Tajikistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Border Demarcation

Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan Border Fencing Complete in Batken, Demarcation Continues

Kyrgyzstan has completed the installation of nearly 328 kilometers of border fencing in the Batken region in the country’s southwest, where armed clashes with Tajikistan took place in 2021 and 2022. For some residents, the new boundary has also raised questions about compensation for lost homes and farmland. On October 29, the Batken regional administration confirmed completion of the fencing, two weeks after the State Border Service made the same announcement. During 2025–2026, 338.5 kilometers of patrol roads were built in the region’s Batken and Leilek districts, allowing patrols to reach previously difficult-to-access areas. The fencing covers part of the countries’ approximately 1,008-kilometer border. The two countries began installing border markers in July 2026 and are continuing this process of demarcation, alongside the preparation of formal boundary records. Three Decades of Disputes Batken lies in the densely populated Fergana Valley, which is divided among Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. National borders here run close to villages and farmland, making disputes over territory particularly sensitive. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were unable to agree on the course of substantial sections of their shared border. Disputes over access to land and water were particularly frequent in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region and the neighboring Sughd region in northern Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan also had a longstanding border dispute with Uzbekistan, which the two countries settled in 2022. In April 2021 and September 2022, clashes escalated into armed conflicts involving heavy weapons. The September 2022 fighting killed more than 100 people across both sides and destroyed hundreds of homes. On the Kyrgyz side alone, more than 140,000 people were displaced. Cross-border movement was severely restricted following the 2021 violence, disrupting trade and visits between communities. Negotiations continued after the fighting, with the two countries’ security chiefs leading efforts to resolve the remaining territorial disputes. The eventual settlement involved exchanges of land, including in areas where communities had grown up close to one another. In December 2024, Bishkek and Dushanbe announced that they had reached agreement on the remaining disputed sections. The two sides completed a draft description of the border alignment and signed the corresponding protocol. In February 2025, negotiators also reached preliminary agreements on road use and access to water infrastructure, two longstanding sources of friction between border communities. On March 13, 2025, Presidents Sadyr Japarov and Emomali Rahmon signed a state border treaty in Bishkek, alongside agreements covering road access and water and energy facilities. That same day, the Kyzyl-Bel–Guliston and Kairagach–Madaniyat international border crossings reopened after being closed for nearly four years. Tajik entrepreneurs were able to return to markets in the Batken region. On March 31, 2025, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on the junction of their three national borders as well as the Khujand Declaration on Eternal Friendship. Compensation Claims Remain Former Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister Tokon Mamytov said in comments to the state news agency Kabar on April 29, 2025, that installing border fencing would help reduce the risk of renewed clashes...

Water Management

Water Projects in Tajikistan: Japan Learns from a Troubled Grant

Residents of Moskva in Tajikistan’s Khatlon region reported receiving water for an average of just 10.9 hours a day in a 2017 survey, nearly four years after a Japanese-funded supply system was completed in June 2013. An external evaluation commissioned by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) gave the project a D rating, the lowest possible. Japan is now financing a new water supply system in Abdurahmoni Jomi district, also in the Khatlon region. The two projects illustrate how its approach to water supply assistance has developed, particularly in metering, utility management, and infrastructure maintenance. A Project That Met Its Targets on Paper Hamadoni district, which includes Moskva and lies near the Afghan border, had a population of approximately 119,000 when the original grant was planned. Some 59% of residents lacked access to a working water supply system, and only 16 of the district’s 47 village wells were operational. More than 70% of residents in village areas relied on canals and rivers for water. The grant financed three deep wells, elevated reservoirs, and a 32.9-kilometer pipeline network in Moskva, as well as a water supply system for two villages and drilling equipment. The project cost 19% more than planned and took 67 months instead of the expected 31. In 2016, the local utility reported that the system supplied water to all 22,505 residents of Moskva and 7,103 residents in the two villages, where it was distributed through communal taps. Leaks, Meters, and a Flat Fee The grant covered pipeline replacement in only part of Moskva. According to the local utility, approximately 70% of the pipes outside the project area needed replacement. Leaks occurred frequently but were not systematically recorded. The utility estimated losses at 35% to 50%, but without household meters it could not accurately distinguish consumption from leakage. Households paid a flat monthly fee of 13.4 somoni (about $1.50 at the time) for unlimited water use. Some residents left their taps running to irrigate gardens, particularly during the summer, reducing water pressure elsewhere in the network. The arrangement provided little financial incentive to reduce consumption. JICA Disagrees with Its Evaluator JICA’s Financial Cooperation Implementation Department issued a separate opinion challenging the D rating, arguing that the evaluation did not adequately reflect the project’s achievements. The department pointed out that the system delivered 7,580 cubic meters of water per day, compared with an originally projected daily average of 5,292 cubic meters. It also cited the expansion in coverage and improvements in water quality. The external evaluator, however, noted that the system had been designed to permit a 24-hour water supply, but service had been limited to a 13-hour daily schedule because of leaks and excessive consumption. The amount pumped into the network did not necessarily reflect how much water reached households. Metering Brings Improvements, 2017–2021 The evaluation recommended replacing deteriorated pipes, installing meters, improving maintenance, and explaining the new arrangements to residents. Japan had already begun a technical cooperation project in April 2017, while the evaluation was underway. It concluded...

С5+1

C5+1 Statement Omits Afghanistan, Prioritizes Trans-Caspian Trade

The United States and the five Central Asian republics have issued a joint statement on economic and security cooperation that makes no mention of Afghanistan, once a central concern of U.S. regional policy. The document followed the October 19 C5+1 ministerial meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Afghanistan's absence from the statement does not mean it has disappeared from negotiations or Washington's strategic interests. Nevertheless, a comparison with earlier C5+1 documents reveals a shift in the published agenda. Where Washington once placed considerable importance on connecting Central Asia with South Asia through Afghanistan, the latest statement focuses on trade across the Caspian Sea and investment in the region's minerals. Afghanistan's Changing Place in C5+1 Talks In July 2021, just weeks before the Taliban retook Kabul, C5+1 participants at a conference in Tashkent explicitly supported closer trade and transport links between Central and South Asia through Afghanistan, as well as efforts to secure peace in the country. That month, the U.S., Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan also announced plans for a quadrilateral platform to support trade and transportation projects linking the two regions. In July 2023, Afghanistan was the subject of a separate C5+1 special session in Astana. Officials called for an inclusive Afghan government that respected women's rights and backed further development of transport and energy links through the country. A joint statement issued by C5+1 leaders that September described Afghanistan as an important factor in Central Asian security. In the 2026 Samarkand statement, Afghanistan goes unmentioned even in the section on border security and terrorism. However, the October 2023 C5+1 connectivity statement had already highlighted the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, which connects Central Asia to Western markets, and also omitted Afghanistan. For Central Asian countries, the Afghan route remains important in practical terms. Uzbekistan is pursuing plans for a railway through Afghanistan to Pakistan, which would give it access to Indian Ocean ports. Kazakhstan is already a major supplier of food to Afghanistan, exporting around $216 million worth of flour and $122 million of wheat in the first seven months of 2026. In September, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also agreed with the United Arab Emirates to study a railway corridor through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan all share borders with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also face the prospect of reduced water supplies from the Amu Darya as Afghanistan builds its Qosh Tepa Canal. Afghanistan's omission from a joint statement should therefore not be taken as a complete account of the policies of all five Central Asian states. What Constrains Washington One possible explanation lies in the U.S. approach to Afghanistan's current authorities. Washington allows practical contacts with representatives of the Taliban but does not recognize the government it has formed. The movement remains designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, although it is not included in the U.S. Department of State's separate list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The designation restricts dealings with the Taliban, although U.S. sanctions rules permit many commercial transactions involving Afghanistan's governing institutions, including civilian infrastructure and transportation projects....

CSTO

CSTO in No Hurry to Help Tajikistan

The authorities in Tajikistan have been ringing the alarm bells over events in neighboring Afghanistan for more than three decades. The Tajik government did so again after violence broke out along a small section of the Tajik-Afghan border in the last months of 2025, and specifically called on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for assistance. The CSTO has responded, but the promised aid has yet to arrive as Tajikistan continues to seek stronger border defenses. The Perennial Border Problem There had been unrest in Afghanistan since the late 1970s, long before Tajikistan became independent in late 1991, and the instability along Tajikistan’s approximately 1,360-kilometer border with Afghanistan has continued ever since. Most of the border area is mountainous and sparsely inhabited, making it ideal for narcotics and weapons smuggling. Weapons smuggling was a huge problem during Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, when weapons were being brought back and forth across the Afghan frontier to fuel civil conflicts in both countries. From the first day of Tajikistan’s independence until June 2005, Russian border guards helped keep watch on Tajikistan’s Afghan frontier. At least several hundred Russian and Tajik border guards, and Tajik and Afghan smugglers and militants have been killed along the Tajik-Afghan border in the last 35 years. Many countries worried about Tajikistan’s border problems with Afghanistan. Neighbors such as China, the other Central Asian states, and not so far away, Russia did not want narcotics or militants from Afghanistan reaching their countries. In the mid- and late-1990s, the Taliban push through Afghanistan to the Central Asian border increased these neighbors’ concerns. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the United States and its allies used facilities in Central Asia to support troops in Afghanistan. All these countries, and more, contributed to Tajikistan’s border defenses in some way, either by simply donating housing materials or winter uniforms, or providing security monitoring equipment and weaponry. It has never been enough to totally stem the border problems, but the security aid Tajikistan received is far more than the country could ever have allocated for that purpose from its state coffers. Emomali Rahmon was Tajikistan’s president in the late 1990s when the Taliban first seized power in Afghanistan. Rahmon viewed the Taliban as a threat, and Tajikistan’s policies toward the Afghan militant group reflected that. Rahmon’s opinion of the Taliban did not change when they regained power in 2021, and despite the other Central Asian states establishing a dialogue and trade ties with the Taliban, Tajikistan has been slow to engage the returned rulers of Afghanistan. In June 2024, Rahmon’s eldest son and heir apparent, Rustam Emomali, told a meeting of the CSTO’s Parliamentary Assembly Council that “Afghanistan has once again become a breeding ground for terrorism.” Emomali said more than 1,000 radical madrassahs had been established in Afghanistan, some in areas close to Tajikistan’s border, and that these religious schools were also preparing suicide bombers. A Turbulent End to 2025 In late August 2025, Tajik border guards...

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SCO Economic Ambitions Outpace Agreement

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) renewed calls for a development bank at its October 20 heads of government meeting in Dushanbe, but the institution remains under negotiation more than a year after members reached political agreement on its creation. Participants adopted a joint communiqué and decisions on economic cooperation, including joint manufacturing and transportation. Financing those ambitions remains a central challenge. Members backed the bank at their September 2025 summit in Tianjin. A year later, the Bishkek summit ended without a founding agreement or capital commitments, and no launch date was set. The SCO brings together ten countries whose economic priorities differ sharply. China and India are among the world's largest economies, while Russia and Iran face Western sanctions. For Central Asian members, the organization offers another route to investment, but agreement on shared goals has yet to produce a common financing institution. Different Priorities Tajik Prime Minister Kohir Rasulzoda reported that SCO countries accounted for 70% of Tajikistan's foreign trade turnover in January–August 2026. Meanwhile, foreign direct investment from member states amounted to just $350 million for the whole of 2025. "These figures demonstrate the enormous untapped potential of our investment cooperation, which significantly lags behind the dynamics of trade relations," Rasulzoda said. Iran has different concerns. First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref called for wider use of national currencies in trade, alongside export insurance and investment protection. Tehran has long sought to reduce its foreign trade dependence on Western financial infrastructure. Sanctions make this an urgent priority, but Iran's interests in international settlements differ considerably from those of India or China, for example. Beijing and New Delhi conduct extensive trade with Western countries, so a single financial model for all SCO members is unlikely to satisfy everyone. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin encouraged joint manufacturing projects using Russia's special economic zones and investment protection agreements. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, is seeking investors for the Tamchy special investment and financial territory, established in July 2025 in the Issyk-Kul region. First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Daniyar Amangeldiev invited SCO partners to develop joint projects there. Financing the Bank A development bank could provide a common source of funding for such projects. In Dushanbe, Belarusian Prime Minister Alexander Turchin renewed calls to accelerate its establishment. "We consider it fundamentally important that this institution become a multilateral development bank with a unique mandate, providing access to long-term investment financing without political conditions," he said. Kyrgyzstan also supported establishing the bank. Amangeldiev urged members to draw on existing financing channels, including the SCO Interbank Consortium, while negotiations continue. Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov confirmed Astana's willingness to host the bank's headquarters. Bishkek had already put forward its candidacy at the September summit. Choosing a headquarters is only part of the task. Members must agree on their financial contributions and how the bank will operate, including who decides which projects receive loans. China has far greater financial resources than most of its SCO partners, giving it the potential to become the bank's principal...

Russia's War in Ukraine

Ukraine Says More Than 20,400 Central Asians Signed Russian Army Contracts

More than 20,400 Central Asian citizens have signed contracts with Russia’s armed forces since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, according to the Ukrainian government’s “I Want to Live” project. The new figures come as families in Kazakhstan secure the return of young men who say they went to Russia for civilian work and were forced into military service. The project’s October figures identify 8,207 Uzbek citizens and 5,308 Tajiks, together accounting for about two-thirds of the regional total. Kazakhstan accounts for 3,819. A further 2,219 are from Kyrgyzstan, and 884 from Turkmenistan. The count covers identified contract signers as of October 1, rather than the number currently fighting, and excludes ethnic Central Asians with Russian citizenship. The figures have not been independently verified. “I Want to Live” is a Ukrainian state project that helps Russian servicemen surrender. For some Kazakh families, the immediate struggle has been to get their sons out of the Russian army. Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. As TCA reported, he and other young Kazakh men later appeared in appeals for help, with some wearing Russian uniforms in or near the combat zone. On October 7, relatives went to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry in Astana to demand help bringing the men home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied them, said he knew of at least 21 cases. Families said their relatives had accepted civilian jobs before being pressured to sign military contracts. Keldibek has now returned to Kazakhstan. His sister told RFE/RL’s Kazakh service that he arrived in Shymkent on the evening of October 21. She said others were still waiting to return. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry had earlier asked Moscow to help repatriate the men and opened a hotline for their families. Their accounts fit a pattern documented by the International Federation for Human Rights. Its April study found that migrants in Russia had been offered military contracts as an alternative to detention or deportation. Others were recruited abroad with promises of civilian work, only to find themselves sent to the front. “Many of these men knew in some capacity what they were signing up for. But some were also deceived or coerced,” FIDH President Alexis Deswaef said. The war has also drawn Central Asians to Ukraine’s defense. TCA’s earlier reporting on both sides described volunteers who regarded Ukraine as home and saw Russia’s invasion as a threat to their families. Kazakh national Zhasulan Duysembin joined Ukraine’s armed forces in 2021 after settling there. In a 2022 interview, he told Ukrainska Pravda: “I had two children in Ukraine, and for the first time I started to think that they might be in danger.” Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency has warned citizens that offers of work or help with immigration papers can lead to recruitment into armed conflicts. It has also reminded them that joining foreign armed forces can bring criminal liability at home. For other families, there has been no homecoming. Kiril Nysanbaev went to Russia for work after completing his military...