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Oil and Gas

Kazakhstan Gains Weight in China’s Energy System

The newly extended U.S. waiver for Russian oil transit through Kazakhstan and the reported giant onshore hydrocarbon discovery in western Kazakhstan point in different directions, yet they belong in the same analytical frame. One concerns an existing flow that already reaches China through working infrastructure, while the other concerns a possible future source that has not yet reached the stage of commercially proven reserves. Together, they mark a change in Kazakhstan’s position. The country is increasingly important to China both as a corridor and as a possible larger upstream partner. The U.S. waiver now runs until March 19, 2027. Kazakhstan is not a giant direct oil supplier to China in the way that Russia or Saudi Arabia is; China’s import structure is broader. But Kazakh-origin oil shipments, Russian transit oil, and adjacent energy links now constitute a single, more complex relationship. According to official Chinese sources, oil imported from Kazakhstan enters mainly through the China-Kazakhstan crude pipeline. More Than Kazakhstan’s Own Barrels Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP reported that in 2024, the Atasu-Alashankou route carried 1.2 million tons of oil and 9.989 million tons of transit oil, against a design capacity of 20 million tons a year. Official Chinese figures sharpen the point. By the end of 2024, total cumulative throughput on the pipeline had reached 280 million tons, including 19.139 million tons in 2024, while cumulative crude imported from Kazakhstan was lower. Kazakhstan’s significance to China is therefore larger than Kazakhstan’s own volumes would suggest, because the route carries more than Kazakhstan’s own oil. A glance at Europe keeps that proportion straight. Eurostat reports that Kazakhstan supplied 12.7% of the European Union’s petroleum oil imports in 2025. The European External Action Service said that Kazakhstan accounted for 10.9% of EU oil imports in the first quarter of 2024. This made it the bloc’s third-largest supplier in that period, and a more important direct oil supplier to Europe than to China. The significance of Kazakhstan’s geographic proximity to China becomes clearer when one looks beyond crude oil. Kazakhstan is not only a direct oil supplier, but also a transit corridor for multiple China-bound energy flows. The Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline is one of China’s major import routes. At the same time, while Kazakhstan’s own gas exports to China remain limited due to rising domestic demand, gas from Turkmenistan and Russia both pass through its territory. Oil and gas do not form a single operational system, but together they show that China’s energy connection with Kazakhstan extends beyond one commodity and beyond Kazakhstan’s own barrels. The Source Side May Be Growing In this context, the reported discovery on the Zhylyoi carbonate platform makes a difference because it widens the source side of the relationship without changing present flows. According to public statements by KazMunayGas officials, the Karaton, Kazhygali, and Zhylyoi formation has resource potential of 4.7 billion metric tons of hydrocarbons, and the broader Zhylyoi carbonate reservoir may hold as much as 20 billion metric tons of oil equivalent. The field is onshore in...

Critical Minerals

Opinion: Supply Chains of Power: How Critical Minerals Are Shaping China–U.S. Competition in Central Asia

Central Asia is no longer a distant frontier for global geopolitics. It is developing into a central arena of competition for critical minerals, supply chains, and industrial power, where minerals are no longer simple commodities but have instead become key components of contemporary statecraft. In essence, this transformation highlights a recognition in Washington and other capitals that critical mineral supply chains are fundamental to next-generation energy systems, the development of artificial intelligence (AI), and strategic defense capabilities. Even as the global economy is multipolar, critical mineral supply chains remain highly concentrated and dominated by China. Control of rare earths is increasingly geopolitical, with clear economic, political, and security consequences. The significance of that imbalance is now shaping U.S. foreign policy, Central Asia’s development strategies, and the future of global economics. China’s Strategy: Control the Chain, Not Just the Mine Though many years in the making, China’s critical minerals strategy is still often misunderstood as focused primarily on resource access. However, Beijing’s efforts are far broader and more effective. Not only securing raw materials, the Chinese leadership has also worked to control the entire supply chain—from extraction to processing, refining, and manufacturing. China’s long-term focus and investments began in the 1980s with efforts that culminated in the Made in China 2025 plan for national and overseas manufacturing. In 2023 alone, Chinese firms invested more than $120 billion in overseas mining and processing, targeting key elements used in energy supply chains. Beijing also fed its industrial base by providing over $220 billion for the production of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable infrastructure. As a result, China now controls approximately 60% of lithium processing, more than 70% of cobalt refining, and over 90% of battery material manufacturing. Strategically, China controls roughly 90% of global rare earth refining and associated technologies. Early investments in supplies enabled Beijing to subsequently concentrate funds into refining capacity to feed its industrial sector. This integrated approach has shifted the power dynamic for global supply chains tied to the critical minerals economy. As evidenced by Beijing’s near monopoly on processing, market control is not just associated with geological supplies but with processing capacity. China’s willingness to weaponize access not only to rare earths but also to processing technology demonstrates Beijing’s market muscle. This distinction is critical. Rare earth elements are not inherently scarce, but they are rarely found in concentrated deposits, making them difficult to extract and refine. Over decades, Beijing developed unique refining capabilities and subsidized an industrial base that disincentivized competition and encouraged processing to shift to China. The Vicious Circle Prohibitive investment costs, long development timelines, and market volatility have discouraged Western investment in alternative supply chains. Each stage (mining, processing, refining, manufacturing) is interdependent: miners won’t invest without buyers and offtake agreements, processors and refiners need secure financing and stable mineral supply, and manufacturers need steady inputs. Such interdependence creates an investment standoff and heightens perceptions of risk. By integrating all stages, Beijing exerts influence across global markets, from pricing to production. This has conditioned global markets...

Smart Electricity

Kyrgyzstan to Install 300,000 Smart Electricity Meters Purchased from China

Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy has signed a contract with Shenzhen Kaifa Technology for the purchase of 300,000 smart electricity meters for the National Electric Network in 2026, according to the ministry. Negotiations are also underway for an additional 90,000 units. The National Electric Network of Kyrgyzstan has introduced an automated electricity control and metering system that has helped strengthen financial discipline in the energy sector. As of the end of 2025, 500,100 smart meters had been installed across the country, bringing the total number of installed meters to more than 923,000. This has improved metering accuracy and reduced electricity losses from 11.7% to 10.6%. Smart meters offer several advantages. They enable automatic data transmission, with readings sent to a central server in real time, eliminating the need for manual inspections. They also allow for remote control: electricity supply can be automatically suspended in cases of non-payment and restored once payment is made. In addition, smart meters help protect against overloads, support voltage stability in the grid, and reduce human error by minimising manual data entry. This also contributes to lowering electricity theft. The rollout is part of the Kyrgyz Energy Modernization and Sustainability Project, supported by the World Bank. The project aims to modernise the energy sector, improve the accuracy of electricity metering, and reduce power losses. Smart metering is particularly important for Kyrgyzstan, which continues to face electricity shortages and relies on imports to meet growing demand from industry and households.

Renewable energy

Chinese Firm Begins Construction of Wind Farm in Kazakhstan

China’s State Power Investment Corporation has begun construction of a 1 GW wind farm in northern Kazakhstan. The project, located near the city of Ekibastuz in the Pavlodar region, is being implemented jointly with Pavlodar Green Energy LLP under agreements signed with the Energy Ministry on January 29. According to the ministry, foreign direct investment in the project will total approximately $1.2 billion, with commissioning scheduled for 2029. The wind farm will include a 300 MW energy storage system designed to stabilize electricity output and support Kazakhstan’s unified power grid. Once operational, the facility is expected to generate around 3.4 billion kWh of electricity annually. The project is also projected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by up to 2 million tonnes of CO₂ per year. In 2025, renewable energy generation reached 8.6 billion kWh, exceeding official targets by 19.4%. Renewables accounted for 7% of total electricity output, up from 6.43% in 2024. Kazakhstan currently operates 162 renewable energy facilities with a combined capacity of approximately 3.5 GW. In 2026, authorities plan to increase renewable output to 8.8 billion kWh through the launch of 10 new projects, including wind, solar, and hydropower plants. Despite growth in renewables, Kazakhstan remains heavily dependent on coal and natural gas. Total electricity generation stood at 123.1 billion kWh in 2025 and is expected to rise to 126.5 billion kWh in 2026. The government is also advancing plans to add 7.6 GW of coal-fired generation capacity, supported by reserves estimated at over 33 billion tonnes. At the same time, Kazakhstan aims to increase the share of renewables to 15% by 2030 and 50% by 2050, alongside plans to update legislation on alternative energy and hydrogen development. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Kazakhstan is launching a large-scale investment program in the energy sector. By 2030, the country plans to attract at least $15.5 billion for the development of coal-fired power generation. The corresponding national project has been approved by the government.

solar power

Chinese Company Plans to Build Solar Power Plant in Tajikistan

Authorities in Tajikistan’s Khatlon region are in talks with a Chinese company over the construction of a 500-megawatt solar power plant, a project that could significantly reshape the region’s energy landscape. The proposal was discussed at a meeting between Khatlon regional head Davlatali Said and representatives of the Chinese company SETS. For a region where power outages remain a persistent issue, the project could mark an important step forward. With population growth and rising energy demand placing increasing strain on the existing grid, authorities are turning to alternative energy sources. Regional officials expect the plant to help reduce electricity shortages and improve environmental conditions. The Chinese side has expressed readiness to invest in the project and introduce modern technologies. The company reportedly has experience implementing similar energy projects, including in Central Asia. Although the project remains at the discussion stage, the parties are already considering key aspects of implementation, including construction timelines and personnel training. If agreements are finalized, the solar power plant in Khatlon could become one of the largest renewable energy projects in Tajikistan.

Gas Exports

Berdimuhamedov’s Beijing Visit and the Reshaping of Central Asia’s Gas System

The visit by Turkmenistan’s Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty, to Beijing on March 17–19 did more than routinely reaffirm Turkmenistan’s ties with China. It opened onto a wider issue in Central Asian energy, not simply about continuing the cooperation between Ashgabat and Beijing, but about how the renewal of that cooperation would affect the Central Asia–wide gas production and transmission system that increasingly intersects with China’s wider infrastructural and industrial presence in the region. No dramatic announcement of any new export route highlighted that wider significance, which emerged from a narrower sequence of policy initiatives that carried broader implications. Xi Jinping used the visit to restate the importance of cooperation in natural gas while widening the agenda to include connectivity, clean energy, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. Within days of the meeting, Turkmenistan moved ahead on a new phase of development at Galkynysh with CNPC. These events signal a further deepening Chinese role in the upstream and systemic organization of Central Asian energy. What Beijing Actually Signaled Beijing’s own language about the matter was direct. In the official Xinhua account of Xi’s March 18 meeting with Berdimuhamedov, China called for the two sides to “expand the scale of cooperation in the natural gas sector” and to raise trade and investment levels. Such language confirms that gas remains at the center of the relationship even as the bilateral agenda widens. For all the parallel discussions of digitalization, transport links, and non-resource cooperation, the political weight of Sino-Turkmen ties still rests primarily on energy. The Chinese side, however, did not treat gas as a self-contained file. Gas remains the primary, but it is increasingly embedded within a wider pattern of regional engagement comprising energy, transport, and adjacent economic sectors. The same Beijing readout on the meeting with Berdimuhamedov placed connectivity, artificial intelligence, the digital economy, and clean energy alongside natural gas under a broader heading of expanded cooperation. This framing removes gas from its status as a stand-alone commodity and places it within a larger operational perspective. Neither the main Chinese readout nor the public official Turkmen framing of the visit highlighted Line D of the Central Asia–China gas pipeline system. Line D has long stood as the clearest indicator of a future expansion of Turkmen gas exports through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan into China. Had the visit produced a concrete breakthrough on that front, the official language would have been the obvious place to signal it. The practical movement after the trip lay elsewhere. Why It Matters Beyond Turkmenistan The focus lay at Galkynysh. In the immediate wake of the visit, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov authorized Turkmengaz to conclude a turnkey contract with CNPC Amudarya Petroleum Company Ltd. for Phase 4 of the Galkynysh gas field. The official Turkmen account linked the decision to meetings held during Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov’s visit to China and specified facilities capable of processing 10 billion cubic meters of marketable gas per year. TCA reported the same move as a new phase of CNPC-backed field development....