Turkmenistan Environment - The Times Of Central Asia

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Access to Clean Water

Water Stress: Will the Summer of 2026 Become a Turning Point for Central Asia?

The summer of 2026 is projected to be a critical and potentially decisive period for Central Asia in the context of water stress. The region is entering the growing season with significantly lower water reserves in its main river basins, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, compared to previous years. The combined impact of climate change and rising consumption is expected to exacerbate irrigation shortages, threatening crop yields and food security. A Region Under Pressure: Water as a Strategic Factor For Kazakhstan, water is taking on an increasing strategic importance in 2026. The southern regions, Kyzylorda, Turkestan, and Zhambyl, have already entered a phase of persistent low water availability. Estimates suggest that the irrigation deficit could reach up to 1 billion cubic meters. The situation in the Syr Darya basin remains critical. Inflows are expected to fall 3.2 billion cubic meters below normal, and by the start of the growing season, total water volume may reach only 1-2 billion cubic meters, far below demand. The Shardara Reservoir, a key regional storage facility, is currently at roughly half of its design capacity. Uzbekistan faces an even more vulnerable position due to its high population density and large agricultural sector. The flow of the Amu Darya is projected to fall to 65% of its historical norm, putting food stability at risk. Tashkent is accelerating investments in canal reconstruction, as water losses during transport reach up to 40%. Against this backdrop, tensions between upstream and downstream countries could become more pronounced. Kyrgyzstan, acting as the region’s “water tower,” faces a difficult trade-off between energy security and its obligations to downstream neighbors. Low accumulation levels in the Toktogul Reservoir have constrained hydropower generation, leading to winter energy shortages and reduced summer water releases, precisely when Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan require them for irrigation. This cyclical dependency turns each growing season into a complex round of “water-for-electricity” negotiations, with diminishing room for maneuver. Tajikistan faces a similar situation in the Amu Darya basin. The Nurek Hydropower Plant is operating under strict conservation principles as reservoir levels remain several meters below previous norms. For Dushanbe, the priority remains fulfilling the Rogun project, which, under low-water conditions, raises justified concerns among downstream states. These tensions are compounded by the accelerated melting of Pamir glaciers, which currently increases water flows but poses a long-term risk of severe depletion. Turkmenistan is also expected to experience acute water stress in 2026. In the Ahal and Mary regions, pasture degradation and limited irrigation are reducing livestock numbers and grain yields. The government is investing in dredging the Karakum Canal and constructing small desalination plants, but these measures only partially offset declining Amu Darya flows. An additional destabilizing factor is Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal project. By summer 2026, its impact on the Amu Darya basin is expected to become physically noticeable. Estimates state that unregulated water withdrawals could reduce downstream flows by 15-25%. Afghanistan’s absence from regional water-sharing agreements creates a legal vacuum that existing mechanisms cannot address. As a result, Central Asia is...

Climate Change

Central Asia’s Climate Risks Could Cost Up to 130% of GDP by 2080

By 2080, climate change is expected to have a profound impact on the economies of Central Asian countries, with potential losses ranging from 20% to 130% of GDP. The most severe effects are projected for mountainous nations. These estimates were presented at a CAREC technology forum by Iskandar Abdullaev, a senior research fellow at the International Water Management Institute in Uzbekistan. According to Abdullaev, climate change is no longer solely an environmental issue but an increasingly significant economic factor. Key risks include droughts and water scarcity, floods, heatwaves, and glacier melt. The projected economic impact varies across the region. Tajikistan could face losses of between 80% and 130% of GDP, Kyrgyzstan 70% to 120%, Kazakhstan 40% to 80%, Uzbekistan 30% to 45%, and Turkmenistan 20% to 60%. Abdullaev emphasized that mountainous countries – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – are particularly vulnerable, as climate change directly affects water resources. Glacier melt reduces river flows, creating challenges for both energy production and water supply. Droughts and extreme heat are already placing pressure on agriculture, with declining crop yields and reduced pasture productivity. Without adaptation measures, the region’s long-term sustainability could be at risk. Experts stress that mitigation and adaptation efforts are essential to reduce these risks. These include modernizing irrigation systems, adopting climate-resilient agricultural technologies, and expanding renewable energy capacity. This is not the only warning. According to the World Bank, natural disasters are already causing significant economic damage in Central Asia. Losses from extreme events, including floods and earthquakes, can reach up to 6% of GDP, with earthquakes alone accounting for up to $2 billion in damages. At the same time, countries in the region face substantial financing gaps following major disasters. In Tajikistan, this gap could reach up to $1.5 billion. Experts warn that climate change is likely to intensify these risks, further increasing the economic burden on the region.

Qosh Tepa Canal

Afghanistan Advances Qosh Tepa Canal While Urging Regional Water Cooperation

Uzbekistan just hosted the Tashkent Water Week forum, and the speaker many wanted to hear from was the representative from Afghanistan. Central Asia and Afghanistan are being hit hard by climate change. This region has endured several droughts already this decade, and indications are that this year will bring drought again. Hanging over the forum was Afghanistan’s plan to complete the Qosh-Tepa Canal in 2028, which will draw water from a river that Central Asian countries also use and further complicate the regional water situation. [caption id="attachment_18865" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Qosh Tepa Canal, artist's rendition; image: TCA, Aleksandr Potolitsyn[/caption] Our Fair Share The forum, which actually spanned only two days, March 25-26, brought together some 80 speakers and more than 1,200 delegates from 19 countries. In the past five years, Central Asia has seen noticeably diminished precipitation, melting glaciers, and record high temperatures, making water conservation a priority. The last days of March saw temperatures soar into the 30s Celsius in southern Kazakhstan. In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there were record-high temperatures in February. Rainfall for the last three months of 2025 was also far below normal across Central Asia. When the Taliban government announced in early 2022 that it would build the 285-kilometer-long, 100-meter-wide, 8.5-meter-deep Qosh Tepa to irrigate lands in northern Afghanistan, it added another water concern to Central Asia, particularly the governments in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister of Water and Energy, Mujeeb-ur-Rahman Omar, led the Afghan delegation at the Tashkent Water Week. At the forum, he repeated his government’s position that historically, Afghanistan has taken only very small volumes of water from the Amu-Darya River basin, while its northern neighbors have been using large amounts for irrigation for decades. “We believe in the fair and sustainable development of the region,” Omar said, adding, “We intend to develop (water resources) on a legal basis, in accordance with the legal rights of the countries in the region.“ Omar is correct that under international law, Afghanistan has an equal right to water from the Amu-Darya, one of Central Asia’s two great rivers. The river currently marks the border between Afghanistan to the south, and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a small section of Turkmenistan to the north. There is no separate regional water use agreement between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan. Since none of the Central Asian governments officially recognize the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government, Russia is the only country that does at the moment, there is no possibility of a legal treaty on water use being signed. So, shortly after the construction of the canal is finished in 2028, some 20% of the water in the Amu-Darya, starting from the point just west of the Tajik-Uzbek border, will be diverted into the Qosh Tepa canal. It is already clear that this will mean the end of some downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan that are on the edge of the Kara-Kum Desert and which are already under strain from insufficient water supplies. Turkmenistan did not send a...

Desertification

Environmental Pressures Affect Up to 80% of Irrigated Land in Turkmenistan

Environmental pressures in Turkmenistan are intensifying, with desertification, water scarcity, and ecological degradation posing increasing risks to agriculture and public health, according to a recent analysis cited by News-Asia. The study was prepared by experts from the Central Asia Climate Foundation (CACF)’s climate change and green energy project office ahead of a regional environmental summit scheduled for April 22–24 in Astana. Researchers warn that desertification has reached critical levels across large parts of the country. The expansion of the Karakum and Kyzylkum deserts is described as among the fastest globally, threatening farmland, infrastructure, and living standards. Land degradation is being exacerbated by overgrazing, soil salinization and inefficient water use. As a result, up to 80% of irrigated land is affected by elevated groundwater salinity, reducing soil productivity. Water scarcity remains another major challenge. Turkmenistan relies heavily on transboundary rivers, particularly the Amu Darya, leaving it vulnerable to upstream water management decisions. Climate change is also contributing to reduced flows in rivers such as the Atrek, Murgab, and Tejen. Much of the irrigation infrastructure dates back to the Soviet era and suffers from significant losses, while agriculture accounts for around 90% of total water consumption. The analysis highlights the continuing regional impact of the Aral Sea crisis. The drying of the sea has increased the frequency of salt and dust storms carrying harmful substances across Central Asia. In northern regions, including Dashoguz, medical specialists have reported rising rates of respiratory illness and other health problems linked to deteriorating air quality. Environmental risks are also growing along the Caspian Sea coast. According to the report, pollution from hydrocarbon extraction combined with declining water levels is affecting biodiversity and undermining fisheries. At the same time, the government has taken steps to address environmental challenges through national climate programs and reforestation initiatives. Turkmenistan is also participating in international projects, including a regional effort launched earlier this year to combat marine litter in the Caspian Sea with support from the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Environment Programme. The upcoming summit in Astana is expected to bring together around 1,500 participants, including government officials and representatives of international organizations, to discuss coordinated responses to environmental threats. Organizers say the meeting could result in a regional action program for 2026-2030 and a joint declaration by Central Asian leaders.

Environment

“Acid clouds” from Iran? Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Weather Agencies Say There is No Threat to Central Asia

Social media has been flooded with claims that a toxic cloud could drift from Iran toward Central Asia following strikes on oil facilities. However, the meteorological services of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan say those fears are not supported by scientific data. In recent days, posts online have warned of so-called “acid clouds” allegedly forming over Iran after attacks on oil depots and other energy infrastructure. Some of these posts claimed the pollution could be carried by atmospheric currents toward Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and China. Others cited reports of “black rain” in Tehran and elevated concentrations of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and soot. Iranian authorities and international reporting have documented severe local air pollution risks in and around Tehran after the strikes. The Iranian Red Crescent Society warned residents that rainfall following the explosions could be acidic and hazardous to health. Experts said the pollution could irritate the skin, eyes, and lungs and contaminate soil and water near the affected areas. Kazhydromet, Kazakhstan’s national weather service, said reports that “acid clouds” from Iran could reach Central Asia are not confirmed by scientific data or observation results. The agency explained that acid precipitation typically forms near the source of emissions and that the concentration of pollutants decreases significantly over long distances due to natural atmospheric processes. Monitoring data, it said, show no signs of such pollution moving toward Kazakhstan or other Central Asian countries. Uzbekistan’s hydrometeorological service, Uzhydromet, expressed a similar position. It said information circulating on social media about “acid clouds” reaching Central Asian countries has no scientific basis. According to the agency, dangerous concentrations of acid precipitation thousands of kilometres from the source are practically impossible, and current observations show no threat to Uzbekistan or neighbouring states. Experts note that large fires at oil facilities can release substantial amounts of harmful pollutants into the atmosphere. However, such risks are primarily local or regional near the source. By the time emissions travel very long distances, atmospheric dispersion and deposition typically reduce concentrations sharply. As a result, the health concerns reported in Tehran do not support claims of a toxic cloud threatening Central Asia. Both Kazhydromet and Uzhydromet urged the public and media outlets to rely on official information and avoid spreading unverified reports.

Water Scarcity

Central Asia and the Global Water Crisis: A Test of Governance and Cooperation

Water scarcity is rapidly transforming from a regional environmental concern into one of the defining global security challenges of the 21st century. UN-linked assessments estimate that around four billion people experience severe water scarcity for at least one month each year, and nearly three-quarters of the global population lives in countries facing water insecurity. Against this backdrop, Central Asia is not an exception but rather a concentrated example of global dynamics: climate pressure, population growth, and inefficient resource management. Regional initiatives, including proposals put forward by Kazakhstan, therefore have the potential to contribute not only to stability in Central Asia but to the development of a more coherent global water governance architecture. The Water Crisis as a Global Reality Water is increasingly regarded as a strategic resource on par with energy and food. Climate change is intensifying droughts, floods, and the degradation of aquatic ecosystems across all regions, from Africa and the Middle East to South Asia, Europe, and North America. Recent mapping and analysis by investigative groups and international media indicate that half of the world’s 100 largest cities experience high levels of water stress, with dozens classified as facing extremely high levels. Major urban centers, including Beijing, New York, Los Angeles, Rio de Janeiro, and Delhi, are among those under acute pressure, while cities such as London, Bangkok, and Jakarta are also categorized as highly stressed. In this context, Central Asia is not an outlier. It is confronting today what may soon become the global norm. Central Asia: Where Global Trends Converge A defining feature of the current environmental situation is that factors beyond natural ones drive the water crisis. Experts increasingly stress that shortages are often less about absolute physical scarcity and more about outdated management systems, infrastructure losses, and inefficient consumption patterns. In this respect, Central Asia can be seen as a testing ground for global water challenges, where multiple stress factors converge. The region, with mountain peaks exceeding 7,000 meters, contains some of the largest ice reserves outside the polar regions. The Pamir and Hindu Kush ranges, together with the Tibetan Plateau, the Himalayas, and the Tien Shan, form part of what is sometimes referred to as the “Third Pole,” the largest concentration of ice after the Arctic and Antarctic. [caption id="attachment_13410" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] The White Horse Pass, Tajikistan; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] However, the pace of change is alarming. By 2030-2040, water scarcity in Central Asia risks becoming chronic. Glaciers in the Western Tien Shan, for example, have reportedly shrunk by roughly 27% over the past two decades and continue to retreat, posing a direct threat to the flow of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. These rivers increasingly fail to reach the Aral Sea in sufficient volume, while the exposed seabed has become a major source of salt and dust storms. [caption id="attachment_21928" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Moynaq, Karakalpakstan; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Infrastructure inefficiencies compound the problem. Estimates suggest that in some systems, 40-50% of water can be lost in deteriorating...