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Afghanistan

Opinion: The Southern Dimension of the Middle Corridor – Afghanistan’s Role in Eurasia’s New Logistics Landscape

Afghanistan’s integration into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is extending beyond local logistics and evolving into one of Eurasia’s key geo-economic projects. Amid the global transformation of supply chains, Central Asia has an opportunity to move beyond its role as a transit periphery and become an active participant in shaping new economic corridors, creating a full-fledged “southern dimension” of Eurasian connectivity. Two Routes: Strategic and Operational Two main directions for Afghanistan’s integration into the Eurasian transport system are currently under discussion, each reflecting a distinct development logic: strategic and pragmatic. The “Eastern Branch” (Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar) is traditionally viewed as the primary trans-Afghan route. Its key advantage is direct access to the ports of Karachi and Gwadar, providing the shortest connection between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. At the same time, geography makes the project highly complex. The route passes through the central and eastern regions of Afghanistan, including the Hindu Kush mountain range, where long tunnels and bridges would be required. This would sharply increase construction and maintenance costs, extend implementation timelines, and heighten security and infrastructure risks. According to available estimates, the project could cost around $5 billion and handle 15-20 million tons of cargo annually. However, the lengthy investment cycle and dependence on political stability mean implementation remains a long-term prospect. The “Western Branch” (Turgundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak) represents an alternative logistics corridor based on more favorable geography. Western Afghanistan is characterized by predominantly flat, semi-arid terrain, reducing the need for complex engineering structures and allowing the project to be implemented in phases. This significantly lowers capital costs, shortens construction timelines, and reduces infrastructure risks. The western route’s initial capacity is estimated at 7-10 million tons of cargo annually, making it the more realistic option for medium-term planning. An additional advantage is its geo-economic flexibility. Via Herat, the route could be integrated not only southward through Pakistan, but also westward through Iran, providing access to Persian Gulf ports. This would transform it into a multi-directional corridor capable of serving several logistics flows simultaneously. The Eastern Branch, therefore, remains the strategic option offering the shortest route to the ocean but requiring substantial investment and time. The Western Branch, meanwhile, presents a more pragmatic solution: faster to implement and more flexible from a geo-economic standpoint. The Role of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in the “Western Maneuver” The implementation of the western trans-Afghan corridor depends on close coordination between two key regional players, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which form the northern foundation of the future route by providing access to the Caspian Sea and, beyond it, global markets. Astana and Ashgabat are effectively creating a new geo-economic framework that could transform Central Asia from an isolated region into a strategic crossroads linking the Caspian Sea with the Indian Ocean. In 2026, Kazakhstan moved toward deeper institutionalization of the initiative, making the route through Herat and Kandahar a government priority. Astana’s strategy is multifaceted. In addition to establishing a permanent interdepartmental commission, Kazakhstan is actively seeking to attract international operators such as the Emirati AD...

Chinese Investment

Tajikistan’s Rahmon Seeks Deeper Economic Ties During China Visit

More than 700 companies with Chinese capital are operating in Tajikistan, and about 12.5% of the nearly $7 billion in foreign investment that entered the Central Asian country’s economy last year came from China, according to Tajikistan’s presidency. Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon shared the data after arriving in Beijing on Monday to push for even closer economic ties with China, which surpassed Russia last year to become Tajikistan’s largest trading partner. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said Rahmon was making the May 11-14 trip at the invitation of President Xi Jinping, who will then host U.S. President Donald Trump from May 13 to 15 China is expanding economic projects and investment across Central Asia, and the rapid pace of development is evident in numerous initiatives currently underway in Tajikistan. Last month, government and industry officials from the two countries met in Dushanbe to discuss “green minerals,” the materials – abundant in Tajikistan – that are used in clean energy technologies such as solar power and electric vehicle batteries. In February, the first container train from China arrived in Tajikistan’s capital after passing through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on what the Chinese embassy said was a new trade route. “The development of modern transport and economic corridors through Tajikistan linking China and South Asian countries with the Middle East was described as another factor promoting cooperation with neighboring China,” Tajikistan’s presidency said in a summary of Rahmon’s speech in Beijing on Monday. More than 50 agreements were signed between Tajik and Chinese companies during the presidential visit. The deals are projected to attract more than $8 billion in investment to Tajikistan, the presidency said. Despite the escalation in trade ties, some economists warn that Tajikistan is becoming more economically dependent on China and that its trade deficit is deepening that vulnerability. China has also expressed concern about the safety of its Tajikistan-based workers after attacks on Chinese installations from the Afghan side of the border in the last year.

Geopolitics

Opinion: The U.S. Still Doesn’t Know Where Central Asia Belongs

Washington cannot decide where Central Asia belongs. Is it part of Europe? Asia? The Middle East? The confusion is on full display in how the House of Representatives has reassigned the region across subcommittees in rapid succession. In the 116th Congress, which convened in 2019, Central Asia fell under the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment. Two years later, in the 117th Congress, it was moved to the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation. That arrangement barely settled before the 118th Congress shifted it again—this time to the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Now, in the 119th Congress, it has been relocated to the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia. On the banks of the Potomac, Central Asia has taken on a nomadic life of its own—constantly on the move, never quite settling in one place. At the State Department, Central Asia is grouped under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs alongside Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. At the Pentagon, by contrast, the Middle East team oversees relations with Central Asia, alongside countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. These mismatches are not just clumsy; they are strategically dangerous. By misplacing Central Asia, Washington is misreading the geography of China’s rise. It is time for Washington to stop the bureaucratic musical chairs and place Central Asia within a coherent grand strategy. Far from being an afterthought, the region is one of the most consequential pieces of the geopolitical puzzle facing the United States: how to respond to China’s strategy. This is because Central Asia sits at the heart of China’s decades-long effort to move its critical lifelines away from the Indo-Pacific and onto the Eurasian landmass. Over the past 15 years, China has quietly reoriented its energy routes, reducing reliance on maritime pathways vulnerable to U.S. naval dominance—particularly chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—and expanded overland imports across Eurasia. Today, China imports significant volumes of natural gas via pipelines from Turkmenistan and Russia, as well as crude oil from Kazakhstan. These continental routes are largely insulated from maritime interdiction, giving Beijing strategic resilience. Central Asia should be understood through this lens. For China, the region is not peripheral—it is essential. The pipelines, railways and trade corridors that underpin China’s resilience all pass through Xinjiang and Central Asia. In this sense, Central Asia is not merely adjacent to China; it is embedded in China’s vision of the future. This is why Washington’s practice of grouping Central Asia with South Asia misses the mark. The two regions operate under fundamentally different strategic logics. South Asia is centered on the Indian subcontinent, shaped by maritime dynamics and the India‑Pakistan rivalry. Central Asia, by contrast, is a continental crossroads—defined by overland connectivity, energy flows and great‑power competition across Eurasia. India, meanwhile, is geographically constrained—lacking direct land access to Central Asia due to territory administered by Pakistan and separated from China by the Himalayas—leaving it...

Kapchagay Reservoir

Kazakhstan’s Kapchagay Reservoir Reaches 98% Capacity

Kazakhstan’s Kapchagay Reservoir in the Almaty Region is now 98% full, holding 18.04 billion cubic meters of water, according to the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation. The reservoir collects water from the transboundary Ili River, which originates in China, and regulates water flow into Lake Balkhash, Kazakhstan’s largest lake. During the most recent non-growing season, approximately 4 billion cubic meters of water were released from the reservoir into Lake Balkhash. Officials say the near-full capacity of the reservoir will ensure sufficient irrigation supplies for agricultural land in the Akdala and Shengeldy rural districts of the Almaty Region. “We maintain constant communication with our Chinese colleagues on transboundary river issues, including the Ili River. Thanks to the coordinated efforts of the two countries, farmers in the Almaty Region have been provided with a stable supply of irrigation water for the third consecutive year,” said Seilbek Nurymbetov, chairman of the ministry’s Committee for Regulation, Protection, and Use of Water Resources. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the Kapchagay Reservoir reached full capacity in August 2024 for the first time in a decade. Created in 1970 as an artificial lake stretching roughly 100 kilometers in length and up to 25 kilometers wide in some areas, the reservoir has a total capacity of more than 18 billion cubic meters of water. The reservoir was originally designed to regulate the flow of the Ili River before it reaches Lake Balkhash. Today, it also serves irrigation, fish farming, and recreational purposes. Located about an hour’s drive from Almaty, its beaches are a popular destination for tourists and local residents. Three of Kazakhstan’s major rivers, the Irtysh, Ili, and Emel, originate in China. The Ili River alone provides about 70% of the water flowing into Lake Balkhash. Located approximately 280 kilometers northwest of Almaty, Lake Balkhash is the world’s fifteenth-largest lake.

Diplomacy

Turkmenistan Highlights International Outreach at Cabinet Meeting

A recent Cabinet meeting in Turkmenistan highlighted contacts with many countries and international organizations, reinforcing a perception that the tightly managed nation is taking more steps, however limited, to engage the world. Appearing via video link, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov presided over the May 1 meeting of ministers who covered economic growth, oil and natural gas production, scientific research, and other national priorities in a review of the year so far. But international outreach was a big part of the high-level discussion in an energy-rich Central Asian country often defined as opaque and restrictive. An account of the meeting by the Turkmenistan State News Agency (TDH) ticked off statistics: 220 delegations visited Turkmenistan this year, 400 delegations from Turkmenistan visited other countries, 711 negotiations and other meetings occurred in the country with foreign states and international agencies, and 57 more international documents were added to Turkmenistan’s legal code. “The development of diplomatic relations through foreign embassies is one of the important directions of the foreign policy work of neutral Turkmenistan,” said the report, referring to the country’s policy of non-alignment and not getting involved in the internal affairs of other countries. “Work on promoting relations with the countries of the Middle East is also ongoing,” it said. Iraq opened its embassy in Ashgabat in March, 17 years after Turkmenistan and Iraq established diplomatic relations in 2009. On May 4, Rashid Meredov, Turkmenistan’s foreign minister, spoke by telephone with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi about regional security, Caspian issues, and other matters, according to the Turkmen Foreign Ministry. The ministry’s statement did not mention the Iran conflict or uncertainty surrounding the ceasefire with the United States. Turkmenistan’s international campaign is consistent with a pattern seen across Central Asia, where governments have sought to diversify their trade and diplomatic ties while maintaining close relations with the region’s major powers, Russia and China. Turkmenistan, however, still exports most of its natural gas to China, its largest trading partner. At the same time, Turkmenistan is intensifying efforts to integrate into the global trading system, with officials reaffirming plans to move towards membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is the last post-Soviet republic to start WTO accession talks. Turkmenistan’s leaders are also working on their international profiles. Berdimuhamedov attended an ecological summit of regional leaders in Kazakhstan last month. His father and predecessor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, traveled to the U.S. in February, China in March, and Austria in April. This month, he is due to travel to the Russian city of Kazan. Although government transparency is limited in Turkmenistan, father and son appear to run the country through a power-sharing arrangement. Outsiders are getting more glimpses of Turkmenistan. The capital, Ashgabat, hosted an international tourism conference in April. This month, the Reuters news agency reported on a trip there after being given what it said was “rare access” to travel in the country. It remains unclear, however, whether any efforts to engage with the outside world will materially change daily life in Turkmenistan, where people...

Foreign Affairs

Czech Prime Minister Says Foreign Ministry Urged Pressure on Kazakhstan Over Russia Ties

On May 2, Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has claimed that officials at the country’s Foreign Ministry advised him to push Kazakhstan to scale back its ties with Russia and China. Speaking to Czech broadcaster TV Nova, Babiš criticized the recommendation, warning it could harm the Czech Republic’s economic interests. Babiš, a billionaire businessman and populist politician, returned to power in December 2025 after his ANO movement won 35% of the vote in the October 2025 parliamentary election and formed a governing coalition. The prime minister said he received a briefing note prepared by the diplomatic service. “They handed me a memo saying I should call on Kazakhstan to limit its relations with Russia and China,” he said. Babiš was vague about the provenance of the memo, describing it as having been drafted by “some officials,” but he suggested that former Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský, a figure associated with the previous pro-Western coalition government (2021–2025), may have been involved in its preparation. Babiš criticized the foreign policy of the previous administration, arguing that it had damaged the Czech Republic’s economic interests. Relations with several major countries, including China, had deteriorated, negatively affecting business activity, he said. The remarks followed Babiš’s visit to Kazakhstan on April 28-29, during which the two sides discussed expanding economic cooperation, including supplies of Kazakh oil and uranium. The Czech Republic views Kazakhstan as an important strategic partner, he added. According to the Kazakh government, bilateral trade between the Czech Republic and Kazakhstan reached approximately $705 million in 2025, a 13% increase on the previous year.