Tajikistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Migration

The Number of Migrants from Tajikistan to Russia Has Decreased Significantly

The number of citizens of Tajikistan applying to participate in Russia’s state "Program for the Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots" has declined sharply, according to data from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. The issue drew public attention following remarks by the head of the Russian cultural organization Rossotrudnichestvo, Yevgeny Primakov. He stated that in the first three quarters of last year, 27,700 people received certificates to participate in the program, of whom 21,400 have already relocated to Russia. Applicants originated from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. However, official statistics indicate that Tajikistan is no longer among the leading source countries. In the first quarter of 2023, Tajik citizens accounted for 37.2% of all applications submitted under the program. By the first quarter of 2025, their share had fallen to 4.1%, moving the country from first place to seventh. In the third quarter of 2025, the share of applicants from Tajikistan dropped further to 2.4%, the lowest level recorded during the period under review. Kazakhstan ranked first in terms of the number of applications submitted. In the second and third quarters of 2025, most applications came from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. As a result, Tajik citizens no longer play a leading role in the program, while the relative positions of other Central Asian countries have strengthened. Experts attribute the decline primarily to changes in program requirements. Since January 1, 2024, applicants have been required to demonstrate proficiency in the Russian language. Following the introduction of this requirement, the number of applications from Tajik citizens decreased markedly. Demographic factors may also have contributed. The average migrant family consists of approximately 2.3 people. This profile is more typical of Russian-speaking and non-indigenous populations in the region, which may have influenced the redistribution of applicants among participating countries. Official reports from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs indicate a steady decline in the share of applicants from Tajikistan and challenge claims of mass migration of Tajik citizens to Russia under the program.

C5-UK

Uzbekistan Eyes UKEF Backing and Market Access at C5–UK Talks

London is hosting the first formal meeting of Central Asian foreign ministers with the United Kingdom on February 26, opening a new “Central Asia–UK” ministerial track after a broader parliamentary program in London earlier in the week. Foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are attending. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubayev is expected to hold bilateral talks with UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper, while Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev has also been holding meetings in London focused on trade, investment, and critical minerals cooperation. With delegations from all five Central Asian countries present, the format provides scope for further bilateral engagements on the margins. On the eve of the ministerial meeting, Central Asian foreign ministers, led by Kazakhstan’s Yermek Kosherbayev, held a session with the UK’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Cooperation with Central Asia, with British MPs emphasizing political dialogue, legislative exchange, and deeper interparliamentary ties as foundations for advancing economic and regional cooperation. For Tashkent, the London meeting comes after a burst of bilateral engagement that has put finance and infrastructure at the center of the relationship. On February 17, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev received the UK Prime Minister’s Trade Envoy to Central Asia and Azerbaijan, Lord John Alderdice, and highlighted how heavily Uzbekistan has leaned on London’s markets: Uzbek sovereign and corporate bonds worth more than $15 billion have been placed on the London Stock Exchange, while trade turnover has doubled over the past five years, according to the presidential press service. Mirziyoyev also flagged potential projects spanning energy, finance, geology, and transport, and the sides agreed to prepare a joint roadmap. That roadmap is already acquiring project language. Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, Jamshid Kuchkarov, met Alderdice in Tashkent with representatives of the London Stock Exchange Group, Arup, and UK Export Finance (UKEF), as well as the UK ambassador, Timothy Smart. According to the Uzbek government, talks focused on transport and logistics infrastructure—rail and road projects, airport modernization—alongside green energy and public–private partnerships. The same meeting produced a memorandum of understanding between Arup and the Ministry of Economy and Finance aimed at engineering and transport infrastructure planning and capacity-building for regions. Alderdice has also put a number on the UK’s offer. Speaking at a UK–Uzbekistan infrastructure conference, he said the UK has “about £4 billion available for export guarantees in Uzbekistan specifically,” linking the figure to potential backing for projects ranging from rail and airports to urban development. He pointed to London as a venue for Uzbek IPOs and bond issuance and said he was exploring potential collaboration with Uzbekistan’s mining sector, noting that the city also hosts the London Metal Exchange. The data suggests why Uzbekistan is pushing: the UK reported total trade in goods and services with Uzbekistan of £2.2 billion in the four quarters to the end of Q3 2025, including £545 million in UK exports and £1.6 billion in imports. Uzbek borrowers have already treated London as more than a diplomatic stop. In 2024, Uzbekistan’s National Bank...

Syria

Syria After Assad: What the New Regional Order Means for Central Asia

The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 fundamentally reshaped Syria’s regional position. The collapse of the old power structure weakened Iran’s entrenched military and economic networks and left Russia’s previously secured foothold uncertain. As Damascus enters a new political phase, external actors are recalibrating their strategies in a landscape that looks markedly different from that of the past decade. For Central Asian governments, the shift is not merely regional. Syria is becoming a testing ground for how mid-sized states navigate post-conflict environments shaped by larger powers, and a potential arena for economic and diplomatic outreach. As influence is redistributed and new investment and trade corridors are reconsidered, decisions taken in Damascus will increasingly intersect with Central Asia’s own foreign policy and economic calculations. In this emerging landscape, a power vacuum is being filled by states seeking to advance their interests. From the earliest days of Syria’s post-Assad transition, Turkey has been particularly active. As part of its declared comprehensive support for the new Syrian authorities, Ankara has taken steps to consolidate its position in the Syrian Arab Republic. Turkey is actively participating in infrastructure reconstruction, investing in economic projects, and expanding military-technical cooperation with Damascus. In August 2025, Syria and Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement covering areas including counterterrorism training, cybersecurity, demining, military engineering, logistics, and enhanced coordination between their armed forces. That same month, the two sides agreed to establish an intergovernmental business council under the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board to promote trade and investment cooperation between public and private companies. Turkish exports to Syria reached $3 billion in 2025, reflecting the rapid expansion of Ankara’s economic presence. For Central Asia, Ankara’s activism carries particular weight. Turkey has simultaneously deepened its political, economic, and security cooperation across the Turkic world, meaning its posture in Syria intersects with its broader regional strategy. A central element of Turkey’s Syria policy remains the issue of refugee returns. However, the prospect of large-scale repatriation is complicated by several factors, notably the long-term presence of around 2.5 million Syrian displaced persons in Turkish society and the absence of stable socio-economic conditions in Syria to support reintegration. Over more than a decade of conflict, a generation of Syrians has grown up in Turkey, many of whom are deeply embedded in the country’s social and economic life. Turkey’s obligations under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, including the principle of non-refoulement, further constrain policy options. Taken together, these factors make large-scale return unlikely until Syria achieves sustained political stabilization and adequate living conditions. In the longer term, Turkey’s objective of neutralizing what it describes as the Kurdish threat emanating from Syrian territory will continue to shape its strategy. Israel has also intensified its military and political engagement since the change of power in Damascus. It has taken steps to establish control over areas adjacent to the Golan Heights and to create a buffer zone, arguing that such measures are necessary to safeguard national security against potential terrorist threats. Israeli officials...

Afghanistan

From Security Threat to Economic Partner: Central Asia’s New ‘View’ of Afghanistan

Afghanistan is quickly becoming more important to Central Asia, and the third week of February was filled with meetings that underscored the changing relationship. There was an “extraordinary” meeting of the Regional Contact Group of Special Representatives of Central Asian countries on Afghanistan in the Kazakh capital Astana. Also, a delegation from Uzbekistan’s Syrdarya Province visited Kabul, and separately, Uzbekistan’s Chamber of Commerce organized a business forum in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif. A Peaceful and Stable Future for Afghanistan The meeting in Astana brought together the special representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for Afghanistan. The group was formed in August 2025. There was no explanation for why the fifth Central Asian country, Turkmenistan, chose not to participate. The purpose of the Astana meeting was to coordinate a regional approach to Afghanistan. Comments made by the representatives showed Central Asia’s changing assessment of its southern neighbor. Kazakhstan’s special representative, Yerkin Tokumov, said, “In the past [Kazakhstan] viewed Afghanistan solely through the lens of security threats… Today,” Tokumov added, “we also see economic opportunities.” Business is the basis of Central Asia’s relationship with the Taliban authorities. Representatives noted several times that none of the Central Asian states officially recognizes the Taliban government (only Russia officially recognizes that government). But that has not stopped Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in particular, from finding a new market for their exports in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan’s special representative, Ismatulla Ergashev, pointed out that his country’s trade with Afghanistan in 2025 amounted to nearly $1.7 billion. Figures for Kazakh-Afghan trade for all of 2025 have not been released, but during the first eight months of that year, trade totaled some $335.9 million, and in 2024, amounted to $545.2 million. In 2022, Kazakh-Afghan trade reached nearly $1 billion ($987.9 million). About 90% of trade with Afghanistan is exports from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. For example, Kazakhstan is the major supplier of wheat and other grains to Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan is the biggest exporter of electricity to Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan’s trade with Afghanistan is significantly less, but from March 2024 to March 2025, it came to some $66 million. To put that into perspective, as a bloc, the Central Asian states are now Afghanistan’s leading trade partner, with more volume than Pakistan, India, or China. Kazakhstan’s representative, Tokumov, highlighted Afghanistan’s strategic value as a transit corridor that could open trade routes between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. Kyrgyzstan’s representative, Turdakun Sydykov, said the trade, economic, and transport projects the Central Asian countries are implementing or planning are a “key condition for a peaceful and stable future for Afghanistan and the region as a whole.” The group also discussed humanitarian aid for Afghanistan. All four of these Central Asian states have provided humanitarian aid to their neighbor since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021. Regional security was also included on the agenda in Astana, but reports offered little information about these discussions. A few days before the opening of the meeting in Astana, Russian Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Sergei...

Afghanistan

Coordination Instead of Declarations: Astana Hosts Meeting of Regional Contact Group on Afghanistan

On Monday, Astana hosted an extraordinary meeting of the Regional Contact Group of Special Representatives of Central Asian Countries on Afghanistan, with delegations from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in attendance. The agenda focused on trade and economic cooperation with Afghanistan, including joint projects, investment protection, transit tariff policy, and the development of transport corridors through Afghan territory. The establishment of the group represents the practical implementation of agreements reached at the Sixth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, held in Astana in August 2024, and reflected in the Roadmap for Regional Cooperation for 2025-2027. The first meeting of the Contact Group took place on August 26 last year in Tashkent. As noted by Erkin Tukumov, Special Representative of the President of Kazakhstan for Afghanistan, Astana is interested in a constructive exchange of views and in identifying practical solutions to pressing issues of cooperation with Afghanistan. In recent years, Kazakhstan has consistently kept Afghanistan among its foreign policy priorities, avoiding rhetorical declarations in favor of a measured and systematic approach. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has paid particular attention to Afghanistan since the change of power in Kabul in 2021. In the first weeks after the Taliban assumed control, Astana began articulating its position on international platforms. One of the key statements was Tokayev’s address at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Dushanbe on September 17, 2021. He advanced a thesis that has since been reiterated in various formats: Afghanistan should be viewed not only as a source of risk but also as a potential driver of regional development, provided that stability and economic recovery are achieved. This position was further elaborated days later at the United Nations General Assembly. At that time, Kazakhstan was among the first to emphasize the need for inclusiveness in Afghanistan’s future political system, not as an abstract requirement, but as a practical condition for stability. Another significant step was the creation last year of the post of Special Representative of the President for Afghanistan, to which Tukumov was appointed. This role goes beyond that of an interdepartmental coordinator: as a direct representative of the head of state, it elevates the Afghan portfolio to the level of strategic priority. The establishment of such a position signals a transition from a situational response to a more systematic policy. The Astana meeting confirmed the intention of regional countries to deepen cooperation through a regular platform capable of coordinating actions and presenting them externally in a consolidated manner. Some external observers suggest that Central Asian countries are only now beginning to develop a common position on Afghanistan. However, that position has largely taken shape in recent years. The current task is not to formulate it, but to coordinate it more precisely. The meeting in Astana demonstrated that, for Central Asian countries, the primary concern is not the nature of the regime in Kabul, but Afghanistan’s capacity to function as a predictable economic partner and responsible participant in international relations. For the region, it is essential that...

Z5+1

Germany Builds a Z5+1 in Central Asia

Germany’s meeting on February 11 with the five Central Asian foreign ministers in Berlin formalized the Z5+1 (“Z” for “Zentralasien”) format as a standing work channel. It joins other “plus-one” formats now crowding Central Asia that function as instruments of influence. The United States is using C5+1 to push a more deliverables-oriented agenda, including critical raw materials, and China has institutionalized leader-level summitry with accompanying treaties, grants, and transport-centered integration. The EU has elevated its relationship to a strategic partnership and is putting Global Gateway branding behind connectivity and investment. Germany’s Z5+1 is best understood as Europe’s effort to add a practical, tool-driven channel that can move faster than EU consensus in some domains while still feeding EU programming rather than competing with it. The concluding Berlin Declaration reads like a program sheet with named instruments, sector priorities, and established a direct link to the EU’s broader “Team Europe” posture through the participation of EU Special Representative Eduards Stiprais. Germany’s Z5+1 fits this competitive field as a European execution lane that can move projects forward with German instruments while staying aligned with EU programs. Berlin Defines the Tools The Z5+1 meeting in Berlin drew on a sequence that Germany has been building since its 2023 “Strategic Regional Partnership” and subsequent summits in Berlin (2023) and Astana (2024), with an explicit emphasis on Central Asian regional cooperation as a counterpart to bilateral ties. The Berlin meeting, therefore, did not attempt to invent a new regional architecture but rather added a stable ministerial format for pushing forward project lists, regulatory expectations, and finance conditions between higher-level meetings. In Berlin, Germany committed €2.7 million to a cooperation platform for the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor: a small sum by infrastructure standards, but targeted at unglamorous coordination like data-sharing, planning discipline, and institutional continuity, i.e., standards and transborder management regimes where corridor initiatives often stall. This profile complements the EU-backed Trans-Caspian Coordination Platform track, which is explicitly tied to a wider €10 billion commitment announced at the January 2024 Global Gateway investors forum for EU–Central Asia transport connectivity. and which has addressed the corridor less as a construction problem than as a finance-and-sequencing problem. Berlin also explicitly supported the commercial participation of German rail and logistics firms in transport and consulting projects, aligning with the intent to keep firm-level engagement attached to ministerial diplomacy. The declaration references export credits and investment guarantees, and links them to business-environment expectations. On the same day, the German Eastern Business Association convened a “Wirtschaftsgespräch” (economics talk) in the Foreign Office with the Central Asian delegations. There, the region was framed as strategically significant for Germany’s diversification agenda, and it was signaled that an autumn leaders’ summit is already in view. Germany’s public accounting of its regional engagement in Central Asia stresses its already-deep base of activity in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in particular, including dozens of projects and multi-billion-euro volumes. The energy transition was mentioned, as the Berlin Declaration points to renewables, hydrogen, and climate programming that Germany is already funding...