Energy Security - The Times Of Central Asia

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Nuclear Energy

U.S. Promotes Small Nuclear Reactors in Uzbekistan

The United States is promoting small modular nuclear reactors in Uzbekistan as Tashkent develops its nuclear power sector with Russia. Secretary of State Marco Rubio promoted the technology during his October 19 visit to Samarkand, linking it to rising energy demand. “We’re introducing U.S. small modular reactors and modernizing the Uzbek electric grid and gas distribution network,” Rubio told the U.S.-Uzbekistan Business and Investment Council. He said the cooperation would help the government keep pace with growing energy demand. Rubio did not name a reactor supplier or announce financing or a construction schedule for an American plant. Uzbekistan’s interest predates Rubio’s visit. In November 2025, the country expressed interest in studying designs from Holtec, GE Hitachi, and NuScale, according to the World Nuclear Association. Tashkent has pursued those discussions alongside its current nuclear partnership with Russia. Small modular reactors generally have an electrical capacity of up to 300 megawatts per unit, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Factories can manufacture their components and assemble them on site. Utilities can add smaller units in stages as demand increases. For Uzbekistan, nuclear power forms part of an effort to expand electricity supply as domestic gas production declines. Once a net gas exporter, the country became a net importer in 2023. Gas output fell 16.3% year-on-year in January-August 2026, increasing pressure on supplies. The World Nuclear Association puts natural gas at 76% of Uzbekistan’s electricity output in 2023. Reducing the amount burned in power stations could ease import needs and leave more available for industry, including petrochemicals. Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom is developing Uzbekistan’s first nuclear complex in the Forish district of the Jizzakh region. The design combines two large Russian VVER-1000 reactors with two smaller RITM-200N units, providing about 2.1 gigawatts of capacity. The smaller reactors are each rated at 55 megawatts. Presidents Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Vladimir Putin launched the project by video link in June, accompanied by a concrete pouring ceremony. The development has expanded substantially since the countries agreed in 2024 to build a plant consisting of six small reactors. The published schedule envisages a technical launch of the first small unit in late 2029, with the larger units following in the 2030s. Nuclear generation is therefore several years away. Uzbekistan must also improve the networks that deliver electricity to homes and businesses. Following a nationwide referendum on the issue, Kazakhstan is also investing in nuclear power. Its planned Balkhash plant, near Ulken on Lake Balkhash, will use Russian technology. A nuclear agreement signed in May envisages two VVER-1200 reactors with a combined capacity of about 2.4 gigawatts. Kazakhstan’s Atomic Energy Agency put the project’s cost at approximately $16.5 billion, including security and supporting infrastructure. Kazakhstan’s strategy calls for at least three nuclear power plants by 2050. China National Nuclear Corporation has been selected to lead the second project. The country is the world’s largest uranium producer, but developing power stations also requires foreign reactor technology and expertise. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have begun cooperating on nuclear safety. Officials...

Oil Exports

Kazakhstan Weighs a Second Major Oil Export Route

Following repeated disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) system, Kazakhstan’s leading oil producers are examining a much larger Trans-Caspian export route. A working group representing eight shareholders responsible for production in the Tengiz and Kashagan fields has commissioned a feasibility study for moving crude from the Atyrau area to Aktau, across the Caspian to Baku, and onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. The study is expected to go to shareholders in November. The current proposal follows a policy line set out in July 2022, when President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev identified the Trans-Caspian route as a priority and instructed KazMunayGas to examine options, including possible participation by Tengiz investors. The present study puts a much larger export channel under commercial examination. CPC remains indispensable, carrying more than four-fifths of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. Of the 78.7 million tons of oil that Kazakhstan exported in 2025, 64.8 million went through CPC. Existing alternatives are small by comparison. Even the eastbound flow to China and the Schwedt route through Russia together absorb only a fraction of CPC volumes, while current Trans-Caspian shipments are smaller still. What has changed is the cost of concentrating so much of Kazakhstan’s oil exports on CPC, not its underlying commercial importance. The producers are in fact studying two alternatives, a subsea pipeline or a much larger tanker fleet. The Trans-Caspian pipeline idea itself is not new. Variants surfaced in 2009 and appeared again in 2016. What is new is the present combination of shareholder sponsorship, operational urgency, and contemplated scale. Each option is intended to support volumes of up to 35 million metric tons a year. KazMunayGas (KMG) moved 1.3 million tons from Aktau toward BTC in 2025, while its agreement with SOCAR provides for a phased increase to 2.2 million tons annually. The shareholder proposal would expand the existing Trans-Caspian route into a second major export channel. Why Redundancy Now Repeated interruptions in CPC flows have converted the risks of route concentration into lost oil production and a lower national production target. In July, for example, attacks struck tankers loading or approaching the CPC marine terminal, repeatedly suspending operations. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov later put production lost to January, June, and July disruptions at about 3.5 million tons and reduced the 2026 production target from 98 million to 96 million tons. Even temporary interruptions reduce revenues and force urgent production decisions upstream. A Trans-Caspian route capable of carrying 35 million tons a year would not replace CPC, but it would materially reduce Kazakhstan’s exposure to a prolonged interruption. The reported figure equals more than half the 64.8 million tons exported through CPC in 2025 and is almost sixteen times the 2.2-million-ton level contemplated under the existing KMG–SOCAR expansion agreement. It would allow Kazakhstan to divert a substantially larger share of production during disruptions. Kazakhstan can now reroute one or two million tons relatively quickly, but not the tens of millions carried through CPC. The first constraint is inside Kazakhstan. Tengiz and Kashagan lack a high-volume pipeline connection to...

Official Visit

Tokayev in Berlin: Ukraine, Putin, and Germany’s Growing Economic Interest in Kazakhstan

The war in Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia, energy, and Germany’s growing interest in Central Asia’s raw materials were all on the agenda during Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Berlin on September 29. The Kazakh president again called for a freeze on hostilities in Ukraine before moving toward diplomacy, while emphasizing Kazakhstan’s close ties with Russia. Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Moscow had so far shown no willingness to engage in substantive peace talks. The two sides also discussed increasing supplies of Kazakh oil, critical minerals, German investment, and transport routes between Asia and Europe. After the meeting, Chancellor Friedrich Merz said the two leaders had discussed Russia and its war against Ukraine “very intensively.” Berlin’s position is that Moscow must end the war and enter serious negotiations involving Ukraine and European states. “The aim of such peace negotiations must be a sovereign Ukraine in a secure Europe,” Merz said. Until Russia is ready for such a peace, he added, Germany will continue to support Kyiv. Reiterating his position, Tokayev advocated a different sequence. He said he did not consider a rapid end to the war realistic under current conditions and called for first freezing hostilities in Ukraine and then moving toward diplomacy and negotiations. The Kazakh president also reaffirmed his commitment to the UN Charter and respect for the territorial integrity of states, while stressing his respect for the Ukrainian people, their culture, history, traditions, and language. A similar position was set out in a joint declaration by Tokayev and German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier. The two expressed support for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in Ukraine in accordance with the UN Charter and underscored their respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of states. At the press conference with Merz, however, Tokayev also emphasized Kazakhstan’s close relationship with Moscow. He said he had “very good contact” with Putin, and described the Russian president as an “outstanding political figure.” Tokayev also explained Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia in geographical and demographic terms. The two countries share a border of more than 7,500 kilometers, and Kazakhstan has a large ethnic Russian population. “Whatever may happen on the territory of Ukraine, we never forget that both Russia and Ukraine are our good friends,” Tokayev said. Merz thanked Kazakhstan for helping prevent the circumvention of sanctions against Russia, describing this as “work for peace.” Kazakhstan has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, but has repeatedly said it will not allow its territory to be used to circumvent them. For the European Union, controls on re-exports through third countries have taken on greater importance since 2022, as Russia’s trade with several Central Asian states increased sharply. Oil featured prominently in the economic discussions. Merz said Germany was interested in receiving more crude from Kazakhstan to replace Russian oil. “We are looking for ways to diversify our supply relationships, and Kazakhstan is an important building block in this region of the world,” the chancellor said. Kazakhstan began supplying crude to the PCK refinery in Schwedt in...

Fuel Supplies

Kyrgyzstan Looks to China to Diversify Fuel Supplies

Kyrgyzstan is looking to turn China into a more regular source of gasoline and diesel as it seeks to diversify its fuel supplies. Bishkek is discussing the construction of oil storage facilities near the Chinese border and a petroleum products pipeline with Chinese energy giants CNPC and Sinopec. Russia supplies around 90% of Kyrgyzstan’s fuel, according to President Sadyr Japarov. A new route could reduce dependence on a single supplier. The talks took place in Beijing on September 23. Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Erlist Akunbekov met with executives from CNPC and Sinopec. Kyrgyz companies are signing petroleum product supply agreements with the two groups, according to the Cabinet of Ministers. The talks come amid disruptions to Russian fuel supplies this year. Bishkek has proposed building oil storage facilities near Torugart and Irkeshtam, the two main road crossings between the countries. The storage facilities are intended to reduce logistics costs. A separate pipeline for petroleum products is also under discussion, providing another potential route for bringing fuel across the border. The talks also cover domestic production in Kyrgyzstan. The two sides are considering the construction of a new oil refinery, as well as joint exploration and development of oil fields. Chinese capital is already present in the sector. The Junda refinery in Kara-Balta, about 60 kilometers west of Bishkek, is controlled by a Chinese investor. The plant has an annual crude-processing capacity of up to 800,000 tons and is undergoing a nearly $194 million modernization program. The upgrade is expected to increase output and enable the refinery to produce Euro 5-standard fuel, which is subject to stricter limits on sulfur and other harmful pollutants. On the same day, Kyrgyz Cabinet Chairman Adylbek Kasymaliev met Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Hangzhou. Kyrgyzstan’s Energy Ministry and China’s National Energy Administration signed an agreement on cooperation in the electric power sector. The government statement did not specify which projects would be covered by the agreement. The proposed pipeline and border storage facilities remain under discussion, separate from the fuel supply agreements being concluded by Kyrgyz companies.

UN General Assembly

Central Asia at the UN: Iran Threats and Sanctions Disputes

U.S. President Donald Trump’s threat to “annihilate” Iran brought the vulnerability of Central Asia’s southern trade routes into focus as the UN General Assembly’s general debate opened in New York. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov challenged unilateral sanctions, while diplomacy over Ukraine raised the prospect of a halt to attacks on energy infrastructure. For landlocked Central Asia, these developments carry consequences far beyond the speeches. Iranian ports provide access to overseas markets, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rely heavily on fuel from Russian refineries, and restrictions on international payments can complicate commerce even where transport links remain intact. Iran and Access to the Sea Addressing the General Assembly on September 22, Trump presented a choice between reaching an agreement with Tehran and carrying out his threat to “annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly.” He also predicted that an agreement could follow the U.S. midterm elections, while defending U.S. military action against Iran. [caption id="attachment_56719" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: UN[/caption] That framing leaves Central Asian countries facing costs regardless of their position on Tehran. Iran provides overland connections to ports serving the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Damage to Iranian infrastructure can therefore disrupt trade between Central Asia and countries that are not parties to the conflict. Uzbekistan’s exposure illustrates the distinction. According to its Ministry of Economy and Finance, goods worth $3.9 billion entered Uzbekistan through Iran in 2025. That represented about 9% of total imports, including approximately $1 billion in technological equipment. Uzbek exports transiting Iran were worth another $1.4 billion. Those figures measure transit, not simply purchases from Iranian suppliers. Pressure intended to isolate Tehran can also obstruct Uzbekistan’s access to equipment and customers elsewhere. Kazakhstan has also sought a larger southern outlet. A 27-year agreement provides for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade says the project would expand access to Gulf markets and destinations in Asia and East Africa. The risks differ by port. Bandar Abbas faces the Strait of Hormuz, while Chabahar sits on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait. Both depend on Iranian infrastructure and remain exposed to the wider conflict and sanctions environment. Developing alternative routes does not make these southern connections dispensable. Nor is exposure uniform. Kazakh officials have emphasized the limited existing role of Persian Gulf shipments in the country’s logistics. For Astana, the threat concerns future diversification as well as current trade. For Uzbekistan, the transit figures show a substantial flow already at risk. Tajikistan, meanwhile, has sought 2.55 million tons of Iranian crude oil and fuel following shortages in Russian supplies. Its search for an alternative leaves Dushanbe exposed to two conflicts, with attacks on Russian refineries disrupting its established supplier, and the conflict involving Iran threatening a potential replacement. Japarov Challenges Sanctions In his General Assembly address, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov argued that unilateral sanctions harm smaller developing states and can become instruments of political pressure. “The right to impose sanctions against a particular state should, in our view,...

Russian Fuel Exports

Russian Diesel Returns, but Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Remain Exposed

Russia sharply increased diesel supplies to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in August after a summer slump in Russian fuel exports strained both countries’ markets and pushed prices higher. But the August rebound underscored a weakness already exposed over the summer: disruptions at Russian refineries can quickly ripple through fuel markets across both countries. In August, Kyrgyzstan received more than 72,000 tons of Russian diesel, up from just 4,400 tons in July. Supplies to Tajikistan rose from 16,000 tons to more than 56,000 tons, around 3.5 times the July level. Overall, Russia exported more than 370,000 tons of diesel to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Mongolia in August, more than double the July volume. Kazakhstan received around 28,000 tons after no deliveries in July, while Mongolia imported about 215,000 tons. Russia's diesel production recovered to around 170,000 tons per day in August, but Moscow maintained restrictions on exports to protect its domestic market, with exceptions for countries covered by intergovernmental agreements. The summer disruption showed that such arrangements do not insulate Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from falling production at Russian refineries. Kyrgyzstan Starts to Diversify Kyrgyzstan consumes around 1.6 million tons of petroleum products a year and receives the overwhelming majority of its imports from Russia. The summer disruption pushed Bishkek to look for additional sources. The authorities discussed purchases from Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Belarusian deliveries began arriving in July, while China also sent an initial batch of fuel. In August, Kyrgyz officials opened talks with China’s Sinopec over further supplies. Another option is to refine more crude oil domestically. In August, 35,000 tons of crude were shipped through Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan for processing at local refineries. The new route gives Bishkek another way to source feedstock while reducing its dependence on finished gasoline and diesel from Russian refineries. The 72,000 tons of Russian diesel delivered in August largely offset July’s collapse rather than establishing a new level of supply. Tajikistan's Options Tajikistan is even more dependent. In the first half of 2026, the country imported 599,500 tons of petroleum products worth $494.7 million. Russia accounted for 91.1% of those supplies. Diesel imports totaled 300,200 tons. The reduction in supplies became visible on the streets of Dushanbe over the summer. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others limited purchases to 20 liters per vehicle. By late July, prices at some stations had reached 17–18 somoni (about $1.90) per liter. As of August 31, the average price was around 16.5 somoni, compared with approximately 11 somoni in early June. Dushanbe responded by increasing purchases from neighboring countries. In July, imports of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan roughly tripled to 34,000 tons. But average monthly imports of these fuels from all suppliers in the first half of the year were around 97,000 tons. Neighboring suppliers can cover part of the shortfall, but for now they cannot quickly replace Russian volumes. In July, the presidents of Tajikistan and Kazakhstan discussed increasing supplies of Kazakh petroleum...