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Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Kazakhstan Opens Criminal Probe Over Calls to Attack CPC Oil Pipeline

Kazakhstan has opened a criminal investigation into public statements that authorities say encouraged attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the main export route for the country’s crude oil, after months of disruption at the system’s Black Sea terminal turned a foreign security risk into a domestic legal and political issue. Prosecutor General Berik Asylov confirmed the case in a written reply to a parliamentary inquiry on January 6. "On December 17, 2025, the Astana City Police Department launched a pre-trial investigation under Part 1 of Article 174 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (incitement of social, national, tribal, racial, class, or religious discord) into negative public comments regarding damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium," the Prosecutor General stated. The authorities have yet to name suspects, publish the posts under review, or announce any arrests. The file remains at the evidence-gathering stage, and prosecutors have left open whether any charges will ultimately be filed under Article 174, or reclassified under other provisions once investigators assess the intent and impact. The probe follows a request by Mazhilis deputy, Aidos Sarym, who said that some social media commentary crossed from opinion into encouragement of harm to strategic infrastructure, endorsed attacks on the CPC, and urged further strikes on critical sites. The political sensitivity is rooted in the 1,500-kilometer pipeline’s central role in Kazakhstan’s economy. CPC carries crude from western Kazakhstan to a marine terminal near Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, where the oil is loaded onto tankers for delivery to global markets. The pipeline is owned by a consortium that includes Kazakhstan, Russia, and several international energy companies. The system dominates Kazakhstan’s oil export economy. More than 80% of the country’s crude oil exports move through the CPC route, which also carries more than 1% of global oil supplies, making it a pressure point for both markets and state revenue when operations are disrupted. The investigation follows a period of repeated disruption at the Novorossiysk terminal in late 2025, after a naval drone strike damaged one of the offshore loading points used to transfer oil from the pipeline to tankers. The damage forced operators to suspend loadings and move vessels away while inspections and repairs were carried out, sharply reducing export capacity. The CPC relies on single-point moorings positioned at sea to load crude onto tankers, a critical constraint on the entire system; when one goes offline, capacity drops quickly. The pipeline cannot store large volumes, forcing upstream producers to cut or slow output. By late December, the impact was visible in Kazakhstan’s production figures. Oil output fell by about 6% during the month after the late November strike constrained exports. Production at the Tengiz oilfield, the country’s largest, dropped by roughly 10%. Exports of CPC Blend crude fell to about 1.08 million barrels per day in December, the lowest level in more than a year, as the terminal operated with only one functioning mooring while others remained offline due to damage and maintenance. Operational pressures continued as...

Oil and Gas

Kazakhstan Boosts Oil Output Despite Export Infrastructure Challenges

Kazakhstan increased its production of oil and gas condensate by 14% in January-November 2025 compared to the same period last year, and exceeded its annual export plan ahead of schedule, despite ongoing disruptions in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). The figures were announced by Deputy Minister of Energy Sungat Yessimkhanov. By the end of 2024, Kazakhstan had produced 87.7 million tons of oil and gas condensate, 97.1% of its target of 90.5 million tons. Total oil exports for the year reached 63.2 million tons. In the first 11 months of 2025, production rose to 91.9 million tons, marking a 14.1% year-on-year increase. The full-year target for 2025 is 96.2 million tons. Over the same period, exports amounted to 73.4 million tons, already surpassing the annual target of 70.5 million tons and representing a 16.1% increase from the previous year. This growth came despite serious challenges to Kazakhstan’s main export route. The CPC, which carries the bulk of Kazakh crude to international markets, experienced disruptions following a drone attack on its infrastructure. The incident raised fresh concerns about the vulnerability of critical export corridors. In the gas sector, Kazakhstan produced 62.8 billion cubic meters of natural gas in January-November 2025, a 16.7% increase from the same period in 2024. The annual gas production target for 2025 has already been met. Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) production rose to 2.8 million tons, up 1.8%. Gas transit volumes through Kazakhstan reached 64.5 billion cubic meters, up 0.9%. During the same period, domestic production of petroleum products reached 14 million tons. The full-year target is 14.5 million tons, on track to match the 2024 total, when 17.9 million tons of crude were processed domestically. Production of oil and gas chemical products increased by 12.2%, reaching 567,600 tons. The target for 2025 is set at 590,000 tons. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Kazakh authorities are actively seeking foreign investment for the construction of a fourth major oil refinery with a projected capacity of up to 10 million tons per year. Overall, Astana plans to attract between $15 billion and $19 billion in investment for the development of the oil refining sector by 2040.

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Kazakhstan Fast-Tracks Delivery of Caspian Pipeline Equipment

Kazakhstan has expedited the delivery of two new offshore berthing facilities for the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), a move prompted by recent drone attacks on CPC infrastructure. The initiative aims to restore the stability of oil exports and ensure uninterrupted operations at the key marine terminal in Novorossiysk. The two new remote mooring devices (RMDs) were procured from a manufacturer in the United Arab Emirates for installation at the CPC Marine Terminal. Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov announced on December 15 in Astana that the delivery timeline has been moved up from April 2026 to January 2025. “The Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the national oil and gas company KazMunayGas are making every effort to deliver the two new RMD units. We are now pushing ahead with this and plan to deliver them in January,” said Akkenzhenov, highlighting the logistical complexity of transporting the technologically advanced equipment to Novorossiysk. According to the CPC press service, the two devices being replaced, CPC-1 and CPC-2, were originally commissioned in 2001. The contract for their replacement was signed in January 2024, and both new units are expected to be completed by December 2025. These upgrades are part of a recovery program following a series of attacks on CPC infrastructure. At the same time, repair work continues on VPU-3, another remote berthing facility. However, efforts have been hindered by severe weather conditions in Novorossiysk, where strong winds and currents have disrupted underwater installation work. “The weather in Novorossiysk is difficult, with very strong winds causing high waves and currents. Divers are descending under the dome to install underwater hoses,” Akkenzhenov explained. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium remains one of the largest energy projects in the post-Soviet space. The 1,511 kilometer Tengiz-Novorossiysk pipeline transports more than two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, along with output from Russian fields, including those in the Caspian Sea. The CPC’s marine terminal in Novorossiysk is equipped with three remote mooring devices, enabling tankers to load safely offshore and ensuring continuous export operations. Since autumn 2025, CPC facilities have been repeatedly targeted. The first attack occurred on September 24, when drones struck the consortium’s office, injuring employees and bystanders. Other key incidents included attacks on the Kropotkinskaya base (February 17 and March 24), the Kavkazskaya facility (March 19), and the Novorossiysk marine terminal (September 24-25). The most serious incident occurred on November 29, when the terminal’s pier was damaged, rendering VPU-2 inoperable. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy estimated losses of 480,000 tons of oil and condemned the attack as “unacceptable and dangerous for global energy security.” The emergency acquisition and fast-tracked delivery of the new berthing units are seen as a strategic investment by Kazakhstan, not only to secure its export capacity but also to reinforce the stability of one of the region’s most critical energy corridors.

oil export

Kazakhstan Looks to Reduce Dependence on Russian Oil Transit Routes

Escalating drone attacks on Russian infrastructure amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, including key facilities in Novorossiysk and the Orenburg region, are compelling Kazakhstan to accelerate its search for alternative oil export routes. In this context, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which transits Russian territory, is increasingly viewed as an unreliable option for transporting the country’s crude oil. In November, damage to the VPU-2 single-point mooring at the Yuzhnaya Ozereyevka terminal near Novorossiysk disrupted operations. Only VPU-1 remains functional, while VPU-3 is undergoing scheduled maintenance. As a result, CPC oil shipments have dropped. The pipeline accounts for over 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, more than 1% of global production. The Kazakh Ministry of Energy clarified that exports were not fully halted and that efforts are underway to reroute shipments. First Kashagan Oil Shipment to China via Atasu-Alashankou On December 8, Reuters reported that Kazakhstan would begin exporting oil from the Kashagan field directly to China for the first time via the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline. The route, which leads to Xinjiang, has previously been used for other fields but not for Kashagan. According to the report, Kazakhstan plans to export 50,000 tons of crude oil through this channel. Of that, the Chinese oil company, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), will receive approximately 30,000 tons, while Japan’s Inpex will take 20,000 tons. Although the pipeline’s annual capacity is around 10 million tons, it has been operating below capacity, averaging 85,000-86,000 tons per month. The Kazakh government had initially planned to ship 1 million tons via this pipeline in 2025, less than the 1.2 million tons exported in 2024. In the first ten months of 2025, shipments reached 858,000 tons, according to industry sources. Kashagan is among Kazakhstan’s most strategic assets and one of the largest oil and gas fields discovered globally in the past 40 years. Operated by the NCOC consortium, which includes ExxonMobil, Shell, TotalEnergies, CNPC, Inpex, and KazMunayGas, the field produces more than 15 million tons of oil annually. Until now, nearly all of this was transported via the CPC. Redirecting Oil Amid Infrastructure Damage On December 10, KazTransOil, the national oil pipeline operator, announced that it had redirected oil exports from the CPC system to alternative routes. In December 2025 alone, an additional 360,000 tons of oil are expected to be exported to Russia (via Samara), China, and across the Caspian Sea. Increases in exports from the original plan include: Atyrau-Samara pipeline: +232,000 tons; To China: +72,000 tons; and through the port of Aktau to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline: +58,000 tons. KazTransOil has also stated it will allow oil companies to temporarily store oil at its tank farm. This would enable greater flexibility in shipment scheduling, optimize pipeline operations, and help maintain uninterrupted deliveries. Rail transport is also being considered to further diversify logistics. In 2024, Kazakhstan exported 54.9 million tons of oil through the CPC. Additional exports included 8.8 million tons via the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, 3.6 million tons via Aktau, and 1.2 million tons to China via Atasu-Alashankou. The BTC...

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Protecting Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from the CPC Drone Attack

The attack by naval drones on the infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) on 29 November was an alarming signal, not only for Kazakhstan but for the global energy sector. The temporary suspension of shipments and the shift to operating through a single remote mooring facility struck at the heart of Kazakhstan’s economy. Around 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports – generating roughly 40% of its export revenues – pass through the CPC, which has handled over 60 million tons of crude annually in recent years. The vulnerability of CPC infrastructure serves as a reminder of how tightly global energy security is intertwined with regional conflicts. The consortium not only carries Kazakh crude; it also plays a stabilizing role for several international stakeholders, including European refiners and multinational shareholders, such as Chevron and ExxonMobil. Any prolonged disruption would reverberate across global markets, raising transport premiums, tightening supplies in Southern Europe, and undermining confidence in the safety of trans-Eurasian energy routes. For a world already grappling with supply shocks, the Novorossiysk incident underscored how the effects from a single strike can ripple far beyond the immediate impact zone. At the same time, the incident revealed a broader and more urgent issue. Military operations are not supposed to target civilian infrastructure, particularly when it belongs to neutral third parties uninvolved in the conflict. While international humanitarian law (IHL) explicitly prohibits attacks on such facilities unless they are being used for military purposes, the reality on the ground is far less clear-cut. In contemporary conflicts, the line between civilian and military use can blur quickly, creating space for competing interpretations and contested justifications. The Legal Grey Zone of Modern Warfare Although the legal framework is clear on paper, its practical application has become increasingly strained in recent conflicts. The increasing use of drones, long-range precision munitions, and cyber tools has blurred the distinction between civilian and military infrastructure and has outpaced the mechanisms designed to protect them. Energy pipelines, ports, and terminal facilities - which once lay far from the frontlines - can now be struck at minimal cost and with limited attribution. This technological shift has opened a grey zone that existing IHL was never designed to manage, heightening the urgency for clearer norms and enforcement tools. The real challenge lies not in the absence of legal norms but in the lack of mechanisms to enforce them, particularly in cases where neutral countries’ assets become collateral damage. There is, therefore, an argument for the introduction of a new international legal framework – or supplementing existing provisions via a UN protocol – to safeguard critical infrastructure. This is especially relevant in an era of precision weapons and drone warfare, where pipelines, energy terminals, and logistics hubs increasingly fall within potential strike zones. Yet the implementation of such a framework faces complications. Under existing IHL, dual-use infrastructure, such as pipelines that may carry resources for both civilian and military use, can be deemed legitimate military targets. Ukrainian officials have justified strikes on Russian energy...

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Why Attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium Could Alter Kazakhstan’s Strategic Plans

Attacks on the infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), reduced export flows, and volatility in commodity markets are generating serious pressures for Kazakhstan. In the coming years, both the country’s financial system and its domestic political balance may face significant tests. A number of experts warn that disruptions in oil logistics via the CPC, which remains the main artery for Kazakh crude exports, could depress budget revenues, strain national companies, and worsen the sovereign outlook. Kazakhstan pumps roughly 80% of its oil exports through the CPC system, and oil revenues account for more than half of the country’s total export earnings. Because CPC Blend is Kazakhstan’s primary export-grade crude, even short interruptions can reverberate through the state budget, the National Fund, and the balance sheets of national companies. This could trigger a domino effect, destabilizing broad swathes of the economy and undermining public finances. Already, the recent rounds of disruption around Black Sea oil shipping are eroding a substantial source of tax revenue for the state. Continued Risk of Strikes Political scientist Dosym Satpaev argues that Kazakhstan may be underestimating the intensity and persistence of the conflict surrounding Ukraine. He contends that both sides in that conflict have used strikes on energy infrastructure as key tools, a tactic that will likely continue. The recent strike targeted the CPC’s single-point moorings (SPMs) at Novorossiysk, a coastal terminal on the Russian Black Sea. These offshore loading points sit in relatively shallow waters and are physically exposed, making them susceptible to the naval drones Ukraine has increasingly deployed against Russian maritime infrastructure. Although the attack officially targeted Russian facilities, the collateral implications for Kazakh oil exports were immediate. According to Satpaev, that means further risks for the CPC. The fact that Kazakhstan remains heavily dependent on this single pipeline reflects a broader failure to diversify exports and reduce reliance on raw material transit. The vulnerability is magnified by the CPC’s ownership structure: although Kazakhstan relies on it for most of its exports, the pipeline network and the Novorossiysk terminal lie on Russian territory and operate under Russian regulatory oversight. Russia holds a majority stake in the consortium, while U.S. firms such as Chevron and Exxon also have significant shares, creating a complex web of interests that limits Astana’s room for manoeuvre. Kazakhstan has already experienced how this dependence can be leveraged. In 2022, Russian regulators repeatedly halted CPC operations over alleged “environmental violations,” moves widely interpreted as political pressure at a moment of diplomatic friction. That precedent underscores how strategic vulnerability to CPC disruptions predates the current wave of attacks. Satpaev is skeptical that alternative export routes, such as via pipelines through the Caspian Sea to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or transit to China, can substitute for the CPC in the near term. Given the global trend toward reduced oil demand, he believes this leaves Kazakhstan exposed to long-term structural risks. At the same time, Satpaev views as unlikely the possibility that Ukraine would attempt to directly stop the CPC’s operations, given the broader consequences such...