xi and Japarov a bilateral program alongside the summit. The most prominent economic issue is likely to be the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, a project discussed for decades that is now under construction across some of Kyrgyzstan's most difficult terrain. The Kyrgyz authorities put the railway’s construction cost at about $4.7 billion. China holds 51% of China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Company LLC, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. Roughly half of the cost is being financed through a 35-year Chinese loan to the company. The summit could bring clearer evidence of how quickly construction is progressing. Any new financing, contracts, or cross-border arrangements would be more significant than another general statement of political support. The railway also places Kyrgyzstan inside a larger shift in regional trade. Commerce between China and the five Central Asian states passed $100 billion in 2025. Bishkek wants a larger share of that traffic and more of the value created along transit routes. Xi's visit offers Japarov an opportunity to press the case for logistics hubs, local employment and supporting roads rather than transit alone. The Documents Behind the Ceremony The SCO's national coordinators have been finalizing the outcome documents in the weeks leading up to the summit. Under Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship, the SCO has emphasized regional stability and economic cooperation, alongside digital transformation, cyber threats, environmental policy, and cultural exchange. SCO decisions require consensus, which tends to soften disagreements in final communiqués. Any agreements that specify funding, deadlines, or responsibility would give the Bishkek package more weight. Bilateral Meetings Around the Summit The summit will bring...

Border Security

Badakhshan Fighting Raises Risks for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

In Nusay district, Badakhshan province (northeast Afghanistan), fighting began around August 11 between Taliban forces and followers of Juma Khan Fateh, a local Taliban commander of ethnic Tajik origin who had resisted efforts to disarm his network. The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project (ACLED) identifies the immediate trigger as an attempt to remove military equipment and vehicles from areas under Fateh’s control, amid longer-running tensions over disarmament, local authority, and control of gold mining. Similar disputes over gold mines have repeatedly produced clashes between local commanders and Taliban forces since 2021. Fateh surrendered on August 17 after nearly a week of fighting. By August 22, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said his case was being prepared for trial. Post-surrender reporting also indicated weapons seizures and disarmament activity around Fateh-linked sites and associates, although the scale of the reported seizures and disarmament remained incompletely verified. The Fateh episode came amid a broader increase in armed instability in Badakhshan during 2026. ACLED recorded 22 anti-Taliban armed-opposition events in the province from January through July, compared with four from June through December 2025. In July, one opposition group temporarily seized the Yaftal-e Sufla district headquarters, while the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) reportedly fought Taliban forces in Zebak. The Yaftal-e Sufla and Zebak operations were separate from the Fateh confrontation, and there is no credible evidence of coordination with Fateh’s network. Fateh’s surrender ended the immediate confrontation, while separate armed-opposition activity in Badakhshan continued. The fighting has already had a direct cross-border consequence for Tajikistan. Nusay lies opposite Tajikistan’s Darvoz district. On August 13, gunfire from the Afghan side crossed into Darvoz, killing a 21-year-old woman inside her home and damaging residential property. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest, saying the fighting had violated the country’s airspace and demanding respect for the state border and measures to prevent a recurrence. The Afghan Foreign Ministry acknowledged the death and expressed regret while blaming “disruptive and opportunistic elements.” The one confirmed limited incident does not show that the conflict has extended into Tajikistan on a sustained basis, but it makes the cross-border dimension more than hypothetical. Tajikistan shares a 1,374-kilometer frontier with Afghanistan, much of it facing Afghan Badakhshan. Dushanbe had already treated this border as a persistent security problem. In late November 2025, two attacks launched from Afghanistan’s territory killed five Chinese nationals and wounded five others in Tajikistan, which then instituted tighter border measures, while the Taliban pledged to cooperate on security and investigations. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is also implementing a program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan frontier with weapons, equipment, and other border-protection means. Its 2026–27 implementation phase antedates the present fighting. A 2026 Security Council monitoring report said Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was active mainly in northern Afghanistan, particularly Badakhshan, and was developing cells capable of projecting a regional threat, with Central Asia remaining a key focus. It also reported concern in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the role of their nationals in the organization and the possible...

Middle East Crisis

Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean....

Power Outage

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Dispute Cause After Regional Power Failure Hits Almaty

A major power failure affected parts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan on August 14. In Almaty, electricity went out at 2:38 p.m. local time in four districts, disrupting transport and traffic in Kazakhstan’s largest city. Traffic lights stopped working and some businesses closed. The metro suspended service, and passengers still underground were evacuated. At several busy intersections, motorists and delivery couriers began directing traffic themselves. In Kyrgyzstan, outages affected parts of Bishkek and Issyk-Kul Region. “An accident in the power system of a neighboring country affected the Central Asian power grid. As a result, power supply disruptions were observed in the Surkhandarya region and several other regions,” Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry said. In Tajikistan, electricity went out in Dushanbe at about 3 p.m. and in numerous other cities and districts. Later that day, the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources said it had formed a working group to determine the cause. The ministry also denied reports of an accident at the Nurek Hydropower Plant. The Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC) later issued a preliminary account attributing the blackout to an emergency at Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Hydropower Plant. “Due to the emergency shutdown of two hydropower units with a combined capacity of 600 megawatts at the Toktogul HPP in the Kyrgyz Republic, there was a power surge on the North-South transit line, causing an overload and its disconnection by emergency protection systems. As a result, Kazakhstan’s southern zone was separated from the country’s unified power system,” KEGOC explained. Kyrgyz energy officials offered a different account. They said an external outage occurred at 3:34 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time on a high-voltage transmission line connecting northern and southern Kazakhstan. The disturbance split the Central Asian grid into isolated sections, leaving Kyrgyzstan temporarily operating autonomously while automatic protection safeguarded equipment. Both accounts illustrate the interdependence of the Central Asian Power System (CAPS). The Soviet-era network connected the region’s electricity systems across borders that were then internal. It was part of a regional water-and-energy arrangement in which hydropower releases from upstream republics supported irrigation downstream. Cross-border power exchanges declined after the Soviet Union collapsed. In 1999, the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed a parallel-operation agreement. Turkmenistan disconnected from CAPS in 2003, while Tajikistan was disconnected from Uzbekistan in December 2009. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an electricity-trade agreement in March 2018. The southwestern section of Tajikistan’s grid reconnected to CAPS in June 2024, but the northern connection was still under development in July 2026. Turkmenistan remains outside the system. In an assessment published on August 16, Zhakyp Khairushev, chairman of the Public Council under Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, called the incident a serious test of the country’s southern power system. He said emergency protection contained the disruption and allowed electricity to be restored in stages. Power restrictions in Kazakhstan were lifted by 5 p.m., but Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continued to disagree over where the failure began.

Power Outage

Major Power Outage Hits Almaty as Blackouts Reported in Bishkek and Dushanbe

A major power outage hit Almaty and parts of the surrounding region on Friday afternoon after high-voltage transmission lines shut down, triggering automatic protection systems across the electricity network. The blackout affected Kazakhstan’s largest city, home to about 2.37 million people, and came amid reports of power cuts at around the same time in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. According to Alatau Zharyq Company, the disruption began at 2:38 p.m. on August 14 when three 500 kV overhead transmission lines owned by national grid operator KEGOC shut down unexpectedly. The company identified the lines as L-5400, L-5300, and L-5320. Their shutdown activated special load-shedding and automatic frequency protection systems in Alatau Zharyq’s network, which the company said “led to the disconnection of electricity consumers in the city of Almaty and the Almaty Region.” The three lines form part of Kazakhstan’s North-South electricity transit system. There was no initial explanation from the company or KEGOC of what caused the three transmission lines to trip. Residents reported outages in communities across Almaty Region. Electricity failures were accompanied in some areas by disruption to internet and mobile services. TCA reporters on the ground confirmed outages across large parts of Bishkek. There was no immediate confirmation that the outages in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan had the same root cause. KEGOC later said preliminary operational data indicated that the disruption was caused by a power surge from the Unified Power System of Central Asia. The company said the disturbance caused southern Kazakhstan and the interconnected Central Asian power system to separate into isolated operation. The underlying cause of the initial surge had not yet been established. The timing caused an additional complication in Almaty, where one of the city’s largest entertainment events of the year is scheduled for Friday evening. Ye, formerly known as Kanye West, is due to perform at Almaty’s Central Stadium on August 14 as part of his 2026 world tour. The blackout quickly produced a wave of jokes on social media. One image circulating widely depicted the rapper dressed as an electrician beside a fuse box, with “Yeezy Electrical” on his overalls. Other users joked that the city’s electricity had been diverted to prepare for the concert. The blackout also struck during a period of intensely hot summer weather, increasing the potential disruption for households and businesses reliant on air conditioning.