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Energy Security

Putin Visit Puts Nuclear Power and Oil Transit at Center of Russia-Kazakhstan Ties

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan is becoming more than a diplomatic event. It is increasingly being seen as a demonstration of how Russia and Kazakhstan are shaping one of Eurasia’s key energy and logistics axes amid the restructuring of global markets, sanctions pressure, and the continued shift of economic flows toward Asia. Symbolically, ahead of the visit, Putin published a programmatic article in Kazakh media titled “Russia-Kazakhstan: An Alliance at the Heart of Eurasia,” in which he outlined a new framework for bilateral relations. The Russian president focused on nuclear energy, oil and gas cooperation, transport corridors, and Eurasian integration, describing the partnership between the two countries as a factor of stability and development for the wider continent. For Moscow, the current visit carries particular significance. It is Putin’s second state visit to Kazakhstan during a single presidential term. A rare occurrence in international diplomatic practice. Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said the move was intended to emphasize the “unprecedentedly high level of relations between our two countries.” The main outcome of the talks is expected to be the signing of agreements related to the construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant with the participation of Russia’s state nuclear corporation, Rosatom. According to Ushakov, the two sides are expected to finalize “the main parameters for the creation of the nuclear power plant and financing of the project through a Russian state export credit.” For Kazakhstan, the nuclear project is about far more than electricity generation. The country faces growing domestic power demand, aging infrastructure, and the need to ensure long-term energy security. At the same time, the project reflects a broader geopolitical calculation. Nuclear energy has traditionally been one of the most sensitive forms of strategic cooperation. A country building a nuclear power plant enters into a long-term technological partnership involving fuel supplies, engineering maintenance, personnel training, and technical support lasting for decades. Russia’s role in constructing Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant would therefore allow Moscow to preserve a deep technological presence in Central Asia despite its growing international isolation. For Astana, however, cooperation with Russia in the nuclear sector remains a pragmatic choice rather than a purely political one. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer of uranium, yet it still lacks its own nuclear power generation sector. Amid intensifying competition between global power centers, Kazakhstan appears less interested in choosing sides than in strengthening its resilience and turning its geography into a strategic advantage. The same logic is evident in the oil and gas agenda surrounding Putin’s visit. Moscow and Astana are discussing increasing the transit of Russian oil to China through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline from 10 million to 12.5 million tons annually. Ushakov said prospects for the negotiations were “optimistic” and noted that the legal framework for the agreements was already in its final stages. According to KazTransOil, approximately 832,000 tons of Russian oil were transported to China through the route in April alone, while first-quarter transit volumes reached 2.5 million tons. Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russian...

Counterterrorism

China to Supply Tajikistan With Intelligence and Counterterrorism Equipment

China will provide Tajikistan with intelligence, police, and counterterrorism equipment worth more than $7.6 million under a grant assistance program approved by the two governments. The governments of the two countries signed the corresponding memorandum of understanding on May 8. The agreement provides for the transfer of equipment by China for the needs of Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. Under the terms of the deal, the Chinese side will deliver 34 intelligence devices along with additional police and counterterrorism equipment. The shipment is expected to enter Tajikistan through the Karasu border crossing. China will also dispatch eight specialists to Tajikistan to install and configure the equipment and train Tajik personnel. Their mission is expected to last 45 days. The total value of the equipment and services amounts to 52 million Chinese yuan, or approximately $7.64 million. All associated costs will be fully covered by the Chinese side. Tajikistan, for its part, has agreed to handle customs clearance, transportation and storage of the equipment once it arrives in the country. Authorities will also exempt the deliveries from taxes and customs duties and provide the necessary conditions for the Chinese specialists, including visas, accommodation, and security arrangements. A special working group will be established to coordinate with Chinese engineers during installation and personnel training. The document separately emphasizes that after delivery the two sides will jointly inspect the quality, quantity and technical specifications of the equipment before signing a formal acceptance certificate. Future operation and maintenance costs will then become the responsibility of the Tajik side. China remains one of Tajikistan’s largest strategic partners. Following President Emomali Rahmon’s recent state visit to China, Tajik officials said more than 80 cooperation documents were signed as a result of high-level talks and business meetings, while China’s Foreign Ministry referred separately to more than ten state-level cooperation documents. Earlier, Tajikistan’s parliament also approved an agreement under which China would finance the construction of nine border facilities along the Tajik-Afghan frontier. The new grant comes amid renewed scrutiny of China’s expanding role in Tajikistan’s security sector. Reports and speculation about a possible Chinese military facility in Gorno-Badakhshan have surfaced periodically, including in 2021 and again in 2024. However, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have denied the existence of a Chinese military base on the country’s territory.

Regional Security

Tokayev Urges Central Asia and China to Strengthen Law Enforcement Cooperation

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev hosted the interior and public security ministers of the “Central Asia-China” format in Astana during the second meeting of regional law enforcement agencies. The meeting was attended by Chinese Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong, Kyrgyz Interior Minister Ulan Niyazbekov, Tajik Interior Minister Ramazon Rahimzoda, Turkmen Interior Minister Muhammet Hydyrov, and Uzbek Interior Minister Aziz Tashpulatov. Participants discussed transnational crime, drug trafficking, cybercrime, and extremism. Tokayev said strengthening cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of Central Asia and China is essential for maintaining regional stability. “Transnational organized crime is becoming increasingly flexible and interconnected. Cybercrime has evolved into a highly profitable global industry,” the president said. According to Tokayev, criminal groups are increasingly using digital platforms to coordinate activities, launder money, and carry out attacks that transcend national borders. He emphasized that Central Asia’s position at the crossroads of major transport and trade routes leaves the region particularly vulnerable to transnational criminal networks. Tokayev said Kazakhstan considers the rule of law a strategic state priority and is continuing the implementation of its “Law and Order” governance concept. He called for stronger efforts to block the financial flows of criminal organizations, suppress the spread of extremist ideology, and detect preparations for terrorist attacks. The president devoted particular attention to cybersecurity threats. “Artificial intelligence in the hands of destructive actors is becoming an information weapon,” Tokayev said. According to him, illegal content and disinformation are spreading online on an industrial scale, while existing mechanisms of international cooperation require substantial modernization. Tokayev also linked security concerns to the expansion of regional transport infrastructure, including the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. “The growth of cargo traffic is associated with certain risks, including transnational crime and the trafficking of contraband, drugs, and weapons,” he said. In Tokayev’s view, the “Central Asia-China” format should evolve into a platform for developing coordinated and practical security measures across the region. Participants in the meeting reaffirmed their intention to expand operational information-sharing, strengthen professional cooperation, and introduce modern technologies into law enforcement activities.

Afghanistan

Opinion: The Southern Dimension of the Middle Corridor – Afghanistan’s Role in Eurasia’s New Logistics Landscape

Afghanistan’s integration into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is extending beyond local logistics and evolving into one of Eurasia’s key geo-economic projects. Amid the global transformation of supply chains, Central Asia has an opportunity to move beyond its role as a transit periphery and become an active participant in shaping new economic corridors, creating a full-fledged “southern dimension” of Eurasian connectivity. Two Routes: Strategic and Operational Two main directions for Afghanistan’s integration into the Eurasian transport system are currently under discussion, each reflecting a distinct development logic: strategic and pragmatic. The “Eastern Branch” (Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar) is traditionally viewed as the primary trans-Afghan route. Its key advantage is direct access to the ports of Karachi and Gwadar, providing the shortest connection between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. At the same time, geography makes the project highly complex. The route passes through the central and eastern regions of Afghanistan, including the Hindu Kush mountain range, where long tunnels and bridges would be required. This would sharply increase construction and maintenance costs, extend implementation timelines, and heighten security and infrastructure risks. According to available estimates, the project could cost around $5 billion and handle 15-20 million tons of cargo annually. However, the lengthy investment cycle and dependence on political stability mean implementation remains a long-term prospect. The “Western Branch” (Turgundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak) represents an alternative logistics corridor based on more favorable geography. Western Afghanistan is characterized by predominantly flat, semi-arid terrain, reducing the need for complex engineering structures and allowing the project to be implemented in phases. This significantly lowers capital costs, shortens construction timelines, and reduces infrastructure risks. The western route’s initial capacity is estimated at 7-10 million tons of cargo annually, making it the more realistic option for medium-term planning. An additional advantage is its geo-economic flexibility. Via Herat, the route could be integrated not only southward through Pakistan, but also westward through Iran, providing access to Persian Gulf ports. This would transform it into a multi-directional corridor capable of serving several logistics flows simultaneously. The Eastern Branch, therefore, remains the strategic option offering the shortest route to the ocean but requiring substantial investment and time. The Western Branch, meanwhile, presents a more pragmatic solution: faster to implement and more flexible from a geo-economic standpoint. The Role of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in the “Western Maneuver” The implementation of the western trans-Afghan corridor depends on close coordination between two key regional players, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which form the northern foundation of the future route by providing access to the Caspian Sea and, beyond it, global markets. Astana and Ashgabat are effectively creating a new geo-economic framework that could transform Central Asia from an isolated region into a strategic crossroads linking the Caspian Sea with the Indian Ocean. In 2026, Kazakhstan moved toward deeper institutionalization of the initiative, making the route through Herat and Kandahar a government priority. Astana’s strategy is multifaceted. In addition to establishing a permanent interdepartmental commission, Kazakhstan is actively seeking to attract international operators such as the Emirati AD...

Chinese Investment

Tajikistan’s Rahmon Seeks Deeper Economic Ties During China Visit

More than 700 companies with Chinese capital are operating in Tajikistan, and about 12.5% of the nearly $7 billion in foreign investment that entered the Central Asian country’s economy last year came from China, according to Tajikistan’s presidency. Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon shared the data after arriving in Beijing on Monday to push for even closer economic ties with China, which surpassed Russia last year to become Tajikistan’s largest trading partner. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said Rahmon was making the May 11-14 trip at the invitation of President Xi Jinping, who will then host U.S. President Donald Trump from May 13 to 15 China is expanding economic projects and investment across Central Asia, and the rapid pace of development is evident in numerous initiatives currently underway in Tajikistan. Last month, government and industry officials from the two countries met in Dushanbe to discuss “green minerals,” the materials – abundant in Tajikistan – that are used in clean energy technologies such as solar power and electric vehicle batteries. In February, the first container train from China arrived in Tajikistan’s capital after passing through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on what the Chinese embassy said was a new trade route. “The development of modern transport and economic corridors through Tajikistan linking China and South Asian countries with the Middle East was described as another factor promoting cooperation with neighboring China,” Tajikistan’s presidency said in a summary of Rahmon’s speech in Beijing on Monday. More than 50 agreements were signed between Tajik and Chinese companies during the presidential visit. The deals are projected to attract more than $8 billion in investment to Tajikistan, the presidency said. Despite the escalation in trade ties, some economists warn that Tajikistan is becoming more economically dependent on China and that its trade deficit is deepening that vulnerability. China has also expressed concern about the safety of its Tajikistan-based workers after attacks on Chinese installations from the Afghan side of the border in the last year.

Geopolitics

Opinion: The U.S. Still Doesn’t Know Where Central Asia Belongs

Washington cannot decide where Central Asia belongs. Is it part of Europe? Asia? The Middle East? The confusion is on full display in how the House of Representatives has reassigned the region across subcommittees in rapid succession. In the 116th Congress, which convened in 2019, Central Asia fell under the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment. Two years later, in the 117th Congress, it was moved to the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation. That arrangement barely settled before the 118th Congress shifted it again—this time to the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Now, in the 119th Congress, it has been relocated to the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia. On the banks of the Potomac, Central Asia has taken on a nomadic life of its own—constantly on the move, never quite settling in one place. At the State Department, Central Asia is grouped under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs alongside Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. At the Pentagon, by contrast, the Middle East team oversees relations with Central Asia, alongside countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. These mismatches are not just clumsy; they are strategically dangerous. By misplacing Central Asia, Washington is misreading the geography of China’s rise. It is time for Washington to stop the bureaucratic musical chairs and place Central Asia within a coherent grand strategy. Far from being an afterthought, the region is one of the most consequential pieces of the geopolitical puzzle facing the United States: how to respond to China’s strategy. This is because Central Asia sits at the heart of China’s decades-long effort to move its critical lifelines away from the Indo-Pacific and onto the Eurasian landmass. Over the past 15 years, China has quietly reoriented its energy routes, reducing reliance on maritime pathways vulnerable to U.S. naval dominance—particularly chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—and expanded overland imports across Eurasia. Today, China imports significant volumes of natural gas via pipelines from Turkmenistan and Russia, as well as crude oil from Kazakhstan. These continental routes are largely insulated from maritime interdiction, giving Beijing strategic resilience. Central Asia should be understood through this lens. For China, the region is not peripheral—it is essential. The pipelines, railways and trade corridors that underpin China’s resilience all pass through Xinjiang and Central Asia. In this sense, Central Asia is not merely adjacent to China; it is embedded in China’s vision of the future. This is why Washington’s practice of grouping Central Asia with South Asia misses the mark. The two regions operate under fundamentally different strategic logics. South Asia is centered on the Indian subcontinent, shaped by maritime dynamics and the India‑Pakistan rivalry. Central Asia, by contrast, is a continental crossroads—defined by overland connectivity, energy flows and great‑power competition across Eurasia. India, meanwhile, is geographically constrained—lacking direct land access to Central Asia due to territory administered by Pakistan and separated from China by the Himalayas—leaving it...