Our People > Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Senior Editor and Contributor

Robert M. Cutler has written and consulted on Central Asian affairs for over 30 years at all levels. He was a founding member of the Central Eurasian Studies Society’s executive board and founding editor of its Perspectives publication. He has written for Asia Times, Foreign Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Euractiv, Radio Free Europe, National Post (Toronto), FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, and many other outlets.

He directs the NATO Association of Canada’s Energy Security Program, where he is also senior fellow, and is a practitioner member at the University of Waterloo’s Institute for Complexity and Innovation. Educated at MIT, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), and the University of Michigan, he was for many years a senior researcher at Carleton University’s Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, and is past chairman of the Montreal Press Club’s Board of Directors.

Articles

Rare Earth Elements

Kazakhstan’s Emerging Role in Global Rare-Earth Supply Chains

October 10 was one of the most consequential days for global trade policy and one of the most volatile for world markets since the U.S.–China tariff conflict first reignited. After China announced tighter export controls on rare earths, U.S. President Donald J. Trump first posted on Truth Social that “there seems to be no reason” anymore for him to meet with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in two weeks' time. Several hours later, the official White House account on X posted a message from Trump that he had learned that "effective November 1st, 2025, [China will] impose large-scale Export Controls [sic] on virtually every product they make, and some not even made by them." He then followed with the declaration that the U.S. will impose a 100% tariff on Chinese imports starting November 1, "or sooner," and launch export controls on critical software. As Washington and Beijing escalate their economic confrontation, the scramble for stable rare-earth supply chains has broadened beyond East Asia. Attention is shifting to Central Asia, where mineral potential and trade corridors align with the broader effort to reduce dependence on China. Kazakhstan has drawn particular attention, not as a single solution, but as a state seeking to leverage its Soviet-era industrial base and access to the Caspian to help meet emerging supply chain needs. Although Kazakhstan has made the most progress in translating its mineral reserves into a functioning mining industry, it remains part of a broader regional effort to diversify away from a single external partner, most notably China. Other Central Asian states are testing their own capabilities to meet global supply chain demands, though most remain constrained by infrastructure, financing, or lack of processing capability. Kazakhstan’s Position in the Emerging Supply Realignment On reserves, Kazakhstan’s rare-earth potential is rooted as much in continuity as it is in discovery. Decades of geological mapping under Soviet administration established its mineral profile, and recent joint surveys by Kazgeology and private firms have both confirmed and expanded those earlier findings. New delineated deposits in the east and center of the country, including the Zhana Kazakhstan site in Karagandy, have reinforced its status as a prospective non-Chinese source of critical materials, with verified concentrations of neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium, and samarium. If current resource estimates are validated, the Zhana Kazakhstan deposit could rank among the largest rare-earth reserves in the world. These elements are essential inputs for high-efficiency magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, and advanced defense systems. The U.S. Department of Defense classifies these rare earths as “critical defense materials,” a designation that underscores their strategic relevance rather than any immediate shift in supply. Both the Pentagon and the Defense Logistics Agency have begun increasing stockpiles and exploring alternative processing sources, but for now, the question in Kazakhstan is not geological endowment, which is established, but the terms under which that endowment can be brought to market. On processing capacity, Kazakhstan’s experience in large-scale mining of uranium, copper, and other critical minerals has...

2 months ago

United Nations

Kazakhstan Recasts Its Foreign Policy at the United Nations

Several days ago I argued here that Kazakhstan’s diplomacy had begun to try to move from survival-mode balancing into a more entrepreneurial phase, testing its accumulated diplomatic capital on the world stage. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s September 24, 2025, speech to the United Nations General Assembly confirms this. It was a statement of intent, marking a departure from decades of careful multivectorism toward a doctrine of initiative and responsibility. The speech sought to anchor a claim that Kazakhstan is not only balancing among vectors but weaving them into a systemic position of leverage to support active participation in the agenda-setting of global affairs. The multivector line, crafted under Nazarbayev, kept Moscow, Beijing, and Western capitals equidistant during a period when Kazakhstan’s priority was survival and gradual integration. The price of that prudence was that the distinct voice that Astana was trying to cultivate could not be heard. The country appeared more like a venue for great-power competition rather than an autonomous actor in favor of its own interests. On the UNGA stage, Tokayev did not abandon the old formula outright. Instead, he pressed it into service as a platform for what he called “bridge building,” but which looks in practice like a bid to shape the rules of the international order, instead of merely accommodating them. Railways, Corridors, and Diplomacy in Motion Tokayev declared to the Assembly: “Kazakhstan today carries eighty percent of all overland freight between Asia and Europe. By 2029, we will build five thousand kilometers of new railway to strengthen the Middle Corridor.” These words accompanied the announcement, only a few days before, of a multibillion-dollar deal with the American company Wabtec for the purchase of three hundred locomotives over ten years. Timed with his UN appearance itself, the announcement highlighted Tokayev's view of infrastructure as diplomacy. In systems terms, railways are not discrete projects but nodes in a meso-level build-out capable of reconfiguring macro-level flows. By embedding a commercial contract into the theater of UNGA, Tokayev gave it a transformational headline. The “Middle Corridor” now functions in two registers. In one, it is freight tonnage, Caspian ferry capacity, Azerbaijan–Georgia transit. In the other, it is a political instrument. Only weeks before UNGA, Astana hosted talks that facilitated the U.S.-backed Armenia–Azerbaijan declaration. By enabling that dialogue, Kazakhstan projected itself into the South Caucasus as an intermediary claiming credibility with both sides. Hosting the South Caucasus dialogue projected Astana's view of itself as a systems-level creator of interdependence at the infrastructural level. From there, the loop feeds back to the structuration of political behavior. Economically, Kazakhstan remains the only Central Asian state with diversified sources of foreign direct investment (FDI). The Netherlands and the United States together still outpace China and Russia in cumulative FDI. Uzbekistan, despite rising visibility, remains structurally dependent on its two large neighbors. By contrast, Astana uses diversification to demonstrate optionality. The locomotive deal is one example; the C5+1 dialogues with Washington are yet another. Reforming the Global Order Tokayev spoke about a “crisis of...

3 months ago

UN General Assembly

Tokayev at the UN Underscores Kazakhstan’s New Diplomacy

Kazakhstan’s international visibility is reaching a peak this late summer and early autumn of 2025. In August, UN Secretary-General António Guterres visited Astana, praising the country’s role as a stabilizing influence in Central Asia and a supporter of multilateral institutions. In a few days, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev will address the UN General Assembly in New York, presenting Kazakhstan as a reliable partner in peacekeeping, sustainable development, and nonproliferation. This upcoming UN speech marks a departure from past appearances, signaling Astana’s intent not only to balance powers but also to set global agendas. Together, these events signify the country’s ascent as a state no longer defined solely by the art of survival between great powers, but one that now seeks to set agendas, convene adversaries, and project norms beyond its borders. This dual UN moment illustrates the broader transformation of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy over the past year: the shift from multi-vector balancing, an inheritance of the Nazarbayev era, toward a more assertive mode of multi-actor entrepreneurship. Framed through the UN stage, Kazakhstan’s diplomacy now aspires to translate regional initiatives into a global narrative. Rather than oscillating between Moscow, Beijing, Brussels, and Washington, Astana has begun to use its accumulated diplomatic capital to initiate, mediate, and institutionalize regional and global frameworks. From Balance to Initiative For three decades after independence, Kazakhstan’s “multi-vector” foreign policy served as a model of survival in a region shaped by the clash of external rivalries. The doctrine emphasized equidistance between Russia, China, and the West, with an overlay of pragmatic economic engagement. In practice, this often meant leveraging one relationship to offset pressure from another while securing steady inflows of trade and investment. Today, however, the war in Ukraine, the erosion of European security, and the sharper contest between Beijing and Washington have undermined the viability of simple balancing. In response, Tokayev’s government has shifted its approach, seeking to overlay a more agenda-setting dynamic on multi-vectorism by positioning Kazakhstan as a regional hub for diplomacy and connectivity. At the UN, this shift might be presented as Kazakhstan’s evolution from passive survival to a more proactive approach to international diplomacy. Astana’s task is to transform such declarations into a durable strategy. Central Asia and the South Caucasus The clearest evidence of Kazakhstan’s new role comes from Central Asia itself. Relations with Uzbekistan, once characterized by rivalry, have been recast as a cornerstone of functional regionalism. Over the past twelve months, Astana and Tashkent have concluded demarcation agreements, expanded electricity grid interconnections, and coordinated positions on water resource management. The consultative meetings of Central Asian leaders, which Kazakhstan has championed, now serve as regularized platforms for joint initiatives, from infrastructure to practical economic integration, with attempts to reduce Russian and Chinese influence. At the UN, this shift may be framed as Kazakhstan’s evolution from mere survival to actively pioneering new approaches in international diplomacy. For Kazakhstan, the partnership with Uzbekistan provides buffering against external pressure and multiplies regional influence. Astana has also made use of the UN Regional Centre...

3 months ago

Gas Exports

The Power of Siberia 2 Project and Central Asia’s Gas Bargaining Power

The proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PoS-2) pipeline from Russia to China has re-entered the headlines on the strength of a new memorandum between Gazprom and CNPC. Russia calls the memorandum “legally binding,” but China has avoided the phrase, because the only thing that is legally binding is an agreement to negotiate. The memorandum affirms a design capacity up to 50 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y), a route via Mongolia, and a total trunk length of roughly 2,600 kilometers (km) on the Russian side before crossing Mongolian territory. Feasibility work has highlighted a 1,420-millimeter (56-inch) pipe diameter, and an indicative cost cited in some trade reporting near $13–14 billion. The political signaling is strong, but pricing terms remain unresolved. For Central Asia, the significance is immediate: even without a final sales contract, the expectation of future Russian volumes tightens China’s negotiating posture with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, the three states already connected to China by the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline (CAGP). Central Asia's Gas Supplies to China China’s westbound import corridor from Central Asia consists today of three parallel pipelines that together provide a nominal capacity of 55 bcm/y (Lines “A” and “B” at 15 bcm/y each, and Line “C” at 25 bcm/y). Construction of the first two lines began in 2008, with operations starting in 2009–2010; Line C entered service in 2014. Line D, planned at 30 bcm/y through Uzbekistan–Tajikistan–Kyrgyzstan to China, has been delayed for years; if completed, it would raise corridor capacity toward 85 bcm/y. Turkmenistan is the anchor supplier. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) estimates its deliveries to China at 32.9 bcm in 2022 (roughly 81% of the country’s gas exports that year), with long-term sales structured on formulas linked to the price of oil. Interfax reports that in the second quarter of 2025, the price for Turkmenistan’s gas fell below $290 per thousand cubic meters (mcm). This figure is consistent with oil-price linkage rather than hub-indexed European benchmarks. Recent industry and regional reporting puts Turkmenistan’s deliveries averaging approximately 35 bcm/y in the mid-2020s. Kazakhstan had committed to supply up to 10 bcm/y, but domestic constraints have kept actual flows lower. S&P Global cites 4.4 bcm in 2022 and 5.86 bcm in 2023, with winter interruptions to protect domestic consumers; of the 29.8 bcm of commercial gas produced in 2023, 19.4 bcm was consumed at home. Uzbekistan’s volumes have been more variable as Tashkent balances domestic demand, imports, and swap operations. Jamestown noted a fall in Uzbek gas export value to China from $1.07 billion in 2022 to $563.5 million in 2023, before a rebound in 2024 and 2025 according to Chinese customs-based press summaries. PoS-2’s Route, Mongolian Gatekeeping, and Central Asian Implications The geography of the route matters for Central Asia. On the Russian side, public summaries describe a corridor from Yamal via Urengoy through Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk, then across Buryatia toward Kyakhta near the Mongolian border. In Mongolia, official communications stress underground installation across the steppes and local economic benefits, but final...

3 months ago

SCO Summit

Kazakhstan Consolidates Leadership at the Tianjin SCO Summit

The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit, which convened in Tianjin (also known as Tientsin) in China from August 31 to September 1, was the largest in the bloc’s twenty-five-year history. It gathered more than twenty heads of state and institutional leaders, among them China’s Xi Jinping, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, India’s Narendra Modi, Pakistan’s Shehbaz Sharif, Iran’s Masoud Pezeshkian, Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, and UN Secretary-General António Guterres. The agenda ranged widely: counterterrorism, supply chain resilience, energy transition, and climate cooperation all featured. For Beijing, the event was the centerpiece of its SCO presidency. Chinese officials cast it as a demonstration of “true multilateralism” at a time when protectionism and bloc politics are resurgent. The summit’s final product, the Tianjin Declaration, mapped strategic priorities to 2035. It stressed four pillars: collective security, economic integration, digital transformation, and sustainable development. Underpinning this ambition was trade estimated to be worth over $512 billion between China and SCO members in 2024, illustrating the economic weight now embedded in the organization. Over the past year, Kazakhstan’s policy entrepreneurship has heightened the significance of its spell as chair spanning 2024-2025. The country's prominence derives not only from these initiatives but also from its structural position as the largest economy on the Caspian Sea, endowed with the world’s largest reserves of uranium and significant critical minerals. Thanks to its successful implementation of a multi-vector foreign policy aligning with its national strategy priorities, including new energy and transportation agendas, Kazakhstan was able to consolidate its leadership profile. Policy Initiatives and Prolific Activism As one of the six founding members, Kazakhstan had chaired the SCO through 2024. At the 2024 Astana Summit, Tokayev unveiled initiatives that set the foundation for Tianjin. He called for the establishment of a UN Regional Center for Sustainable Development Goals in Central Asia and Afghanistan, arguing that the region’s fragility requires a dedicated UN presence. He also proposed an International Agency for Biological Security, intended to manage risks exposed by the pandemic era, and the creation of an SCO Investment Fund to finance joint projects in infrastructure and technology. During that year, Kazakhstan organized over 140 events in security, economic, and cultural fields, a scale that exceeded most previous chairs. This activism reinforced Astana’s image as a policy entrepreneur within Eurasia’s multilateral institutions. Energy cooperation emerged as the most concrete innovation. In 2024, under Kazakhstan’s presidency and at its motivation, the organization produced a new “SCO Strategy for Energy Cooperation to 2030” committing members to mutual coordination not only in hydrocarbons but also in renewable energy deployment, cross-border grids, and green finance. In Tianjin in 2025, this framework was carried forward as members endorsed an action plan translating the strategy into specific mechanisms for project financing, technical standards, and pilot cross-border infrastructure. In this way, Kazakhstan’s energy agenda was embedded into the SCO’s medium-term program going forward. Cultural diplomacy was another theme. The “Spiritual Shrines of SCO Countries” project, launched under Kazakhstan’s chairmanship, sought to catalogue and promote shared civilizational heritage. Tokayev also advanced...

4 months ago